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Abstract 
This study takes a longitudinal approach to analysing household income distribution in the 
Philippines over the past decade using data from the redesigned Philippine Family Income and 
Expenditure Survey and Labour Force Survey. Using existing and newly-developed analytical 
tools, the study examined the income trajectories or income mobility of a sample of households 
tracked in 2003, 2006, and 2009 and found income mobility within this time period to be 
significant. However, income poverty rates and inequality levels over the past decade remained 
stagnant because significant positive and negative mobility existed across space and over time, 
thereby suggesting that the country’s economic growth has created both winners and losers. In 
addition, positive changes in socio-economic capital were offset by reductions in economic 
returns to capital, highlighting that investments in socio-economic capital development should 
be complemented with effective management of economic returns to capital. Furthermore, 
there are some indications that households with lower income experienced slightly faster 
income growth. However, transitory income fluctuations contribute significantly suggesting 
that convergence of income of the poor and non-poor may be in part due to random variations. 
This result indicates that in order to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth, it is also 
important to provide economic risk-management tools for those who periodically move into 
and out of economic hardships.   
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Introduction 
In response to the challenge of ensuring that socio-economic opportunities are evenly 
distributed, the United Nations (UN) along with its approximately two hundred member states 
have committed to reducing various forms of socio-economic deprivation and exclusion, 
particularly in developing countries. In this context, a list of targets between 1990 and 2015 
were identified. The targets span multiple dimensions of socio-economic development such as 
income, health, education, employment and gender equality. These constitute the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG).  
Eradicating extreme hunger and poverty is the first of the eight MDGs that UN member 
states have committed to pursue by 2015. Under this goal, there are three specific targets: to 
halve the proportion of people living under US$1.25 a day, to achieve full and productive 
employment and decent work for all- including women and young people, and to halve the 
proportion of people who suffer from hunger (UN 2014). Although substantial gains have been 
made towards this goal — for instance in 2010, the global poverty rate has already fallen to 
less than half of the proportion of poor estimated in 1990 — much effort is still needed to 
improve the lives of the 1.2 billion people who remain extremely poor. As 2015 marks the 
deadline set for achieving the MDGs, it is important to evaluate where we stand and identify 
what else can be done for those who remain in the shackles of poverty. This serves as the main 
motivation of this research. In particular, the study focuses on income as a measure of socio-
economic well-being.  
The Philippines is an important case study for examining how income distribution 
evolves over time because of the seemingly weak impact of economic growth in reducing 
poverty and inequality. In general, a country’s economic performance is usually measured in 
terms of its gross domestic product (GDP). From 2009 to 2012, the country’s GDP per capita 
has grown rapidly, expanding by 4.1% annually which is among the highest growth trajectories 
in Asia (WDI 2014). Since 2000, GDP per capita grew at an annual rate of 3.1 (WDI 2014). 
Given the large contribution of the household sector to GDP, it is intuitive to think that the 
country’s observed economic growth would have an impact on the mean and the variance of 
its household income distribution. However, a cursory look at conventional socio-economic 
indicators seems to suggest that the benefits of economic expansion have not had a significant 
impact on the income distribution with headcount poverty and inequality rates remaining high 
and barely moving (WDI 2014). There are several possible reasons why this could be the case. 
First, it is possible that the observed economic growth is accruing to the richest households 
only while the income of the remaining households is fixed. To some extent, the propensity of 
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the richest households to be under-represented in household surveys may partially explain why 
economic growth does not seem to have a significant impact on the mean and variance of the 
household income distribution. Second, there is a growing gap between the coverage of 
national accounts and household surveys. For example, rents of homeowners and the value of 
financial services are imputed in the national accounts but not in household surveys (WB 2010). 
Third, it is possible to attribute this observation to the limitations of conventional indicators 
like average household income, cross-sectional poverty and inequality which simply quantify 
changes in the marginal distribution of income. Previous studies suggest that such an approach 
does not give a complete appraisal of the dynamics of the country’s development process 
(Reyes, Tabuga, Mina, Asis & Datu 2011; Bayudan-Dacuycuy & Lim 2013). The objective of 
this study is to provide a benchmark for probing beyond indicators of marginal distributional 
income changes by adopting a longitudinal approach in examining income mobility patterns. 
This approach is intended to provide a better means of understanding the dynamics of living 
standards in the Philippines.  
Although several studies have analysed growth, poverty and inequality in the Philippines 
(e.g., Balisacan & Fujisaki 1998; Balisacan & Pernia 2002; Pernia 2003; Schelzig 2005; Aldaba 
2009), most have only provided static snapshots of poverty and inequality in the country. While 
these indicators are useful for studying how income distribution evolves over time, they are 
unable to identify whether those who are initially poor are able to get out of poverty and in 
what ways the persistently poor differ from the transiently poor. To address this shortcoming, 
I use conventional and newly developed statistical methods that are designed to take into 
account the temporal dimension of the income distribution using longitudinal data rather than 
a series of cross-sectional data. The use of a portfolio of statistical techniques allows us to 
examine the robustness of results, which in turn enhances the reliability of inferences for 
drawing policy implications.  
The importance of providing a longitudinal perspective in income distributional analysis 
can be illustrated with the following simple example. Consider two scenarios for a two-
individual society consisting of one income-poor and one non-poor individual. In the first 
scenario, incomes of both individuals did not change between the initial and final time periods. 
In the second scenario, the individuals switched incomes. Although there is a complete reversal 
of income ranks in the second scenario, the cross-sectional estimates will portray stagnant 
poverty distribution in both scenarios since this approach does not distinguish between 
persistent and transient forms of disadvantage. From a policy perspective, it is important to 
distinguish between these scenarios because they could require different policies. For instance, 
21 
 
the first scenario calls for a policy that would address persistent forms of disadvantage while 
the second scenario calls for a policy that would minimize socio-economic vulnerabilities. 
In general, socio-economic mobility attempts to measure how people’s living standards 
change across space and over time. It describes the ability of people to partake in the socio-
economic opportunities created by economic growth. In addition, it also determines which 
disparities in economic opportunities at a specific point in time can be used as a measure of 
welfare inequality over the long term (Fields 2008). If any person can work their way up the 
social hierarchy, then high inequality may be less consequential for a country’s long-term 
growth trajectory. By exploiting longitudinal data and adopting richer methodologies, we can 
broaden our understanding of socio-economic mobility in the Philippines and eventually 
contribute to a more evidence-based policy-making.  
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part consists of two chapters that provide 
the building blocks needed for examining income mobility in the Philippines. In Chapter 1, I 
address the question ‘how is income mobility measured?’. Here, I discuss two important 
analytical considerations. First, I review several definitions of income mobility and explain 
how each concept is operationalized using empirical data. The discussion highlights that a good 
understanding of income mobility would require taking a multidimensional perspective. 
Secondly, I discuss why high levels of income mobility should not always represent a desirable 
outcome as conventionally perceived due to the inflationary impact of measurement errors and 
transient income fluctuation on mobility estimates. In Chapter 2, I provide a background of the 
socio-economic history of the Philippines over the past thirty years. The discussion is centred 
on answering the question ‘has economic growth been pro-poor in the Philippines?’. A 
simple simulation experiment showed that shifting from a cross-sectional to a longitudinal 
perspective could portray the economic development process in the Philippines in a different 
light than is conventionally perceived. This identifies the need to analyse income mobility 
patterns using actual panel data.  
The second part of the study discusses the results from the empirical investigation of 
income mobility patterns in the Philippines. In Chapter 3, I describe the longitudinal data from 
the Philippine Family Income and Expenditure Survey and Labour Force Survey which serve 
as the main data sources for the succeeding analyses. The period of time covered in this study 
coincides with the decade that precedes the rapid economic growth episode currently 
experienced by the country. I split the analysis into two main periods with both similarities and 
differences in economic conditions. In Chapter 4, I ask the question ‘is there income mobility 
in the Philippines?’. As pointed out earlier, it is tempting to think that the income distribution 
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in the country is stagnant based on cross-sectional trends of poverty and inequality. Contrary 
to this perception, I find that significant amounts of positive and negative mobility exist, but 
they tend to offset each other and result in small changes in the income distribution at the 
aggregated level. There is also some evidence that transitory fluctuations contribute 
significantly to the observed level of income mobility. After establishing that there is 
considerable amount of mobility in the country, I focus the discussion on mobility at the low-
income range in Chapter 5. In particular, I ask the question ‘how long do people stay in 
poverty?’. The results suggest that poverty in the Philippines can be considered as mostly 
chronic or persistent in nature. Thus, the finding that the initially poor experienced slightly 
better income mobility outcomes may not be enough to eliminate poverty soon. Despite faster 
income growth, it may take generations for the poor to exit poverty if they are trapped in vicious 
cycles of socio-economic deprivation. Nevertheless, the results presented in Chapter 5 also 
suggest the relative importance of transient poverty increases as the poverty line decreases or 
the poverty measure under consideration becomes more sensitive to the illfare of the poorest 
of the poor. This result highlights the importance of examining the robustness of poverty 
estimates to measurement parameters and estimation methodology. After examining poverty 
dynamics, Chapter 6 discusses the relationship between inequality and income mobility where 
I ask the question ‘who are the income-mobile?’. The statistical analyses lead to mixed 
findings. While there is evidence that initially disadvantaged households experienced slightly 
better income mobility outcomes than initially high-income households, the differences in their 
income trajectories taper off when a proxy measure of permanent income rather than initial 
income is used to group households into different income groups. The results also suggest that 
advantaged households had the most erratic income fluctuations, experiencing the highest 
income gains (losses) in 2003-2006 and highest income losses (gains) in 2006-2009.  
The third part of this thesis briefly discusses policy implications on and future directions 
for income mobility studies in the Philippines from both substantive and technical viewpoints. 
After providing a longitudinal perspective of poverty and income inequality and given the fact 
that a good understanding of the factors that contribute to income mobility is important in 
identifying appropriate policy intervention programs, I ask the question ‘what drives income 
distribution dynamics in the Philippines?’ in Chapter 7. To address this question, I use an 
exact accounting procedure in measuring the contribution of socio-economic capital, socio-
economic returns on capital and shocks on the observed changes in poverty and income 
inequality. The results indicate that the higher levels of ownership of assets and higher 
economic returns to formal and non-agricultural employment have contributed to lower poverty 
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while human capital and access to basic services remain stagnant. However, the results also 
portray the impact of changes in socio-economic capital and changes in economic returns to 
capital as offsetting forces that contribute to slow poverty and inequality reduction despite the 
rapid economic growth that the Philippines has experienced since the beginning of the 21st 
century. Furthermore, the findings in this chapter also point to the importance of accounting 
for socio-economic shocks when outlining poverty-alleviation strategies. Given the importance 
of employment in inducing income mobility and the increasing prevalence of non-traditional 
employment, Chapter 8 investigates whether non-traditional employment can induce upward 
mobility using multiple job holding as a case study by asking the question, ‘is multiple job 
holding correlated with income mobility?’. Unlike in industrialized countries where 
pluriactivity is used to enhance one’s skills to be able to move into better occupations, I find 
that multiple job holding in the Philippines is mainly used as a coping mechanism, a stark 
indicator of the high prevalence of underemployment and limited leverage against risks of 
income shortfall. This suggests that the emergence of non-standard employment arrangements 
which are not usually covered by labour policies can push workers trapped in precarious jobs 
to poverty. On the other hand, Chapter 9 takes a step further in investigating the future of 
income mobility literature in the Philippines (and other developing countries) with regard to 
data availability. To reconcile the need for providing a more dynamic perspective of the 
evolution of income distribution with the lack of panel data in developing countries, I ask the 
question ‘how can we measure income mobility when there is no (or lack of) panel data?’. 
I evaluate the performance of several pseudo-panel estimation techniques in measuring a wide 
array of income mobility indicators and find that methods with more flexible income model 
specifications perform better than those with highly parameterized models. More importantly, 
these flexible pseudo-panel procedures produced estimates of poverty dynamics and 
movement-based indices which are consistent with the estimates computed from the actual 
panel data. Nevertheless, further improvements are warranted to be able to develop a more 
satisfactory estimation procedure for indices measuring temporal dependence and the 
inequality-reducing effect of income mobility. 
In summary, despite the faster economic growth rates that the country has experienced 
over the past decade, one of the main recurring findings of this study is the presence of a strong 
offsetting effect of income losses and income gains across space, over time and between socio-
economic capital, socio-economic returns to capital and shocks. These offsetting forces have 
contributed to the seemingly stagnant income distribution in the country. In addition, I also 
find that the amount of mobility is significantly lower when permanent rather than current 
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income is used. Overall, these results call for the need to identify a more aggressive mix of 
policy recommendations that will facilitate inclusive economic growth, minimize socio-
economic vulnerabilities, and reduce poverty and long-term inequality in the Philippines more 
sustainably.   
This research can be considered as a benchmark for future income mobility analysis in 
the Philippines. It surpasses conventional studies which have sketched poverty and inequality 
in the country as a one-time event and ignored the persistence and recurrence of such states 
over time. The analyses presented here strike a balance between improving (household) income 
distribution measurement theory and enhancing the accessibility of distributional statistics to 
policymaking. The topics covered in this study are quite broad because as a benchmark study, 
one of the main objectives of this research is to demonstrate the use of a wide range of analytical 
tools that enrich income distributional analysis by exploiting the longitudinal feature of 
household panel data. Although broad policy implications of the findings are discussed, very 
detailed policy recommendations are reserved for future studies. One of the potential 
shortcomings of this study is the lack of detailed analysis of the spatial disparities in income 
mobility. This is mainly driven by data limitations as the panel data used in this study can 
provide reliable estimates at the national and broad-regional levels only. Future research that 
will further explain this topic can consider using small area estimation techniques in order to 
provide more disaggregated estimates of income mobility. In addition, since the study covers 
three time periods only, the use of more sophisticated analytical tools (e.g., multi-level models) 
that require more time points is very limited. Nevertheless, while more research is warranted to 
address these limitations, I hope this thesis helps to shift the attention of policymakers away 
from static and towards more dynamic measures of well-being to better understand how this 
analytical approach will affect the direction of policies and programs on inclusive growth.  
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Chapter 1 Analytical Tools for the Analysis of Income Mobility 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The concept of well-being refers to human welfare in a wide range of aspects such as 
income, health, education, work, family, and other things that are important to people’s lives. 
Implicitly related to this concept is the term socio-economic deprivation which refers to the 
lack of capability for valuable functionings that will allow one to tap opportunities needed to 
improve his/her living standards (Sen 1999). The measurement of well-being is an essential 
component of policy-making. For instance, a society’s progress or socio-economic 
development is often gauged by how much people’s well-being or living standards have 
improved and by how much socio-economic deprivation has been reduced over time. 
Measuring well-being also allows socio-economic planners to identify policy priorities that 
will put the needs of the people first and will address the challenges that societies face ahead 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 2013). A good example 
is the implementation of the MDGs which show a clear, global commitment to end the multiple 
dimensions of poverty and disadvantage.  
There are different ways of measuring a country’s overall well-being. Initially, traditional 
metrics have centred on the monetary aspects of well-being. Until 1970s, the use of GDP and 
other income-based measures flourished.1 Later on, there had been emphasis in understanding 
how income is distributed throughout the population and this led to the emergence of various 
measures of income poverty (Foster, Greer & Thorbecke (FGT) 1984) and income inequality 
(Shorrocks 1982). However, narrow conceptualisations of disadvantage that are solely based 
on income ignore the fact that people have different capabilities to convert income into 
resources that improve living standards (Callander, Schofield & Shrestha 2011). For instance, 
people may have sufficient money to purchase food, but face difficulties in accessing markets 
that sell food because they live in remote areas. Conventional income-based measures of 
poverty would classify these individuals as non-poor. A better way to conceptualize 
disadvantage is in terms of the lack of capabilities, freedom or resources to participate in 
mainstream society (Nussbaum & Sen 1993; Sen 1999; United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) 2008). This implies a shift from conceiving disadvantage in terms of ‘the 
                                               
1  Here, income is used as a general term to encompass different monetary measures of well-being. In Chapter 8, 
I use income in a more specific context to refer to the amount of money or its equivalent that accrue to an individual 
or group of individuals as a result of an economic transaction such as rendering labour, sale of goods or services, 
returns from investments. This definition distinguishes income from consumption expenditure.  In other chapters, 
household expenditure is referred to as income.  
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means of living’ people dispose of to the ‘opportunities’ they are given to choose the life that 
they want to live (McLachlan, Gilfillan & Gordon 2013). To shift the attention of policymakers 
away from conventional monetary-based measures of well-being and socio-economic 
deprivation in the 1980s, researchers started exploring more holistic measures of human 
development in the 1980s (McGillivray 2006). In 1990, the UN published its first Human 
Development Report which also launched the Human Development Index (HDI), a simple 
yardstick that expresses well-being in terms of income, health and education (UNDP 1990).  
Despite its limitations, HDI is still widely used to complement traditional income-based 
indicators in measuring socio-economic development among developing countries (UNDP 
2013). On the other hand, more advances have been made in terms of developing holistic 
measures of well-being in industrialized countries due to its more advanced data collection 
systems. For instance, the Better Life Index (BLI) proposed by OECD covers eleven 
dimensions of well-being which include housing, income, jobs, community, education, 
environment, governance, health, life satisfaction, safety and work-life balance (OECD 2011).2    
Although contemporary leading poverty researchers are unambiguous in declaring that 
disadvantage goes beyond income deprivation, with the debate progressively moving into the 
multi-faceted nature of socio-economic disadvantage, income remains a very important 
resource and a gatekeeper to participation in socio-economic transactions (Harding & 
Szukalska 2000). Furthermore, there is still much to learn about how to maximize the 
information provided by income data to better understand societal progress, particularly in 
developing countries where there are limited non-pecuniary socio-economic indicators. For 
instance, estimates of income poverty and inequality are conventionally presented as static 
cross-sectional aggregates which do not provide any information as to how persistent is poverty 
for different groups of people. Ignoring how people’s incomes move over time may lead to 
inappropriate policy interventions. To illustrate how solely relying on these static indicators 
masks important features of a country’s development process, consider a hypothetical 
population consisting of ten people. Of these ten people, four were rich and six were poor in 
the initial time period. Suppose in the subsequent period, all initially rich became poor and all 
initially poor became rich. Furthermore, suppose the incomes of the initially poor became 
                                               
2  Ravallion (2011) argues that the indices such as HDI and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) recently 
proposed by researchers from Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) (Alkire and Santos 
2013), suffer from issues about marginal rates of substitution. In particular, according to Ravallion (2011), it is 
difficult to find an economic theory that can justify how multiple indicators should be weighted to form a singular 
index because there is no consistent valuation across different dimensions of well-being. Rather than a single 
multidimensional index, Ravallion (2011) thinks that developing a reliable set of multiple indicators of poverty 
and deprivation should be given more priority.  
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higher than the initial incomes of the initially rich. This scenario would lead to a twenty-
percentage point reduction in poverty rate and an increase in inequality. Whether this turn of 
events is good or bad is subject to value judgment. On the good side, the development process 
has allowed the initially poor to catch up with the rest of the population. However, the complete 
reversal of incomes may also portray a very unstable income distribution. In general, while 
changes in the cross-sectional estimates of poverty and inequality are useful in providing a 
general picture of a developing country’s socio-economic progress, they do not provide a 
complete appraisal of the temporal dynamics of the development process.  
The study of income mobility is an emerging research paradigm in income distributional 
analysis which capitalizes on the increasing availability of panel data (Fields 2011). Unlike 
static cross-sectional measures which are based on changes in the marginal distribution of 
income, income mobility is measured based on the joint temporal distribution of income. A 
good understanding of income mobility trends is important for evidence-based policy planning 
because different income mobility regimes call for a different mix of policies. For instance, 
large increases in cross-sectional estimates of inequality may merit less concern when they are 
accompanied by high income mobility rates since it means that the poor can eventually get out 
of poverty. Analogously, a significant increase in cross-sectional poverty and inequality may 
be problematic when it is accompanied by low levels of income mobility. Nevertheless, high 
income mobility rates may not always be desirable. As pointed out in the example earlier, 
complete reversal of incomes wherein the richest swaps income with the poorest, second richest 
swaps income with the second poorest and so on, will still give the same cross-sectional 
estimates of poverty and inequality but at the same time will portray a highly unstable income 
distribution.  
In summary, the main point that the discussions presented in this chapter seeks to convey 
is that while the analysis of income mobility provides a broader picture of the income 
distribution dynamics than conventional static socio-economic indicators, there are also 
additional technical considerations that have to be carefully taken into account. In general, the 
accompanying methodological decisions may lead to variations in research findings which in 
turn could cause confusion among non-technical audience. Policy responses to findings of 
income distributional analysis may lead to sub-optimal intervention programs when the 
estimates are not well explained to policymakers and other key stakeholders. In contrast, when 
the robustness of the results to measurement parameters are carefully examined, income 
mobility research can empower users and stakeholders by providing them with a better 
understanding of the impact of methodological decisions on research findings.  
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As a springboard for the analyses presented in the succeeding chapters, this chapter 
reviews the state of the art of examining income mobility by presenting the analytical tools that 
are used throughout this study. The rest of the discussion highlights that while examining 
income mobility patterns enriches our understanding of the evolution of poverty, inequality 
and income distribution, in general, there are additional technical considerations that have to 
be taken into account. A good understanding of these substantive and methodological issues 
will help us communicate the results of income distributional studies better so that it will feed 
into public discussion. This chapter addresses the following questions: 
(i)   Why it is important to probe beyond cross-sectional trends of poverty, inequality and 
economic growth when examining a country’s income distribution? 
(ii)  How do we measure the different dimensions of income mobility? 
(iii)  What are the important considerations when examining income mobility? 
 
1.2  What is Income Mobility and Why it is Important? 
Income mobility can be likened to a concept of a ladder where the ladder represents the 
income distribution.3 Some individuals climb up while others slide down.  People also move 
from one step to another at different rates.  Researchers have offered several interrelated 
reasons explaining the relevance of examining the patterns at which people are moving along 
the income distribution.  First, income mobility is often regarded as a corrective tool for the 
negative impacts of high or increasing inequality. Friedman (1962 p.1971) articulated this 
hypothesis using an example, “Consider two societies that have the same distribution of annual 
income. In one, there is great mobility and change so that the position of particular families in 
the income hierarchy varies widely from year to year. In the other, there is great rigidity so 
that each family stays in the same position year after year. Clearly, in any meaningful sense, 
the second would be the more unequal society.” To elucidate this idea further, it is helpful to 
first distinguish the two types of inequality: inequality of outcomes and inequality of 
opportunities.4 Consider a simple scenario wherein a new job needs to be filled. Applying and 
being considered for this job represents an “opportunity” while being hired or denied represents 
an “outcome.” In this example, there is inequality of opportunity when job applicants with the 
                                               
3 The concept of income mobility originated from the notion of social mobility. Broadly defined, social mobility refers to the 
shifting of individuals in social space (Sorokin 1927, 1959). Defining the segments of this social space is based on the 
stratification of individuals’ well-being. There are several ways of doing this. Sociologists use occupations as the basis for 
social stratification while economists use income as their yardstick.   
4 The relationship of income mobility with inequality of outcomes and opportunities is more commonly discussed in an 
intergenerational context. Income mobility, when measured in terms of correlation between children’s and parental income, is 
consistent with the meritocratic idea that an individual’s well-being should depend on their own abilities and efforts rather 
than their parents’ (Jenkins 2011). Nevertheless, this can also be extended in an intragenerational context. 
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same level of skills are discriminated on the basis of factors that do not have anything to do 
with their expected job performance and for which they do not have control of. Examples of 
these factors are sex, ethnicity, religion, among others. On the other hand, if selection is based 
solely on skills wherein the most skilled has the highest probability of getting the job, then any 
variation in employment outcomes would represent inequality of outcomes. More generally, 
when new opportunities in the form of wealth, income, socio-economic services, among others 
are created in the course of economic growth but the chance to access these new opportunities 
is mediated by factors that are beyond a person’s control, we can say that there is inequality of 
opportunities. Otherwise, traditional view of inequality suggest that if outcomes reflect the 
level of effort, then inequality of outcomes will just be a result of variations in effort (Roemer 
1998; Bardhan, Bowles & Gintis 2000).5 Following this argument, increasing or high level of 
cross-sectional inequality need not have negative normative implications and should only be 
considered as a “distributional problem” if it is predominantly characterized by inequality of 
opportunities (Atkinson, Bourguignon and Morrison 1992).  
By providing a wider perspective of how the distribution of income evolves over time, 
the examination of income mobility offers a way to distinguish inequality of opportunities from 
inequality of outcomes (Shorrocks 1978; Fields 2010). For instance, a scenario wherein cross-
sectional inequality is increasing at the same time that the initially poor continuously 
experience low income mobility prospects may portray inequality of opportunities.  On the 
other hand, a scenario wherein both initially poor and non-poor are enjoying high levels of 
income mobility may portray inequality of outcomes (Gottschalk 1997; Van Kerm 2006). 
Several studies provide empirical evidence of why inequality of outcomes could be of less 
concern than inequality of opportunities in the long-run.  Using World Values Survey data for 
thirty OECD countries, Fisher (2009) finds that living in a perceived socio-economically 
mobile society uplifts individual life satisfaction. On the other hand, Tocqueville ([1856] 1986) 
surmised that when upward income mobility of others is unaccompanied by one’s own, the 
initially poor who did not experience income mobility may resort to political actions (e.g., hold 
political rallies) which they think would help them become upwardly mobile like their non-
poor counterparts (Hirschman & Rothschild 1973).   
Different income mobility regimes call for a different mix of policies. A good 
understanding of the income mobility patterns enables policy planning and more efficient 
                                               
5 The works of Roemer, Bardhan, Bowles & Gintis provide excellent discussion about traditional and contemporary views of 
inequality. One of their main arguments is that it makes more sense to identify which mechanism of transmission of advantage 
is justified and which is unfair instead of pursuing an abstract objective of disconnecting initial levels of advantage and 
economic outcomes.  
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allocation of efforts and resources.6 In theory, there are several possible types of income 
mobility regimes; zero mobility and perfect mobility are the two extreme cases. A society is 
said to have zero mobility if the income of every unit in the population is held fixed and there 
is perfect mobility if the conditional distribution of income destinations is the same for every 
income origin. In empirical application, the true income mobility regime often falls in between 
these two extreme cases. When initially poor people experience low income mobility, they 
become trapped in poverty and this could lead to the perception that there is no merit to work 
hard because the chance of getting out of poverty is limited. Without any mobility-enhancing 
intervention, such case could lead to a vicious cycle of poverty. This represents a significant 
waste of human resources (Asian Development Bank (ADB) 2012). Thus, finding an 
appropriate redistributive policy (e.g., conditional cash transfer) might be the way to counter 
this problem. Analogously, a scenario where high income range people experience low income 
mobility, portrays a system where socio-economic advantage accumulates over time. To be 
able to make the high income state more permeable to people from lower income segments, 
creation of additional high quality jobs and provision of trainings to meet the skill-requirement 
of these new jobs might be the way to move forward. In these two examples, low income 
mobility is portrayed as a problem that has to be addressed. However, the opposite case, i.e., 
having high income mobility, is not necessarily a desirable outcome. For instance, a high level 
of income mobility that is mainly driven by large fluctuations in transitory income could 
represent a very unstable economic system (Jarvis & Jenkins 1998). Analogously, low levels 
of income mobility may also be regarded as a good indicator if it represents a mature economy 
that has already achieved long-run equilibrium.  
To be able to identify the ideal level of income mobility, it is first important to understand 
how mobility is conceptualized. The next section enumerates the different definitions of 
income mobility and discusses how various conceptualisations can lead to qualitatively 
different income mobility trends. 
 
1.3  How Do We Measure Income Mobility? 
Technically, income mobility can be regarded as a transformation between two income 
vectors over a period of time. However, there is a long standing debate as to which features of 
the vector transformation characterise low or high mobility (Maasoumi 1998; Fields & Ok 
                                               
6 It is often considered that static analysis of development is more suitable for treating symptoms of socio-economic 
disadvantage while a more dynamic analysis allows us to tease out causal relations among different factors and thus plan a 
more effective intervention of escaping disadvantage.  
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1999a; Fields 2008, 2009). The debate can be partially attributed to the different beliefs on 
which characteristic aspects of income are important to be examined over time. In addition to 
the different perspectives on what characterizes mobility, Ferreira et al. (2013) identified two 
other basic considerations that one needs to navigate to be able to measure income mobility: 
(i) concept of income and (ii) the time gap between the two income vectors. The first 
consideration entails choosing a specific type of income for which mobility should be 
measured. Hence, it answers the basic question mobility of what. As pointed out earlier, the 
term “income” is used throughout this study as a general term that encompasses different 
monetary measures of well-being and there are several types of income that could be of interest 
for mobility research. For instance, some researchers prefer to use earnings which includes 
regular cash income plus other income received from transfers while other researchers argue 
that consumption expenditure provides more insights into a person’s economic well-being than 
the information provided by earnings. Chapter 3 discusses this issue further. The second 
consideration entails choosing the length of observation period for which income mobility is 
to be measured. It answers the question how far apart in time the two income vectors are from 
one another (Ferreira et al. 2013). In this context, there are two modes of measuring income 
mobility – intra-generational and intergenerational. Intra-generational income mobility 
corresponds to the historical income trajectories of the same set of people while 
intergenerational mobility refers to the income history of people from the same lineage across 
generations (i.e., parents and children) (Ferreira et al. 2013). The focus throughout the study is 
intra-generational mobility.7 
 The following section provides a general overview of some of the commonly used 
conceptual definitions of income mobility. In this review, I adopt the taxonomy proposed by 
Fields (2008) who defined income mobility in three perspectives: mobility as movement, 
mobility as origin independence and mobility as equalizer of long term income.8 While the 
measures under these perspectives may differ in terms of functional forms, the choice of 
income mobility concept to be examined goes beyond the differences in formula and should be 
tailored to specific research questions that a study wants to answer (Ferreira et al. 2013).  
                                               
7 Although it is worthwhile to examine both intra-generational and intergenerational mobility as they capture short to medium-
term and long-term changes in income distribution, respectively, the analyses presented in the succeeding chapters correspond 
to intra-generational mobility because information about parental income is not available.  
8 It can be argued that these three income mobility perspectives are not mutually exclusive. For instance, Jenkins (2011) 
categorized the concepts of income mobility into four broad groups: mobility as positional change, mobility as individual 
income growth, mobility as reduction of longer-term inequality and mobility as income risk. In his discussion, the mobility as 
origin-independence perspective proposed by Fields (2008) is subsumed under mobility as positional change. 
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For notation, the succeeding discussion assumes that the target population consists of N 
individual units whose incomes are observed for two different time points; the term Yit is used 
to denote the ith individual’s income at time t.  
1.3.1     What Characterizes Mobility of Incomes? 
The first main perspective views mobility in terms of income movements. There are four 
sub-concepts within this perspective. First, income mobility may be gauged in terms of gross 
movements or what is commonly referred to as income flux. Mobility measures following this 
concept can be expressed as functions of the absolute income differences denoted by |Yi2 – Yi1|. 
Second, mobility measures based on net income movements can be expressed as functions of 
actual differences in income levels denoted by (Yi2 – Yi1). Unlike the first concept, the second 
concept distinguishes positive (or upward) from negative (or downward) income mobility and 
hence, other researchers also refer to the income flux and net income movement as non-
directional and directional mobility, respectively. The third concept under the movement 
perspective views mobility in terms of changes in income shares denoted by 
𝑌𝑖1
∑𝑌𝑖1
 - 
𝑌𝑖2
∑𝑌𝑖2
 while 
the fourth concept views mobility in terms of the changes in income ranks denoted by 
Rank(Yi2) – Rank(Yi1).  In summary, the first two concepts measure changes in income levels 
(absolute mobility) while the last two concepts examine changes in an individual’s income in 
relation to the incomes of everyone else in the society (relative mobility). Hence, the last two 
concepts of mobility depend not only on whether an individual’s income changed over time 
but also on how the change alters his/her income share or income rank (Jenkins 2011).9 
The second perspective views mobility in terms of the extent to which an individual’s 
income in the past influences his/her current income (Lillard & Willis 1978). This is referred 
to as origin independence perspective. The basic property underpinning this perspective is that 
a more mobile society is one where an individual’s first period-income is less important in 
predicting his/her income in the succeeding periods (Ferreira et al. 2013). In other words, 
mobility is high when an individual’s income destination is weakly correlated to one’s income 
origin and it is low when the correlation between the income origin and income destination is 
strong.  
The third main perspective views mobility as an equalizer of long-term incomes. This 
perspective evaluates the extent to which long-term incomes are distributed more or less 
                                               
9 Under the positional movement concept, it is not possible for all individuals to be uniformly upwardly (or downwardly) 
mobile (Jenkins 2011).  
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equally over time. In general, an individual’s income at any given time will differ from his/her 
average income taken over several successive time periods. Using temporal average income 
will smoothen the longitudinal variability in each individual’s income as well as the variability 
across individuals.10 The equalizer of long-term income perspective characterizes mobility in 
terms of the speed at which inequality is reduced as the observation period is lengthened 
(Shorrocks 1978, Jenkins 2011).11 Under this perspective, mobility is high when the inequality 
in longitudinally-averaged income is less than the inequality at any particular point in time 
(Ferreira et al. 2013).  
To impart meaning to the discussions above, consider the example provided in Table 1.1 
which shows four income mobility scenarios labelled as S1, S2, S3 and S4, based on a 
hypothetical population consisting of four persons labelled as A, B, C and D. Each number 
corresponds to the amount of income units that each individual holds at a specific time point.  
First, we can use Scenario S1 to illustrate the difference between gross and net income changes. 
Under S1, the incomes of persons A and B increased by one unit each while that of persons C 
and D dropped by one unit. Summing up the absolute income differences across the four 
individuals is one of the many ways of measuring total income flux. In this example, the sum 
is four income units. On the other hand, summing up the individual income differences without 
taking the absolute value gives us a value of zero. Thus, whereas the first concept yields a non-
zero estimate of mobility, the second concept leads to null mobility.  The second scenario can 
be used to illustrate the difference between measuring income mobility in terms of changes in 
income levels and changes in either income share or income ranks. Under S2, the final incomes 
of persons A, B, C and D are twice their respective initial incomes. Summing up the income 
differences across all persons would give a non-zero estimate of mobility whereas summing up 
the changes in either income shares or income ranks gives a mobility estimate of zero. The 
third scenario illustrates the difference between movement-based and origin independence-
based perspectives of income mobility. Under S3, person A swaps income with person D and 
person B swaps income with person C. In this scenario, the correlation between the initial and 
final income vectors is -1. Since the initial income vector perfectly predicts the values of the 
final income vector, we can say that there is no mobility based on the origin independence 
perspective. Similarly, since the observed increases in the income of the initially two poorest 
persons offset the observed income declines of the remaining two persons, we can also say that 
there is no directional income mobility under this scenario. However, since all persons 
                                               
10 The longitudinally averaged income can be used to approximate permanent or long-term income. 
11 The speed of inequality reduction depends on the chosen inequality measure (Schluter and Trede 2003).  
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observed change in both the actual income levels and income ranks, Scenario S3 portrays a 
mobile society in terms of non-directional income mobility and positional movement. Lastly, 
the fourth scenario illustrates the difference between mobility based on origin independence 
and mobility as equalizer of long-term income perspectives. The relatively high yet negative 
correlation (i.e., -0.8) between the two income vectors implies that there is low income mobility 
based on the origin independence perspective. However, since inequality in average income 
(4.5, 3, 4.5, 3) is lower compared to either the initial or final income vector, we can say that 
there is mobility based on the concept of equalizer of long-term income. 
This section has discussed the differences between various concepts of income mobility 
that are commonly used in the literature. The concepts explained here are used intensively 
throughout the thesis, particularly when I describe the income mobility patterns in Chapter 4. 
The next section enumerates several analytical tools that can be used to compute these concepts 
using empirical data.  
 
Table 1.1 Differences Between Income Mobility Perspectives 
Scenario 
Initial income 
vector 
Final income 
vector 
 A  B C  D A  B C  D 
S1 (1, 2, 3, 4) (2, 3, 2, 3) 
S2 (1, 2, 3, 4) (2, 4, 6, 8) 
S3 (1, 2, 3, 4) (4, 3, 2, 1) 
S4 (1, 2, 3, 4) (8, 4, 6, 2) 
                                
1.3.2  Analytical Tools for Measuring Income Mobility 
An income transition matrix is one of the most popular analytical tools used to summarize 
income mobility under the movement perspective. In particular, a transition matrix with 
boundaries between R income classes consists of each element 𝑝𝑘|𝑗 =
𝑃(𝑏𝑗−1 ≤𝑌𝑖𝑡−1<𝑏𝑗 ,   𝑏𝑘−1≤𝑌𝑖𝑡<𝑏𝑘)
𝑃(𝑏𝑗−1 ≤𝑌𝑖𝑡−1<𝑏𝑗)
 
which is equal to the conditional probability that individual i moves to class k of income at time 
t given he/she was in class j at t-1, where 0 = b0< b1< … < bR-1< bR  (Table 1.2). When income 
mobility is low, one would expect that the diagonal elements of the transition matrix would be 
close to one. On the other hand, when income mobility is high, the diagonal elements of the 
transition matrix are likely to take equal values. Depending on one’s research objective, the 
income classes can be specified in a number of ways. For example, it can be divided into R = 
2 classes where the classes correspond to the state of being poor or non-poor. This is useful for 
measuring movements into and out of poverty. More generally, incomes could be divided into 
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different income brackets according to absolute income cut-off points or income quantiles to 
measure absolute and relative mobility, respectively.   
To be able to compare two transition matrices, it is useful to summarize the mobility 
implied from each transition matrix into a single scalar value.  A simple approach is to count 
the number of classes for which an individual moved during an observation period. For 
example, if an individual moved from class 1 to class 3, then that individual is given a value of 
2 because he/she moved by two classes. Equation (1.1) is computed by taking the average 
number of classes moved across all individuals. The immobility ratio is another simple 
summary measure that can be computed by counting the number of individuals who remained 
in the same class and dividing the count by the total number of individuals in the target 
population (1.2). However, one of the disadvantages of using an income transition matrix to 
provide a compact summary of the income mobility process is that it ignores the mobility 
experienced by individuals whose incomes changed yet remained in the same income class. 
 
Table 1.2 Sample Income Transition Matrix 
Quintile 
Poorest 
Quintile 
2nd 
Quintile 
3rd 
Quintile 
4th 
Quintile 
Richest 
Quintile 
Poorest Quintile 0.5 0.25 0.2 0.05 0 
2nd Quintile 0.1 0.4 0.35 0.1 0.05 
3rd Quintile 0.05 0.2 0.45 0.2 0.1 
4th Quintile 0 0.05 0.35 0.45 0.15 
Richest Quintile 0 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.55 
 
𝑎𝑣𝑒 # 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑 =
∑ |∑ 𝑟∗𝐼{𝑏𝑟−1≤𝑌𝑖𝑡−1<𝑏𝑟}−∑ 𝑟∗𝐼{𝑏𝑟−1≤𝑌𝑖𝑡<𝑏𝑟} |
𝑅
𝑟=1
𝑅
𝑟=1𝑖
𝑁
         (1.1) 
𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝐼{𝑏𝑟−1≤𝑌𝑖𝑡−1<𝑏𝑟,𝑏𝑟−1≤𝑌𝑖𝑡<𝑏𝑟}) 
𝑁
                       (1.2) 
 
In addition to using a transition matrix, there are a number of alternative ways of 
measuring income mobility. For instance, the class of indices proposed by Fields and Ok 
(1999b) can be used to measure the first two concepts of income mobility under the movement 
perspective. On the other hand, the average rank and King’s (1983) indices are used to measure 
the third mobility concept under the movement perspective while Hart’s (1976) index can be 
used to measure mobility based on the origin independence perspective. Furthermore, some 
examples of mobility indices that can be used when taking the equalizer of long-term income 
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perspective include the measures proposed by Shorrocks (1978), Chakravarty, Dutta & 
Weywark (CDW) (1985) and Fields (2010). Table 1.3 provides the computational formula for 
each of these mobility indices.  
While the list of concepts and empirical measures provided in this section is not 
exhaustive, these are the most commonly used tools in mobility studies.12 It is important to 
note that the differences in mobility estimates based on varying concepts and analytical tools 
are not necessarily of limited practical interest because each concept corresponds to inherently 
distinct notions of what mobility is (Ferreira et al. 2013). Figure 1.1 illustrates this point.  Using 
simulated data, I compare the relationship among different income mobility indices. While 
there is a general linear (either positive or negative) relationship among the indices considered, 
the strength of the correlation depends on the income mobility concept being measured. For 
instance, indices that do not differentiate between downward and upward income mobility 
(e.g., Fields-Ok’s, King’s, average rank jump, Hart’s and Shorrocks’ indices) are strongly 
correlated with each other but exhibit more variability when compared to equalization indices 
and poverty dynamics.  
In providing a descriptive summary of the income mobility patterns in Chapter 4, 
measures related to the Fields-Ok’s, average rank jump, Hart’s, Shorrocks’ indices and 
transition matrices are used intensively. This mix of indicators is chosen to provide an optimal 
insight to the different perspectives of mobility without having to use a very long-list of 
overlapping indicators.     
 
1.4     Incorporating Income Mobility in the Analysis of Poverty, Inequality and Pro-
Poor Growth 
A number of studies have emphasized the usefulness of capturing the temporal dynamics 
of poverty, inequality and pro-poorness of growth for policy-targeting (Grimm 2007; Van 
Kerm 2009; Bourguignon 2011; Palmisano & Peragine 2014; Palmisano & Van de gaer 2013). 
Conventional measures of poverty, inequality and pro-poorness of growth are focused on 
understanding the pure cross-sectional effect of economic growth and ignores the identity of 
income recipients (Palmisano & Peragine 2014). In technical parlance, this is termed as the 
temporal anonymity property. However, people change their income positions over time. 
Today’s poor (rich) is not necessarily the same set of people who were poor (rich) yesterday. 
Thus, if the objective is to understand how growth impacts the living conditions of the initially 
advantaged or disadvantaged, then it is important to capture income mobility. This section 
                                               
12  Fields (2008) provides a more comprehensive review of the various income mobility concepts used in the literature. 
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extends the discussion provided in Section 1.3 by reviewing the different ways of taking 
income mobility into account when measuring poverty, inequality and pro-poorness of growth. 
As in the previous section, the discussion highlights the differences between various 
methodologies to demonstrate the sensitivity of resulting estimates to the choice of 
measurement techniques.13 
 
1.4.1  Measuring Intertemporal Poverty 
 Since the work of Sen (1976), many of the poverty estimation studies have centred on 
tracking snapshots of poverty by examining the trends of its incidence, depth and severity over 
time using repeated cross-sectional data collected at different time points. However, these 
poverty measures are not very useful in distinguishing a society where most of the poor have 
been trapped in socio-economic dearth for a long time from a society where many of the poor 
have been experiencing transient downturn in fortunes (Bane & Ellwood 1986). Given that a 
longitudinal perspective provides a broader picture of poverty and the panel data required to 
provide this broader picture is gradually becoming more available, several advances in 
measuring intertemporal poverty has been made over the years (Jalan & Ravallion 1998; Yaqub 
2000; Foster 2009; Gradin, del Rio & Canto (GRC) 2012).  Some of the ideal properties of an 
intertemporal poverty measure include continuity, focus, monotonicity, scale invariance, 
duration sensitivity and transfer axioms (GRC 2012).14  
 This section reviews several estimation tools for measuring persistent and transient 
poverty using two analytical frameworks – components approach and spells approach. The 
notations used in this section are slightly different from the notations used in Section 1.3. Here, 
Yit is used to denote the i
th person’s income at time t, normalized by the poverty line z. In other 
words, Yit in this section is equal to the Yit used in the previous section divided by the poverty 
line.  
                                               
13 For an introductory review of poverty and inequality measurement, readers are referred to Foster et al. (2013).  
14 According to GRC (2012), the continuity axiom states that any increase in household income at any time period when the 
household is non-poor should not change the value of the intertemporal poverty measure. The monotonicity axiom states that 
any decrease in household income during episode of poverty should increase the value of the intertemporal poverty measure. 
The scale invariance axiom states that rescaling the income and poverty line by the same factor should not change the value 
of the intertemporal poverty measure. The focus axiom states that any increase in the income of the non-poor should not affect 
the intertemporal poverty measure. The duration sensitivity axiom states that an intertemporal poverty measure should be able 
to differentiate the impact of shorter or longer poverty spells.  
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Table 1.3 Formula of Different Income Mobility Indices 
 
 Source: Fields (2008 and 2010) 
                Note: In the notations above, I{condition} is an indicator function which takes a value of 1 if the condition is satisfied and 0 otherwise. On the other hand,  
                I( ) is an inequality index. Z is used to denote the poverty line.  
Concept Index Formula
King
Average Rank Jump 
Poverty Persistence
Poverty Inflow
Time dependence Hart
Shorrocks
Fields
Chakravarty, Dutta and 
Weywark (CDW)
Income Movement
Fields-Ok
Mobility as Equalizer of 
Income
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Figure 1.1 Relationship between Different Income Mobility Indices 
 
           Source: Author’s computations using simulated data and the Stata tools for income mobility analysis developed by Van Kerm (2002). 
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Measuring Intertemporal Poverty using the Components Approach 
 The components approach can be traced back to the permanent income hypothesis 
proposed by Friedman which states that over a person’s lifecycle, each has his/her own 
permanent income stream but it can have short-term transitory fluctuations from time to time 
(Friedman 1957). The main interest of the components approach lies in disentangling the 
contribution of the short-term and long-term components to a person’s income intertemporal 
poverty status.  
Jalan & Ravallion (1998) Approach 
 Jalan & Ravallion (JR) (1998) proposed using the longitudinal average as an estimate of 
permanent income. In particular, suppose  ?̅?𝑖 = 
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
, 𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ( , 𝑌𝑖𝑡) and ?̅?𝑖 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 ( , ?̅?𝑖). The 
measures of total poverty and poverty persistence are given by (1.3) and (1.4), respectively. On 
the other hand, transient poverty is estimated by subtracting poverty persistence from total 
poverty (1.5).  
                                                   𝛼
𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 
∑ ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁 
                                                     (1.3) 
                                                   𝛼
  𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 
∑ ?̅?𝑖
𝛼𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
                                                         (1.4) 
                                                   𝛼
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 𝑛𝑡 =   𝛼
𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑙   𝛼
  𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡
                                    (1.5) 
These measures are identified by the parameter α and hence, they are analogous to the class of 
poverty indices proposed by Foster, Greer & Thorbecke (FGT) (1984). When α = 0, they 
measure the incidence of intertemporal poverty, depth when α = 1 and severity when α = 2. If 
all units have longitudinal average incomes that exceed the poverty line z, but income in some 
time periods fall below z,  Pα
persist will be equal to 0 while Pα
transient will be equal to Pα. On the 
other hand, if all units have longitudinal average income falling below z, both Pα
Total and Pα
persist 
will take a value of 1 and consequently, Pα
transient will be 0.  
 One of the main caveats of the JR approach is that the values of the resulting poverty 
measures do not necessarily range between zero and one because the Pα
total is not always 
guaranteed to be higher than Pα
persist
 or Pα
transient.  
 
Duclos, Araar & Giles (2010) Approach 
 Duclos, Araar & Giles (DAG) (2010) also proposed using longitudinal average income 
as an estimate of permanent income. However, unlike the JR approach, the DAG approach 
differentiates a poor person whose income consistently fell below the poverty line throughout 
the observation period from a person with the same longitudinal average income but 
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experienced both poverty and non-poverty. By doing so, the DAG approach takes into account 
a person’s risk-aversion to unexpected income fluctuations. This is consistent with the notion 
that a person’s (economic) disutility tends to increase as the variation in their income stream 
increases which also leads to higher transient poverty (Gottschalk 1982). The DAG approach 
entails computing the variability-adjusted poverty status of each person (1.6). The parameter α 
≥ 1 represents a person’s level of risk aversion to income variations wherein a value of unity 
means that the person is risk-neutral. On the other hand, the risk-premium that person i would 
be willing to pay to be able to remove the variability in its poverty gap status is given by  𝛼(𝑔𝑖) 
(1.7). Under the DAG approach, transient poverty is defined as the total cost that will be 
incurred due to variability in poverty gaps over time while total poverty is the sum of the 
average poverty gap in the population, the cost of inequality in equally-distributed poverty gaps 
among individuals and transient poverty.15 
                                                 𝑖𝛼(𝑔𝑖)
1
𝛼 = (
∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑇
𝑖=1
 
)
1
𝛼
                                                      (1.6) 
                                              𝛼(𝑔𝑖) =   𝑖𝛼(𝑔𝑖)    𝑖 (𝑔𝑖)                                             (1.7) 
                    𝛼
𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 
∑ ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁 
+  (
∑ ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁 
)
1
𝛼
- 
∑ ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑡
𝛼𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁 
  + 
∑ 𝛾𝛼(𝑔𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
               (1.8) 
                                                 𝛼
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 𝑛𝑡 = 
∑ 𝛾𝛼(𝑔𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
                                                   (1.9) 
                                         𝛼
  𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑡 =  𝛼
𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑙    𝛼
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 𝑛𝑡                                        (1.10) 
 
 Although the JR and DAG approaches both fall under the components framework of 
measuring poverty dynamics, the two approaches have remarkable differences. For instance, 
while the income movements above the poverty line influences a person’s persistent poverty 
status under the JR approach, the same cannot be said about the DAG approach because it 
censors income movements at the poverty line. In other words, under the JR approach, a person 
experiencing numerous episodes of poverty may still be considered not persistently poor if 
his/her income for at least one time period is high enough to make the longitudinally-averaged 
income exceed the poverty line. On the other hand, since only poverty gaps are considered 
when using the DAG approach, high incomes for few time periods cannot compensate for the 
numerous episodes that a person spent in poverty. Another important difference between the 
two approaches lies on how transient poverty is conceptualized. In the JR approach, transient 
poverty is simply the difference between total poverty and poverty persistence whereas under 
                                               
15 When a household is risk neutral (α = 1), transient poverty will be equal to 0. 
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the DAG approach, transient poverty is intimately linked with the level of risk aversion a person 
has towards income fluctuations.  
 
Measuring Intertemporal Poverty using the Spells Approach 
 Unlike the components approach, the spells approach treats a person’s poverty status in 
each time period, independently. This approach is consistent with the arguments presented by 
Jappelli (1990) stating that it is not safe to assume that individuals can “borrow” income from 
different time periods when there are variations in the liquidity constraints over time.  
 
Conventional Spells Approach 
  The conventional spells approach entails counting the number of time periods when the 
observed income of each person fell below the poverty line. Then, a specific frequency 
threshold 𝜏 ≤ T is used to distinguish transient from persistent poverty (1.13). For example, in 
the study of Gaiha & Deolalikar (1993) covering nine years of data, the authors defined 
persistent poverty as those whose income fell below the poverty line for at least five years. On 
the other hand, in a study covering three survey years, Reyes et al. (2011) defined persistent 
poverty as those who experienced income shortfall for at least two years.  
                                                  𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 
∑ 𝑉𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
                                                          (1.11) 
                                           𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖 𝑛𝑡 = 
∑ ( −𝑉𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
                                                            (1.12) 
where 
                                      𝑉𝑖 =   {
   𝑖𝑓  ∑  (𝑌𝑖𝑡 <  )  
 
𝑡   𝜏
0, 𝑜𝑡 𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑠𝑒                         
                                       (1.13) 
 
 The intertemporal poverty measures presented in (1.11) and (1.12) have several 
limitations. First, they only estimate the number of persistently and transiently poor and do not 
provide any information about the depth and severity of intertemporal poverty. These measures 
are not also absolutely sensitive to the duration of poverty. For example, a persistently poor 
person who stays in poverty for an additional year because of lower income, will not reflect an 
increase in Ppersist.  Similarly, a transiently poor person who stays in poverty for an additional 
year will not increase Ptransient as long as the time spent in poverty does not exceed 𝜏. 
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Foster (2009) Approach 
 To address the limitations of the conventional spells-based measures of poverty 
dynamics, Foster (2009) introduced a class of intertemporal poverty measures that are sensitive 
to poverty duration and can be used to estimate incidence (1.14), depth (1.15) and severity of 
intertemporal poverty (1.16). The proposed measures are provided below:  
                                                            𝐾0 = 𝐻𝐷                                                         (1.14) 
                                                            𝐾 = 𝐻𝐷𝐺                                                       (1.15) 
                                                            𝐾2 = 𝐻𝐷𝐺𝑆                                                     (1.16) 
 
where H is the proportion of the persistently poor persons (i.e., H = Ppersist), D is the average 
duration that persistently poor persons spent in poverty, G is the average proportional income 
shortfall of persistently poor persons and S is the average squared proportional income shortfall 
of persistently poor persons. From this, it is straightforward to estimate transient poverty. First, 
we estimate 𝐾(𝑌,  , 𝜏 = 0) using the same formula where all poverty spells are accounted for. 
Transient poverty is then estimated by subtracting poverty persistence from total poverty.   
 Although the Foster approach takes into account the number of episodes spent in poverty, 
it does not take into consideration whether some poverty episodes occurred consecutively. 
Hence, it fails to consider that continuous episodes of poverty can be more harmful than the 
same number of periods spent in poverty but spread in between several episodes of non-poverty 
(Bane & Ellwood 1986; Jappelli 1990).16 
 
Gradin, del Rio and Canto (GRC) (2012) Approach 
 Gradin, del Rio & Canto (2012) noted that many of the techniques discussed above fail 
to satisfy several properties of an ideal intertemporal poverty measure. For instance, the 
conventional spells approach and Foster approach violate the poverty duration sensitivity 
property because these approaches only take into account the number of poverty episodes 
within the observation period but not the duration spent in consecutive episodes of poverty.  
On the other hand, components-based measures such as the JR approach violate the 
intertemporal focus, poverty spell duration sensitivity and regressive transfer axioms because 
periods of high income compensate for periods of low income. To address this issue, GRC 
proposed a class of intertemporal poverty measures which circumvent these limitations.  
 
                                               
16  This is consistent with the state dependence hypothesis about poverty which states that the longer a household stays in 
poverty, the lower the chance of escaping it.  
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                                         𝑝𝑖
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            𝑖𝑓 𝛼 = 0 
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The term γ is analogous to the parameter used in the conventional poverty measures 
proposed by FGT (1984) which indicates index’s sensitivity to the depth of poverty. The 
parameter β indicates the level of sensitivity of the poverty measure to the duration of the 
poverty spell. In particular, higher values of β provide more penalty to longer episodes of 
poverty.  
 In summary, the discussion in this section suggests that there are various ways of 
capturing the temporal dynamics of poverty. In Chapter 5, I examine the robustness of the 
intertemporal poverty trends by estimating poverty using all the approaches presented in this 
section. 
 
1.4.2  Income Mobility-Adjusted Pro-Poor Growth Assessment 
Economic growth is said to be pro-poor when it allows the disadvantaged to catch-up 
with the rest of the population by providing an impetus for them to reach their full economic 
potential. Hence, an economic growth that is pro-poor allows a country to maximize its 
available human resources. Given these benefits, it is not surprising to note that the pro-poor 
growth literature has flourished over the years and now, it offers a portfolio of methods for 
measuring pro-poor growth (Kakwani and Pernia 2000; Kakwani & Son 2004, 2008; Ravallion 
& Chen 2003; Araar et al. 2009; Duclos 2009; Essama-Nssah & Lambert 2009). However, like 
conventional static measures of poverty, most of the existing pro-poor growth measures are 
based on changes in the marginal distribution of income. As mentioned earlier, this is what is 
referred to as temporal anonymity. Income distributional measures that satisfy temporal 
anonymity property ignore any reordering of incomes among individual units. For example, if 
the individual units swap income with each other, any income distributional measure satisfying 
temporal anonymity should have the same value. Previous studies suggest that the level of pro-
poorness of growth is usually lower under the temporal anonymity assumption than when the 
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joint distribution of income is used (Fields & Puerta 2010). Furthermore, departing from the 
temporal anonymity principle when assessing pro-poorness of growth provides a way of 
evaluating the extent up to which the benefits of economic growth reach the initially poor and 
those who just entered poverty. Thus, some researchers argue that pro-poorness of growth is 
better measured using the joint income distribution. To elucidate this, consider the simple 
example provided by Grimm (2007) wherein the population is divided equally into two income 
groups – the poor and the non-poor. Suppose that between two time periods, all initially poor 
persons observed fast income growth such that by the end of the observation period, their 
incomes are equal to the initial income levels of the initially non-poor. At the same time, the 
income of the initially non-poor contracted to levels that are even lower than the initial income 
of the initially poor. Following the conventional pro-poor growth assessment tools which 
satisfy the temporal anonymity principle, one would conclude that the growth pattern has been 
anti-poor both in absolute and relative terms. In particular, since poverty gap increased, one 
could conclude that growth has not been pro-poor in absolute terms. Furthermore, since the 
bottom half of the population observed negative income growth while the average income of 
the other half remained constant, then growth will be judged as anti-poor in relative terms. 
However, if one evaluates the observed growth pattern on the basis of individuals’ income 
group membership at the initial time period, this leads to the assumption that the growth process 
has been pro-poor.  
 
Figure 1.2 Sample Growth Incidence Curve 
 
Source: Author’s computations using simulated data.  
Note: In this figure, the GIC intersects the x-axis at approximately Pi = 40. If the poverty line is set at or lower  
than Y1(40), then growth is said to be absolutely pro-poor. Otherwise, it is not absolutely pro-poor. On the  
other hand, growth is said to be relatively pro-poor if the GIC of the poor uniformly lies above the green line. 
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The growth incidence curve (GIC) proposed by Ravallion & Chen (RC) (2003) is one 
of the most commonly used analytical tool for examining pro-poorness of growth.  For 
notation, Yt(pi) is used to denote the income of the individual whose income rank at time t is pi 
and z denotes the poverty line. The GIC plots the income growth (y-axis) at each percentile of 
the income distribution (x-axis) within the time period under consideration. Growth is 
considered to be “absolutely pro-poor” when the GIC lies above the x-axis up to the maximum 
value of p wherein Y1(pi) < z
17 while it is “not absolutely pro-poor” if the curve lies below the 
x-axis for the same range of p. However, when the curve switches sign before that maximum 
value of p wherein Y1(pi) < z, then GIC fails to provide an unambiguous pro-poor growth 
assessment. On the other hand, under the relative definition, growth is considered pro-poor 
when the GIC lies above the horizontal line corresponding to g or the growth in mean income 
up to maximum value of p wherein Y1(pi) < z.  Again, GIC fails to provide a conclusive 
assessment when the curve switches signs before that maximum value of p wherein Y1(pi) < z.  
In general, unless the economic growth is uniformly distributed within the income distribution 
(i.e. income changes by the same amount at each percentile), a pro-poor growth pattern would 
exhibit a downward sloping GIC. Figure 1.2 illustrates these points.  
When the GIC fails to yield an unambiguous pro-poor growth assessment, RC (2003) 
proposed to use the concept of rate of pro-poor growth (RPPG). The authors defined RPPG as 
the mean growth rate of the poor. Technically, RPPG is the area under the GIC up to the 
maximum value of p wherein Y(pi) < z. To assess the pro-poorness of growth, the 
corresponding evaluation function can be expressed as the difference between the observed 
growth in mean incomes g and (21).18 Thus, the evaluation function can be expressed as   
                                                     𝑊𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐺(𝑌 , 𝑌2, 𝑔,  ) = 𝑔   
∑ 𝑔( 𝑖)
𝐹𝐺𝑇(0)
 𝑖=1
𝐹𝐺 (0)
                         (1.21) 
 
where FGT(0) is the headcount poverty index.  Following the absolute definition, growth is 
said to be absolutely pro-poor when RPPG or the second term in WRPPG is positive. On the 
other hand, growth is considered to be relatively pro-poor when RPPG is greater than g or when 
WRPPG is negative.  
                                               
17 z denotes the poverty line. If the GIC lies above the x-axis for all p, then there is first-order poverty dominance (Atkinson 
1987; Foster and Shorrocks 1988).  
18 It can be shown that the RPPG is equal to the ratio of the change in Watts poverty index to the headcount poverty rate. The 
Watts poverty index is computed as 
 
𝑁
∑ (       𝑌𝑖) {𝑌𝑖 <  }
𝑁
𝑖  . As will be seen later, the Watts index is typically used to 
estimate the average exit time from poverty. It is also one of the few poverty measures that satisfy the focus, monotonicity, 
transfer and decomposability properties (Foster et al. 2013). 
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 Noticeably, the GIC approach proposed by RC (2003) is only based on the changes in 
the marginal distribution of income over time and does not take into account individual income 
movements. Grimm (2007) adjusted the GIC approach when the assumption of temporal 
anonymity is removed and the joint distribution of income is used to account for a person’s 
income mobility. In particular, Grimm (2007) coined the term “individual growth incidence 
curve” (IGIC) and defined the individual rate of pro-poor growth index (IRPPG) as the area 
under the IGIC up to the maximum value of p(Y1) wherein Y(p(Y1)i) < z. Implicitly, this 
includes income growth rates of non-poor individuals at the final time period as long as they 
were classified as poor at the initial time period. The pro-poor growth evaluation function can 
be expressed as 
                                                     𝑊𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐺(𝑌 , 𝑌2, 𝑔,  ) = 𝑔   
∑ 𝑔( (𝑌1)𝑖)
𝐹𝐺𝑇1(0)
 (𝑌1)𝑖=1
𝐹𝐺 1(0)
                                    (1.22) 
where 
                                   g(p(Y1)i) = (𝑌(𝑝(𝑌 )𝑖)2   𝑌(𝑝(𝑌 )𝑖)  )/𝑌(𝑝(𝑌 )𝑖)                               (1.23) 
 
Under Grimm’s (2007) approach, growth is said to be absolutely pro-poor when either the 
IRPPG or the second term in WIRPPG is positive. On the other hand, growth is considered to be 
relatively pro-poor when IRPPG is greater than g or when WIRPPG is negative. The only 
difference of (1.22) from that of RC (2003) is that income growth rates are computed with 
respect to the income quantile in which a person belonged to during the initial time period. 
 
1.4.3   Measuring Dynamics of Income Inequality 
As pointed out in Section 1.3, one of the income mobility perspectives is based on the 
extent to which income dynamics contributes to a more equitable distribution of long-run 
income. This perspective is appealing because it directly links income mobility with inequality. 
For socio-economic researchers, it is important to examine whether an increase in income 
mobility can contribute to transitory variations in income so that permanent income inequality 
would be less than observed income inequality (Jarvis & Jenkins 1998). In other words, high 
income inequalities in fluid societies might be less problematic because the distribution of 
lifetime income would be generally even through income mobility (Krugman 1992). The 
indices proposed by Fields (2010), CDW (1985) and Shorrocks (1978) follow this approach.  
Jenkins & Van Kerm (2006) decomposed the changes in cross-sectional income 
inequality, measured using the generalized Gini coefficient, as a function of two components: 
a measure of pro-poorness of growth and changes in individual incomes (redistribution or re-
ranking), as shown in (24).   
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                                   ∆𝐺(𝑠) =  𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝑣)   𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟(𝑣)                         (1.24)                                                       
 
where 
 
           𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝑣) =  ∬[ (Ф ; 𝑣)   (Ф2; 𝑣)] (
𝑌2
?̅?2
) 𝑓(𝑌 ; 𝑌2)𝑑𝑌 𝑑𝑌2        (1.25) 
 
                            𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟(𝑣) =  ∬ (Ф ; 𝑣) (
𝑌2
?̅?2
 
𝑌1
?̅?1
) 𝑓(𝑌 ; 𝑌2)𝑑𝑌 𝑑𝑌2                    (1.26) 
 
and w() is the weight of an individual which is a decreasing function of the individual’s rank 
in the income distribution as identified by the parameter v, f(Y1, Y2) is the joint probability 
density distribution of Y1 and Y2,  Фt is the cumulative density distribution of Yt and ?̅?𝑡 is the 
mean of the income distribution {Yit}.   
 As the definition of pro-poor growth implies, the first component measures how much 
income growth benefits those on lower incomes relative to those on higher incomes while the 
second component measures how much re-ranking in income positions is associated with the 
income growth (Jenkins & Van Kerm 2009). Decomposing the temporal changes in inequality 
into pro-poor and redistribution components is particularly useful for comparing groups in 
which inequality is moving at the same pace (Jenkins & Van Kerm 2006).    
 I use Jenkins & Van Kerm’s (2006) approach of decomposing changes in inequality in 
Chapter 4 to briefly examine whether there is equalizing mobility in the Philippines.    
 
1.4.4    Identifying Correlates of Income Mobility 
When identifying the factors that drive income mobility in the succeeding chapters, the 
proximate determinants of mobility will be broadly grouped in this thesis into (i) (geographic) 
location, (ii) household composition, (iii) education, (iv) employment, (v) access to (basic) 
services and (vi) physical assets.19 Several studies have highlighted that specific locational 
endowments may prompt concentration of skills which in turn expands better economic 
opportunities while locational disadvantage such as remoteness tends to increase the cost of 
carrying out economic activities which in turn has an adverse impact on income mobility 
prospects (Lobao, Hooks & Tickamyer 2007; Aslam & Corrado 2012). Urban-rural disparities 
in various income and non-income measures of well-being have also been well-documented in 
                                               
19  There are other factors that can influence the household income distribution based on the existing literature. For example, 
health is directly correlated with productivity which in turn, is directly correlated with economic well-being (Baker 2004). In 
addition, social networks can also be used to access essential resources such as education, healthcare and other utilities more 
easily (Acock & Hurlbert 2011, Jain & Sonnen 2011). However, this study does not include these types of variables as they 
are not available in the data used here.  
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many empirical studies (WB 2013). For instance Fields et al. (2003) find that poverty is 
predominantly a rural phenomenon in Indonesia, South Africa, Spain and Venezuela. In the 
Philippines, socio-economic development landscape has a very distinctive spatial feature 
wherein people living in the National Capital Region (NCR) and its neighbouring provinces 
have significantly lower poverty rates compared to those living in central and southern 
Philippines (Balisacan 1994, 1997; Balisacan & Hill 2003; Barrios & Landagan 2004; Schelzig 
2005).  In general, geography can act as either a gateway to better living standards especially 
when a specific location is endowed with rich natural resources or to economic challenges 
when a location is too remote and has very limited access to various social services. In addition 
to geography, one of the recurring findings in the development literature is related to human 
production theory. In particular, a number of studies provide empirical support that increases 
in household size tend to be correlated with downward income mobility because the additional 
resources needed to sustain a larger household is not usually compensated by higher income 
flows (Fields et al. 2003).  Furthermore, consistent with human capital theory, higher education 
often leads to higher productivity and therefore, upward economic mobility prospects (Morgan, 
Grusky & Fields 2006; Hout & DiPrete 2006; Greenstone et al. 2013). There are a number of 
case studies that have shown that higher educational attainment (of the household head) reduces 
the household’s vulnerability to poverty (Azam & Imai 2009). The Philippines is one of the 
countries which have a high regard for education, and this perspective is deeply rooted in its 
culture. For many poor Filipino households, education is considered one of the most important 
legacies that parents can impart to their children to be able to move away from socio-economic 
deprivation (Maligalig et al. 2014). Furthermore, several studies find a strong link between 
poverty cycles and employment transitions.  For instance, Dartanto & Nurkholis (2013) find 
that a transition from formal to informal employment can push a non-poor household into 
poverty in Indonesia. In the Philippines, ADB (2010) find that middle class households with 
more members working as own-account and casual workers have higher risk of falling into 
poverty. Analogously, access to (basic) services and assets are also found to be significant 
correlates of well-being (WB 2004). For instance, access to high-quality healthcare services 
helps workers avoid employment interruptions due to sickness which in turn, allows them to 
continue translating their labour into financial capital (Schelzig 2005). Similarly, many forms 
of physical assets (e.g., land) and technological innovations are also useful tools for extracting 
more wealth (Carter 2000; Schelzig 2005; Moser 2006).  In particular, ownership of land 
minimizes the risk of long poverty spells (Adam and Jane 1995) while household losing land 
have higher risk of experiencing downward mobility (Justino & Verwimp 2013). 
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The explanatory variables that will be included in the statistical models in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7 fall under the categories described in this section.  
 
1.5 Analytical Considerations When Examining Income Mobility 
This section highlights the importance of being cautious when interpreting mobility 
estimates at face value due to other confounding factors like measurement errors and transitory 
income fluctuations (Lillard and Willis 1978; Solon 2001; Fields et al. 2003; Antman & 
McKenzie 2007; Krebs, Krishna & Maloney 2012).  For example, an income mobility pattern 
that portrays low-income individuals to be catching up with high-income individuals may be 
artificially driven by the downward bias in the reported incomes of individuals at the top of the 
income hierarchy. On the other hand, it is also possible that a significant portion of the observed 
income mobility is driven by transitory income shocks. Depending on the objective of the 
study, it may be important to carefully examine the impact of these factors on the income 
mobility estimates.  
 
1.5.1  Correcting for Measurement Error and Data Contamination 
The discussion in the previous sections assumes that income is measured accurately.  
However, previous studies suggest that income, particularly those derived from household 
surveys, are prone to measurement errors (Duncan & Hill 1985; Bound & Kruger 1991; 
Gottschalk and Huynh 2010; Glewwe 2012). If measurement errors are non-negligible, the 
results of income distributional analysis may produce biased results and thus, lead to 
misleading conclusions and policy implications. This section briefly examines the issue of 
measurement errors in the context of income mobility estimation.  
What are the common sources of measurement errors? The most basic forms of data 
contamination may arise from randomly misreporting income or data encoding mistakes. 
Conventionally, these errors are assumed to average out (i.e., zero-mean) and are uncorrelated 
with the true income. This type of error is commonly referred to as classical measurement 
errors. On the other hand, non-classical measurement errors either have non-zero means or are 
correlated with the true income. Either way, both types of measurement errors contribute to 
additional noise in observed incomes and findings from previous studies suggest that they can 
lead to biased estimates of cross-sectional poverty and inequality (van Praag, Hagenaars & van 
Eck 1983; Chesher & Schluter 2002; Jenkins 2011).20 However, there are only few studies that 
                                               
20 Ravallion (1994) and Chesher & Schluter (2002) proposed adjustment procedures to correct the bias induced by 
measurement errors on cross-sectional estimates of poverty and inequality.  
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have investigated the extent of measurement error bias on income mobility estimates. When 
income is measured with error, the true historical income profile is unobserved. Thus, the 
estimated mobility of observed income will reflect the changes in the joint distribution of the 
true income and measurement errors.  
Measurement errors tend to make income less correlated over time. Hence, when income 
mobility is viewed in terms of origin-independence perspective, measurement errors can lead 
to over-estimation of mobility. This is supported by the findings of Glewwe (2012) who 
estimated that about 15% to 42% of observed mobility in Viet Nam in the 1990s can be 
considered as upward bias due to measurement errors present in the survey data used. Krebs et 
al. (2013) also noted a non-negligible upward bias on income mobility estimates in Mexico due 
to measurement errors. Overall, although there are limited studies which examine the impact 
of measurement errors on income mobility estimated in terms of other mobility perspectives, 
it is safe to assume that the effect are not necessarily trivial  (Boheim & Jenkins 2006).   
There are several ways to minimize the bias induced by measurement errors. For 
instance, when the main income data source is a household survey, the survey records may be 
matched with reports by the same respondents from administrative data that are assumed to be 
error-free. In turn, this supplementary data can be used to derive appropriate income adjustment 
factors.  In particular, some studies use tax data records to correct for the potential bias present 
in the data on observed income.21 On the other hand, some researchers minimize measurement 
error bias by restricting the sample to population groups that are less likely to misreport income. 
For example, Gottschalk & Huynh (2010) proposed excluding those who are self-employed or 
those whom a large portion of income is imputed from the analysis. Some researchers trim the 
data by removing the bottom and top 1% while others take out all outlying income values 
before estimating mobility. Furthermore, others rely on more sophisticated statistical modeling 
techniques. One example is the use of a latent class of Markov models to gauge the impact of 
measurement errors on income transition matrices (Breen & Moisio 2004; Worts, McDonough 
& Sacker 2010). Given sufficient length of longitudinal data, the main idea behind this 
approach is to assume that the true transition probabilities are stable over time and this can be 
estimated from the Markov model. The resulting residuals are then treated as measurement 
errors. The use of instrumental variables is an alternative tool that can be used to address the 
bias caused by measurement error and it is particularly useful when the concept of origin-
                                               
21 However, this approach may not be feasible for many developing countries where such type of administrative 
tax data is usually inaccessible if not unavailable.  
52 
 
independence is being used. The idea behind instrumentation is to use a proxy variable that is 
highly correlated with the outcome of interest but is uncorrelated with the measurement error. 
Arellano & Bond (1991) recommended the use of the income lagged two periods while Holtz-
Eakin, Newey & Rosen (1988) proposed using income lagged three or more periods as 
instruments. In a more general setting and/or in the absence of reliable instruments, one can 
conjecture different forms of measurement error and create synthetic data of measurement 
errors by drawing from its assumed distribution. In turn, this can be incorporated to the 
observed income and estimate different income mobility indicators. This approach is useful for 
identifying bounds for income mobility estimates.22 
 In this study, I approximate the impact of measurement error using a simple simulation 
exercise and find that the income mobility estimates presented here may be higher than the 
actual magnitude of income mobility. Nevertheless, the bias could be minimal depending on 
the form of the measurement error.23  
 
1.5.2  Decomposing Income into Permanent and Transitory Components 
As suggested earlier, a person’s observed income can be decomposed into permanent and 
transitory components (Friedman 1957). Permanent income refers to a person’s income over a 
long horizon while transitory income refers to income received from unanticipated sources. 
Although transitory income can be either positive or negative, it is expected to average out in 
the long-run.  
In general, the relevance of decomposing income mobility due to the dynamics in 
permanent and transitory income, for policy planning is manifold. First, understanding whether 
the observed mobility is a result of movements in either permanent or transitory income is 
important for outlining poverty reduction programs. Without distinguishing poverty 
persistence from transient poverty, policy planners may not be able to properly target intended 
program recipients which could lead to the transiently poor receiving disproportionately more 
assistance than the persistently poor or in some cases, the persistently poor people receive 
assistance that is only enough to protect them from temporary economic risks (Jenkins 2011). 
In other words, programs with unclear targeting mechanisms are at risk of being poorly-
                                               
22 The same approach was adopted by Khor & Pencavel (2008) when estimating income mobility in China using Chinese 
Household Income Project (CHIP) data. In particular, the authors find that when the mean of the simulated error is 
approximately 10% of the mean of measured income, the average quintile move in urban China increases by approximately 
4% while immobility ratio increases by 5%. 
23 Assuming that there is classical measurement error which inflates the variance of the observed (log) income by 5%, the 
results of a simple simulation experiment that I carried out suggest that income mobility in the Philippines can be overestimated 
by 15%. On the other hand, a positive auto-correlation between the measurement errors can offset the bias-increasing effect 
of measurement errors on mobility estimates. However, it is difficult to infer the form of measurement errors.  
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implemented and prone to undercoverage and leakage (Dutrey 2007; Ravallion 2009). In 
general, poverty reduction programs are cost-inefficient when it is not clear what type of 
poverty is being addressed and who the intended recipients are. Nevertheless, while it makes 
sense to spend more effort to alleviate the living conditions of the persistently poor, it is also 
useful to institutionalize risk-coping mechanisms that will enhance the socio-economic security 
of the transiently poor (Deaton 1991). Furthermore, it is also important to examine the 
dynamics in the transitory component of income as the cumulative effects of temporary income 
fluctuations among the poor could eventually lead to poverty persistence, especially when there 
are irreversible asset losses (Baulch & Hoddinott 2000; Hoddinott 2006). More generally, 
disentangling the contribution of permanent and transitory components on income mobility 
allows us to understand the incentive and security aspects of income mobility. For instance, the 
prospect of upward or downward mobility in the long-run, provides incentives for individuals 
to be engaged in productive economic activities. This is referred to as the incentive aspect of 
income mobility and it is primarily concerned with the dynamics of permanent incomes 
(Jenkins 2011). On the other hand, the security aspect of income mobility is contextualized 
within the assumption in economic theory that individuals are risk averse (Kaufmann 1970 as 
cited in Sinn 1981). In other words, for an average person, the ability to predict future income 
is important when planning consumption behaviour. Thus, people become more concerned on 
the arrangement of expenditures when income streams are fluctuating due to mobility of 
transitory income (Fachinger & Himmelreicher 2012). Second, decomposing income mobility 
into its permanent and transitory components also allows us to distinguish income mobility as 
a desirable outcome from income mobility as an indicator of instability (Friedman & Kuznets 
1954).24 In particular, income mobility is desirable when the growth in a person’s permanent 
income is negatively correlated with his initial level of income as such type of growth pattern 
allows the poor to catch-up with the rich (Benabou & Ok 2011). In this context, income 
mobility makes the distribution of opportunities more equitable in the long-run (Atkinson et al. 
1992). On the other hand, income mobility may be perceived as an indicator of socio-economic 
insecurity when it is mostly driven by fluctuations in short-term income (Jarvis & Jenkins 1998; 
Creedy & Wilhelm 2002; Allanson 2008; Rohdes, Tang & Rao 2013).25 
                                               
24 Analogously, cross-sectional estimates of inequality may also be decomposed into inequality due to disparities in permanent 
income and inequality due to varying income fluctuations. Up to some extent, income inequalities arising from disparities in 
permanent income may be associated with inequality of opportunities.  
25 Jenkins (2011) argue that fluctuation in transitory income is not a perfect indicator of economic instability. This is because 
income fluctuations may arise from voluntary choices made by an individual. For example, if an individual voluntarily decides 
to work shorter hours, the resulting income fluctuations will not necessarily imply insecurity.  
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There is a wide range of literature discussing the different methodologies for 
decomposing income into its permanent and transitory components. One of the most commonly 
used approach is to estimate variance-components models with varying complexity and 
conditioned on various covariates (Dickens 2000; Geweke & Keane 2000; Moffitt & 
Gottschalk 2002; Zandvakili 2002; Ramos 2003; Gustavsson 2007). While the econometric 
literature offer several estimation methods to fit the variance component models using 
longitudinal data, there are several issues regarding the use of parametric models. One of the 
potential issues of this method is that it requires panel data of adequate length to be able to 
estimate the model parameters consistently.26 However, while panel data is regularly collected 
in many industrialized countries, it is not collected frequently in developing countries.  On the 
average, developing countries with nationwide longitudinal data on income have three to four 
waves only. In such cases, a simpler alternative approach is warranted. A candidate measure 
of permanent income is the individual’s or household’s income averaged over a specific time 
period after adjusting for inflation. This approach averages out the measurement error over 
time. This is also the approach that I use to derive a proxy measure of permanent income in the 
succeeding chapters.  
 
1.6    Summary 
This chapter presented the building blocks for examining income mobility, many of 
which are heavily used in the succeeding chapters. First, it reviewed the different definitions 
of income mobility. The existing literature offers three broad perspectives of what mobility 
means: as movements, as origin independence and as equalizer of long-term incomes. 
Additionally, there are different indicators for measuring the various concepts of income 
mobility. These measures do not necessarily produce quantitatively and qualitatively similar 
results. In many cases, a satisfactory measure of one particular concept may be a poor measure 
of another. Thus, when the objective is to provide a more holistic picture of a country’s 
underlying income mobility process, it is important to examine it under different perspectives 
due to its multidimensional nature. However, calculating too many income mobility measures 
may also result in a confusing array of numbers. Instead of providing a more comprehensive 
view of the income mobility process, this may just obscure the big picture.  To strike a balance 
between these two considerations, a possible approach is to focus on a limited number of 
                                               
26 Even if long panel data is available, there are other issues in using variance components model. For instance, Shin & Solon 
(2009) argued that parametric models are in some sense, “arbitrary mechanical constructs” such that the estimates can be 
sensitive to variations in how the underlying model is specified. In addition, choosing which parametric model specification 
is the most appropriate in different contexts is not an easy task.  
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indicators capturing different aspects of income mobility. Thus, in examining the mobility 
patterns throughout the study, I choose an optimal mix of indicators to cover as many 
dimensions of income mobility as possible within the context of the research question under 
consideration.  
As previous studies have shown that income data are prone to measurement errors, the 
chapter briefly discussed the impact of measurement errors on income mobility estimates. 
There are several ways to minimize the bias due to measurement errors. One is to use external 
data to measure the degree of measurement bias and derive appropriate adjustment factors; 
another is to rely on finding suitable instruments to estimate income mobility parameters 
consistently. In the absence of auxiliary information, a general approach that can be adopted is 
to simulate measurement errors using distributional assumptions. Such simulation studies can 
help constructing bounds for the proportion of the observed income mobility that can be 
attributed to measurement errors.  
Third, the chapter also emphasized that the normative assumption of more income 
mobility being always a desirable outcome should be examined with caution. An income 
mobility regime that is mainly driven by fluctuations in the transitory component of income 
may represent socio-economic insecurity. For policy planning, it is important to determine 
whether the observed mobility is a result of changes in permanent or transitory income. In this 
context, the chapter reviewed several econometric methods to decompose observed income 
into its permanent and transitory components. Much of the proposed procedures rely on using 
parametric models. If the available panel data is not of sufficient length to allow (consistent) 
estimation of the parameters of these models, one can adopt simpler techniques such as 
longitudinal-averaging of individual incomes to approximate the permanent component. 
In summary, the main point that the discussions presented in this chapter seeks to convey 
is that while the analysis of income mobility provides a broader picture of the income 
distribution dynamics than conventional static socio-economic indicators, there are also 
additional technical considerations that have to be carefully taken into account. In general, the 
accompanying methodological decisions may lead to variations in research findings which in 
turn could cause confusion among non-technical audience. Policy responses to findings of 
income distributional analysis may lead to sub-optimal intervention programs when the 
estimates are not well explained to policymakers and other key stakeholders. In contrast, when 
the robustness of the results to measurement parameters are carefully examined, income 
mobility research can empower users and stakeholders by providing them with a better 
understanding of the impact of methodological decisions on research findings.  
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Chapter 2 Has Economic Growth been Pro-Poor in the Philippines? 
  
2.1     Introduction 
The notion of an Asian Century has attracted the interest of the global community 
towards the region. As billions of Asians are expected to enjoy living standards similar to those 
in Europe today, few decades from now, the Asian Century is a term used to refer to the 
forecasted domination of the region in terms of the world’s socio-economic and political 
landscape  (ADB 2011a). This is not surprising considering that, over the past five decades, 
Asia has witnessed rapid economic growth, significant poverty reduction and improved living 
standards. If these trends continue, economists forecast that the region will account for half of 
the global output, trade and investment by 2050 (ADB 2007). Signs of the advent of the Asian 
Century are quite apparent today. With the sluggish economy currently experienced by Western 
countries, the engine of growth of the global economy is now being driven by China and India, 
Asia’s powerhouse economies (Eichengreen, Gupta & Kumar 2010; Santos-Paulino & Wan 
2010). Nevertheless, other developing Asian countries like the Philippines are also showing 
signs of growth momentum.  Since 2009, the country’s GDP per capita has been increasing at 
annual rate of 4.1%. In the first quarter of 2013, the GDP grew by 7.8% surpassing China’s 
7.7% (CEIC 2014).27 Due to this solid performance, the country has been dubbed one of the 
emerging Asian Tigers (Coclanis 2013). However, a cursory review of the country’s historical 
growth performance reveals that its economic development path has been characterized by 
several boom and bust cycles in the past (Aldaba 2009; Schelzig 2005). For many years, the 
Philippines had been labelled as the Sick Man of Asia due to its lagging economic performance 
and low growth elasticity of poverty when compared to its Asian neighbours (Kind 2000) 
(Table 2.1). Thus, the rapid economic growth regime currently experienced by the country is a 
critical juncture. If complemented by an appropriate mix of socio-economic policies, economic 
experts believe that this episode could serve as a window of opportunity for the country to 
accelerate its development and be freed from shackles of poverty and economic stagnation 
(WB 2013). Otherwise, when institutions continue to operate in the favour of a privileged few, 
the current strong growth episode could end up as just another part of its perennial boom-bust 
cycle (Bird & Hill 2009). The first step to be able to outline growth-sustaining policies is to 
understand the underlying factors that drive the economic prospects of the Philippines. 
Although there are several metrics that can be used to evaluate the economic prospects of the 
                                               
27 This also surpassed the growth rates of other key Asian countries such as Indonesia (6%), Thailand (5.3%) and Viet Nam 
(4.9%) (WDI 2014).  
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country, this study reviews the evolution of the household income distribution in the 
Philippines. Since an economic growth that reduces social exclusion and minimizes the gap 
between the poor and the rich contributes to a more sustainable development (Aldaba 2009; 
Canlas, Khan & Zhuang 2009), analysing the historical development path of the household 
income distribution allows us to evaluate the sustainability of the Philippines economic growth. 
The main objective of this chapter is to review the trends in economic growth, poverty 
and inequality in the Philippines over the past thirty years leading to the current rapid economic 
regime experienced by the country. This is done by drawing from findings in the previous 
literature and by using data from WB’s PovcalNet. PovcalNet is an online computational tool 
that contains grouped income distribution data that allows users to reproduce comparable 
estimates of average income, poverty and inequality that WB researchers use (WB 2012). The 
last part of the chapter briefly demonstrates how our perception of the evolution of the income 
distribution may change when income mobility is taken into account. To do this, I simulate 
synthetic unit-level income from PovcalNet’s grouped distribution data for the Philippines for 
the years 1985 to 2009. Then, I create pseudo-panels by assuming different income reranking 
scenarios. The discussion of the results of the simulation experiment sets the tone for the 
detailed discussion of income mobility in the succeeding chapters. In particular, this chapter is 
outlined to answer the following questions: 
i. How did the household income distribution in the Philippines evolve over the past 
thirty years? 
ii. Have the poor Filipinos benefited from economic growth more than the non-poor?  
 
Table 2.1 Socio-Economic Indicators for Selected Southeast Asian Countries 
country Period 
GDP per capita 
US$2/day 
Poverty Rate 
Inequality    
(Gini, %) 
initial 
year 
final 
year %growth 
initial 
year 
final 
year 
initial 
year 
final 
year 
Indonesia 1984-2011 646.10 1650.52 3.47 88.40 43.33 30.50 38.14 
Lao PDR 1992-2008 271.73 561.52 4.54 84.80 66.00 30.40 36.70 
Malaysia 1984-2009 2713.11 5984.92 3.16 12.30 2.27 48.60 46.20 
Philippines 1985-2009 907.09 1325.90 1.58 61.90 41.50 41.00 43.00 
Thailand 1981-2010 915.45 3163.90 4.28 44.10 4.05 45.20 39.40 
Viet Nam 1993-2008 317.12 775.76 5.96 85.70 43.40 35.70 35.60 
Source: WDI (2014) 
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2.2     Brief History of Economic Growth in the Philippines Over the Past Three Decades 
The Republic of the Philippines is an archipelago consisting of 7,107 islands located in 
the Pacific Ring of Fire within the Southeast Asian region.28 The country is divided into three 
main geographical divisions: Luzon in the north, Visayas in the center and Mindanao in the 
south. Within each division, the country is further divided into 17 regions and 81 administrative 
provinces. In terms of population structure, the Philippines is the seventh most populated 
country in Asia with a population size of about 98.4 million (in 2013) and an average annual 
population growth of 1.7% (WDI 2014). The country has a relatively young population with a 
median age of 23.4 years; where 33.4% of the country’s population are under 15 years of age 
and 6.8% are aged 60 years or over (NSO 2013). The average life expectancy (at birth) in the 
Philippines is approximately 65.2 years for men and 72.1 years for women (UNESCAP 2013). 
The Philippines is a rapidly urbanizing country. For instance, compared to 1980s where only 
62.5% of the population lived in rural areas, current estimates suggest that about 49.1% of the 
population are now living in urban areas (UNESCAP 2013). In terms of employment structure, 
the Philippines’s labour force mainly relies on services sector as its main source of employment 
where about 58.9% of the employed population work in services, 32.1% in agriculture while 
the rest are employed in industry (ADB 2013a).   
In terms of the recent economic history, the 1980s have been regarded as the “lost 
decade” in the Philippines.  Much of the unsatisfactory growth performance happened in the 
early part of the 1980s as the weakening demand for exports was compounded by difficulties 
in tapping funds from the international market and series of domestic political struggles. These 
events partially triggered the government during that period to declare a moratorium on its 
foreign debt servicing (ADB 2007).  The economy revived its optimism as a new democratic 
government was established in 1986. In particular, from 1985 to 1988, the GDP per capita and 
household expenditure per capita, were growing at approximately the same pace, about 2 to 
2.5% per year. However, this recovery was short-lived as political power struggle and natural 
calamities plagued the country. In 1990, a major earthquake hit the northern and central parts 
of the country while a volcano erupted in 1991. The severity of these natural disasters impeded 
growth. From 1988 to 1991, the GDP per capita grew by only 0.3% per year. Despite this, 
survey-based estimates suggest that household expenditure per capita continued to grow at a 
                                               
28  The Pacific Ring of Fire is an area within the Pacific ocean where there is a number of plate tectonic activities (e.g., 
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions). It is estimated that about nine in ten earthquakes occur in the Pacific Ring of Fire (Park 
2007).  
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modest pace of 2.5% per year during the same period. There are two competing reasons for 
this apparent inconsistency. First, it is possible that the household sector is growing much more 
rapidly than the growth of enterprise or government sectors (WB 2001). On the other hand, it 
is also possible that there are measurement biases in both the national accounts and household 
surveys.29 Nevertheless, the slow poverty reduction from 1988 to 1991 seems to be more 
congruent to the slow GDP growth experienced during this period.  
The Philippines experienced a severe electric power crisis from early 1990s until 1994. 
During this period, the GDP per capita dropped by 0.08% per year while household expenditure 
increased by only 1.04% per year. The country’s economy rebounded only after the electric 
power crisis was addressed in 1994. From this year until 1997, GDP per capita rose by 2.9% 
per year while household expenditure per capita grew more rapidly at an annual rate of 7.6%.  
Overall, the gains that transpired from 1985 to 1997 have been largely concentrated on 
the first and last three years (WB 2001). Growth was impeded again when the Asian financial 
crisis struck in 1997. This was further aggravated by the severe drought that struck the country 
in 1998 which affected a significant number of poor agriculture-based households. Between 
1997 and 2000, estimates of GDP and average household expenditure barely changed. In the 
first part of 2000, income from semi-conductors, one of the country’s main exports, dropped 
significantly when the global economy weakened due partly to the dot-com bubble burst and 
speculations that the change of millennium will have a severe effect on technological products 
(Aldaba 2009).  The country also experienced another political crisis when the president was 
ousted from office due to corruption-related allegations (Canlas et al. 2009). Nevertheless, the 
country’s GDP per capita still expanded by 1.7% annually from 2000 to 2003 (WDI 2014). 
From 2003 to 2006, growth in the GDP per capita is relatively high based on historical standard. 
However, it slowed down until 2009 due to the global price hikes in oil and food in 2007 and 
financial crisis in 2008 (Canlas et al. 2009). On the average, GDP per capita improved by 2.2% 
while household expenditure per capita increased by 1.5% per year from 2006 to 2009 (WDI 
                                               
29 The WB (2010) report offers several reasons to explain this divergence. First, growth in GDP may be driven by flow of 
investments, the benefits of which usually accrue to the upper tail of the income distribution (WB 2010). Since very affluent 
households are not adequately represented in household surveys and are prone to report lower income and consumption, it is 
possible that the mean income and expenditure derived from household surveys are underestimated (Deaton & Dupriez 2011). 
However, some may argue that the poorest of the poor are also likely to be under-represented in household surveys.  When 
housing units are used as ultimate sampling units, those who usually live in makeshift housing and in remote areas may not 
have chance of being in the sample. Consequently, this will contribute to the overestimation of mean income. Another possible 
reason is that there are consumption items included in national accounts but not in household surveys (WB 2010). The list 
includes: imputed rents to homeowners, indirectly imputed financial services, and consumption by non-profit institutions 
serving households (Deaton 2005). The exclusion of these items in household surveys may contribute to the divergence of 
national accounts and survey-based estimates.  
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2014). Since 2009, the Philippines has posted remarkable economic gains. In 2012, the 
country’s economy grew by 6.6% while estimates for the first quarter of 2013 place economic 
growth at around 7.8% (WDI 2014). With these recent developments, economic analysts are 
revising their growth forecast upwards to reflect the growth momentum transpiring in the 
Philippines (WB 2014).  In addition, for the first half of 2013, various international credit rating 
agencies have also upgraded the country’s investment grade (ADB 2013b).  
2.3     Poverty, Inequality and Pro-poor Growth Patterns in the Philippines 
2.3.1  Cross-Sectional Perspective 
The Philippines has experienced stagnant economic growth until the late 1990s but since 
then, the country’s economy has grown faster. This section reviews how economic growth has 
affected the household income distribution by examining poverty, inequality and pro-poor 
growth patterns in the Philippines. There are several studies that have done similar analysis 
(Balisacan & Fujisaki 1998; Balisacan & Pernia 2002; Schelzig 2005; Aldaba 2009). However, 
these studies used varying methodologies and looked at different time periods. Thus, for 
purposes of comparability across years when reviewing the country’s  poverty, inequality and 
pro-poor growth trends, I use the Povcalnet’s database in the succeeding discussion. 
Comparisons are drawn from cross-sectional estimates for the period 1985 to 2009.   
 
Figure 2.1 Comparison of Estimates of Growth from  
Survey and National Accounts 
 
  Source: WDI (2014) and Povcalnet (2014) 
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As pointed out earlier, survey-based estimates and those that are derived from national 
accounts do not necessarily produce qualitatively similar results. Figure 2.1 illustrates this 
point. From 1985 to 1997, the Philippines’ GDP per capita and average household expenditure 
per capita generally moved in the same direction. Thereafter, GDP increased while average 
household expenditure went down. Some researchers argue that the GDP growth in the 
Philippines might have been overestimated in the recent years (Medalla and Jandoc 2008) while 
others contend that the estimates from national accounts compiled by government are 
statistically sound (Virola 2010).  
Table 2.2 summarizes the trends in economic growth, poverty and inequality in the 
Philippines. Over the past three decades, the country’s household expenditure per capita 
increased by 150% or approximately 1.7% annually between the periods 1985 and 2009. Prior 
to the peak of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, household expenditure experienced steady 
expansion. In particular, the household expenditure per capita grew by an average of 3.5% per 
year from 1985 to 1997 but it barely moved after the 1997 crisis.  Despite the growth during 
this period, poverty reduction had been fairly slow.  In particular, headcount poverty rate 
dropped by only 0.87 percentage points annually between periods 1985 and 2009 (from 62% 
in 1985 to 42% in 2009).  
In the context of graduation from poverty, estimates of the Watts index predicts that if real 
income of all Filipinos in 1985 increased by 2% per year, then the average exit time from the 
US$2-poverty threshold was about 18 years.30  However, due to the stagnating poverty rates 
after the Asian financial crisis, the average exit time from the US$2-poverty threshold dropped 
only to 9 years almost three decades later.   
Table 2.2 also provides estimates of conventional measures of inequality such as the Gini 
coefficient and generalized entropy (GE) indices. The results suggest that regardless of the 
index under investigation, the inequality in the Philippines is persistently high. At the same 
time, there seems to be no significant change in the level of income inequality in the Philippines 
between 1984 and 2009. This can be partly attributed to the rise in income inequality from 
1984 to 1997 being compensated by the decline in inequality between 1997 and 2009. The 
fastest increase in inequality transpired during the country’s highest income growth period, 
during the years 1994 to 1997. 
  
                                               
30 This is computed by dividing by the value of the Watts index by the expected income growth rate. In this case, the Watts 
index value in 1985 is 36. Dividing this by an assumed annual income growth rate of 2% will yield 18 years. This means that 
in 1985, poverty was expected to be eradicated by 2003. However, in 2009, the Watts index suggests that the average poverty 
exit time is still 9 years.   
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Table 2.2 Distribution of Household Monthly Income Per Capita in the Philippines, 1985-2009 
(in 2005 PPP US$) 
 
                            Source: Author’s computations using simulated data from Povcalnet and WDI data.   
                            Note: The Povcalnet data are originally expressed as monthly estimates. I multiplied them by 12 to approximate annual figures. The headcount poverty 
                            index corresponds to the proportion of the population living below the poverty line. The poverty gap index refers to the average income shortfall of the poor  
                            in proportion to the poverty line. The squared poverty gap is the squared income shortfall of poor in proportion to the poverty line. The Watts index is an  
                            approximate measure of the average exit time out of poverty.  All poverty indices are computed using the WB US$2/day poverty line. The Gini index is a  
                            measure of inequality that ranges between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating greater inequality. The Generalized Entropy (GE) index measures the  
                            redundancy or lack of randomness in the income distribution, with higher values corresponding to higher levels of inequality. The GE measures are more  
                            sensitive to differences in the lower income brackets if the value of the parameter α is close to 0 and they are more sensitive to differences in the higher  
                            income brackets if α is close to 1.The lower and upper bounds correspond to two standard errors below and above the point estimate of poverty and inequality.  
                            For details, readers may refer to Foster et al. 2013.  
Statistics 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009
GDP per capita (US$) 907.09 964.00 972.65 970.39 1,057.42 1,060.55 1,116.06 1,241.55 1,325.90
Mean 825.84 899.76 970.56 1001.4 1258.56 1237.92 1218.12 1187.88 1243.8
Lower Bound 809.4 882.6 950.04 981.24 1229.16 1209.36 1192.8 1163.76 1218.96
Upper Bound 842.28 916.92 991.08 1021.56 1287.96 1266.48 1243.44 1212 1268.64
Headcount poverty Index 0.62 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.42
Lower Bound 0.62 0.57 0.55 0.52 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.41
Upper Bound 0.63 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.42
Poverty Gap 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.14
Lower Bound 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.2 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.13
Upper Bound 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.14
Squared Poverty Gap 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06
Lower Bound 0.12 0.1 0.11 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
Upper Bound 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06
Watt's Index 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.18
Lower Bound 0.36 0.3 0.31 0.28 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.18
Upper Bound 0.37 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.19
Gini 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.43
Lower Bound 0.4 0.4 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.42
Upper Bound 0.42 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.44
GE(0) 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.3 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.3
Lower Bound 0.27 0.26 0.31 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.29
Upper Bound 0.29 0.28 0.33 0.32 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.33 0.31
GE(1) 0.32 0.3 0.36 0.34 0.41 0.4 0.36 0.35 0.34
Lower Bound 0.3 0.29 0.34 0.32 0.39 0.38 0.34 0.34 0.32
Upper Bound 0.33 0.32 0.38 0.35 0.43 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.35
GE(2) 0.51 0.47 0.58 0.53 0.71 0.69 0.56 0.54 0.52
Lower Bound 0.46 0.43 0.53 0.48 0.64 0.62 0.51 0.49 0.48
Upper Bound 0.56 0.52 0.64 0.57 0.78 0.76 0.61 0.59 0.56
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Figure 2.2 shows the GICs from 1985 to 2009. The GIC plots the income growth at each 
percentile. Growth is said to be absolutely pro-poor when it is above zero for all percentiles 
and it is relatively pro-poor when the growth of the income of the poor is higher than the growth 
in mean income (RC 2003). Following these definitions, I find mixed results about the pro-
poor growth process that transpired in the country. For instance, growth has been absolutely 
pro-poor between 1985 and 2009, particularly during 1985-1988, 1991-1994, 1994-1997 and 
2006-2009. However, there were periods when growth was not absolutely pro-poor. These 
periods include the episodes of decreasing household income between 1997 and 2006, and even 
during the modest growth periods in 1985-1988 and 1991-1994.  On the other hand, it is clear 
that during high growth periods in 1988-1991 and 1994-1997, the income of the rich increased 
faster than the income of the poor suggesting that the respective growths during these periods 
were not pro-poor. Nevertheless, there is a sign that the poor benefited more from the observed 
growth than the non-poor during 2006-2009. Meanwhile for the other years, the GICs do not 
provide a clear pro-poor growth assessment.   
The finding that income inequality remains pervasively high and the pace of poverty 
reduction slow leads socio-economists to conclude that an inclusive growth is yet to be a 
sustainable feature of the Philippines’ economic development narrative even on the heels of a 
rosy macroeconomic picture. Several studies concluded that policies have been ineffective in 
redistributing the benefits of growth to the country’s poorest of the poor (Schelzig 2005; 
Aldaba 2009). Poor Filipinos are trapped in precarious jobs due to the country’s highly 
segmented labour markets (Usui 2011, 2012) and the poor’s limited capacity to invest on 
education (Maligalig et al. 2014). Furthermore, many people who managed to get out of 
poverty at some point are immediately pulled back to economic dearth during crises due to 
their lack of access to risk management tools (Reyes & Tabuga 2012). Development experts 
offer various explanation why the pattern of growing inequality at the backdrop of rapid 
economic growth is also observed in many developing Asian countries. For instance, Zhuang, 
Kanbur and Rhee (2014) argue that globalization and market-oriented reforms which 
developing Asian countries are experiencing have inflationary impact on both growth and 
inequality. Nevertheless, amidst these substantive potential explanation, several technical 
issues remain. For instance, the data used for poverty, inequality and pro-poor growth 
calculations are based on analyses of repeated cross-sectional data. As pointed out in Chapter 
1, repeated cross-sectional data overlook one vital point that should be of concern when one is 
examining the welfare of the poor. In particular, it does not give any information as to what 
happened to particular individuals. Individual incomes change from year to year but repeated 
cross-sectional data is unable to reveal whether particular individuals experienced income 
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mobility. One of the things that have recently captured the interest of development experts in 
the Philippines is the extent to which our perception about poverty, inequality and pro-poorness 
of growth in the country could change when we shift from a static to a more dynamic 
perspective (Reyes et al. 2012; Bayudan-Dacuycuy & Lim 2013). The next section concludes 
the review of the Philippines’ socio-economic history with a simple thought-experiment. Using 
several simulated pseudo-panel data sets, I will re-examine household income distribution 
trends with a more dynamic perspective. 
2.3.2  Longitudinal Perspective  
To account for individual income mobility when examining pro-poorness of growth, I 
construct several sets of pseudo-panel data following the methodology described in Appendix 
A2.1 because there is no actual panel data that cover the past three decades in the Philippines. 
In a nutshell, the approach entails considering different income re-ranking scenarios and for 
each scenario, computing dynamic measures of poverty and inequality as well as Grimm’s 
(2007) individual rate of pro-poor growth as discussed in Chapter 1. Figure 2.3 provides a 
graphical summary of the various re-ranking scenarios considered.  The first scenario is an 
extreme case corresponding to a static income ranking scenario wherein the income rank of 
each individual in 1985 remains the same in 2009. Another extreme case is the complete 
reversal of income ranks scenario wherein the individual with the lowest income in 1985 is the 
same individual with the highest income in 2009, the individual with the second lowest income 
in 1985 is the same individual with the second highest income in 2009, and so on. The other 
scenarios considered are generated by using different values for the correlation of the income 
ranks between the two time periods. Note that the neutral case corresponds to when an 
individual’s income rank in 1985 is independent with his/her income rank in 2009.
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Figure 2.2 Growth Incidence Curves in the Philippines, 1985-2009 
 
         Source: Author’s computations using simulated data from Povcalnet and DASP package of Stata.                                                    
                                                         Note: The green line represents the growth in mean income while the red line represents mean of growth rates.
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Turning back to the estimates provided in Table 2.2, the US$2 headcount poverty rates 
in the country decreased from 62% in 1985 to 42% in 2009. If the income ranks are perfectly 
positively correlated, then the conventional perception about changes in cross-sectional 
poverty will not differ. Looking at movements into and out of poverty, one can conclude that 
41% stayed in poverty and 21% got out of poverty. On the other hand, at the extreme case that 
income ranks are perfectly negatively correlated, about 5% of the population remained in 
poverty, 58% got out of poverty while 37% slid down into poverty. Moreover, if the incomes 
were absolutely driven by random fluctuations (i.e., income ranks in initial and final time 
periods are independent), the results of my simulation suggest that about 26% of the country’s 
population were poor in both periods, 37% got out of poverty while 16% fell into poverty (left 
panel of Figure 2.4).   
In terms of changes in inequality, it can also be observed from the right panel of Figure 
2.3 that when the correlation of income ranks between the initial and final time period is close 
to (positive) one, the observed changes in income inequality can be primarily attributed to low 
level of pro-poor growth accompanying low income mobility. On the other hand, as the 
correlation moves away from (positive) one, the observed change in income inequality over 
the past thirty years becomes a portrait of offsetting forces of highly pro-poor growth and high 
income mobility. Furthermore, in terms of the estimated values of the IRPPG, Figure 2.5 shows 
that growth for the past three decades has been absolutely pro-poor because the average income 
growth of the poor is positive in every income reranking scenario considered. However, in 
relative terms, shifting from cross-sectional to longitudinal perspective paints a different 
picture. Specifically, the observed growth in the Philippines allows the poor to catch-up with 
the non-poor for majority of the scenarios considered except for instances when the income 
ranks between the initial and final time period are strongly positively correlated (Figure 2.5). 
Of course, whether a pro-poor growth on the basis of IRPPG should be considered as a 
desirable outcome or not is a value judgment.  Nevertheless, the results presented here hint us 
on how our perception of trends in poverty, inequality and pro-poor growth based on cross-
sectional estimates will change when income mobility is accounted for. This validates the 
argument that it is important to take income mobility into consideration when examining 
household income distribution.  
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Figure 2.3 Income Re-ranking Scenarios Considered                
for Constructing Pseudo-Panel Data Sets      
 
 
                         Source: Author’s computations using simulated data from Povcalnet.                                                    
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Figure 2.4 Poverty and Inequality Dynamics in the Philippines, 1985-2009 
 
                               Source: Author’s computations using simulated data from Povcalnet.                                                    
 
Figure 2.5 Individual Income Growth in the Philippines, 1985-2009 
 
                                                                                         Source: Author’s computations using simulated data from Povcalnet.                                                   
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2.4     Summary 
Not everyone benefits from economic growth and not everyone falls behind when the 
economy contracts. In other words, the consequences of economic development do not accrue 
uniformly across all segments in the society. A historical analysis of economic growth pattern 
provides socio-economic planners the opportunity to examine the distribution of growth. This 
information is helpful when evaluating a country’s ability to sustain rapid economic growth or 
identify binding constraints which hamper growth.  
Using a range of analytical tools for examining pro-poor growth, this chapter reviewed 
the evolution of the income distribution of the Philippines from 1985 to 2009. Data on 
household expenditure per capita suggest that the economic growth observed in the country 
has been translated to a modest reduction in absolute poverty. However, the data do not provide 
sufficient empirical evidence to conclude that the gap between the rich and the poor is 
narrowing down. In other words, the income growth experienced by the poor does not seem to 
allow them to catch-up with the rich. The statistics presented in this chapter echo the findings 
of previous studies about the Philippines’s dismal performance in terms of accelerating income 
growth, reducing poverty and closing the gap between the rich and the poor since the 1980s. 
Even during episodes of faster economic expansion, the pace of poverty reduction in the 
country has been persistently slow. In fact, compared to its other Asian neighbours, studies by 
Aldaba (2009), Balisacan (2001) and Schelzig (2005) conclude that the growth elasticity of 
poverty in the country has been significantly lower.  Whether these results directly imply the 
persistence of cumulative advantage and poverty traps is worth rethinking for various reasons. 
For instance, the analytical tools used to draw these conclusions fail to account for the profile 
of people who moved into and out of poverty. Minimal changes in aggregate poverty rates do 
not imply that there have been no movements in and out of poverty. This provides an 
incomplete picture of the socio-economic development in the Philippines which in turn, makes 
it difficult for policymakers to identify appropriate intervention programs. In fact, through a 
simple simulation experiment, the analysis of pseudo-panel data has demonstrated that 
conclusions about changes in poverty, inequality and pro-poor growth patterns can be more 
dynamic than we conventionally think if mobility of individual incomes is explicitly taken into 
account.  
The analysis presented in this chapter provides the motivation for examining income 
mobility in the succeeding chapters. If a country with a specific set of temporal changes in its 
marginal distribution of income portrays a multitude of possible income mobility regimes and 
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in turn, different policy implications for making economic growth more beneficial for 
everyone, then it is important to shift our attention from a static to a more dynamic income 
distributional analysis. In the case of the Philippines, if the slow reduction in cross-sectional 
poverty and income inequality accompanying the rapid economic growth over the past decade 
has occurred in the context of high levels of income mobility, it would be indicative that upward 
mobility is achievable. Although such pattern cannot discount the difficulties that the poor still 
confront, it would encourage policymakers in the country to continue the existing programs 
that expand opportunities for income growth and promote greater access to absolute income 
mobility across the income distribution. On the other hand, if slow reduction in cross-sectional 
poverty and income inequality accompanying the rapid economic growth has occurred in the 
context of low income mobility, it could prompt policymakers to re-examine the effectiveness 
of existing programs in breaking the vicious cycles of poverty and disadvantage in the 
Philippines.  
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Appendix A2.1 Constructing Synthetic Pseudo-Panel Data of Income 
The Povcalnet database is the main data source of the synthetic pseudo-panel data. It is 
an online poverty analysis tool developed by the WB which contains grouped distribution data 
in the form of income shares of different income quantiles aggregated for each country. The 
income data is expressed as either income or consumption expenditure in 2005 purchasing 
power parity (PPP) adjusted-US dollars.31 This is done by inflating (deflating) the current year 
income into 2005 prices using national consumer price indices of each country and then 
applying the PPP conversion factors developed by International Comparison Program. The data 
available for the Philippines is based on household expenditure per capita and has periodicity 
of three years starting 1985 to 2009.  
Using the grouped distribution data for the Philippines, I fit Lorenz parametric models to 
simulate individual-level incomes following the approach by Datt (1998).  In general, a Lorenz 
function can be expressed as  
                                                   L(y) = g(L(p), p, θ)                                                   (A2.1) 
where 
y – income , µY– average income, f(y) – income density curve and  L(p) – share to total income 
of the bottom p percent of the population and θ are parameters of the Lorenz function. 
Generally, one can consider different parametric forms for the Lorenz function. The choice 
depends on which form will yield a valid Lorenz curve. In this study, I use the Log Normal 
form. Preliminary investigations suggest that results are generally robust under different 
parametric specifications.  
From the grouped distribution data, one can estimate the parameter(s) θ using the grouped 
distribution data (p, L(p)). In addition, all Lorenz functions can be expressed as 
                                                                𝐿(𝑝) =  
 
𝜇𝑦
∫ 𝑦𝑓(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑥
0
                                                            (A2.2) 
                                                                   𝑝 =  ∫ 𝑓(𝑦)𝑑𝑦
𝑥
0
                                                                     (A2.3) 
 
It follows that the derivative of a Lorenz function with respect to y evaluated at a point 
p0 is equal to the ratio of the income quantile at p0 to overall mean income.   
                                                                             𝐿′(𝑝 = 𝑝0) ∗  𝜇𝑦 =  𝑦(𝑝0)                                                    (A2.4) 
 
The last equation suggests that, a synthetic income quantile yp can be imputed by 
multiplying the derivative of the Lorenz function (with respect to y) evaluated at p = p0 by the 
average income.  Where appropriate, I evaluate the derivative of L(p)GQ for 10,000 unique 
                                               
31  Prior to the use of 2005 PPP, the WB estimates poverty and inequality using the 1993 PPP.  Milanovic (2009) find that the 
difference in poverty and inequality estimates between 1993 and 2005 PPP are not trivial.   
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values p0 that were uniformly distributed within [0,1] range to simulate the entire parametric 
Lorenz-based income distribution. This produces an individual-level income dataset with 
10,000 data points (i.e., “individuals”) per year. Since the simulated individual-level income 
may not exactly match the underlying income distribution from which the grouped distribution 
data was derived, I implemented the adjustment procedure proposed by Shorrocks & Wan 
(2008) to ensure that the characteristics of the synthetic sample exactly match the actual Lorenz 
coordinates used in modelling.32 
In the absence of genuine panel data of income for the past three decades, I adopt a naïve 
approach to be able to incorporate a longitudinal perspective in my analysis. To create a 
pseudo-panel data that will allow me to implement individual pro-poor growth assessment 
discussed in Chapter 1, the approach entails the following steps. First, I assume that the 
population is closed to births, deaths and migration throughout the observation period. 
Certainly, this assumption is somewhat unrealistic but not too far-stretched for the purpose of 
demonstrating how conclusions about income distribution trends may change when income 
mobility is incorporated. To construct pseudo-panel datasets, recall that from the grouped 
distribution data, 10,000 individual income data points are simulated for each (survey) year. 
Under the closed population assumption, each of the 10,000 points corresponds to a panel 
individual. Since there is no prior information that will enable me to match the identity of the 
individuals from 1985 to 2009, I consider a number of possible income re-ranking scenarios. 
Each scenario corresponds to one pseudo-panel data set. Figure 2.2 provides an illustration of 
the different scenarios considered. The leftmost panel on the first row of the figure depicts an 
income reversal scenario wherein the correlation between the initial and final income ranks is 
equal to one. In other words, the initially poorest becomes the richest, the initially second 
poorest becomes the second richest and so on.  The third and fourth panels on the third row of 
the figure portray the scenario wherein an individual’s income ranking at the initial time period 
is independent of his/her ranking at the final time period. The last panel on the last row 
illustrates the scenario wherein income ranks are absolutely persistent.  
What are the feasible ranges of the correlation between the income ranks? 
Most of the discussion provided in Section 2.4.2 operates under the assumption that there 
is no prior information about the correlation between the income ranks of individuals in the 
                                               
32 Often, the Lorenz coordinates provided in Povcalnet are based from published figures. Thus, employing Shorrocks and 
Wan’s algorithm implies that the simulated unit-level income data will produce descriptive statistics that are consistent with 
the published figures.  
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initial and final time periods. Hence, the simulations consider different possible correlation 
values between -1 and 1. As mentioned earlier, a rank correlation equal to -1 implies that there 
is a complete reversal of individual income ranking while a value of +1 implies that income 
ranking is completely static. In estimating poverty dynamics based from cross-sectional data, 
Dang, Lanjouw, Luoto & McKenzie (DLLM) (2014) confronted the same dilemma. Instead of 
choosing a point estimate for the correlation between individuals’ (real) incomes in the initial 
and final time periods, the authors used 0 and 1. These correlation values were then used to 
construct lower and upper bounds for different indices of poverty dynamics. Noticeably, 
DLLM (2014) did not consider negative correlations. They argued that while it is possible for 
some individuals to have negative correlation in incomes over time as a result of different 
socio-economic mechanisms, it is unlikely that the correlation will be negative for the entire 
population.  
So what are the reasonable values for this correlation?  As a form of validation exercise, 
I use actual panel data available from the Philippines between 2006 and 2009, the details of 
which are described in Chapter 3.  Figure A2.1 shows the correlation between the rank of 
individuals’ initial and final incomes in the Philippines.  The Pearson’s correlation index gives 
a value of 0.85. However, one could expect that the correlation of income ranks from 1985 to 
2009 to be much lower as we believe that there would be more income mobility for a longer 
observation period.  To validate this hypothesis, I also use panel data with a longer observation 
period for a country which is quite similar to Philippines. In this context, I refer to the Indonesia 
Family Life Survey. From 1993 to 2007, the estimated correlation of income ranks is 0.41.  If 
the true income rank correlation from 1985 to 2009 is within the vicinity of this estimate, then 
Figure 2.4 would suggest that the initially poor are catching-up in the sense that their incomes 
are growing faster than that of the initially non-poor. 
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Appendix Figure A2.1 Correlation of Income Rank using 
Actual Panel Data in Philippines, 2006-2009 
 
                                                                                  Source: Author’s computations using simulated data from Povcalnet.                                                
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Chapter 3 Family Income and Expenditure Survey and Labour Force Survey 
 
3.1   Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have briefly examined how the income distribution in the 
Philippines has evolved since the 1980s. One of the interesting patterns that emerged is that 
both poverty and inequality barely changed over the past decade despite moderate to rapid 
economic growth. More importantly, I have also discussed the importance of probing beyond 
conventional cross-sectional indicators of the income distribution to be able to better 
understand the dynamics of socio-economic development. After having shown that important 
features of the income distribution dynamics may be overlooked if the patterns of income 
mobility are not taken into account using a simple simulation experiment based on pseudo-
panel data, the rest of this paper examines income mobility patterns in the Philippines using 
actual panel data. This chapter describes the Family Income and Expenditure Survey and 
Labour Force Survey which serve as the main data sources for the analyses presented in the 
succeeding chapters. The following discussion centres on the content of FIES and LFS, 
observation period, income measure and representativeness of survey data.   
3.2     Survey Content and Administration  
The Philippine National Statistics Office (NSO) conducts the FIES every three years to 
collect household income distribution data. The main data collection instrument is an 
approximately seventy-page questionnaire which includes detailed questions about different 
sources of household income and a comprehensive list of expenditure items.  Data is collected 
through face-to-face interviews wherein the main respondent, typically the head of the 
household, is asked to answer the survey questionnaire. In addition to household earnings and 
expenditure, FIES also collects information about household characteristics such as the profile 
of household head, household composition, the dwelling unit characteristics, type of assets held 
and access to basic services. In particular, about 60% of the survey instrument is allotted to the 
consumption module, 15% for the earnings module and the remaining 25% is allotted for 
household characteristics and other information (Ericta & Fabian 2009).  
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is likewise collected by the NSO every quarter and it is 
the main data source for official employment statistics in the Philippines. It has a four-page 
questionnaire that collects information about the employment status of each household 
member. In particular, it asks questions such as labour force status, type of employment and 
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sector of employment. The LFS also collects the basic socio-demographic characteristics such 
as age, sex and educational qualification of each household member (NSO 2012).  
The FIES follows a semestral recall method wherein each sampled household is visited 
twice every year. The first visit is usually conducted in July of the reference year while the 
second visit is conducted in January following the reference year (Ericta & Fabian 2009). The 
NSO follows this scheme to capture the seasonal variations of household income and 
consumption (Ericta & Fabian 2009). On the other hand, the LFS is collected every April, July, 
October of the reference year and in January of the succeeding year (NSO 2012). The July and 
January rounds of LFS coincide with the semestral rounds of FIES making it possible to merge 
the household-level data collected from FIES with the individual-level data of LFS (NSO 
2003).  
Both FIES and LFS have undergone several revisions over the years (NSO 2003; Ericta 
& Fabian 2009). For instance, along with other household surveys conducted by NSO, both 
surveys started following the 2003 Master Sample Design for Philippines Household Surveys 
in 2003.33 The 2003 Master Sample Design provides a scheme where a subsample of 
households used in previous survey waves are rotated back for the succeeding waves (Ericta & 
Fabian 2009). 
3.3    Observation Period 
 The reference years for this study are 2003, 2006 and 2009. This period is quite 
interesting for both substantive and technical reasons. We have seen in Chapter 2 that compared 
to previous years, the Philippines experienced more rapid economic growth during this period. 
From 2003 to 2009, the country posted an annual average growth of 2.9% in terms of GDP per 
capita. This is about twice as fast as the country’s average income growth rate two decades 
earlier (WDI 2014). In particular, the first period, 2003-2006, marks the transition from several 
decades of slow economic growth to faster economic expansion. However, the higher 
economic growth rates occurred in the context of a slight increase in cross-sectional poverty, 
which could be indicative that the poor have benefitted less from economic growth. The second 
period, 2006-2009, continues the rapid economic growth trend. Although this period coincides 
with the 2008 global financial crisis, both cross-sectional headcount poverty rates and income 
inequality did not change significantly during this period.  
                                               
33 In repeated cross-sectional surveys, a master sample is a sample from which subsamples can be drawn for the purpose of 
more than one (household) survey or more than one round of survey.  
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 The study period also precedes the more rapid economic episode that is currently 
experienced by the Philippines. Although the transition into a faster economic growth regime 
could have paved way for more significant gains in reducing the number of poor and the gap 
between the poor and the rich, estimates of poverty rates and inequality levels barely changed 
during this period. The availability of panel data during this period through the redesigned FIES 
and LFS provides the opportunity to examine income mobility to give a more nuanced 
assessment of seemingly trivial changes in cross-sectional poverty and inequality and hence, a 
more comprehensive appraisal of the country’s socio-economic development. 
3.4    Income Measure  
There are several monetary measures that are of interest for income distributional 
analysis. Two of the most commonly used measures are income and consumption expenditure. 
Haughton and Khandker (2009) identified the advantages and disadvantages of using income 
or consumption expenditure. For instance, income data collected from surveys can be 
compared with administrative tax data records to check the reliability of the survey data. More 
importantly, examining the patterns of the distribution of different sources of income (e.g., 
employment, remittances, subsidies, etc.) is also relevant in policy analysis.  In the Philippines, 
household income which is the sum of income from paid employment, self-employment, assets, 
transfers, remittances and other sources is used as basis for computing official poverty statistics 
(NSCB 2003).Nevertheless, a number of researchers examining income distribution in the 
country have increasingly favoured the use of consumption expenditure (David & Maligalig 
2001; Balisacan & Pernia 2002) for various pragmatic and conceptual reasons. In particular, 
advocates of consumption expenditure-based measures argue that expenditure is more closely 
related to a person’s living standards because it does not only reflect the welfare level that a 
person can achieve using its income but also captures one’s ability to access savings or credit 
markets during episodes of low income. In addition, some argue that income data usually 
suffers from downward bias when survey respondents discount the extent to which they 
consume their own production, especially in developing countries that heavily depend on the 
informal economy in which various income sources are hard to capture and can have erratic 
fluctuations from time to time (Deaton & Zaidi 2002). In addition, consumption expenditure 
flow is generally smoother than income and thus, the former is considered a better measure of 
people’s long-term economic prospects (Jefferson 2012). The other benefits of using 
consumption expenditure as a measure of material well-being include its ability to better reflect 
price change, private and government transfers as well as insurance value of government 
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programs and credit markets (Meyer & Sullivan 2003). For further discussion, readers may 
refer to the work of Meyer & Sullivan (2003) who provided well-developed arguments in 
favour of using consumption expenditure rather than income when examining a country’s 
income distribution.  
Table 3.1 Regional Price Differences 
Region   Region   
National Capital 
Region (NCR) 
100 
Region 7 - Central 
Visayas  
105.4 
Cordillera 
Administrative Region 
(CAR) 
100.3 
Region 8 - Eastern 
Visayas  
90.3 
Region 1 - Ilocos  93.4 
Region 9 - Zamboanga 
Peninsula 
94.1 
Region 2 - Cagayan 
Valley  
92.6 
Region 10 - Northern 
Mindanao  
89.2 
Region 3 - Central 
Luzon  
96.5 Region 11 - Davao  99.7 
Region 4-A -
CALABARZON 
95.3 
Region 12 - 
Soccsksargen  
87.2 
Region 4-B -
MIMAROPA 
96 
Autonomous Region of 
Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM) 
107.6 
Region 5 - Bicol  97.8 Caraga Region 88.9 
Region 6 - Western 
Visayas  
96.3     
      Source: Sta. Ana and Varona (2012) 
      Note: 100 = reference category 
 
Following the common practice in many developing countries (Deaton 1997), this study 
mainly uses consumption expenditure, unless stated otherwise. Household expenditure derived 
from FIES is the sum of expenditure on food, utilities, household operation, personal care, 
taxes and miscellaneous items. From this point onwards, the term income is used loosely to 
refer to this chosen monetary measure unless stated otherwise.34 This income measure has been 
divided by the household size, assuming that there are no economies of scale in consumption 
(Lanjouw & Ravallion 1995). This is slightly different from the approach commonly used in 
industrialized countries which adopts an equivalence scale to take into account the possibility 
that children generally consume less than adults. Nevertheless, the choice of expressing the 
income measure in per capita terms is consistent with the usual practice in developing countries 
(Deaton 2004).  Within each household, all household members are given the same income 
                                               
34 I have also done preliminary analysis of mobility of household income per capita. However, the results are qualitatively 
similar with the patterns depicted by the mobility of household expenditure per capita. To save space, I decided to focus on 
expenditure. Nevertheless, Appendix 4.1 presents some results based on household income per capita.  
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value. This is consistent with the notion that households act as the main budgetary units for 
which socio-economic decisions of individuals are made (WB 2014a). Unless stated otherwise, 
all estimates are expressed as monthly income per capita in constant 2005 PPP US$ to account 
for inflation. The income measure is further adjusted to account for differences in regional 
prices using the results based from the spatial price indices estimated by Sta. Ana & Varona 
(2012) (Table 3.1). In such cases, the prices in the National Capital Region is used as 
benchmark.  
 
3.5  Sampling Design and Survey Weight Adjustments for Non-Coverage Bias 
The FIES and LFS follow multistage stratified sampling design (NSO 2003). The target 
population of both surveys includes all households in the Philippines except institutional 
households and households from least accessible barangays (LAB) or villages (NSO 2003).35 
The villages (or combination of villages in some instances) were treated as the primary 
sampling units (PSUs). For each geographic region, the total number of sampled households 
were computed such that it would satisfy a pre-determined level of reliability.36 Hence, the 
total number of sampled PSUs per region was computed by dividing the target number of 
sampled households per region by the desired sample size per PSU. The PSUs were selected 
using the probability proportional to size sampling scheme where size is gauged in terms of the 
number of households enumerated in the 2000 Census of Population and Housing. For each 
sampled PSU, housing units were selected with equal probability (NSO 2003). This resulted to 
a target sample of approximately 40,000 households for each survey wave.  
The target sample was grouped into four replicates. In this study, I use the households 
from the fourth replicate only because these are the households that were tracked over time. 
There are three potential panel data sets that can be constructed: (i) households that are 
observed in both 2003 and 2006, (ii) households that are observed in both 2006 and 2009; and 
households that are observed in all three periods.37Table 3.2 shows the sample size for each of 
the panel data sets.  
 
                                               
35  A village is considered an LAB if (i) there is no regular means of transportation, (ii) the cost of one-way fare from the 
nearest accessible village is more than $10 to $15 based on 2003 prices or (iii) it takes more than 8 hours to reach the village. 
Of the 41,942 villages in the Philippines, 350 were classified as LABs and excluded from the target population (NSO 2003). 
On the other hand, institutional households refer to institutions that provide care to a group of people (e.g., health care 
institutions, etc.) (UNESCAP 2009). 
36 The regional sample size was computed so that the expected coefficient of variation of headcount poverty rate would not 
exceed 10% in NCR and 5% in areas outside NCR (NSO 2003). 
37  The full sample is designed to produce reliable estimates at the national and regional levels. On the other hand, the 
longitudinal sample is expected to provide reliable estimates at the national level.  
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Table 3.2 Sample Size 
Regions 
2003 
(replicate #4) 
2003-
2006 
2006-
2009 
2003, 
2006, 
2009 
Philippines 10,476 7,899 7,509 6,519 
National Capital Region (NCR) 954 611 724 449 
Cordillera Administrative Region 
(CAR) 404 297 319 261 
Region 1 - Ilocos  616 517 469 441 
Region 2 - Cagayan Valley  523 421 406 372 
Region 3 - Central Luzon  842 666 618 551 
Region 4-A CALABARZON 1,021 745 681 604 
Region 4-B MIMAROPA 450 331 297 266 
Region 5 - Bicol  612 481 469 396 
Region 6 - Western Visayas  736 623 558 525 
Region 7 - Central Visayas  745 550 505 464 
Region 8 - Eastern Visayas  560 424 381 353 
Region 9 - Zamboanga Peninsula  451 338 334 299 
Region 10 - Northern Mindanao  558 384 354 322 
Region 11 - Davao 559 415 406 346 
Region 12 - Soccsksargen  550 411 397 341 
Autonomous Region of Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM) 
442 351 280 257 
Caraga Region 453 334 311 272 
Source: Author’s computations using longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
While the longitudinal subsample is expected to provide reliable estimates at the national level, 
it is not free from the risk of producing biased estimates. There are several sources of bias in 
this context. First, the survey does not follow households that moved out of its previous 
dwelling unit. Excluding them from the analysis could lead to the well-known non-coverage 
bias common in longitudinal studies. Second, bias may also arise from panel nonresponse when 
households that remained in the same dwelling unit refuse to participate in the succeeding 
survey waves.  The consequences of these biases are major concerns in many longitudinal 
studies especially when the profile of sampling units that drop out are systematically correlated 
with the characteristic of  being studied  (Ashenfelter, Deaton & Solon 1986). To investigate 
this issue, I compare the measure of central tendency and dispersion of household expenditure 
per capita between the full cross-sectional sample and the longitudinal subsample. Preliminary 
investigation suggests that measures of central tendency and dispersion tend to be 
underestimated in the longitudinal subsample, especially when I examine households that 
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appear in all three waves (Table 3.3).38 To formally test whether the differences in the 
distributions are statistically significant, I use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. This test confirms 
that there are significant differences in the distributions of the full sample and longitudinal 
subsample. In this context, I am likely to produce biased estimates of income mobility if I do 
not introduce further adjustments. 
 
Table 3.3 Comparison of Full Cross-Sectional and Longitudinal Subsample 
Time period 
2003 2006 2009 
Mean 
Std 
Error 
Gini 
Std 
Error 
Mean 
Std 
Error 
Gini 
Std 
Error 
Mean 
Std 
Error 
Gini 
Std 
Error 
Full sample             
cross-sectional 
sample 
1258.53 0.44 1228.05  0.441   1286.33 0.43  
  9.43 0.002 10.88  0.003  12.79  0.002 
Longitudinal 
subsample 
       
 
  
2003-2006 1158.34 0.434 1121.06 0.44    
  13.34 0.005 13.41 0.004    
2006-2009     1197.41 0.449 1223.23 0.426 
      15.52 0.005 14.34 0.004 
2003, 2006 and 
2009 
1138.48 0.428 1132.76 0.438 1159.69 0.414 
  28.32 0.006 28.80 0.005 25.86 0.004 
         Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of  
          FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
         Notes: For each year, the first column represents the average and its corresponding standard error while 
the estimates of the Gini coefficient and its standard error are provided in the second column. The mean  
         is expressed in 2005 PPP US$. 
 
Table 3.4 Features of Longitudinal Subsample Using Attrition-Adjusted Weights 
Time period 
2003 2006 2009 
Mean Gini Mean Gini Mean Gini 
Longitudinal 
subsample 
(Adjusted) 
       
 
  
2003, 2006 and 
2009 
1234.84 0.431 1233.27 0.445 1267.91 0.423 
  31.30 0.006 32.57 0.006 29.21 0.005 
         Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of  
          FIES  2003, 2006 and 2009. 
         Notes: For each year, the first column represents the average and its corresponding standard error while 
the estimates of the Gini coefficient and its standard error are provided in the second column. The mean  
         is expressed in 2005 PPP US$. 
                                               
38  The same findings are drawn for household income per capita. Various software packages such as DASP (Araar & Duclos 
2007), Stata’s income mobility tools (Van Kerm 2002), ADECOMP (Azevedo, Nguyen & Sanfelice 2012) and MCLUST 
(Fraley & Raftery 2012) are used extensively in most of the computations.  
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Rubin (1987) proposed the use of weighting procedure to address attrition and non-
coverage bias. Hence, I introduce weights for non-response by estimating logistic regression 
models for the probability of appearing in 2003, 2006 and 2009 waves, and specifying 
consumption, age of household head, sex of household head and urbanity as controls. The 
inverse of the predicted probabilities are multiplied with the existing survey weights.  Table 
3.4 shows the average household expenditure per capita and measure of inequality estimated 
using the adjusted survey weights. Although it is noticeable that the adjusted estimates are now 
more closely aligned with estimates based on the full sample, some studies suggest that the 
weighting procedure only corrects for observable characteristics related to dropping out of the 
sample (Fiztgerald, Gottschalk & Moffitt 1998). In other words, the longitudinal subsample 
may still be systematically different from the full sample in terms of unobservable 
characteristics. Nevertheless, it is important to note how this residual bias can affect the 
estimates. Given that households that moved from their original dwelling were not followed, it 
is possible that households with deteriorating socio-economic status and migrated between 
2003 and 2006 and households with improved socio-economic status and migrated between 
2006 and 2009 are systematically underrepresented. If we examine the numbers provided for 
the full cross-sectional sample in Table 3.3 and the numbers provided in the longitudinal 
subsample in Table 3.4, this would explain why the average income in 2003 and 2009 is lower 
in the longitudinal subsample but it is higher in 2006. Furthermore, it is apparent that the year-
on-year differences in the mean and Gini coefficient are smaller using the longitudinal 
subsample than using the full cross-sectional sample. This could imply that the estimates 
provided in this study are likely to represent lower bounds of the actual magnitude of income 
mobility in the Philippines.  
Throughout the rest of this study, all analysis incorporates weights adjusted for attrition 
and non-coverage. These weights are also multiplied by the household size. Hence, a household 
consisting of three family members is weighted thrice as high than a single-person 
household.39For convenience, I restrict the analysis to data for the 6,519 households that appear 
in all waves.40 
As can be inferred from Table 3.5 and Figure 3.1, regions in the northern part, particularly 
the National Capital Region (NCR) have significantly higher income than the rest. Thus, I also 
                                               
39 Thus, the weights sum up to the total individual population.  
40 I decided against trimming the data (to remove the outliers) because the public use file of FIES has already undergone 
various data cleaning processes (Ericta & Fabian 2009). 
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provide subnational estimates in most of the succeeding analyses to capture the spatial 
variations in economic well-being within the country.  
 
Table 3.5 Average Household Income Per Capita by Region 
Location 
Panel Sample 
2003 2006 2009 
mean std err mean std err mean std err 
LUZON       
National Capital 
Region (NCR) 
2239.77 133.50 2297.86 158.83 2195.53 114.48 
Cordillera 
Administrative 
Region (CAR) 
1157.25 111.67 1065.41 133.72 1054.19 100.43 
Region 1 - Ilocos  1133.38 100.41 1232.92 106.72 1300.44 92.23 
Region 2 - Cagayan 
Valley  
1216.74 90.40 1217.32 87.59 1295.92 100.16 
Region 3 - Central 
Luzon  
1337.95 62.13 1411.11 73.77 1403.81 74.00 
Region 4-A -
CALABARZON 
1613.97 90.42 1545.10 92.11 1503.36 80.93 
Region 4-B -
MIMAROPA 
757.33 88.42 744.52 62.63 930.42 136.97 
Region 5 - Bicol  1192.61 190.30 1041.54 149.76 1041.21 122.31 
VISAYAS       
Region 6 - Western 
Visayas  
1045.55 74.98 1044.50 84.10 1137.46 80.80 
Region 7 - Central 
Visayas  
957.23 75.94 960.16 75.94 977.80 71.32 
Region 8 - Eastern 
Visayas  
972.25 79.49 994.93 73.74 1201.69 121.17 
MINDANAO       
Region 9 - 
Zamboanga 
Peninsula  
846.81 105.07 928.04 138.61 1032.59 140.25 
Region 10 - 
Northern Mindanao  
1039.68 102.08 1095.81 101.71 1095.94 74.97 
Region 11 - Davao  1071.99 102.23 915.09 75.76 1046.81 99.60 
Region 12 - 
Soccsksargen  
836.42 58.55 825.25 62.58 995.79 71.98 
Autonomous 
Region of Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM) 
576.56 52.03 516.88 30.00 567.09 34.35 
Caraga Region 742.23 55.29 746.05 53.21 777.95 61.96 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 
2006 and 2009. 
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3.6      Poverty Lines 
 In the succeeding discussion, poverty is measured using four sets of poverty lines. Three 
of them are absolute poverty thresholds in the sense that the poverty status of a household does 
not depend on the incomes of other households. These are the US1.25/day (US$456/year), 
US$2/day (US$729.6/year) poverty line proposed by WB and the official poverty line compiled 
by the NSCB. Unlike the US$1.25 and US$2/day poverty lines which take a single scalar value, 
the national poverty line differs across provinces. On the other hand, the half-of-median 
threshold is a relative poverty line in the sense that it implicitly depends on the distribution of 
the incomes of all households. Because the half-of-median yields the smallest poverty threshold 
followed by the official poverty line while the US$2-a-day produces the highest poverty 
threshold, one would expect that poverty estimates will be highest based on the US$2-a-day 
poverty line. Thus, the US$1.25/day and US$2/day-based estimates can be considered as lower 
and upper bound of poverty, respectively.   
 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter described the features of the main survey data that are pertinent to the 
measurement of income mobility. The succeeding chapters cover various topics about income 
mobility patterns in the Philippines.  
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Figure 3.1 Regional Map of the Philippines 
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Appendix Table A3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Household Expenditure Per Capita 
(in 2005 PPP US$) 
Mean Median Std Dev Obs Mean Median Std Dev Obs Mean Median Std Dev Obs
Philippines
Urbanity
Rural 856.28 617.55 1,299.57 4,047.00 836.55 600.63 785.56 4,047.00 904.00 663.42 809.76 4,047.00
Urban 1,625.43 1,222.39 1,435.02 2,472.00 1,642.59 1,158.03 1,706.54 2,472.00 1,643.38 1,178.89 1,589.99 2,472.00
Major Island Group
NCR 2,239.77 1,631.83 1,896.19 449.00 2,297.86 1,572.89 2,497.04 449.00 2,195.53 1,624.21 1,906.35 449.00
Luzon excl. NCR 1,316.74 966.99 1,591.75 2,891.00 1,305.11 942.77 1,286.49 2,891.00 1,318.59 982.37 1,261.51 2,891.00
Visayas 996.47 696.19 972.32 1,342.00 1,001.86 662.25 1,023.92 1,342.00 1,089.44 723.04 1,156.18 1,342.00
Mindanao 879.85 587.52 860.63 1,837.00 867.17 572.20 889.19 1,837.00 950.81 633.62 1,017.51 1,837.00
Gender of household head
Female 1,819.13 1,267.04 2,620.60 951.00 1,665.71 1,200.25 1,586.66 1,080.00 1,689.69 1,268.03 1,513.39 1,273.00
Male 1,147.69 817.39 1,112.64 5,568.00 1,156.94 773.37 1,327.74 5,439.00 1,177.44 821.74 1,242.52 5,246.00
Age of household head
Hhld head's age ≤ 35 1,057.62 752.26 1,090.41 1,379.00 1,041.69 659.66 1,455.68 900.00 1,029.78 699.56 1,251.77 636.00
35 < Hhld head's age ≤ 44 1,111.98 786.26 1,711.71 1,614.00 1,043.42 726.19 1,016.28 1,618.00 1,113.45 783.60 1,075.31 1,421.00
Hhld head's age > 44 1,405.34 993.76 1,362.68 3,526.00 1,393.73 947.58 1,504.67 4,001.00 1,377.38 966.49 1,395.28 4,462.00
Education of household head
Primary school 799.02 617.40 651.25 3,253.00 776.75 581.63 668.01 3,228.00 816.58 639.14 606.71 3,181.00
Secondary school 1,336.65 1,041.70 1,045.21 2,728.00 1,314.64 991.63 1,116.67 2,734.00 1,335.08 1,024.85 1,105.46 2,757.00
College 2,930.43 2,237.76 3,343.99 538.00 3,018.15 2,257.93 2,843.42 557.00 2,990.61 2,392.24 2,524.09 581.00
Family size
Family size ≤ 3 1,906.94 1,285.16 2,666.63 1,470.00 2,058.65 1,334.69 2,518.04 1,529.00 2,103.07 1,424.34 2,327.92 1,693.00
3 < Family size ≤ 5 1,348.82 1,001.87 1,130.78 2,448.00 1,354.42 979.91 1,188.48 2,467.00 1,430.39 1,044.28 1,249.85 2,443.00
5 < Family size ≤ 7 1,045.05 759.88 922.57 1,679.00 1,023.06 726.19 946.29 1,615.00 1,064.79 770.61 928.09 1,571.00
7 < Family size ≤ 9 793.15 571.46 653.19 657.00 802.88 574.13 709.83 669.00 903.24 683.06 775.46 588.00
Family size > 9 841.58 523.23 1,169.48 265.00 761.18 523.87 928.67 239.00 718.34 583.01 480.59 224.00
Main source of Income
Agriculture 1,464.68 1,071.22 1,576.83 4,473.00 1,451.08 1,027.53 1,476.05 4,483.00 1,460.32 1,057.88 1,416.70 4,704.00
Non-Agriculture 595.30 490.58 402.41 2,046.00 625.45 480.11 808.81 2,036.00 645.69 528.90 507.97 1,815.00
2003 2006 2009
Household characteristic
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009.
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Chapter 4 Is there Income Mobility in the Philippines? 
 
4.1     Introduction 
I noted in Chapter 2 that the economic development in the Philippines has been 
characterized by boom and bust cycles until the 2000s. However, starting 2000, the country 
experienced a more rapid growth episode and estimates suggest that it is gaining more 
momentum in the recent years (WDI 2014). Modest to rapid economic growth can be expected 
to raise household income. However, this link seems to be weak in the Philippines. Household 
survey estimates suggest that from 2003 to 2009, average household income per capita 
increased by only 0.36% annually. Further, despite 4.1% annual GDP growth from 2009 to 
2012, average household income barely moved (NSCB 2013a). Estimates from household 
surveys also suggest that income inequality remained high over the past decade. For instance, 
the Gini coefficient based on household income per capita hardly changed from 0.44 in 2003 
to 0.43 in 2009. Nevertheless, the minimal changes in the cross-sectional estimates of poverty 
and inequality do not necessarily imply that the country’s income distribution is stagnant. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, examination of income mobility could provide additional information 
on the underlying mechanisms that drive the income distribution to change. Thus, the main 
objective of this chapter is to provide a descriptive analysis of the income mobility that 
transpired over the past decade in the Philippines. In particular, the chapter addresses the 
following questions:  
(i) Why is average household income not growing at the same pace as the country’s 
overall economy?  
(ii) What does a small change in cross-sectional inequality mean?  
(iii) Are all households’ incomes static over time or are they changing at different 
rates? 
(iv) If there is mobility, is it characterized by genuine income movements?  
 
To answer these questions, I use a portfolio of analytical methods, both conventional and new 
in the income mobility literature to document the income mobility patterns. Acquiring this 
knowledge is the first step to being able to provide inputs for policymakers in developing 
policies that will foster more inclusive economic growth. Throughout the chapter, I use 
household expenditure per capita as the main income measure.  
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4.2  Is there income mobility in the Philippines? 
4.2.1    Is there relative income mobility? 
We learned from Chapter 1 that relative mobility refers to how the income of each unit 
changes in comparison with the changes observed in other units of the population. A simple 
way to gauge the level of relative mobility is to estimate the proportion of the population 
moving from one income quantile to another over time using an income transition matrix. 
Using household expenditure per capita data derived from the FIES, the results from this 
exercise show that in 2009, about 85% of the household population were found in a vingtile 
different from its origin in 2003, 72% were found in a different decile; and 52% were found in 
a different quintile.41 Nevertheless, income persistence was also strong. From 2003 to 2009, 
about 55% of the population did not move beyond two vingtiles from 2003 to 2009.   
With respect to directional mobility, I find that about 11% of the population moved one 
vingtile up while 17% moved one decile up. Long-distance upward moves were also not trivial. 
For instance, the proportion of the population moving in a higher quintile from 2003 to 2009 
was 26.3%. Because relative mobility is based on income ranks, one could expect that 
downward mobility is as frequent as upward mobility. This is because in a fixed population, 
for a person to be able to move up an income rank, another person has to go down portraying 
a zero-sum game.  For instance, I find that about 25.7% moved into a lower quintile during the 
observation period.  
Another way of measuring the extent of relative mobility is to look at how income ranks 
among the population units have changed over time. To what extent does current income rank 
dictate one’s ranking in the future? In general, a stagnant household income distribution will 
imply that people that were initially at the bottom of the income hierarchy will remain at the 
bottom, while the rich will continue occupying the top spot.  If we plot the ranks of the initial 
and final-period incomes, a stagnant distribution will resemble a perfect unit-slope diagonal 
line. The rank correlation calculated is relatively high with the Pearson correlation estimated 
at 0.80. Regressing the income rank in 2009 on the income rank in 2003, I find that the slope 
coefficient is close to one, which indicates income rigidity. Nevertheless, while income ranks 
are persistent, there is also considerable relative mobility in the sense that a significant fraction 
of the population experienced higher or lower income ranks in 2009 compared to their initial 
ranks in 2003. In addition, based on the results of the simple linear regression analysis, 40% of 
the variation in income ranking in 2009 cannot be explained by the income rank in 2003. 
                                               
41 (Income) vingtiles divide the population into twenty groups according to income, ten groups for deciles and five groups for 
quintiles.  
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Table 4.1 provides a summary of the amount of relative mobility that occurred from 2003 
to 2009. Overall, the results show that despite the strong persistence of income ranking, the 
income dynamics that transpired during this period is also characterized by considerable 
medium and long-distance movements of income ranks. 
 
Table 4.1 Summary of Relative Income Mobility Measures 
Income mobility indicator 2003-2009 
Average number of vingtiles moved  (non-directional) 
2.77 
0.03 
Average number of vingtiles moved (directional) 
0 
0.05 
Proportion of population remaining in leading 
diagonals  
0.15 
0.005 
Proportion of population moving one vingtile up 
0.11 
0.005 
Proportion of population moving one vingtile down 
0.12 
0.005 
Proportion of population moving two vingtiles up 
0.08 
0.004 
Proportion of population moving two vingtiles down 
0.09 
0.004 
Proportion of population moving at least three vingtiles 
up 
0.23 
0.006 
Proportion of population moving at least three vingtiles 
down 
0.22 
0.006 
Correlation of income ranks 0.8*** 
                  Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal  
                  subsample of FIES  2003, 2006 and 2009. 
                  Note: The numbers in smaller font size are standard errors.  
 
4.2.2 Is there absolute income mobility? 
If all incomes increased by a constant proportional factor, the relative mobility measures 
presented in the previous section would indicate that there is no mobility. This is because 
relative mobility indicators only capture variations in income shares or rank orders of the 
population units over time. In other words, relative mobility measures are more sensitive to the 
changes in the shape of the income distribution rather than the changes in location. In contrast, 
absolute mobility gauges how income levels change from one time period to another. In this 
context, absolute mobility captures the growth dimension of income dynamics.  
Nevertheless, there is still much mobility going on. For instance, following the approach 
used in ADB (2010a), I group  each  household  according  to  its income levels to  determine  
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Table 4.2 (Absolute) Income Transition Matrix, 2003-2009 
2
0
0
3
 
 
2009 
extreme 
poverty 
moderate 
poverty 
low 
middle 
income 
middle 
income 
upper 
middle 
income 
rich 
extreme 
poverty 0.4942 0.3951 0.1045 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 
moderate 
poverty 0.2185 0.4219 0.3341 0.0243 0.0007 0.0004 
low middle 
income 0.0423 0.1983 0.5660 0.1860 0.0074 0.0000 
middle income 0.0040 0.0231 0.2933 0.5776 0.0934 0.0085 
upper middle 
income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0487 0.5298 0.3644 0.0572 
rich 0.0000 0.0000 0.0221 0.2665 0.4836 0.2279 
   Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES      
2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
whether it is extremely poor, moderately poor, lower middle income, middle income, upper 
middle income and rich.42 
The results are summarized in the income transition matrix presented in Table 4.2. From 
2003 to 2009, about 49% of the household population changed income status. Interestingly, I 
find that both positive and negative mobility are prominent features of the income dynamics 
observed during this period.  More importantly, it appears that there is as much positive 
mobility as there is negative mobility. Noticeably, five out of ten Filipinos who lived in extreme 
poverty in 2003 were still in the same situation in 2009; four moved to moderate poverty and 
the remaining 10% reached low middle income status. About 40% of those who lived in 
moderate poverty in 2003 remained in the same income status in 2009 while more than 20% 
fell to extreme poverty. In addition, those who were in either middle or upper middle-income 
status in 2003 were less likely to experience income increase than those who were initially in 
lower middle-income strata.  Although not shown in Table 4.2, the number of units found at 
the right of the off-diagonal section of the transition matrix is slightly higher than number of 
units at the left off-diagonal. In particular, about 26% of the population moved up to a higher 
income status while 22% moved down.    
 Thus far, the inferences based on (absolute) transition matrix have implicitly relied on 
the following measures of positive and negative mobility denoted by MU and MD where MU 
                                               
42 The first group consists of incomes not exceeding US$1.25/day which is considered as an extreme form of income poverty, 
the second group consists of incomes falling in between US$1.25 and US$2 (moderate poverty), third group consists of 
incomes falling in between US$2 and US$4 (lower middle income), fourth group consists of incomes falling in between US$4 
and US$10 (middle income), fifth group consists of incomes falling in between US$10 and US$20 (upper middle income) and 
last group consists of incomes exceeding US$20/day (rich). The cut-off points are expressed as daily expenditure per capita in 
2005 PPP US$.  
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represents the proportion of the population whose income went up a certain income threshold 
c while MD represents the proportion of the population whose income went down with respect 
to c.   
                                            𝑀𝑈 =
 
𝑛
∑ (𝑌𝑖   ) (𝑌𝑖2   )                                       (4.1) 
                                           𝑀𝐷 =
 
𝑛
∑ (𝑌𝑖   ) (𝑌𝑖2   )                                        (4.2) 
Noticeably, the value of these measures depend on the pre-specified cut-off point c. In this 
context, the transition matrix above treats all households with the same income status as 
identical. In other words, this transition matrix and other scalar measures derived from it, fail 
to capture positive and negative income movements occurring within the same income group. 
Recently, Foster & Rothbaum (2012) proposed a more general approach in comparing positive 
and negative income mobility rates. In particular, the authors defined MU
* and MD
* such that  
                                         𝑀𝑈
∗ = ∫
 
𝑛
∑  (𝑌𝑖   ) (𝑌𝑖2   )
 𝐻
0
𝑑                              (4.3) 
                                        𝑀𝐷
∗ = ∫
 
𝑛
∑ (𝑌𝑖   ) (𝑌𝑖2   )
 𝐻
0
𝑑                               (4.4) 
The mobility measures MU
* and MD
* are integrated for all values of c, 0 ≤ c ≤ cH, where cH can 
be set to be equal to the maximum income observed throughout the observation period. Hence, 
these mobility measures are not sensitive to a predetermined income threshold. Such a mobility 
measure provides an analytical tool for examining income mobility that incorporates the 
distribution sensitivity approach of the income transition matrix but is not pegged with respect 
to some predetermined income cut-off points (Foster & Rothbaum 2012).  Figure 4.1 
summarizes the upward and negative mobility estimates based on these mobility measures. The 
y-axis of the income mobility curve represents the values of MU and MD while the x-axis 
represents the different cut-off points c. We can see that for cut-off points less than the mean 
income, mobility rates increase uniformly and peak around the mean income.  Thereafter, 
mobility rates gradually decrease. Consistent with the findings from the income transition 
matrices, I find that the total amount of positive income mobility is slightly higher than negative 
mobility. However, the difference between the two does not seem to be significant. 
Remarkably, the pattern of positive and negative mobility is quite symmetric across different 
cut-off points. The symmetry implies that for every household that experienced a positive 
(absolute) income increase at any point in the income distribution, there is a household that 
experienced a reduction in its (absolute) income level. Table 4.3 provides a summary of the 
amount of absolute mobility that occurred from 2003 to 2009. 
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Figure 4.1 Income Mobility Curve, 2003-2009 
 
               Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal  
                subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
 
Table 4.3 Summary of Income Mobility Measures 
Income mobility indicator Estimate 
Average absolute change            
|Income2009 - Income2003| 
492.68 
13.69 
Average absolute percentage change 
|Income2009 - Income2003|/Income2003 
0.41 
0.006 
Average income change            
(Income2009 - Income2003) 
33.07 
15.32 
Average percentage change           
(Income2009 - Income2003)/Income2003 
0.16 
0.008 
                                Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita  
                                           data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
                                           Note: The numbers in smaller font size are standard errors. 
  
4.2.3  Is there equalizing mobility? 
The level of income inequality in the Philippines is one of the highest in Southeast Asia 
(WDI 2014). Despite slight indications of a decreasing trend over the recent years, estimates 
suggest that income inequality in the country has remained very high. Because the observation 
that it has remained high is based on cross-sectional trends, we can only conclude that the gap 
between the rich and the poor has remained wide. However, as noted from the previous section, 
households are not necessarily static with respect to their position in the income distribution. 
In other words, those who are poor today are not necessarily the same households who were 
poor yesterday. The same is true for the middle class and the rich households. In particular, if 
poorer households have higher upward mobility prospects, then it is possible that despite the 
M*u = 256.34
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high levels of cross-sectional inequality, we would still observe lower inequality in the long-
run.  
Examining the relationship between long-run inequality and income mobility is the main 
theme of this section. Unlike the measures used in the previous section which view mobility in 
terms of income movements, this section investigates the extent to which income inequality 
that exists at any given time, is offset when household incomes are averaged over time and 
whether there is greater or less mobility at the lower income segments relative to mobility in 
higher income ranges.   
 
Table 4.4 Inequality-Reducing Effect of Income Mobility 
  GE(0)  GE(1) Gini GE(2) 
2003-2009         
Single year income  0.3081  0.3449  0.4309 0.6074 
Average income  0.2773 0.3049   0.4115  0.4710 
Shorrocks’ R 0.0870 0.0980 0.0390 0.2246 
                              Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the  
                              longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
                              Note: GE(a) – is the generalized entropy index for measuring inequality. The index is  
                              more sensitive to changes in the lower incomes for lower values of a and it is more  
                             sensitive to changes in the upper incomes for higher values of a.  
 
One of the long-standing views about mobility is that it is a channel for making economic 
opportunities more evenly distributed. In other words, income mobility is seen as equalizer of 
incomes in the long-run. I begin the empirical investigation with the computation of the 
stability index proposed by Shorrocks (1978). This index directly links the concept of mobility 
with income inequality by providing an estimate of the relative reduction of cross-sectional 
inequality achieved through mobility of incomes. Table 4.4 presents the average inequality 
based on single-period incomes, the inequality of permanent incomes computed by taking the 
longitudinal average income of each household and the Shorrocks’s rigidity or stability index.43  
Values of this index depend on the level of sensitivity of the underlying inequality measure to 
incomes in different parts of the distribution. Depending on the inequality measure being used, 
the results show that about 5% to 20% of cross-sectional inequality is reduced when household 
incomes are averaged from 2003 to 2009. The relative reduction in income inequality is lowest 
when inequality is measured based on the Gini coefficient and it increases as one uses an 
inequality measure that is more sensitive to the changes in the lower or higher income range. 
                                               
43 As shown in Chapter 1, the Shorrocks’ rigidity or stability index is equal to one minus the ratio of the inequality of 
longitudinally averaged incomes to the average inequality over time.  
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However, the reduced inequality is still considerably higher than the level of inequality in other 
neighbouring countries, based on current estimates (Table 4.5).  
 
Table 4.5 Comparison of Philippines’ Income Inequality 
With Other Southeast Asian Countries 
Country Year Gini 
Cambodia 2009 0.3603 
Indonesia 2010 0.3557 
Lao PDR 2008 0.3674 
Philippines 2003 to 2009 0.4115 
Thailand 2010 0.3937 
Vietnam 2008 0.3557 
                                          Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per 
                                              capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006,  
                                              2009 and WDI. 
                                              Notes: The estimate for Philippines is based on longitudinally- 
                                             Averaged income while the rest are based on current year incomes.  
 
Figure 4.2 Change in the Logarithm of Income between 2003 and 2009, 
by Income Percentile 
 
                        Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the  
                           longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
In the previous section, we have seen that the mobility patterns observed in the country 
are not homogeneous. For instance, the income mobility that occurred from 2003 to 2009 is 
not uniformly positive nor negative. But how does the observed income mobility vary across 
the different segments of the income distribution? Have the incomes of the initially poor 
households increased faster? To answer this question, I first group the initial incomes of the 
household population into percentiles. I then take the average logarithmic change between the 
initial and final period-incomes of all people for each percentile, as illustrated by the downward 
sloping line in Figure 4.2.  The results suggest that the majority of the richest 40% of the 
household population in the Philippines experienced income reduction from 2003 to 2009 and 
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those who experienced larger income increases started with lower initial incomes. In fact, if I 
regress the logarithmic change from 2003 to 2009 on the percentile of income in 2003, I find 
that 10 higher percentile points on the 2003 income distribution is associated with a 0.9 
percentage points lower average income growth from 2003 to 2009.  Whether this implies that 
the poor benefitted more from the economic growth or not merits further investigation. 
However, the observed income changes may either be driven by changes in permanent or 
transitory income. In other words, if some of the households in 2009 experienced transitory 
shocks in their income, the income fluctuations may have placed them below or above their 
permanent (that is, steady-state) income. Khor & Pencavel (2008) argued that those who were 
below their steady-state income in the final period were more likely to have experienced 
smaller income increase between the initial and final periods, while the opposite holds for those 
who were above their steady-state income in the final period. This pattern is illustrated by the 
upward sloping line in Figure 4.2 wherein the average logarithmic change in income is plotted 
with respect to the income percentile in 2009. In other words, income growth from 2003 to 
2009 was lower for households with lower income in 2009. The results of the regression 
model(s) depicted in Table 4.6 suggest that 10 higher percentile points on the 2009 income 
distribution is associated with a 0.6 percentage points faster income growth from 2003 to 2009. 
To address the issue, I also compute the income growth for households grouped 
according to their average income throughout the observation period. Obviously, using 
incomes averaged over a six-year period as a measure of permanent income is not without 
question. Nevertheless, it is still helpful to use this approximate measure of steady-state income 
when answering whether the observed income growth pattern benefitted the poor more than 
the rich. The solid line in Figure 4.2 exhibits a slightly downward pattern for the bottom 20% 
of the population. Thereafter, there is not a dominant positive or negative slope.  This is 
consistent with the regression estimates in Table 4.6, which suggest that 10 higher percentiles 
on average income is associated with only 0.01 percentage points lower income growth from 
2003 to 2009.   
The results provided in Figure 4.2 are based on observed income growth averaged across 
all units within each percentile. However, units within each percentile have varied income 
growth experiences. Figure 4.3 plots the minimum and maximum income growth for each 
percentile where the percentile is based from the average of incomes over the six years. The 
typical lowest income growth is approximately 17% annual income reduction, while the typical 
highest income growth is approximately 20% annual income increase.  While these variations 
in income growth experiences are generally independent of income position, there is slight 
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evidence suggesting that the ultra-rich tend to experience both the highest and lowest income 
growth. 
Table 4.6 Regression Estimates of the Relation between Changes 
in Income and Percentiles of Income 
  2003-2009 
  (I) (II) (III) 
Percentile of initial 
income 
 -0.0009***    
     
Percentile of final 
income 
  0.0006***   
     
Percentile of averaged 
income 
     
    -0.0001*** 
Intercept 
0.0536*** -0.0259***    0.0143*** 
     
R2  0.1197  0.0586      0.0029 
                     Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the  
                       longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Range of Values of the Change in the Logarithm of Income between 2003 
and 2009, by Percentile of Average Income 
 
                         Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the  
                            longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
 
Overall, the panel data suggest that incomes of poor people are increasing slightly faster 
than those who were initially non-poor. However, the advantage does not seem to be 
remarkable and more effort is needed for the poor to be able to catch-up. Moreover, the 
considerable proportion of the household population experiencing negative mobility tend to 
offset the inequality-reducing effect of faster income growth among the poor. This observation 
can be further validated when I decompose the changes in inequality levels from 2003 to 2009 
into pro-poor and re-ranking components following the approach proposed by Jenkins & Van 
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Kerm (2009). In particular, suppose the change in inequality from time t to t+1 is denoted by 
ΔG(s). As discussed in Chapter 1, Jenkins & Van Kerm (2009) showed that this can be 
expressed as the difference between the amount of income re-ranking and pro-poor income 
dynamics that transpired during the observation period. The results are presented in Table 4.7. 
The first two rows correspond to the values of the S-Gini index for 2003 and 2009, respectively. 
The third row corresponds to the contribution of income mobility or redistribution to the change 
in inequality while the last row corresponds to the contribution of the progressivity of growth 
or the extent to which growth benefits the poor. The results show that while many of the initially 
poor households experienced improvements in terms of the share of income held, this is offset 
by income re-ranking that contributes to wider income gaps. The consequence is the observed 
slow pace of the reduction in income inequality.  
 
Table 4.7 Decomposition of Change in Inequality into 
Re-ranking and Pro-poor Components 
  v= 1.5 v=2 v=3 v=4 
Initial S-Gini 0.298 0.428 0.551 0.612 
Final S-Gini 0.294 0.422 0.54 0.598 
Change -0.004 -0.007 -0.011 -0.014 
R-component 0.058 0.071 0.078 0.082 
P-component 0.062 0.078 0.09 0.096 
Kakawani 
index 
2.38 2.98 3.433 3.67 
                          Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the  
                            longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
  
 As pointed out at the beginning of this section, the estimates provide weak evidence that 
household incomes have increased significantly, which suggests a stagnant income 
distribution. To summarize the findings in this section, I find that income persistence or income 
immobility is indeed strong. For instance, the numbers presented in Table 4.2 suggest that about 
half of the household population who were in extreme poverty in 2003 remained in the same 
status in 2009, while some 23% of the households that were classified rich in 2003 remained 
in the same position six years after. Stronger income status persistence emerge when one looks 
at the transition matrix based on income quintiles. In most of these cases, the entries in the 
main diagonal tend to be the largest in any row, suggesting substantial immobility. 
Nevertheless, the distribution of household income in the Philippines is much more dynamic 
than conventionally perceived based on the growth of average per capita household income. In 
both absolute and relative terms, I find that a considerable number of initially poor people have 
managed to move out of poverty while some initially rich people experienced negative income 
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movements. In addition, a considerable number of middle class households have either fallen 
into poverty or have managed to move up the income ranks. Remarkably, for a given number 
of people that experienced positive income movements at any point in the income distribution, 
a commensurate number of people observed negative income movements. This behaviour 
contributed to a slow pace of improvement in average incomes. However, income mobility is 
contributing to a gradual reduction in long-run inequality. For instance, I find that those who 
are in the bottom 20% experienced slightly better mobility. However, for the remainder of the 
population, the observed mobility has a mean-reversion effect, which suggests that a significant 
portion of the observed mobility is driven by transitory fluctuations. I turn to this issue in the 
next section.   
4.3   Discussion 
Is the observed income mobility driven by permanent income dynamics or transitory 
income fluctuations? For instance, it is possible that the global financial crisis that began in 
2008 might have caused a transitory income shock, especially for the richest segment of the 
population. This would explain why many rich people experienced significant income declines 
in 2009. To answer this question, I replicate Table 4.2 using 2003-2006 and 2006-2009 as 
reference periods, which allows us to examine income mobility before and after the global 
financial crisis. The results show that income persistence was stronger before the crisis 
especially in the bottom and top income tiers. Unlike the poor and rich people, middle income 
people were less mobile from 2006 to 2009. It is possible that during this period, middle income 
people were using their savings as buffer against the economic shocks.  
From 2003 to 2006, the country’s economy measured in terms of GDP per capita 
increased by an annual rate of 2.04%. Despite this, (absolute) poverty increased during this 
period. Several studies point to potential contributing factors. For instance, Reyes et al. (2011) 
noted that the family size of chronically poor households increased faster than their real 
incomes. Consequently, the reduced income per member pushed these households into more 
severe poverty. Estimates from labour force survey also reveal that labour outcomes seem to 
have deteriorated during this period. In particular, labour participation rate decreased from 
66.7% in 2003 to 64.2% in 2006 (WDI 2013) while the proportion of employed persons 
working less than 40 hours per week rose by 1.5 percentage points based from my estimates 
using the labour force survey. The share of the employed population engaged in unpaid family 
employment also increased from 10% to 11.5% over the three year period. Because households 
of lower economic status rely mostly on income from labour, it is not surprising to note that 
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the inferior job quality has been accompanied by increased poverty. Santos (2008) surmised 
that the expanded coverage of the value tax, which began in 2005, may have also resulted in 
higher poverty rates as the resulting inflation reduced the real income of the poor. Virola (2008) 
identified climate-induced shocks as another factor contributing to the downward mobility 
experienced by households in the low-income range.  
The results presented in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 portray a stronger income persistence at the 
top of the income pyramid before the financial crisis. This may be attributed to the fact that 
much of the economic growth observed during this period occurred in high productivity sectors 
while the growth in the agriculture sector where the poor households are concentrated remained 
sluggish (Canlas et al. 2009).  
From 2006 to 2009, GDP per capita increased at an annual rate of 2.19%, slightly higher 
than the 2003-2006 growth rate. Relative to 2003-2006, poverty persistence was significantly 
lower during this latter period. This outcome may be partially attributed to the expansion of 
poverty reduction efforts by the national government. For instance, the coverage of the 
Conditional Cash Transfer program expanded from covering 161 municipalities in 2008 to 277 
municipalities in 2009 (Virola 2008). Like the poor, middle income households also 
experienced more positive income mobility prospects. This may also be explained by the 
improvement in quality of employment in various labour market indicators during this period. 
For instance, vulnerable employment decreased from 44.5% in 2003 to 42.6% in 2006 (WDI 
2014), while the proportion of employed persons working less than 40 hours per week 
decreased from 38% in 2006 to 35.4% in 2009. Wages, particularly in the government sector, 
also increased significantly during this period with the enactment of the Salary Standardization 
Law.44 However, the gains observed during this period were partially offset by the food price 
and global financial crises in 2008. In particular, the significant increase in food prices in 2008 
pushed vulnerable households into poverty while the global financial crisis depressed the value 
of assets of middle income and rich households (Yap, Reyes & Cuenca 2009). Nevertheless, 
compared to other countries, the Philippines had shown more resilience to the adverse impact 
of the 2008 global financial crisis (ADB 2012a)45; which may explain why low to middle 
                                               
44 The Salary Standardization Law increased government employees’ salary to make it at par with their counterparts who are 
doing similar jobs in the private sector (TUCP 2009). 
45A report from ADB (2012a) identified several factors why the Philippines was not significantly affected by the financial 
crisis relative to other countries, especially those which also have a large number of households with at least one (international) 
migrant family member. First, ADB (2012a) surmised that since Filipino migrants were spread across the world, the negative 
impact of the crisis was less stark than in other countries whose migrant workers were mainly concentrated on the heavily 
affected countries.  Second, the buoyant demand for Filipino workers from a broad range of fields such as domestic services, 
health care, engineering and computer hardware and software development, lead to an increased deployment of Filipino 
migrant workers even during the financial crisis. 
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income households still experienced better income mobility prospects from 2006 to 2009 than 
the 2003-2006 period. 
 
Table 4.8 (Absolute) Income Transition Matrix, 2003-2006 
2
0
0
3
 
 
2006 
extreme 
poverty 
moderate 
poverty 
low 
middle 
income 
middle 
income 
upper 
middle 
income 
rich 
extreme 
poverty 0.6730 0.2757 0.0497 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 
moderate 
poverty 0.2591 0.5033 0.2207 0.0164 0.0004 0.0000 
low middle 
income 0.0331 0.2219 0.5840 0.1564 0.0041 0.0006 
middle income 0.0035 0.0258 0.2801 0.5887 0.0923 0.0096 
upper middle 
income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0313 0.4975 0.3845 0.0868 
rich 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2271 0.4458 0.3271 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 
2006 and 2009. 
Notes: Extreme poverty - US$1.25/day or lower;  moderate poverty - US$1.25 to US$2; lower middle income – US$2 to US$4;  
middle income – US$4 to US$10; upper middle income –US$10 to US$20; rich - exceeding US$20/day (rich).  
 
 
Table 4.9 (Absolute) Income Transition Matrix, 2006-2009 
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2009 
extreme 
poverty 
moderate 
poverty 
low 
middle 
income 
middle 
income 
upper 
middle 
income 
rich 
extreme 
poverty 0.5581 0.3518 0.0893 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 
moderate 
poverty 0.1687 0.4752 0.3361 0.0197 0.0002 0.0000 
low middle 
income 0.0171 0.1622 0.6295 0.1845 0.0064 0.0003 
middle income 0.0010 0.0170 0.2446 0.6373 0.0945 0.0057 
upper middle 
income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0490 0.5305 0.3564 0.0641 
rich 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2704 0.5089 0.2207 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 
2006 and 2009. 
Notes: Extreme poverty - US$1.25/day or lower;  moderate poverty - US$1.25 to US$2; lower middle income – US$2 to US$4;  
middle income – US$4 to US$10; upper middle income –US$10 to US$20; rich - exceeding US$20/day (rich).  
 
While household income distribution in the Philippines is much more dynamic than 
conventionally perceived, income mobility has been lacklustre compared with other 
developing countries. Latin American countries such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Costa 
Rica also have high levels of income inequality. However, in the past 15 years, these countries 
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have experienced significantly more upward mobility (Ferreira et al. 2013). In contrast, income 
mobility in the Philippines has been characterized by offsetting forces of upward and 
downward mobility. While high economic growth contributed to upward mobility of some 
households, many man-made and natural crises and the lack of inclusive growth have pushed 
a large number of households into poverty. This finding is consistent with findings from 
previous studies suggesting that the country has been ineffective in minimizing poverty inflows 
during income shocks because of the lack of social protection services and inefficient 
redistribution policies (Manasan 2009; Balisacan et al. 2010).  
 
4.4   Summary 
Recent estimates of macroeconomic indicators paint a vibrant Philippine economy. For 
instance, from 2009 to 2012, real GDP per capita grew by 4.1% annually. In the first quarter 
of 2013, total GDP expanded by 7.8%, faster than China (7.7%), Indonesia (6%), Thailand 
(5.3%) and Viet Nam (4.9%) (NEDA 2013). This outcome is in sharp contrast to the economic 
contraction that the country experienced in the 1980s and much higher than its modest growth 
performance in the 1990s and first half of 2000s. However, the rapid economic growth has yet 
to be manifest in the distribution of household income in the Philippines based on conventional 
indicators. For instance from 2009 to 2012, average real per capita household income barely 
moved (NSCB 2013b). At the same time, income inequality has remained persistently high 
over the past decade (ADB 2012b). Together, these indicators portray a stagnant household 
income distribution.  
This chapter has investigated this puzzle by examining the mobility patterns of household 
incomes in the Philippines. The contribution of examining household income dynamics in the 
Philippines is twofold.  First, studying household income mobility addresses the limitations of 
the conventional indicators that focus only on the features of the marginal distributions and 
how they change over time. However, marginal distributions usually fail to provide a good 
representation of the dynamic features of a country’s growth process. Second, measuring how 
much income mobility is present is important in gauging the impact of economic growth on 
living standards.  
The analyses provide a broad snapshot of the income mobility patterns in the Philippines 
from 2003 to 2009. The investigation provides three main findings. First, the distribution of 
household incomes in the Philippines is much more dynamic than conventionally thought. For 
instance, about 72% of the population moved into a different income decile and 53% moved 
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into a different quintile during the observation period. The average annual percentage change 
of income per capita is about 21%. Nevertheless, income persistence is strong. For instance, 
the correlation between the ranks in 2003 and 2009 is approximately 0.8. Second, the observed 
income mobility is characterized by high positive and negative mobility rates. Interestingly, 
the patterns of positive mobility are quite symmetric with the patterns of negative mobility 
throughout the income distribution. In other words, for every person who experienced an 
income increase at any point in the income distribution, there is another individual (or a 
commensurate number of individuals) who experienced an income decline. This finding means 
that the income gains experienced by a significant number of Filipinos during this period of 
economic of growth has been neutralized by the income reductions experienced by others. This 
offsetting of positive and negative income mobility heavily contributes to the static nature of 
the indicators of the income distribution at the aggregate level. Third, the empirical 
investigation also reveals that a non-negligible portion of the observed mobility is driven by 
fluctuations in the transitory component of income. This puts into question the sustainability 
of the observed economic mobility.  
The findings from this chapter serve as roadmap for the remainder of this study. First, it 
is operationally useful to differentiate persistent and transient poverty to be able provide 
optimal intervention programs for the varying needs of the poor. Thus, Chapter 5 examines the 
duration of poverty experiences of Filipinos. Second, while I find evidence that the country’s 
poor have experienced slightly better income mobility prospects, an important task for policy-
targeting is to be able examine the profile of upwardly and downwardly income mobile 
individuals. Chapter 6 discusses this topic. Third, a good understanding of the factors that 
contribute to income mobility is instructive for devising policies that would distribute the 
benefits of economic growth more equitably.  Thus, Chapter 7 identifies the proximate 
determinants of income mobility in the Philippines. Fourth, as households in the Philippines 
heavily rely on earnings from employment, there is a need to investigate the status of quality 
of employment in the country and its role in fostering more sustainable positive mobility. An 
examination of the effectiveness of existing social safety nets in minimizing economic 
vulnerabilities is also warranted as the results of this chapter show that both positive and 
negative mobility are common features of the country’s income dynamics. This topic is 
examined in Chapter 8. Fifth, it is operationally useful to provide a longitudinal perspective 
when examining the evolution of income or any other measure of living standards. In general, 
while static indicators of development are useful for a quick analytical assessment of economic 
progress, they hide a number of important features of the underlying development process. 
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However, to be able to provide a longitudinal perspective, panel data that track income or other 
measures of living standards of the same set of individuals are needed. However, many 
developing countries do not have adequate panel data because it is often costly to collect. The 
pseudo-panel estimation approach discussed in Chapter 9 is a good example of a methodology 
for exploiting the information available from repeated cross-sectional survey data more 
optimally to answer questions that are conventionally answered by longitudinal data.  
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Appendix 4.1 Mobility of Household Incomes  
 
In this section, I briefly examine the mobility patterns in the Philippines using household 
income data. There are some advantages in using household income rather than expenditure to 
measure poverty, inequality and mobility. For instance, it is arguably easier to link income with 
socio-economic policies because income can be decomposed into components such as earnings 
from employment and receipts from government transfers -- things that concern socio-
economic planners. Furthermore, it is also possible to measure poverty, inequality and mobility 
at finer levels of disaggregation using income data collected from administrative systems.  
However, using income as a welfare measure has disadvantages too. For instance, since income 
is generally more sensitive to erratic fluctuations (Jefferson 2012), it is intuitive to expect more 
mobility using household income data than expenditure-based estimates. Additionally, the 
proportion of people who are classified as poverty-vulnerable tend to be higher using income-
based measures. Nevertheless, this conclusion is not impeccable as there are studies that found 
more mobility using expenditure data (Gradin, Canto & del Rio 2008). The objective of this 
section is to briefly compare the differences in mobility patterns between household 
expenditure and income in the Philippines. 
Appendix Figure 4.1 presents the mobility curve based on household income data. The 
mobility pattern is remarkably similar when it is compared with the expenditure-based mobility 
curve shown in Figure 4.2. The upward mobility curve presented in Appendix Figure 4.1 is 
generally symmetric with the downward mobility curve which implies that downward mobility 
offsets upward mobility. As expected, I also observe higher mobility rates using income data 
as evidenced by higher values of Foster & Rothbaum’s (2012) mobility indices. This is also 
confirmed from the various mobility indicators presented in Appendix Table 4.2.  
Using the same income thresholds to distinguish extreme poverty, moderate poverty, low 
middle income, middle income, upper middle income and rich, I replicate the absolute mobility 
matrix presented in Table 4.2 using household income. The results are shown in Appendix 
Table 4.1. About half of the people living in extreme poverty in 2003 still remained extremely 
poor in 2009, 35% moved to moderate poverty while the rest entered middle income status. 
This is approximately the same with the estimate that I calculated using expenditure data. 
Interestingly, income persistence among the rich seems to be stronger when using income data. 
In particular, 31% of the initially rich in 2003 remained rich in 2009 which is higher than the 
23% estimated using expenditure data.  
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Appendix Figure A0.1 Mobility Curve Using Household Income Data, 2003-2009 
 
Source: Author’s computations using household income per capita data from the longitudinal subsample  
of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
 
Appendix Table A0.1 (Absolute) Household Income Transition Matrix, 2003-2009 
2
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2009 
extreme 
poverty 
moderate 
poverty 
low 
middle 
income 
middle 
income 
upper 
middle 
income 
rich 
extreme 
poverty 0.4952 0.3530 0.1406 0.01 0.0000 0.0012 
moderate 
poverty 0.2257 0.4047 0.3147 0.0536 0.0012 0.0000 
low middle 
income 0.0553 0.1927 0.5288 0.2126 0.0090 0.0016 
middle income 0.0052 0.0359 0.2893 0.5384 0.1156 0.0156 
upper middle 
income 0.0000 0.0030 0.0411 0.5056 0.3616 0.0887 
rich 0.0000 0.0000 0.0366 0.3163 0.3359 0.3113 
Source: Author’s computations using household income per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 
2006 and 2009 
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Appendix Table A4.2. Selected Indicators of Mobility, 2003-2009 
Income mobility indicator Income Expenditure 
Average number of vingtiles 
moved  (non-directional) 
2.91 2.77 
0.04 0.03 
Average number of vingtiles 
moved (directional) 
0 0 
0.06 0.05 
Proportion of population 
remaining in leading diagonals  
0.14 0.15 
0.005 0.005 
Proportion of population moving 
one vingtile up 
0.11 0.11 
0.005 0.005 
Proportion of population moving 
one vingtile down 
0.11 0.12 
0.005 0.005 
Proportion of population moving 
two vingtiles up 
0.09 0.08 
0.004 0.004 
Proportion of population moving 
two vingtiles down 
0.09 0.09 
0.004 0.004 
Proportion of population moving at 
least three vingtiles up 
0.23 0.23 
0.006 0.006 
Proportion of population moving at 
least three vingtiles down 
0.23 0.22 
0.006 0.006 
Correlation of income ranks 0.77*** 0.8*** 
Average absolute change            
|Income2009 - Income2003| 
672.61 492.68 
20.04 13.69 
Average absolute percentage 
change |Income2009 - 
Income2003|/Income2003 
0.49 0.41 
0.01 
0.006 
Average income change            
(Income2009 - Income2003) 
25.98 33.07 
22.11 15.32 
Average percentage change           
(Income2009 - 
Income2003)/Income2003 
0.21 0.16 
0.01 0.008 
                        Source: Author’s computations using household income and expenditure per capita data from the  
                       longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
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Chapter 5 How Long Do the Poor Stay in Poverty? 
 
5.1  Introduction 
Official headline statistics of poverty in the Philippines are usually presented as a cross-
sectional snapshot picture of disadvantage (NSCB 2013a). These static measures describe 
poverty in the country as a one-time event, and ignore the persistence and recurrence of poverty 
over time. However, the poor are not all the same: some experience disadvantage as a 
temporary once-off event, others experience recurring episodes of disadvantage, and others 
endure longer spells of socio-economic deprivation and the associated long-lasting grip of 
social exclusion. Overall, emerging from poverty is not a simple rags to riches story because 
moving out of poverty today does not completely remove the risk of falling back into economic 
dearth in the future. This chapter further probes the results from Chapter 4 suggesting that 
households with lower incomes in the Philippines have experienced slightly better income 
mobility prospects than the rest of the population but this may not be enough to set forth a 
virtuous cycle of development that will permanently improve the lives of more than four 
million poor Filipino households (NSCB 2013b) and put the Philippines on-track of its goal of 
becoming the next Asian Tiger. This is done by examining the factors that characterize 
intertemporal income poverty, i.e., duration and frequency of episodes that households spend 
below the poverty line.  
A household’s intertemporal poverty experience can either be persistent (chronic) or 
transient. Persistent poverty could be further transmitted across generations giving way to 
vicious cycles of socio-economic hardship while transient poverty is characterized by a 
household’s inability of meeting its minimum basic needs from time to time.  High levels of 
persistent poverty are harmful to a country’s long-term growth prospects and thus, governments 
and international development community alike, aim to eradicate persistent poverty. This 
commitment is exemplified in the MDGs which identify eradication of extreme poverty as its 
first objective (UN 2014). Nevertheless, tackling transient poverty is also important because it 
can also slow down a country’s growth momentum (Jalan & Ravallion 2000). When outlining 
intervention programs, it is important that policy planners differentiate between persistent and 
transient poverty as the policy interventions necessary to ameliorate these different types of 
disadvantage may be very different.  For instance, providing social safety nets to minimize the 
adverse impact of socio-economic shocks may not be an optimal strategy to reduce 
disadvantage amongst people who have experienced uninterrupted, even intergenerational, 
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spells of disadvantage. Similarly, providing long-term social assistance to those who are 
transiently poor may not be cost-effective. The key message is that no poverty and disadvantage 
reduction programs will serve as a “one-size-fits-all” policy lever, and hence probing beyond 
cross-sectional measures of poverty and examining its intertemporal patterns can guide 
efficient and cost-effective policymaking decisions.  
Given the importance of examining intertemporal poverty for policy-making, several 
studies have attempted to incorporate a longitudinal perspective in the analysis of poverty in 
the Philippines using either actual panel or pseudo-panel data (Balisacan & Pernia 2002; 
Tabunda & Albert 2002; Albacea & Gironella 2003; Reyes et al. 2011; Bayudan-Dacuycuy 
and Lim 2013). However, they fall short of examining the sensitivity of their estimates to 
different methodologies, different types of poverty indices and different poverty line 
specifications, to which I hereafter refer as measurement parameters. Examining the robustness 
of intertemporal poverty estimates is important because previous poverty estimates highly 
depend on the measurement parameters used (Kurosaki 2006). In addition, knowledge on the 
robustness of estimates provides more nuanced insight into poverty and disadvantage patterns 
which in turn, could help researchers to better communicate key policy messages.  
The discussion in this chapter contributes to the existing poverty literature in the 
Philippines by providing a broader examination of intertemporal poverty using a more 
complete set of analytical tools. In particular, the chapter addresses the following substantive 
and methodological questions: 
Substantive 
(i) Is poverty in the Philippines characterized by long episodes of poverty spells or 
transitory movements around the poverty line?  
(ii)  What is the spatial distribution of intertemporal poverty in the Philippines?  
(iii)  Aside from geography, what are the characteristics of intertemporally poor? 
Methodological 
(iv) Are the observed patterns sensitive to the estimation parameters? 
(v) How robust are the poverty rankings to the parameters used in the estimation 
process?  
5.2   Intertemporal Poverty in the Philippines 
Like many developing countries, poverty reduction is explicitly articulated in the 
Philippines’s development plan (Reyes et al. 2011). Over several decades, the country has been 
working to reduce poverty by implementing a multitude of anti-poverty programs which aim 
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to improve the quality of life of the poor (Schelzig 2005; Aldaba 2009; Bayudan-Dacuycuy & 
Lim 2013).  From 1986 to 1992, the administration of then President Corazon Aquino 
implemented three major intervention programs which include the Tulong sa Tao (Help for the 
People), the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and the Community 
Employment and Development. From 1992 to 1998, the Ramos administration implemented 
the Social Reform Agenda which focused on the development of the twenty poorest provinces 
and the poorest sectors. From 1998 to 2001, the Estrada Administration launched the Lingap 
Para sa Mahirap (Care for the Poor) which provided assistance to the poorest families from 
each local government unit.  From 2006 to 2010, the Arroyo administration started the Kapit 
Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan (KBLK) (Linking Arms Against Poverty Program) which offered 
socio-economic services to the poor. The current Aquino administration is implementing the 
Social Reform Program (SRP) which provides conditional cash transfers to families that satisfy 
certain criteria. While most of these programs occupy the centrepiece of each administration’s 
platform, each program has its own thrust. For instance, the CARP focused on agricultural 
development, KBLK paid attention on improving delivery of social services (Schelzig 2005) 
while SRP is spending effort on institution-building and promoting effective participation in 
governance (NEDA 2011).   
During the period that these programs were implemented, the Philippines noted a 
reduction in poverty rates. For instance, I noted from Chapter 2 that the proportion of the 
population living below US$2 a day dropped by approximately 20 percentage points between 
1985 and 2009. However, it can also be noted that the pace of poverty reduction in the 
Philippines is significantly lower than other countries’ pace and this process has been painfully 
slow despite faster economic growth that the Philippines experienced during the past decade 
(Aldaba 2009). There are several possible reasons that could explain why poverty is barely 
declining amidst faster economic growth rates in the country. First, it is possible that most of 
the poor have incomes far below the poverty line and it takes a very long time before the 
benefits of economic growth trickle down to the persistently poor. Second, it is possible that 
the poor don’t contribute much to economic growth because they are concentrated on low 
productivity sectors due to their limited skills. Third, as suggested in Chapter 4, even if many 
low income people are moving into and out of poverty transiently, the number of people falling 
into poverty may offset the number of people moving out of poverty at any given time. These 
scenarios call for different policy response; the first two should focus on long-term human 
capital development programs because it will be hard for the persistently poor to get out of 
poverty by solely relying on their efforts while the other scenario should be geared towards 
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minimizing recurring socio-economic vulnerabilities. However, Reyes (2002) identified that 
one of the bottlenecks in policy planning that has contributed to the slow poverty reduction is 
that the previous intervention programs were not well-targeted and tend to discount the 
heterogeneous needs of the poor. That study argued that there was no clear guideline where 
long-term human development efforts and short-term risk management initiatives should be 
channelled. This issue could be attributed to the lack of intertemporal poverty data that can be 
used to inform policies. As pointed out in Chapter 3, socio-economic planners in the 
Philippines had to rely on poverty data collected from cross-sectional surveys for many years 
and it was only in 2003 when the FIES, the data source of official poverty estimates, was 
redesigned to collect nationally-representative panel data. With cross-sectional surveys, 
researchers were unable to measure intertemporal poverty directly. Nevertheless, there were 
some efforts to examine the intertemporal patterns of poverty even before FIES was redesigned 
by analysing either pseudo-panel data (e.g., Balisacan and Pernia 2002; Albacea & Gironella 
2003) or actual longitudinal data from one-shot surveys (e.g., Reyes 2002a; Tabunda & Albert 
2002), however, the data limitations made it hard for these studies to generalize their results to 
larger populations.  
More recently, Reyes et al. (2011) and Bayudan-Dacuycuy & Lim (2013) and used the 
panel data from the redesigned FIES to provide a more dynamic perspective of intertemporal 
poverty in the Philippines.  Both studies characterize the country’s poverty to be mostly 
persistent in nature. However, while they have addressed the limitations of previous research 
by providing direct survey estimates of persistent and transient poverty at the national-level, 
they also have critical limitations. First, both studies employed confining methodology as they 
solely relied on the spells approach only for measuring intertemporal poverty. As explained in 
Chapter 1, the spells approach narrowly focuses on frequency of poverty episodes over time 
and ignore the fact that people can “borrow” income from different time periods. Second, both 
studies restrictively measured poverty in terms of incidence or head count of poor. Third, both 
studies used the official poverty lines compiled by the government, the use of which remains 
debatable because the official poverty thresholds are based on different regional food menus 
which tend to make the resulting estimates inconsistent across regions (Bersales 2009).   
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by measuring intertemporal poverty 
using a more comprehensive set of analytical tools and measurement parameters. To do this, I 
adopt the spells and components approaches as described in Chapter 1. In addition, I measure 
intertemporal poverty in terms of incidence, depth and severity. Four different sets of poverty 
lines are used to examine the robustness of estimates to poverty line specifications. Examining 
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robustness of intertemporal poverty estimates is important for both methodological and 
substantive reasons. The existing literature suggests that the poverty estimates may vary 
significantly depending on measurement parameters (Grootaert & Kanbur 1995; JR 1998,  
McCulloch & Baulch 1999; Kurosaki 2006; Christiaesen & Shorrocks 2012). If robustness of 
the parameter estimates is not guaranteed, it is possible that the poverty levels reported are 
arbitrary leading to inaccurate interpretations and outcomes.46 For example, if the magnitude 
of poverty reported is higher or stagnant than it actually is, the business community may be 
dissuaded from investing in the country (Balisacan 1997).  
There are several examples of poverty reduction programs in the Philippines that rely on 
the reliability of poverty rankings. For example, only households living in selected 
municipalities from the 20 poorest provinces are eligible for the national government’s 
conditional cash transfer program during the first stages of its inception (Reyes & Tabuga 
2012). Other government agencies such as PhilHealth, a government-owned corporation that 
provides health insurance, as well as non-government agencies also use poverty rankings to 
identify areas that need priority assistance (Addawe, Martinez & Perez 2007). With the use of 
narrow estimation methodologies, it will be difficult to gauge whether these intervention 
programs that rely on poverty rankings are implemented optimally. 
 Another important contribution of this study is to provide estimates of intertemporal 
poverty at the sub-national level. Locating where the poor are is important for socio-economic 
planning. For one, it makes the delivery of social services more efficient and cost-effective 
(Kanbur 1987). It also helps exploit dynamic externalities and geographic spill-over effects of 
economic growth (Ravallion & Jalan 1996). However, previous studies such as that of Reyes 
et al. 2011 and Bayudan-Dacuycuy & Lim 2013 do not clarify whether the areas with the 
highest levels of total poverty are also the same location as those areas with the highest levels 
of persistent or transient poverty. This is important to know because policymakers may be more 
concerned on channelling resources to areas with slightly lower levels of total poverty but with 
more prevalent persistent poverty than areas with higher levels of total poverty but significantly 
lower poverty persistence. Considering that persistent and transient poverty call for different 
policy mix, this type of research will also improve the efficiency of poverty reduction programs 
by being able to target appropriate interventions to where these are needed.  
 
                                               
46 Recently, ADB (2014) released a report suggesting that poverty in Asia increased from 1.6 billion in 2005 to 1.8 billion in 
2010. This result contradicts a number of poverty assessments that were published by various international development 
agencies which suggest that poverty in the region has declined. Ravallion (2014) surmised that this contradiction stems from 
the measurement parameters used by ADB.   
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5.3   Methodology 
To provide a more comprehensive picture of the intertemporal poverty in the Philippines 
compared to previous studies, this chapter measures intertemporal poverty using the 
methodologies proposed by Jalan & Ravallion (JR) (1998), Duclos, Araar & Giles (DAG) 
(2010), Foster (2009) and Gradin, del Rio and Canto (GRC) (2012) as discussed in Chapter 
1.47  The second part of this chapter differentiates the characteristics of the persistently poor, 
transiently poor and non-poor by estimating multinomial logistic models. The dependent 
variable measures the intertemporal poverty status of each household and takes two forms as 
shown in (5.1). The first form evaluates poverty status using the components approach while 
the second form uses the spells approach. As pointed out in Chapter 1, under the components 
approach, a household is considered persistently poor if its longitudinally-averaged income 
falls below the specified poverty line, transiently poor if its longitudinally-averaged income is 
higher than the poverty line but at least one of its cross-sectional incomes fell below the poverty 
line and non-poor if the household never experienced income shortfall (below the poverty line). 
Under the spells approach, a household is considered persistently poor if at least two of its 
cross-sectional incomes fell below the poverty line, transiently poor if only one of its cross-
sectional incomes fell below the poverty line and non-poor if the household never experienced 
income shortfall. Each outcome of interest is regressed on several household characteristics 
such as the human capital available to the household, assets held by the household, access to 
basic services and geographic characteristics in the initial time period. These variables are 
included in the model because as discussed in Chapter 1, higher levels of human capital and 
assets, greater access to basic services and favourable geographic characteristics reduce 
poverty risk. For instance, it is well-established in the literature that higher levels of education 
expand socio-economic opportunities of poor Filipinos and thus, minimize the risk of staying 
in poverty for a long time (Maligalig et al. 2014). As discussed in Chapter 1 too, access to 
productive assets, basic services and spatial endowments can also be used to minimize the risk 
of long poverty spells (WB 2004; Schelzig 2005; WB 2013). Changes in these factors are also 
included as control variables in the regression models to capture for demographic and economic 
events (5.1). This is further discussed in Chapter 6.   
                                               
47  There are some limitations with regards to the measurement of poverty from the data. In particular, I do not have information 
about the poverty status of the households before the beginning of the observation period. Moreover, since I am using survey 
data conducted every three years, there is no way to know how people moved into and out of poverty in between the survey 
years. For instance, a household that is classified as poor in two consecutive survey years may have been non-poor in between. 
In other words, there is incomplete information about the duration of poverty because the data is censored. For simplicity, the 
discussion assumes that the observation periods follow a continuum.  
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(a) 𝑊 = {
0,   𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑠  𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟                 
 ,   𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟
2,   𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑒 𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟  
 
(b) 𝑊2 = {
0,   𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑠  𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟                 
 ,   𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟
2,   𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎 𝑠𝑖𝑒 𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟  
 
+ 𝛽3𝐴  𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖 𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝 𝑦 
𝑊𝑖 = 𝛽 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎   𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴  𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖 𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝 𝑦 
                          +𝛽5∆ 𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎   𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 + 𝛽6∆𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽7∆𝐴  𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖 𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                    (5.1) 
 
5.4   Empirical Results 
5.4.1     Intertemporal Poverty in the Philippines 
I begin with a presentation of cross-sectional estimates of poverty. Figure 5.1 plots the 
headcount poverty rate or the proportion of poor people in y-axis against different low income 
thresholds in the x-axis. I placed two vertical lines in the same figure to represent the lowest 
and highest poverty line under consideration in this study. Depending on the poverty line used, 
it is estimated that about 13% to 39% of the population can be considered poor in 2009 (Figure 
5.1). Furthermore, Table 5.1 presents headcount poverty rate, poverty gap, severity of poverty 
and Watts index using the four sets of poverty lines. Separate estimates are also provided for 
urban and rural areas. The estimates suggest that the poverty gap or average income shortfall 
is about 3% to 13% while the severity of poverty or average squared income shortfall is roughly 
1% to 5% of the poverty line in 2009. If all household incomes per capita were increased by 
2% per year, the estimates of Watts index suggest that poverty is expected to be eradicated 
after 8 to 9 years from 2009.48  Table 5.1 also indicates that poverty in the Philippines has a 
remarkable geographic feature. In particular, the proportion of poor in rural areas is about two 
to four times the headcount poverty rate in urban areas. The magnitude of income shortfall and 
the inequality among the poor are also significantly higher in rural areas than in urban areas. 
Hence, it is not surprising to note that from 2009, it will take about 13 years for all households 
in rural areas to exit US$2/day poverty compared to the 4 years needed for households from 
urban areas to accomplish the same feat, assuming a uniform 2% annual income growth.  
Although the numbers presented in Table 5.1 are useful for gauging how significant 
poverty is in the Philippines, they provide limited  information about poverty dynamics  over  
                                               
48  As explained earlier, the average exit time needed to exit poverty is computed by dividing the value of the Watts index by 
the expected income growth rate. For example, the Watts index value in 2009 using the US$2/day poverty line is 16.64. 
Dividing this by an assumed annual income growth rate of 2% will yield 8.32. This means that, under the assumption that all 
incomes grow at a uniform rate of 2% per year, US$2 poverty rate will be eradicated after 8.32 years.   
where poverty status is gauged based on the 
number of episodes spent in poverty 
 
where poverty status is gauged based on 
longitudinally-averaged income  
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time. For instance, the slight increase in poverty from 2003 to 2006 and minimal reduction 
between 2006 and 2009, do not readily imply limited movements into and out of poverty 
(Reyes et al. 2011). This can be proved by examining poverty transition rates presented in 
Tables 5.2 to 5.5. The rows in each table are divided into three main panels, from top to bottom, 
poverty transition rates between 2003 and 2006; 2006 and 2009; 2003 and 2009 while the 
columns present estimates for the national level as well as for urban and rural areas. 
The estimated poverty transition rates show a large degree of poverty inflow and outflow 
despite the minimal changes in the cross-sectional measures of poverty. For example, 75% of 
the population with incomes below US$2/day in 2003 were non-poor in 2009 while the other 
25% remained (US$2/day) poor. This highlights the importance of providing a longitudinal 
perspective when examining poverty.  
 
Poverty Estimates using the Components Approach 
In this section, I present the estimates of persistent and transient poverty using the JR and 
DAG approaches. As explained in Chapter 1, although both methodologies follow the 
components approach of measuring intertemporal poverty, they conceptualize transient poverty 
differently. The JR approach defines transient poverty as the residual when persistent poverty 
is subtracted from total poverty whereas DAG links transient poverty in terms of a person’s 
level of risk aversion.  
 
Figure 5.1 Headcount Poverty Curve, 2009 
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of   
FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
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Table 5.1 Cross-Sectional Measures of Poverty in the Philippines, 2003-2009 
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 
2006 and 2009. 
Note: Since these numbers are estimated from the longitudinal data, they are slightly different from the estimates presented 
in Chapter 2 which used pseudo-panel data. The numbers in smaller font size are standard errors.  
 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the results. For both figures, the rows correspond to the 
estimates for each of the four sets of poverty lines used in the computations while the columns 
correspond to the different measures of poverty estimated at the national, urban and rural levels. 
The height of the bars corresponds to the magnitude of intertemporal poverty wherein the dark-
shaded bars correspond to persistent poverty while the light-shaded bars correspond to transient 
poverty. 
Phils Urban Rural Phils Urban Rural Phils Urban Rural
US$1.25/day Poverty Line
18.29 6.54 29.67 19.25 7.32 30.80 15.40 6.54 23.97
0.55 0.59 0.85 0.06 0.62 0.86 0.54 0.63 0.82
4.47 1.19 7.65 4.74 1.53 7.85 3.15 1.17 5.07
0.17 0.14 0.29 0.18 0.17 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.24
1.63 0.36 2.86 1.66 0.47 2.81 0.99 0.31 1.65
0.08 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.11
5.68 1.44 9.79 5.94 1.86 9.90 3.85 1.37 6.24
0.24 0.18 0.41 0.24 0.22 0.40 0.19 0.17 0.32
US$2/day Poverty Line
40.52 21.68 58.78 43.55 25.01 61.52 39.19 22.08 55.78
0.71 0.96 0.88 0.72 1.03 0.87 0.71 1.00 0.89
14.24 6.04 22.19 15.12 7.00 22.99 12.53 6.03 18.83
0.30 0.33 0.44 0.31 0.36 0.44 0.28 0.34 0.41
6.51 2.35 10.54 6.86 2.74 10.85 5.26 2.28 8.15
0.18 0.16 0.28 0.18 0.19 0.28 0.15 0.16 0.24
19.62 7.81 31.05 20.72 9.10 31.99 16.64 7.72 25.28
0.46 0.46 0.70 0.47 0.51 0.70 0.41 0.47 0.61
0.5*Median Poverty Line
15.39 4.69 25.76 15.65 5.75 25.25 13.00 5.32 20.45
0.51 0.49 0.82 0.53 0.57 0.83 0.50 0.56 0.78
3.73 0.93 6.44 3.51 1.05 5.90 2.66 0.95 4.31
0.16 0.12 0.27 0.15 0.14 0.25 0.13 0.12 0.22
1.33 0.28 2.34 1.16 0.30 1.99 0.82 0.25 1.37
0.07 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.10
4.70 1.12 8.17 4.33 1.26 7.31 3.22 1.11 5.27
0.21 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.18 0.34 0.17 0.15 0.29
Official Poverty Line
27.00 12.42 41.13 28.19 14.01 41.93 28.41 15.16 41.25
0.64 0.80 0.90 0.66 0.85 0.90 0.66 0.89 0.91
7.15 2.75 11.42 7.44 3.12 11.63 7.24 3.53 10.83
0.21 0.22 0.34 0.22 0.25 0.35 0.22 0.26 0.33
2.71 0.89 4.47 2.78 1.03 4.47 2.59 1.16 3.98
0.11 0.10 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.10 0.11 0.17
9.21 3.38 14.85 9.51 3.86 14.99 9.14 4.34 13.79
0.30 0.29 0.49 0.31 0.33 0.49 0.30 0.34 0.46
Watts Index
Severity of Poverty
Watts Index
Headcount poverty rate
Poverty gap
Severity of Poverty
Poverty gap
Severity of Poverty
Watts Index
Headcount poverty rate
Poverty gap
Headcount poverty rate
Poverty gap
Severity of Poverty
Watts Index
Headcount poverty rate
Poverty Measure
2003 2006 2009
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There are several interesting features that can be drawn from the estimates based on the 
JR procedure. First, most of the indicators show that poverty is mostly persistent in nature. For 
instance, about 96% of the total observed US$2/day poverty is persistent and only 4% can be 
attributed to the effect of transitory income shortfall. Interestingly, the relative importance of 
persistent poverty declines with the poverty line. For example, if US$1.25/day poverty line is 
used instead of US$2/day, the relative importance of headcount poverty persistence drops to 
87%.  
 
Table 5.2 Poverty Transition Matrix, US$1.25/Day Poverty Line
  Philippines Urban Rural 
  Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor 
2003 2006 
Poor 67.21 32.79 54.84 45.16 69.86 30.14 
Non-Poor 8.51 91.49 4.00 96.00 14.33 85.67 
2006 2009 
Poor 55.69 44.31 47.56 52.44 57.57 42.43 
Non-Poor 5.79 94.21 3.30 96.70 9.02 90.98 
2003 2009 
Poor 49.42 50.58 35.68 64.32 52.36 47.64 
Non-Poor 7.78 92.22 4.50 95.50 12.00 88.00 
 Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal  
   subsample of  FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
Table 5.3 Poverty Transition Matrix, US$2/Day Poverty Line 
  Philippines Urban Rural 
  Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor 
2003 2006 
Poor 84.64 15.36 75.77 24.23 87.81 12.19 
Non-Poor 15.56 84.44 10.96 89.04 24.02 75.98 
2006 2009 
Poor 76.14 23.86 66.57 33.43 79.91 20.09 
Non-Poor 10.69 89.31 7.24 92.76 17.20 82.80 
2003 2009 
Poor 75.28 24.72 64.05 35.95 79.30 20.70 
Non-Poor 14.61 85.39 10.47 89.53 22.24 77.76 
   Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal  
   subsample of  FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
Table 5.4 Poverty Transition Matrix, Half of Median Poverty Line 
  Philippines Urban Rural 
  Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor 
2003 2006 
Poor 61.61 38.39 51.35 48.65 63.42 36.58 
Non-Poor 7.30 92.70 3.51 96.49 12.01 87.99 
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2006 2009 
Poor 55.58 44.42 52.26 47.74 56.32 43.68 
Non-Poor 5.10 94.90 2.46 97.54 8.33 91.67 
2003 2009 
Poor 47.41 52.59 35.46 64.54 49.52 50.48 
Non-Poor 6.74 93.26 3.84 96.16 10.36 89.64 
   Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal  
   subsample of  FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
Table 5.5 Poverty Transition Matrix, Government Poverty Line 
  Philippines Urban Rural 
  Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor 
2003 2006 
Poor 71.81 28.19 61.66 38.34 74.77 25.23 
Non-Poor 12.06 87.94 7.25 92.75 18.99 81.01 
2006 2009 
Poor 72.10 27.90 65.21 34.79 74.33 25.67 
Non-Poor 11.26 88.74 7.00 93.00 17.36 82.64 
2003 2009 
Poor 67.07 32.93 57.00 43.00 70.02 29.98 
Non-Poor 14.11 85.89 9.22 90.78 21.15 78.85 
   Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal  
   subsample of  FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
Figure 5.2 Intertemporal Poverty Estimates using the JR Approach 
 
    Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES  
    2003, 2006 and 2009
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Figure 5.3 Intertemporal Poverty Estimates using the 
DAG Approach 
 
      Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of  FIES  
      2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
The share of transient poverty also increases when we shift from poverty incidence to 
poverty gap and poverty severity. In particular, about 10% to 29% of the poverty gap and 16% 
to 38% of the poverty severity can be linked with transient poverty. Second, transient poverty 
is more common in urban areas than in rural areas. In urban areas, transient poverty accounts 
for approximately 11% to 29% of its total headcount poverty rate while only 2% to 10% of the 
rural poverty can be attributed to transitory downturn in monetary fortunes.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the JR approach does not differentiate a household with a 
relatively stable income flow from a household with highly fluctuating income as long as their 
longitudinally-average incomes are equal. Hence, an interesting question to be asked is how 
will these poverty estimates be affected when we take into account people’s risk aversion to 
unstable income flows? The DAG approach is used to investigate this issue. In the following 
analysis, I set the aversion parameter α = 1.5, 2 or 2.5, where higher values imply greater risk 
aversion.  These values imply that households are not risk-neutral.49 Figure 5.3 presents the 
poverty estimates. The rows identify the poverty lines used while the columns represent the 
intertemporal poverty estimates for different levels of risk aversion to income fluctuations at 
                                               
49 A value of 1 for the risk aversion parameter α would imply that all households are risk-neutral.  
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the national, urban and rural level. Again the height of the dark-shaded and light-shaded bars 
correspond to the magnitude of persistent and transient poverty, respectively. At α = 1.5 and 
using US$2/day poverty line, the height of the light-shaded bar suggests that households would 
be willing to increase the average poverty gap by 1 percentage point just to remove the 
variability in the income shortfall observed from 2003 to 2009. If I divide the height of the 
light-shaded bar by the total height of the stacked bar, I find that the estimated share of transient 
poverty based on the DAG approach is roughly 5% to 7% of the total poverty when α= 1.5 and 
increases to 8% to 9% when α= 2.5. In other words, as households become more risk-averse, 
transient poverty becomes more common.  
 
Poverty Estimates using the Spells Approach 
Table 5.6 presents all possible poverty spells in years 2003, 2006 and 2009 with respect 
to different poverty lines. The results show that about 46% to 76% of the population never 
experienced poverty, 12% to 15% were poor for only one survey year, 9% to 13% were poor 
for two years and 6% to 28% were consistently poor for all three years. Following the 
conventional spells approach, these numbers may also be used to estimate persistent and 
transient poverty. If I define poverty persistence as being poor for at least two survey years, the 
estimates presented in Table 5.6 suggest that between 16% to 41% of the population were 
persistently poor. Despite the differences in the methodologies, it is interesting to note that the 
spells-based estimates of poverty persistence are roughly the same as the estimated proportion 
of population who were persistently poor based on the JR approach.50 Both methodologies 
suggest that poverty is not just once-in-a-lifetime experience wherein a significant fraction of 
the population experience poverty for a long time period. However, a different story emerges 
when I compare the estimates of total poverty. Following the spells approach, total poverty 
would correspond to those who were poor for at least one time period. Given this definition, 
total poverty is estimated to be approximately 29% to 54% of the population.  These numbers 
are significantly higher relative to the estimates of total poverty based on the components 
approach, which placed poverty at around 18% to 41%. Consequently, the relative importance 
of persistent and transient poverty also differ across these two estimation approaches. In 
particular, the results based on the conventional spells approach suggest that approximately 
58% to 77% of the total (headcount) poverty observed is persistent, whereas the components  
 
                                               
50 The estimated proportion of population who are persistently poor based on the JR approach is 15% using the US$1.25 
poverty line and 40% using the US$2 threshold.  
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Table 5.6 Population Share by Intertemporal Poverty Status 
 
           Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of   
           FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
           Note: P - Poor, NP - Non-Poor. The numbers in smaller font size are standard errors.  
 
 
 
                                          Poverty Status                                           
(2003, 2006, 2009) Phils Urban Rural Phils Urban Rural
7.75 1.91 13.4 28.33 12.33 43.84
0.39 0.35 0.67 0.65 0.79 0.90
4.55 1.67 7.33 5.97 4.1 7.78
0.29 0.29 0.48 0.33 0.45 0.48
1.29 0.42 2.14 2.18 1.56 2.78
0.16 0.16 0.28 0.20 0.27 0.29
4.7 2.53 6.81 4.05 3.7 4.39
0.29 0.37 0.44 0.27 0.42 0.34
2.97 1.57 4.33 4.83 4.32 5.32
0.25 0.31 0.40 0.33 0.53 0.41
3.98 2.17 5.74 4.42 4.26 4.58
0.27 0.34 0.41 0.30 0.48 0.34
3.38 2.64 4.11 3.86 3.87 3.84
0.28 0.42 0.38 0.30 0.48 0.36
71.37 87.08 56.15 46.37 65.86 27.47
0.65 0.81 0.91 0.73 1.11 0.79
Phils Urban Rural Phils Urban Rural
5.91 1.33 10.34 15.5 6.12 26.36
0.35 0.28 0.61 0.54 0.60 0.83
3.58 1.07 6 4.05 1.93 6.24
0.26 0.23 0.45 0.27 0.30 0.43
1.39 0.33 2.42 2.72 1.32 4.16
0.16 0.13 0.28 0.23 0.26 0.37
4.52 1.95 7 5.2 3.68 6.83
0.28 0.32 0.45 0.30 0.42 0.43
2.8 1.67 3.88 5.02 3.48 6.68
0.26 0.34 0.39 0.32 0.47 0.44
3.38 1.67 5.03 4.13 3.19 5.17
0.25 0.31 0.39 0.27 0.39 0.37
2.91 1.99 3.81 5.69 5 6.52
0.25 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.51 0.44
75.53 89.98 61.52 61.08 80.29 44.03
0.62 0.73 0.90 0.72 1.02 0.88
P,NP,NP
NP,P,P
NP,P,NP
NP,NP,P
NP,NP,NP
NP,P,NP
NP,NP,P
NP,NP,NP
P,P,P
P,P,NP
P,NP,P
$1.25 poverty line $2 poverty line
Half of median poverty line Gov't poverty line
P,P,P
P,P,NP
P,NP,P
P,NP,NP
NP,P,P
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approach suggests that persistent poverty account for 84% to 96% of total (headcount) 
poverty.51 
As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the concepts of persistent and transient 
should not be used interchangeably because they are measuring different aspects of socio-
economic disadvantage. Measuring persistent and transient poverty at the national-level is the 
first step to understand the dynamic feature of poverty in the country. Overall, the results 
presented in this section suggest that poverty in the Philippines can be considered to be mostly 
persistent in nature. Nevertheless, the magnitude of transient poverty is not negligible. The 
findings of the robustness checks point that the share of transient to total observed poverty 
tends to increase dramatically as I increase the poverty line and/or use a poverty index that is 
more sensitive to the illfare of the poorest of the poor.     
5.4.2   Where are the Persistently and Transiently Poor? 
This section revisits the spatial distribution of intertemporal poverty in the Philippines. 
Similarly to the previous section, estimates are presented for both the components and spells 
approaches. This allows us to evaluate the robustness of spatial poverty rankings across the 
methodologies considered in this study. Although this section does not provide more 
disaggregated estimates beyond the regional-level due to sample size restrictions, the analysis 
identifies proximate areas that could be potentially useful for the targeting of poverty-reduction 
programs.52 
 
Components Approach 
Figure 5.4 shows the spatial distribution of intertemporal headcount poverty while Figure 
5.5 also presents the estimates for intertemporal poverty gap and poverty severity for the 17 
geographic regions in the Philippines using the JR approach. The columns represent the 
estimated incidence, depth and severity of poverty while the row correspond to the different 
poverty lines used. One take on the results is that, when longitudinal average income data is 
used, it provides evidence that is consistent with an orthodox view that most of the persistently 
poor live in the regions with the lowest average per capita income. In particular, I find that 
                                               
51  Had I defined persistent poverty as those who experienced poverty for two consecutive survey years, the relative importance 
of persistent poverty would be approximately 50% to 73%.  
52 A more informative exercise is to provide estimates at the administrative level (e.g., provinces or municipalities). However, 
the small sample sizes may lead to high standard errors of intertemporal poverty estimates. In this context, there are several 
small area estimation techniques that can be used (Elbers, Lanjouw & Lanjouw 2003; Martinez 2013; Martinez, Lucio & 
Vilaruel 2014), etc. This is reserved for future research. 
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Regions 4B, 9, Caraga and ARMM have the highest prevalence of total poverty and poverty 
persistence. Not surprisingly, these regions have the lowest longitudinally-averaged income 
per capita (Appendix Table A5.3). On the other hand, NCR, the region with the highest 
longitudinally-averaged income, posted the lowest total poverty and poverty persistence rate. 
Other regions with low poverty persistence are also from the northern Philippines which 
include Regions 3 and 4A.  
Focusing on the robustness of the results, I find that the regional ranking of poverty 
persistence is relatively uniform across varying measurement parameters. Nevertheless, there 
are slight changes in the rankings that are worth pointing out when measurement parameters 
are changed. For example, the magnitude of persistent poverty tends to be higher in Region 9 
when lower poverty lines or poverty measures that are more sensitive to the ill fare of the 
poorest of the poor are used. The opposite happens for Caraga wherein poverty persistence 
decreases when either lower poverty lines or more inequality-sensitive measures are used.  
A high level of transient poverty indicates how erratic a household income flow is over 
time. Understanding how erratic income flows create poverty cycles in certain areas is 
important to be able to prevent economic stagnation. Thus, like persistent poverty, it is also 
instructive to examine the regional distribution of transient poverty. Interestingly, a separate 
examination of transient poverty reveals a very different picture compared to what the estimates 
of poverty persistence portray. Both Figures 5.4 and 5.5 highlight that it is not necessarily the 
case that regions with the highest persistent poverty are also the same regions with the highest 
transient poverty. Furthermore, in contrast to poverty persistence wherein the regional ranking 
is quite robust under various measurement parameter specifications, the regional ranking with 
respect to transient poverty heavily depends on the poverty line and type of poverty measure 
used. For example, NCR ranks third among the regions with the highest proportion of 
households that are transiently poor with respect to the US$2 poverty line but it ranks bottom 
with respect to other measures of poverty persistence. On the other hand, ARMM posted the 
lowest transient poverty with respect to US$2 poverty threshold.53 
When aversion to income fluctuations is taken into account by using the DAG approach 
the same regions with high and low persistent and transient poverty can be identified (Figure 
5.6).  
 
                                               
53  As pointed out in Chapter 1, the JR approach does not ensure that the total poverty is always greater than or equal to poverty 
persistence. This happens in the case of Region 7 and ARMM wherein the computed US$2 transient poverty rates are negative. 
Appendix Table A5.3 provides adjusted estimates which ensure that all poverty estimates are non-negative.  
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Spells Approach 
Figure 5.7 shows the estimates of selected indicators of intertemporal poverty following the 
spells approach. In particular, the first column presents the duration-adjusted poverty 
headcount ratio proposed by Foster (2009) while the second and third columns present selected 
indices from the class of intertemporal poverty measures proposed by GRC (2012). As 
explained in Section 1.4.1, the intertemporal poverty measures proposed by Foster (2009) and 
GRC (2012) address the limitations of conventional spells-based measures that narrowly focus 
on headcount poverty rate and are insensitive to poverty duration. It is clear from Figure 5.7 
that Regions 7, 9, ARMM and Caraga have the highest intertemporal poverty estimates. In 7 
out of 12 indicators, ARMM ranked first among the regions with the highest levels of poverty. 
For instance, roughly 55% to 90% of the household population in ARMM have experienced 
poverty for at least one episode from 2003 to 2009. Interestingly, except for the US$2/day 
poverty line, ARMM is not in the list of  four regions  with the  highest  average  duration of 
poverty. Nevertheless, the average duration of poverty is still relatively high because a typical 
poor household in ARMM experienced poverty in two out of the three survey years. Like 
ARMM, Region 9 has widespread poverty that persists over the years. In fact, the estimates 
show that Region 9 posted the highest average poverty duration wherein households spend 2.1 
to 2.5 (survey) years living with income less than the poverty line.  In contrast, Regions 3, 4A 
and NCR have consistently shown the lowest intertemporal poverty levels. 
In summary, poverty in the Philippines has a remarkable spatial feature. In general, most 
of the regions with the highest levels of chronic or persistent poverty are in the southern part 
of the Philippines: Regions 7, 9, ARMM and Caraga.  This is in sharp contrast with the regions 
that posted the lowest levels of poverty persistence which are all located up north, close to the 
country’s centre of commerce. As I investigate the economic structure of each region, I find 
that the areas which heavily rely in the agriculture sector based on share of agricultural 
employment to total employment tend to have higher proportion of persistently poor 
households. This is consistent with the findings from a number of studies that have concluded 
poverty in the Philippines a predominantly rural and agricultural phenomenon (Schelzig 2005; 
Aldaba 2010). There are several substantial explanations for this. First, the structure of 
agriculture is predominantly small-scale and thus, those who are agriculture-dependent are 
unable  to  take  advantage  of  economies  of  scale.  Second,  the  Philippines  has significant 
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Figure 5.4 Map of Persistent and Transient (Headcount) Poverty 
 
                       Persistent Poverty                                           Transient Poverty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of  
   FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
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Figure 5.5 Regional Intertemporal Poverty Estimates (JR Approach) 
 
                 Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
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Figure 5.6 Regional Intertemporal Poverty Estimates (DAG Approach) 
 
              Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
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Figure 5.7 Regional Intertemporal Poverty Estimates (Spells Approach) 
 
            Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
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exposure to bad weather, as it sits in one of the most tropical cyclone-prone areas in the world 
that experience an average of ten typhoons every year (PAG-ASA 2014).54 These weather 
disturbances often have debilitating effects as estimates suggest that a strong typhoon in the 
Philippines can destroy more than US$ 75 million (approximately 3 billion Philippine pesos 
using prevailing exchange rates) worth of agricultural crops (PAG-ASA 2014).  Small scale 
agricultural workers are usually the most affected because their produce over several months 
can be wiped out easily by one typhoon.  Third, the Philippines has weak institutions to support 
agricultural expansion or buffer risks present in the agricultural sector.  Previous studies 
identify inadequate provision of socio-economic services such as lack of access to concrete or 
paved roads exacerbates the chronic poverty in remote agricultural areas (Schelzig 2005; 
Aldaba 2009). Weak property rights also contribute to why rural households are trapped in 
longer poverty episodes compared to their urban counterparts. While there have been several 
agrarian reforms that have been implemented in the Philippines since the 1970s which aim to 
improve the welfare of the low income households in rural areas who depend on access to land 
for their day-to-day living, existing systems (e.g., credit market) have not delivered the 
maximal economic opportunities envisaged by the reform (Balisacan 2002). 
       Although more urbanized regions like Regions 3, 4A and NCR show lower levels of persistent 
poverty, transient poverty is not a trivial problem in these areas. What are the causes of transient income 
downturn in urban areas?  One is the lack of opportunities due to population strain. As the prospects of 
more economic opportunities usually attract the rural poor to migrate to urban centers, urban population 
starts growing rapidly. The scarce opportunities available for the growing population can lead to a 
highly unstable income flow. Second, it is also widely perceived that people living in urban areas are 
more exposed to health and safety risks due to makeshift housing, poor sanitation, fire hazards and 
crime (Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council 2008; Aldaba 2009). In general, when 
socio-economic shocks erode the meagre assets accumulated by households, they can be pulled back 
into transient poverty.  
Although the different intertemporal poverty estimation tools have produced roughly 
similar lists of regions with the highest and lowest levels of poverty persistence, the rankings 
are not perfectly robust across all approaches, especially with respect to transient poverty. 
While it may be true that the minimal differences in the regional rankings may not have a 
profound policy impact, policy research still needs to address the issue of the robustness of 
poverty estimates by using more comprehensive methods. In addition, the impact may be more 
severe if a similar computational exercise was undertaken at finer administrative levels where 
                                               
54  PAG-ASA, the Philippines’s weather bureau, stands for Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services. 
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resources are allocated on the basis of various indicators which includes poverty. However, 
due to sample size limitations, this study did not conduct a rigorous intertemporal poverty 
ranking of the provinces. This is reserved for future research.  
5.4.3    Who are the Persistently and Transiently Poor? 
The objective of this section is to draw our attention to the possible heterogeneity in the 
intertemporal poverty experience of Filipino households.  Appendix Tables A5.1 and A5.2 
provide a descriptive summary of the proportion of the population classified as persistently 
poor, transiently poor and non-poor, disaggregated by different household characteristics. The 
results show that the intertemporal poverty is higher in households whose heads are male, with 
low educational attainment and are working in the informal sector. In addition, those who are 
living in southern Philippines especially those who heavily rely on entrepreneurial activities 
and on agriculture sector have higher risk on experiencing more severe poverty status over 
time.  
Table 5.7 summarizes the results of the statistical models that I estimated to measure the 
correlation of each factor with intertemporal poverty in the presence of other household 
characteristics using the components and spells approach and different poverty line 
specifications. In particular, it shows the regression coefficients of the multinomial logistic 
models for the probability of being classified as persistently poor, transiently poor and non-
poor. These coefficients can be interpreted as multinomial log-odds, i.e., for a unit change in 
the explanatory variable, the logit of the propensity to be classified as persistently poor (or 
transiently poor) relative to being non-poor will change by an amount equivalent to the 
regression coefficient, holding all other explanatory variables constant.55  As pointed out in 
Chapter 1, the explanatory variables are chosen based on standard human capital theories.  
In general, the regression models presented in Table 5.7 confirm the importance of 
standard socio-demographic characteristics like sex, age and education in explaining a 
household’s intertemporal poverty status.  In particular, the results show that individuals living 
in female-headed households are at risk of spending more time in poverty than their 
counterparts living in male-headed households. Interestingly, this result deviates from the 
descriptive statistics provided in Appendix Tables A5.1 and A5.2 wherein I observe lower 
poverty rates for female-headed households. However, this does not imply that women in the 
country are not disadvantaged. In fact, controlling for a number of socio-demographic 
                                               
55 If we take the exponential of these regression coefficients, we will get the relative risk ratios.  
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characteristics seems to erode the advantage of female-headed households over male-headed 
households.56 Hence, the model estimates suggest that after controlling for other factors, living 
in female-headed households in the country is still positively correlated with longer poverty 
spells. Thus, it is not surprising that the Philippine government still acknowledges women as 
one of the most vulnerable groups who must be provided with social protection against the risk 
of falling into a vicious cycle of poverty (NCRFW 2004). On the other hand, the age of the 
household head presents a typical concave relationship with income (Kearl & Pope 1983) and 
consequently, a convex   relationship with the length of stay in poverty.  In  particular,  during 
prime age years, individuals are in the process of climbing up the occupational ladder. With 
higher income accompanying this process, these people have less risk of falling into poverty. 
However, beyond a certain age threshold, individuals start to experience income deterioration. 
For instance, some of those who used to work in the formal sector could only rely mostly on 
pensions after retirement, representing a fraction of their previous income. With advancement 
in age, some of those who work in the informal sector have less employment opportunities 
because they are less capable of performing physical tasks that jobs in the informal sector entail. 
Furthermore, the estimated models reiterate the importance of education in minimizing the risk 
of falling into poverty. Better educated households, as proxied by educational attainment of the 
household head, face less risk of long poverty spells. In this context, higher educational 
attainment serves as a mechanism for expanding one’s overall social mobility prospects. This 
is consistent with the human capital theory which suggests that the skills and knowledge 
imparted by higher educational attainment improves an individual’s productivity, and in turn, 
his/her ability to mobilize resources (Tilak 2002). While educational attainment explains a 
significant portion of the differences in household income and poverty status, education 
remains a development puzzle in the country. For instance, compared to other countries with 
similar level of development, the Philippines has much higher gross enrolment rates in 
secondary and tertiary education (WDI 2014). Despite this advantage, significant pockets of 
                                               
56  The descriptive statistics confirm results from previous studies suggesting that Philippines is one of the few countries where 
female-headed households do not necessarily portray a vulnerable group (Chant 1997). Whereas female-headed households in 
many countries are usually characterized as a vulnerable group due to the presumed lack of ability of women to mobilize socio-
economic resources for the family, female-headed households in the Philippines are more likely to be found in middle and 
high-income groups.  Several reasons have been offered to explain this anomaly. First, the majority of these female heads are 
widows in their senior years who have had enough time to accumulate assets (Chant 1997). Second, female-headed households 
are more likely to have higher proportions of members who are already working. In fact, Ofstedal, Reidy & Knodel (2004) 
estimate that about 40% of total income of female-headed households come from the contributions of children and other family 
members compared to 25% for male-headed households. Third, female-headed households in the country are characterized by 
successful women who have higher educational attainment than an average male household head.  
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Table 5.7 Regression Coefficients of Multinomial Logistic Models for Intertemporal Poverty in the Philippines  
  (Base = Non-poor)  
Variable 
Components Approach Spells Approach 
US$1.25 US$2 US$1.25 US$2 
Persistent Transient Persistent Transient Persistent Transient Persistent Transient 
Main Island (base = NCR)                 
Luzon 14.74 1.615** 1.761*** .7193** 1.738 1.835** 1.37*** .7893*** 
Visayas 15.94 2.246*** 2.63*** .8773*** 2.871** 2.439*** 2.161*** .918*** 
Mindanao 16.18 2.438*** 3.055*** 1.192*** 3.093** 2.643*** 2.645*** 1.15*** 
Urban -.7792*** -.3362** -.8372*** -.4097*** -.6535*** -.3525** -.752*** -.4219*** 
Hhld head is Male -.8212* -0.02772 -0.3164 0.1372 -.7392* 0.01908 -0.3364 0.2069 
Hhld head's Age -.146*** -.07295*** -.06805** 1.29E-02 -.146*** -.0658** -.04758* 0.008981 
Hhld head's Age2 (x 10000) 15.39*** 7.989*** 8.414*** 0.1004 15.47*** 7.21*** 6.263** 0.5388 
Marital Status of hhld head        
(base = Single) 
                
Married -0.1719 -.7561* 0.1995 0.0541 -0.06679 -.854** 0.2322 -0.004984 
Other -0.9965 -.8357** -0.5165 -0.03779 -0.8185 -.8883** -0.4676 -0.02353 
Hhld head's Educational 
Attainment                                
(base = Primary education) 
                
Secondary education -1.168*** -.6984*** -1.059*** -.3709*** -.9229*** -.7924*** -1.007*** -.314** 
College education -2.815** -1.69*** -2.782*** -1.255*** -2.813** -1.723*** -2.717*** -1.117*** 
Hhld type (base = Single family)                 
Extended family 0.07459 0.115 -0.1549 0.1655 -0.07087 0.1817 -0.1142 0.163 
Two or more non-related 
individuals  
-11.13 -16.69 -13.45 0.7791 -9.873 -12.28 -12.91 0.8591 
Proportion of hhld members who 
are young 
3.247*** 1.297*** 3.364*** 1.538*** 2.72*** 1.381*** 3.119*** 1.487*** 
Family size .742*** .4392*** .8163*** .3285*** .7093*** .428*** .7315*** .3336*** 
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Table 5.8 (con’t) Regression Coefficients of Multinomial Logistic Models for Intertemporal Poverty in the Philippines  
  (Base = Non-poor) 
Variable 
Components Approach Spells Approach 
US$1.25 US$2 US$1.25 US$2 
Persistent Transient Persistent Transient Persistent Transient Persistent Transient 
Agricultural hhld  .8974*** .2856* 1.176*** .4413** .8569*** .2588* 1.073*** .4618** 
At least one hhld member is 
working abroad 
-.7014** -.3591* -.7894*** -.2559* -.8061*** -.2991* -.7763*** -0.2092 
Proportion of employed hhld 
members 
0.4205 0.2748 .4709* 0.2968 .4735* 0.228 0.3439 .3691* 
Proportion of employed members 
with permanent job 
-0.07962 -0.1215 -0.08583 0.05797 -0.1474 -0.0843 -0.04303 0.03026 
Proportion of employed members 
with formal job 
-.402* -0.1718 -.5577*** -.382** -.4598* -0.1229 -.4919*** -.3998** 
Hhld owns land/house -.4552** -0.2301 -.3351* -0.1405 -.4813** -0.185 -.3067* -0.1419 
Type of toilet facility                   
(base = water-sealed) 
                
Closed pit .6018*** 0.2427 .5974*** 0.1466 .5389*** 0.2467 .4783** 0.2026 
Open pit / others .2949* 0.1142 .628*** 0.2503 .3215** 0.06999 .5258*** .3141* 
Hhld had access to electricity -1.188*** -.7223*** -1.18*** -.523*** -1.068*** -.7524*** -1.123*** -.4776** 
Hhld had access to water faucet -0.007578 -0.1731 -.4351*** -.3877*** -0.01936 -0.1857 -.4319*** -.3783*** 
Hhld owns refrigerator -1.939*** -1.089*** -1.616*** -.8847*** -2.053*** -1.008*** -1.54*** -.8438*** 
Hhld owns information gadget -.7699*** -.4366*** -1.051*** -.5772*** -.7733*** -.3914*** -1.066*** -.4502** 
Hhld owns phone -2.778*** -.7764*** -1.671*** -.847*** -2.251*** -.7423*** -1.523*** -.8375*** 
Hhld owns washing machine -2.676*** -.9971*** -1.893*** -.8125*** -2.116*** -.9966*** -1.729*** -.7868*** 
Hhld owns transportation -1.749** -.716** -1.603*** -.4255** -1.014* -.8483** -1.191*** -.4947** 
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Table 5.9 (con’t) Regression Coefficients of Multinomial Logistic Models for Intertemporal Poverty in the Philippines  
  (Base = Non-poor)  
Variable 
Components Approach Spells Approach 
US$1.25 US$2 US$1.25 US$2 
Persistent Transient Persistent Transient Persistent Transient Persistent Transient 
Change in family size  .3561*** .1942*** .3646*** .1605*** .3297*** .1928*** .3417*** .1523*** 
Hhld head's educational 
attainment deteriorated 
0.4681 .4844* .5828** 0.1836 0.2238 .6087** .5648** 0.143 
Hhld head's educational 
attainment improved 
-.5328* -.4706** -.6961*** -0.2968 -.7037** -.3785* -.6523*** -0.2691 
Hhld's main source of income 
shifted from non-agri to agri 
.6844*** .3169* .9244*** .4908** .8224*** 0.1815 .8916*** .4555* 
Hhld's main source of income 
shifted from agri to non-agri 
-0.1961 0.111 -.4627* 0.06591 -0.1116 0.08199 -.3925* 0.04958 
Hhld shifted from land/house 
ownership to non-ownership 
.5236** 0.2467 .354* 0.1604 .5041** 0.2397 .3573* 0.1283 
Hhld shifted from land/house 
non-ownership to ownership 
-0.1944 -0.1136 -0.04462 0.0284 -0.2016 -0.0989 0.0085 -0.0115 
Change in the proportion of 
employed members 
-0.2479 0.0131 -.5914** -0.2664 -0.2002 0.008346 -.4976** -0.2935 
Intercept -16.29 -2.146** -2.41** -2.172*** -2.915* -2.553** -1.936** -2.513*** 
Source: Author’s computations using data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
Note: The dependent variable is based on household expenditure per capita. 
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poverty remain in the country. In fact, other Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and 
Thailand with almost the same levels of secondary and tertiary enrolment rates have 
significantly better poverty trends. This finding challenges the quality of the education system 
in the country and the extent to which it is possible to arrest poverty in the future. Thus, it is 
imperative for socio-economic planners to implement policies that will make the education 
system more responsive to the needs of the poor. To raise the country’s quality of education 
and be at par with other countries in Southeast Asia, the Philippines shifted from a 10-year to 
12-year basic education system starting 2014. This system, commonly referred as K-12, is 
widely adopted by both industrialized and developing countries (Magno 2011). The system 
aims to provide competitive basic education. However, whether it will contribute to poverty 
reduction or not, is a test of time. The result may also be indicative of the limited good jobs 
available in the labour market. Several studies show that the Philippines confronts a dual jobs 
challenge which entail expanding formal sector employment and at the same time, improving 
the quality of jobs in the informal economy (WB 2013). In addition, the impact of expanding 
non-traditional employment arrangements which accompany globalization on the working 
poor is an issue that has to be examined as well. This topic is further discussed in Chapter 8.  
 Household composition is also a significant explanatory factor in inferring one’s  length 
of stay in poverty. Larger households have higher risks of experiencing longer poverty spells. 
In particular, the odds of staying in poverty increases with the number of dependent children 
in the family. This is consistent with the mounting evidence suggesting that lower fertility is 
correlated with improved socio-economic outcomes. In particular, instead of allocating a 
portion of its available resources for more productive economic activities, households must 
reallocate its available resources for every additional member. For example, having more 
dependent children in the family limits the ability of women to engage in paid employment as 
they are usually expected to do childrearing (Adair et al. 2002). At the same time, having more 
children in the family could also have a negative impact on household savings. For instance, 
using data from the 2009 FIES, I estimate that the correlation between the number of children 
and household saving is -0.11 (p-value<0.0001). Since larger households have less savings, 
they are more vulnerable to unexpected income shocks arising from illness, unemployment, 
among other factors that lead to reduced income flows. Nevertheless, larger household sizes 
could also have a negative impact on the duration of poverty spell in the later stage of the 
household’s life cycle. For instance, the estimated models suggest that the risk of staying in 
poverty decreases with the proportion of household members who are working. In this context, 
some argue that parents who were initially disadvantaged during their early childrearing years 
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would fare better in the future because there will be more children to contribute in mobilizing 
resources for the household even after these children form their own families due to close 
family ties of Filipinos (Ongsotto & Ongsotto 2002).  However, several arguments have been 
offered against this hypothesis. For instance, studies show that an additional child in the 
household reduces the probability of other children in the family being enrolled in school 
(Conley 2000) which in turn, may hinder these children from reaching their full economic 
potential in the future. In other words, while they may be able to contribute to income 
generation for the household, the income may be at sub-optimal levels.  
The patterns of poverty dynamics in the country have a remarkable spatial feature. The 
results of the estimated models suggest that those who live in rural areas particularly in the 
southern part of the country have higher risks of staying in poverty.57 On the other hand, 
individuals living in urban areas where most of the economic activities are centred, experience 
shorter poverty spells. Some even argue that those who experience longer-than-average poverty 
spells in urban areas may be partly considered as a spill-over effect of the socio-economic 
disadvantage in rural areas (Reyes 2002b; CEDAW 2009).  As poor households migrate from 
rural to urban areas, many of them remain poor until they get good jobs. Thus, they inflate the 
number of urban poor. Hence, urban poverty reflects residual absorption of rural migrants 
(Mitra 1992). In general, the prominent spatial feature of the distribution of poverty is not 
unique in the Philippines. In many developing countries, significant pockets of poverty are 
clustered in specific areas (Bigman & Fofack 2000; Hennigner & Snel 2002). Factors like 
climate, geography, natural resources, access to urban centers and local political conditions and 
economic opportunities drive the significant spatial variations in the length of poverty spells 
(Ravallion & Wodon 1997). The model results also confirm that greater access to basic services 
such as electricity, clean water and sanitary toilet facilities is correlated with lower 
intertemporal income poverty. For instance, having access to electricity contributes positively 
to higher household savings since a unit cost of lighting with electricity is generally cheaper 
than using candles or oil lamp. In turn, households can then use the additional savings as a 
cushion against the risk of falling into poverty in the future. On the other hand, experts agree 
that access to clean water and sanitation facilities (e.g., sanitary toilets) has a multiplier effect 
on many socio-economic indicators particularly, movements into and out of poverty (WHO 
and UNICEF 2008). In particular, access to these facilities have a direct impact on health 
outcomes. Not surprisingly, those who lack access to clean water and sanitation facilities have 
                                               
57 Most of the poorest provinces are in Mindanao. In addition, the risk of persistent poverty is highest in Mindanao.  
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higher risks of contracting diseases like cholera, typhoid, infectious hepatitis and polio. 
Consequently, these health shocks may contribute to income depletion of affected households, 
pushing them towards poverty. On the other hand, the cost-savings incurred by households 
with access to electricity, clean water and sanitation facilities may contribute to a household’s 
increased propensity to start-up income-generating (micro-) entrepreneurial activities. This 
result suggests the need for the government to facilitate universal access to basic services.  
The estimated models also suggest that ownership of land and other productive 
(disposable) assets like television, radio, telephone, washing machine, among others is 
negatively correlated with the duration of income poverty spells. There are several reasons why 
these variables are significantly correlated with intertemporal income poverty. For instance, 
during periods of economic uncertainties, these assets may be sold to cushion the disruptions 
in income flows. Some of these assets may also be used to improve access to information that 
will enhance efficiency for planning their routine economic activities. For example, farmers 
who own television or radio may be warned about an impending weather disturbance earlier. 
More importantly, many of these assets could also be used to generate income. Furthermore, 
most of these variables could be considered as indicators of material deprivation and hence, it 
is difficult to infer the direction of their relationship with intertemporal poverty.  
Variation in employment outcomes is one of the statistically significant correlates of 
intertemporal poverty. Labour serves as one of the few assets that low income individuals have 
access to. In this context, having more household members who are working would naturally 
decrease the risk of staying in poverty for extended periods of time. This is confirmed by the 
negative coefficient of the proportion of household members who are employed, on poverty 
status as discussed earlier. But beyond the number of members working for the family, the type 
of employment also matters. For instance, the estimated models suggest that households which 
rely mostly on wages, particularly in non-agricultural sectors, experience shorter poverty spells 
than those who rely on agricultural wage employment or earnings from self-employment. The 
level of productivity in the agriculture sector is one of the reasons why this is the case. In 
particular, low agricultural productivity contributes significantly to persistent poverty in many 
developing countries. In addition to low productivity, frequent income fluctuations arising 
from crop loss (due to weather disturbances) or sudden changes in food prices also contribute 
to longer poverty durations for those who rely on agricultural wage employment. Among 
agricultural workers, farmers and fishermen have the highest risk of more severe poverty spells 
(NSCB 2012).  Like agricultural wage employment, self-employment is also correlated with 
longer poverty durations relative to those who rely on non-agricultural wage employment.  
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Although they do not comprise a homogeneous group, a significant bulk of the self-employed 
in many developing countries including the Philippines are working on own-account with 
significantly less income. Banerjee & Duflo (2007) argue that much of the self-employed in 
developing countries are running their business because “they are still relatively poor and every 
little bit helps” until they find a more stable wage job. In the case of the Philippines, this is 
confirmed by the study of Hasan & Jandoc (2010) who concluded that the majority of the self-
employed in the country are not “capitalists in waiting.” In this context, it is not surprising to 
note that transitions from either agricultural wage or self-employment into non-agricultural 
wage employment reduces the risk of long poverty spells. Similarly, employment in the formal 
sector decreases the risk of being trapped in longer episodes of poverty. Compared to an 
informal job, a typical job in the formal sector is associated with higher and more stable income 
flows. Formal jobs also offer wider social protection coverage. These features serve as a 
cushion for unexpected income shocks which in turn, decreases the risk of falling into poverty.  
Interestingly, the negative effect of formal employment is stronger in the US$2 poverty line-
based model suggesting that having a formal job is not quite common among the poorest of the 
poor.  Lastly, households where at least one member is working abroad tend to spend less time 
in poverty. The Philippines is one of the large-labour exporting countries and previous studies 
suggest that it contributes to improved macro and micro socio-economic outcomes for the 
country (Ang, Sugiyarto & Jha 2009). For instance, remittance from a migrant worker abroad 
eases liquidity constraint for many low income households. This allows households to 
restructure their economic activities away from traditional subsistence activities and towards 
more efficient economic ventures (Brown & Leeves 2008).58  In addition, remittance from 
abroad has a positive impact on investment on productive assets which in turn, could lead to 
lower risks of falling into poverty. Similarly, domestic remittances also contribute positively 
to minimizing poverty durations. In fact, its impact on the length of poverty spells could be 
stronger than remittance from abroad because low income individuals are more likely to receive 
remittance from internal migration (Pernia 2008).   
5.5. Summary  
Reducing poverty is considered as one of the most important tasks of the developing 
world. Not surprisingly, poverty monitoring remains at the heart of the economic development 
                                               
58 Some argue that international remittance could also lead to negative outcomes on a household’s welfare. For instance, 
Rodriguez & Tiongson (2001) find that households with migrant workers have lower labour force participation rates and 
shorter work hours. The authors attribute it to the propensity of the migrant’s relatives to substitute income-generating activities 
for more leisure.  
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literature aiming to advance poverty reduction efforts. In the Philippines much effort is needed 
to be able to eradicate extreme poverty as according to recent estimates, about two out of five 
Filipinos are still living below US$2/day (WDI 2014).  Compared to its other Southeast Asian 
neighbours, the country has shown lower growth-elasticity of poverty and performed dismally 
on other social economic indicators for many years. This has earned the country its title Sick 
Man of Asia (Ching 1993). Nevertheless, a more robust and stronger economic performance 
has been noted in recent years, prompting economic analysts to upgrade their growth forecasts 
for the Philippines.  
The examination of household panel data in the Philippines reveals that despite faster 
economic growth over the past decade, poverty remains a prominent feature of its development 
landscape. This poverty has two forms: persistent and transient. For instance, while about 40% 
of the population were US$2/day-poor at any given (survey) year between 2003 and 2009, 
estimates suggest that about 30% were poor in all (survey) years examined while 60% 
experienced. Overall, this suggests a more dynamic poverty phenomenon in the country than 
what is conventionally perceived when examination is only based on trends in cross-sectional 
indicators of poverty. To be able to respond to the challenge of reconciling stronger economic 
growth with positive gains in poverty reduction, it is important to implement policies that can 
minimize both persistent and transient forms of poverty. However, this calls for a different mix 
of policies. This prompts the need to address the question: how long do the poor stay in 
poverty? Consistent with the findings of Reyes et al. (2011) and Bayudan-Dacuycuy & Lim 
(2013), the results presented in this chapter suggest that most poverty experiences of Filipino 
households were persistent. In other words, households tended to stay in poverty for extended 
periods of time. This pattern is in sharp contrast with the intertemporal poverty in industrialized 
countries wherein the share of persistent poverty would normally be much smaller compared 
with transient poverty. This implies that poverty reduction programs in developing countries 
like the Philippines should be aimed primarily at providing long-term human capital 
development. Nevertheless, the robustness analysis presented in this chapter revealed that the 
relative importance of persistent and transient poverty were sensitive to the type of poverty 
measure used and the poverty line specified. In particular, the relative importance of transient 
poverty increased dramatically as the poverty line decreased or as the poverty measure becomes 
more sensitive to the illfare of the poorest of the poor.  
In conclusion, the results can be used to illuminate several important broad policy 
implications. First, an insignificant change in the cross-sectional estimates of poverty from 
2003 to 2009 does not imply that all poor households were systematically excluded from 
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reaping the benefits of the faster economic growth that transpired during this period. In 
particular, about 15% to 20% of the households classified as poor in an initial time period 
managed to escape poverty in the succeeding survey wave. Nevertheless, the risks of falling 
into poverty were also not trivial. For instance, about 10% to 15% of the initially non-poor 
households fell into poverty in the succeeding wave. In other words, transition from poverty to 
non-poverty does not necessarily imply a permanent escape from socio-economic dearth. To 
be able to understand poverty vulnerability in the Philippines better, future research may use 
the concept of fuzzy logic (Lemmi & Betti 2006) or construct poverty vulnerability lines such 
as those proposed by Dang and Lanjouw (2014). More importantly, the relevance of poverty 
vulnerability also means that existing social protection systems should be improved to 
minimize the adverse consequences of income shocks for both the poor and economically 
vulnerable. Second, for about 15% to 40% of the population, poverty has been a long episode 
of socio-economic deprivation. A more aggressive policy intervention is needed for these 
persistently poor households. One of the first steps might be to institutionalize an effective 
targeting system that will identify persistently poor households.  Equally important is to ensure 
that intervention programs are accessible as many of these chronically poor households are 
likely situated in remote and hard-to-reach areas. Third, given that estimates could change 
depending on measurement parameters, programs that rely on poverty ranking should be 
examined rigorously. Overall, both persistent and transient poverty should be of concern for 
the country’s socio-economic planners and there should be a balanced policy program that 
supplements long-term investment on the development of human capital of the persistently 
poor with provision of social safety nets that can stabilize income flows of the transiently poor.
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Appendix Table A5.1 Intertemporal Poverty Headcount Rate using the Components Approach (%),  
by Household Characteristics  
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Rural 25.45 18.4 56.15 58 14.53 27.47 18.8 19.68 61.52 36.74 21.72 41.54
Urban 4.9 8.02 87.08 20.5 13.64 65.86 3.4 6.62 89.98 10.16 13.37 76.46
NCR 0 1.09 98.91 4.29 11.11 84.6 0 0.89 99.11 2.4 8.66 88.94
Luzon 9.03 10.77 80.2 30.7 16.31 52.99 6.37 9.55 84.07 17.79 17.08 65.13
Visayas 21.44 18.3 60.26 52.04 12.95 35.01 15.2 19.36 65.44 29.54 19.75 50.7
Mindanao 28.64 18.67 52.7 60.13 11.93 27.94 21.89 20.04 58.07 38.77 20.34 40.89
Female-headed hhld 5.86 8.33 85.81 20.17 12.52 67.31 3.78 8.39 87.83 10.29 13.77 75.94
Male-headed hhld 16.75 14.03 69.22 42.43 14.33 43.24 12.33 13.98 73.69 25.66 18.18 56.16
Single 2.97 11.54 85.49 15.9 13.87 70.23 2.61 7.48 89.91 5.92 14.89 79.18
Married 16.73 13.53 69.74 41.89 13.92 44.19 12.33 13.72 73.95 25.42 17.8 56.78
Widowed/Separated/  
Others
6.55 11.75 81.71 25.19 15.44 59.37 4.01 10.58 85.4 12.89 16.58 70.53
Primary school 26.64 19.07 54.28 59.09 14.78 26.13 20.19 19.28 60.53 38.91 22.17 38.92
Secondary school 7.21 9.95 82.84 27.62 14.97 57.41 4.63 9.79 85.58 13.29 15.91 70.8
College 0.24 1.28 98.48 2.18 5.94 91.88 0 0.66 99.34 0.2 3.25 96.55
Family size ≤ 3 4.27 10.06 85.67 21.23 17.87 60.9 3.12 8.3 88.59 8.5 18.01 73.49
3 < Family size ≤ 5 9.27 11.22 79.5 31.45 14.01 54.54 6.12 11.17 82.71 15.78 15.62 68.61
5 < Family size ≤ 7 18.44 13.73 67.83 44.36 13.28 42.37 13.89 13.87 72.24 27.76 18.18 54.06
7 < Family size ≤ 9 28.29 19.59 52.12 60.96 13.24 25.81 21.6 19.12 59.28 40.77 22.24 36.99
Family size > 9 33.65 17.26 49.09 60.46 11.45 28.1 24.7 21.31 53.99 48.43 15.71 35.86
Hhld head's age ≤ 35 23.12 14.58 62.3 50.58 11.77 37.66 18.27 15.69 66.05 33.07 18.18 48.75
35 < Hhld head's age ≤ 44 17.59 13.41 69 44.43 13.82 41.75 12.09 14.16 73.74 26.98 18.1 54.92
Hhld head's age > 44 9.76 12.53 77.71 30.61 15.51 53.88 6.89 11.39 81.72 16.57 17.01 66.43
Non-agriculture hhld 7.06 10.39 82.55 26.37 14.85 58.79 4.68 9.23 86.09 13.49 15.74 70.77
Agriculture hhld 38.36 21.37 40.27 76.19 11.99 11.82 29.42 24.45 46.12 51.96 22.83 25.21
Main source of income: 
entrepreneurial income
18.49 14.17 67.34 42.65 14.11 43.24 13.95 14.43 71.62 26.37 18.08 55.55
Main source of income: 
Agricultural wage/salary
38.39 22.16 39.45 80.55 9.1 10.35 29 26.62 44.38 54.92 21.21 23.87
Main source of income: Non-
agricultural wage/salary
7.15 10.53 82.32 27.89 15.05 57.06 4.56 9.27 86.17 14.38 16.36 69.26
Hhld characteristics
US$1.25 US$2 half of median poverty line government/official
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
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Appendix Table A5.2 Intertemporal Poverty Headcount Rate using the Spells Approach (%),  
by Household Characteristics 
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Rural 27.2 16.65 56.15 59.72 12.81 27.47 22.64 15.85 61.52 40.98 17.48 41.54
Urban 5.57 7.34 87.08 22.3 11.83 65.86 4.41 5.61 89.98 12.23 11.31 76.46
NCR 0.24 0.85 98.91 6.27 9.14 84.6 0.24 0.65 99.11 2.79 8.27 88.94
Luzon 9.78 10.02 80.2 32.43 14.57 52.99 7.89 8.04 84.07 21.08 13.79 65.13
Visayas 23.29 16.45 60.26 53.42 11.57 35.01 19.36 15.21 65.44 33.03 16.27 50.7
Mindanao 30.61 16.7 52.7 62.23 9.83 27.94 25.5 16.43 58.07 42.53 16.58 40.89
Female-headed hhld 6.46 7.73 85.81 22.11 10.58 67.31 4.61 7.56 87.83 11.87 12.19 75.94
Male-headed hhld 18.06 12.72 69.22 44.17 12.59 43.24 15.02 11.29 73.69 29.06 14.78 56.16
Single 3.74 10.78 85.49 17.47 12.3 70.23 3.74 6.35 89.91 6.84 13.97 79.18
Married 18 12.25 69.74 43.66 12.15 44.19 15.01 11.04 73.95 28.79 14.43 56.78
Widowed/Separated/  
Others
7.42 10.87 81.71 26.91 13.71 59.37 4.88 9.72 85.4 14.84 14.63 70.53
Primary school 27.94 17.77 54.28 60.96 12.92 26.13 23.72 15.75 60.53 43.03 18.05 38.92
Secondary school 8.58 8.58 82.84 29.54 13.05 57.41 6.49 7.93 85.58 16.14 13.06 70.8
College 0.24 1.28 98.48 2.61 5.51 91.88 0 0.66 99.34 0.18 3.26 96.55
Family size ≤ 3 5.31 9.02 85.67 24.1 15 60.9 4.14 7.28 88.59 12.51 14 73.49
3 < Family size ≤ 5 10.28 10.22 79.5 33.46 12 54.54 8.07 9.23 82.71 18.42 12.97 68.61
5 < Family size ≤ 7 19.89 12.28 67.83 46.05 11.59 42.37 16.94 10.83 72.24 31.19 14.75 54.06
7 < Family size ≤ 9 29.27 18.62 52.12 61.7 12.5 25.81 25.51 15.21 59.28 44.35 18.66 36.99
Family size > 9 35.92 14.99 49.09 60.8 11.11 28.1 27.42 18.59 53.99 50.55 13.6 35.86
Hhld head's age ≤ 35 24.99 12.71 62.3 52.59 9.76 37.66 22.13 11.83 66.05 37.34 13.91 48.75
35 < Hhld head's age ≤ 44 18.51 12.49 69 46.3 11.95 41.75 15.02 11.24 73.74 29.86 15.22 54.92
Hhld head's age > 44 10.82 11.47 77.71 32.17 13.95 53.88 8.28 10 81.72 19.31 14.26 66.43
Non-agriculture hhld 7.86 9.59 82.55 28.27 12.95 58.79 6.08 7.83 86.09 16.27 12.96 70.77
Agriculture hhld 40.75 18.98 40.27 77.58 10.6 11.82 34.79 19.09 46.12 56.21 18.58 25.21
Main source of income: 
entrepreneurial income
19.71 12.95 67.34 44.26 12.5 43.24 16.12 12.26 71.62 29.32 15.13 55.55
Main source of income: 
Agricultural wage/salary
41.79 18.76 39.45 80.48 9.17 10.35 37.51 18.11 44.38 58.25 17.87 23.87
Main source of income: Non-
agricultural wage/salary
7.94 9.74 82.32 30.19 12.75 57.06 6.14 7.69 86.17 17.77 12.97 69.26
Hhld characteristics
US$1.25 US$2 half of median poverty line government/official
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
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Appendix Table A5.3 Intertemporal Poverty Headcount Rate using the JR approach (%), by Region 
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Persistent Transient Total Persistent Transient Total Persistent Transient Total Persistent Transient Total
NCR 2,244.39 0.00 0.44 0.44 3.10 4.61 7.72 0.00 0.38 0.38 1.75 3.11 4.86
CAR 1,092.29 7.10 7.64 14.74 38.11 8.65 46.76 4.56 5.66 10.22 13.77 9.04 22.81
Region 1 1,222.25 4.53 4.81 9.33 25.99 7.74 33.73 2.72 4.40 7.12 15.57 7.57 23.13
Region 2 1,243.33 6.43 5.58 12.01 30.22 6.85 37.07 3.93 4.87 8.80 11.76 7.86 19.62
Region 3 1,384.29 0.92 2.28 3.20 14.07 7.01 21.08 0.70 1.85 2.55 8.06 6.35 14.41
Region 4-A 1,554.14 4.18 2.45 6.63 17.99 4.60 22.59 2.46 2.16 4.62 10.90 5.15 16.05
Region 4-B 810.75 25.27 8.14 33.41 59.25 6.49 65.75 21.23 8.21 29.44 34.95 9.04 44.00
Region 5 1,091.79 19.68 6.50 26.18 48.06 7.26 55.32 14.64 6.66 21.29 31.08 9.73 40.81
Region 6 1,075.84 12.19 7.45 19.64 42.59 6.06 48.66 7.19 8.92 16.10 19.86 7.51 27.37
Region 7 965.06 22.41 6.80 29.21 51.46 3.53 54.98 18.53 7.39 25.92 33.08 6.80 39.89
Region 8 1,056.29 18.02 7.85 25.87 47.49 6.38 53.88 13.83 7.29 21.11 24.59 11.51 36.10
Region 9 935.81 35.01 5.98 40.99 60.59 4.31 64.90 30.17 7.03 37.20 40.15 6.72 46.87
Region 10 1,077.15 21.76 5.80 27.56 48.02 4.04 52.06 16.63 6.95 23.58 34.95 5.67 40.63
Region 11 1,011.30 18.54 6.54 25.08 47.17 5.28 52.45 14.84 5.85 20.69 28.10 6.78 34.89
Region 12 885.82 12.38 9.72 22.10 46.43 7.60 54.04 8.04 9.47 17.51 28.89 9.84 38.74
ARMM 553.51 34.22 10.12 44.34 82.60 2.47 85.08 24.51 12.77 37.28 36.87 14.19 51.06
Caraga 755.41 24.73 7.78 32.51 60.39 7.50 67.89 18.47 9.35 27.82 42.77 8.81 51.57
Location
US$1.25 US$2 half of median government/officialPermanent 
Income (US$)
143 
 
Appendix Table A5.4 Standard Errors of Intertemporal Poverty Headcount Rate  
using the Components Approach (%), by Household Characteristics  
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Rural 0.83 0.70 0.91 0.88 0.60 0.79 0.76 0.72 0.90 0.90 0.73 0.88
Urban 0.54 0.65 0.81 0.96 0.81 1.11 0.46 0.59 0.73 0.76 0.80 1.02
NCR 0.00 0.56 0.56 1.23 1.86 2.13 0.00 0.52 0.52 0.85 1.70 1.86
Luzon 0.66 0.69 0.90 1.02 0.81 1.11 0.57 0.64 0.82 0.88 0.81 1.06
Visayas 1.32 1.22 1.54 1.56 1.02 1.48 1.17 1.24 1.51 1.46 1.25 1.56
Mindanao 1.24 1.01 1.32 1.28 0.78 1.18 1.15 1.04 1.31 1.31 1.02 1.29
Female-headed hhld 0.89 1.07 1.34 1.55 1.23 1.82 0.71 1.08 1.26 1.22 1.30 1.67
Male-headed hhld 0.58 0.53 0.72 0.77 0.55 0.78 0.52 0.52 0.68 0.69 0.59 0.77
Single 1.38 3.05 3.31 3.42 3.45 4.61 1.33 2.26 2.61 1.89 3.87 4.19
Married 0.59 0.52 0.72 0.77 0.54 0.78 0.52 0.52 0.68 0.69 0.59 0.78
Widowed/Separated/  
Others
0.98 1.34 1.59 1.77 1.39 1.99 0.76 1.28 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.86
Primary school 0.95 0.82 1.05 1.03 0.74 0.93 0.87 0.80 1.03 1.04 0.85 1.02
Secondary school 0.56 0.65 0.82 0.98 0.78 1.09 0.46 0.65 0.77 0.75 0.80 1.00
College 0.24 0.52 0.57 0.65 1.23 1.37 0.00 0.35 0.35 0.20 0.87 0.89
Family size ≤ 3 0.63 0.97 1.12 1.25 1.23 1.54 0.54 0.90 1.02 0.87 1.25 1.42
3 < Family size ≤ 5 0.62 0.70 0.89 1.04 0.78 1.14 0.52 0.69 0.83 0.82 0.80 1.05
5 < Family size ≤ 7 1.04 0.89 1.26 1.36 0.95 1.39 0.93 0.88 1.19 1.21 1.02 1.37
7 < Family size ≤ 9 1.92 1.70 2.18 2.16 1.50 1.96 1.75 1.64 2.12 2.13 1.86 2.14
Family size > 9 3.21 2.54 3.45 3.40 2.29 3.12 2.93 2.73 3.42 3.44 2.48 3.34
Hhld head's age ≤ 35 1.27 1.01 1.45 1.51 0.96 1.48 1.17 1.04 1.41 1.42 1.11 1.51
35 < Hhld head's age ≤ 44 1.08 0.94 1.30 1.40 0.98 1.40 0.94 0.96 1.24 1.26 1.07 1.41
Hhld head's age > 44 0.58 0.67 0.83 0.92 0.73 1.01 0.50 0.63 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.96
Non-agriculture hhld 0.46 0.54 0.68 0.78 0.63 0.87 0.39 0.50 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.81
Agriculture hhld 1.27 1.02 1.22 1.04 0.76 0.80 1.22 1.08 1.25 1.26 1.02 1.05
Main source of income: 
entrepreneurial income
0.78 0.66 0.93 0.97 0.66 0.99 0.71 0.67 0.89 0.89 0.73 0.98
Main source of income: 
Agricultural wage/salary
2.35 1.94 2.29 1.81 1.26 1.42 2.23 2.09 2.34 2.34 1.87 1.95
Main source of income: Non-
agricultural wage/salary
0.62 0.75 0.92 1.08 0.86 1.18 0.51 0.68 0.82 0.86 0.89 1.11
Hhld characteristics
US$1.25 US$2 half of median poverty line government/official
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Appendix Table A5.5 Standard Errors of Intertemporal Poverty Headcount Rate  
using the Spells Approach (%), by Household Characteristics 
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Persistently 
Poor
Transiently 
Poor
Non-Poor
Rural 0.84 0.67 0.91 0.87 0.57 0.79 0.80 0.66 0.90 0.91 0.67 0.88
Urban 0.56 0.63 0.81 0.99 0.77 1.11 0.50 0.56 0.73 0.82 0.74 1.02
NCR 0.24 0.50 0.56 1.48 1.69 2.13 0.24 0.46 0.52 1.04 1.61 1.86
Luzon 0.68 0.67 0.90 1.04 0.78 1.11 0.62 0.60 0.82 0.94 0.73 1.06
Visayas 1.35 1.18 1.54 1.55 0.97 1.48 1.27 1.14 1.51 1.49 1.18 1.56
Mindanao 1.26 0.96 1.32 1.27 0.73 1.18 1.20 0.96 1.31 1.31 0.95 1.29
Female-headed hhld 0.93 1.03 1.34 1.61 1.13 1.82 0.79 1.02 1.26 1.28 1.24 1.67
Male-headed hhld 0.60 0.51 0.72 0.77 0.52 0.78 0.56 0.48 0.68 0.71 0.54 0.77
Single 1.57 2.96 3.31 3.55 3.32 4.61 1.57 2.10 2.61 2.03 3.82 4.19
Married 0.60 0.50 0.72 0.78 0.52 0.78 0.56 0.48 0.68 0.71 0.54 0.78
Widowed/Separated/  
Others
1.06 1.29 1.59 1.80 1.31 1.99 0.85 1.22 1.44 1.50 1.37 1.86
Primary school 0.96 0.80 1.05 1.03 0.71 0.93 0.91 0.74 1.03 1.05 0.79 1.02
Secondary school 0.61 0.61 0.82 1.00 0.73 1.09 0.53 0.60 0.77 0.82 0.74 1.00
College 0.24 0.52 0.57 0.71 1.20 1.37 0.00 0.35 0.35 0.18 0.87 0.89
Family size ≤ 3 0.69 0.93 1.12 1.32 1.15 1.54 0.61 0.86 1.02 1.06 1.13 1.42
3 < Family size ≤ 5 0.66 0.67 0.89 1.05 0.74 1.14 0.59 0.63 0.83 0.87 0.73 1.05
5 < Family size ≤ 7 1.07 0.85 1.26 1.38 0.88 1.39 1.00 0.79 1.19 1.26 0.93 1.37
7 < Family size ≤ 9 1.93 1.69 2.18 2.16 1.50 1.96 1.85 1.51 2.12 2.16 1.75 2.14
Family size > 9 3.27 2.37 3.45 3.39 2.25 3.12 3.02 2.61 3.42 3.45 2.29 3.34
Hhld head's age ≤ 35 1.30 0.95 1.45 1.51 0.88 1.48 1.25 0.93 1.41 1.45 0.99 1.51
35 < Hhld head's age ≤ 44 1.10 0.91 1.30 1.41 0.93 1.40 1.01 0.87 1.24 1.30 1.00 1.41
Hhld head's age > 44 0.60 0.65 0.83 0.94 0.71 1.01 0.54 0.59 0.76 0.80 0.70 0.96
Non-agriculture hhld 0.48 0.53 0.68 0.80 0.59 0.87 0.43 0.47 0.61 0.67 0.59 0.81
Agriculture hhld 1.28 0.96 1.22 1.02 0.73 0.80 1.25 0.98 1.25 1.24 0.94 1.05
Main source of income: 
entrepreneurial income
0.80 0.63 0.93 0.98 0.63 0.99 0.75 0.63 0.89 0.91 0.68 0.98
Main source of income: 
Agricultural wage/salary
2.37 1.82 2.29 1.84 1.34 1.42 2.34 1.82 2.34 2.31 1.78 1.95
Main source of income: Non-
agricultural wage/salary
0.65 0.73 0.92 1.10 0.81 1.18 0.58 0.63 0.82 0.94 0.80 1.11
Hhld characteristics
US$1.25 US$2 half of median poverty line government/official
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Appendix Table A5.6 Standard Errors of Intertemporal Poverty Headcount Rate using the JR approach (%), by Region 
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
Persistent Transient Total Persistent Transient Total Persistent Transient Total Persistent Transient Total
NCR 0.00 0.56 0.56 1.23 1.86 2.13 0.00 0.52 0.52 0.85 1.70 1.86
CAR 2.10 2.89 3.26 3.50 2.76 3.32 1.74 2.62 2.97 2.79 2.83 3.43
Region 1 1.65 1.86 2.33 2.60 2.16 2.68 1.38 1.82 2.18 2.37 2.10 2.69
Region 2 1.69 2.24 2.60 2.86 2.05 2.91 1.44 2.02 2.36 2.18 2.36 2.83
Region 3 0.66 1.31 1.44 1.90 1.82 2.32 0.50 1.19 1.28 1.44 1.80 2.13
Region 4-A 1.16 1.21 1.61 1.97 1.59 2.24 0.96 1.07 1.40 1.72 1.43 2.06
Region 4-B 3.34 2.77 3.49 3.20 2.27 2.66 3.15 2.90 3.51 3.51 2.73 3.33
Region 5 2.63 2.15 2.85 2.82 2.12 2.51 2.44 2.08 2.79 2.79 2.39 2.76
Region 6 1.93 1.92 2.39 2.47 1.76 2.34 1.52 2.05 2.32 2.15 2.00 2.47
Region 7 2.34 2.04 2.62 2.61 1.42 2.50 2.19 2.00 2.58 2.59 1.92 2.62
Region 8 2.65 2.50 3.06 3.05 2.19 2.83 2.41 2.40 2.98 2.77 2.80 3.03
Region 9 3.22 2.28 3.23 3.07 1.84 2.79 3.14 2.36 3.26 3.24 2.39 3.17
Region 10 2.94 2.14 3.13 3.11 1.64 3.01 2.71 2.31 3.09 3.13 1.98 3.10
Region 11 2.62 2.15 2.97 3.04 1.87 2.92 2.50 2.08 2.90 2.89 2.19 3.05
Region 12 2.47 2.66 3.04 3.01 2.11 2.72 2.04 2.63 2.95 2.97 2.56 2.95
ARMM 3.41 2.94 3.09 2.34 1.37 1.99 3.28 3.12 3.23 3.39 3.21 2.81
Caraga 3.23 2.64 3.40 3.21 2.45 2.63 3.00 2.74 3.39 3.41 2.67 3.08
US$1.25 US$2 half of median government/official
Location
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Chapter 6 Who are Income Mobile? 
 
6.1  Introduction 
Chapter 5 has discussed mobility among low income range people and found that poverty 
in the Philippines is mostly persistent in nature. This chapter extends the discussion by 
examining the mobility patterns of people from other income segments. Here, mobility is 
defined in terms of how fast income is growing. The discussion focuses on the relationship 
between income inequality and income mobility by identifying the characteristics of those who 
benefitted from economic growth through high positive income mobility and of those who were 
left out because they experienced negative income mobility. This is an important analytical 
exercise because as explained in the previous chapters, the high levels of inequality in the 
Philippines could imply that different population groups benefit from economic growth at 
different rates. In particular, I address the following questions:  
(i)   What are the characteristics of the income mobile households in the Philippines?  
(ii) How do the income mobility outcomes of initially advantaged and initially 
disadvantaged households differ?  
 
In answering the first question, I will identify who has benefited from economic 
development and who has been left out. I will also examine whether the initially disadvantaged 
groups caught-up with the initially advantaged ones through faster income growth rates. For 
the second research question, I will examine whether the impact of economic development on 
initially advantaged and initially disadvantaged households differ when the country’s economy 
is expanding or contracting.  
Investigating how the benefits of economic growth accrue to different groups is usually 
addressed by comparing the income growth rates of different segments of the population. 
Examining the growth incidence curves (GIC) provides a good starting point for this analytical 
exercise. We have learned earlier that a growth process is considered relatively pro-poor if it 
allows the poor to catch-up with the non-poor through faster income growth rates resulting in 
a downward sloping GIC. While several studies briefly examined this issue in the Philippines 
(e.g. Balisacan & Pernia, 2002; Pernia, 2003; Schelzig, 2005; Aldaba 2009), most used data 
from repeated cross-sectional surveys. Chapter 1 identified that the problem with working with 
cross-sectional surveys is that when individuals are ranked according to their income in each 
time period, the composition of a particular income quantile in the initial time period will not 
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exactly match the composition of the same quantile in a subsequent time period because people 
move from one quantile to another over time. This process makes it difficult to infer whether 
the initially poor or initially non-poor experienced faster income growth rates (Grimm 2007). 
Another potential disadvantage of the GIC is that it implicitly ignores what happened in 
between the start and end of the observation period.  The analyses in this chapter address the 
limitations of previous studies in several ways. First, I depart from the conventional approach 
of measuring income mobility using growth rates between initial and final-period incomes 
(Tabunda & Albert 2002; Reyes et al. 2011; Takahashi 2013) by incorporating the available 
information between the start and end of the observation periods. This allows me to distinguish 
people who experienced consistently positive or negative mobility from people who 
experienced unstable income flows, an issue that has not been explored in previous studies 
(Reyes et al. 2011; Takahashi 2013). Second, I go beyond the conventional approach of 
examining pro-poorness of growth by testing the convergence (vs. divergence) and symmetry 
(vs. asymmetry) of household income mobility following the approach of Fields et al. (2007). 
Similar to the concept of pro-poor growth, the concepts of convergence and symmetry refer to 
the effect that income mobility patterns over time have on the differences in income between 
the initially advantaged and initially disadvantaged people. From a policy perspective 
understanding these patterns would help us gauge the extent to which the high income 
inequality in the country is a reflection of inequitable distribution of socio-economic 
opportunities. 
6.2     Different Patterns of Income Mobility 
Variations in the effect of economic growth on people’s living standards can be explained 
by differences in their socio-demographic characteristics, resource endowment, skills, risk 
aversion, effort and luck (Morrisson 2006; Marrero & Rodriguez 2013; Ros 2013). As pointed 
out earlier, there is more concern among policymakers when the observed inequality portrays 
inequality of opportunities rather than inequality of outcomes. Inequality of opportunities could 
lead to long episodes of segmentation between the advantaged and the disadvantaged groups 
and thus, can undermine the country’s full economic potential (Braham, Rattansi & Skellington 
1992; Pasha & Palanivel 2003) whereas if socio-economic opportunities are distributed 
equally, inequality of outcomes would only arise due to variation in efforts (Arrow, Bowles & 
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Durlauf 2004; Kenworthy 2004).59  Hence, despite diversity being woven in the fabric of the 
socio-economic development process, there is much interest in understanding what causes 
socio-economic inequalities, especially in a developing country like the Philippines where 
rapid economic growth is accompanied by persistently high income inequality. 
To determine the extent to which income inequality in the Philippines is characterized by 
inequality of opportunities, it is important to examine how the incomes of different population 
groups with varying levels of (initial) advantage change over time. In this context, the income 
mobility process can be generally classified as (i) convergent or divergent; and (ii) symmetric 
or asymmetric.  Income mobility is said to be convergent when incomes of the initially 
disadvantaged are growing at least as fast as their initially advantaged counterparts and it is 
divergent when the initially disadvantaged group receives disproportionately less benefits from 
the observed mobility process (Shorrocks & van der Hoeven 2004; Grimm et al. 2007).  
There are several factors that can contribute to convergent income mobility. For instance, 
if economic growth expands the access of initially disadvantaged to credit markets, then the 
additional capital can unleash the growth potential of the poor leading to faster income growth 
rates. Similarly, macro-level policies on government spending and progressive taxation may 
also contribute to faster income growth rates among the poor (Pintus 2008). Analogously, a 
divergent income mobility process could be attributed to capital market imperfection wherein 
the initially disadvantaged systematically confronts borrowing constraints which in turn, 
prevents them from reaping the benefits of economic growth (Galord 1996; Banerjee & Duflo 
2003; Ravallion 2012). On the other hand, the movement of the additional capital created by 
growth could also be perfectly fluid in which case, a person’s initial resources will not have a 
significant effect on his/her subsequent income growth. In general, convergent income mobility 
can be linked to the concept of pro-poor growth while divergent mobility can be associated 
with poverty traps and cumulative advantage.  
Solely relying on a converging income mobility process cannot guarantee that the poor 
will have adequate resources such as financial capital, education and employment that would 
assure that they will never experience poverty again. In particular, even if the income mobility 
pattern is convergent (or divergent) for a specific time period, it is not always the case that the 
same pattern will persist over time. For instance, a convergent income mobility spell may be 
followed by a divergent income mobility spell, or vice-versa. Hence in addition to convergence, 
                                               
59 Kenworthy (2004) examined the hypothesis that economic growth is always accompanied by increasing inequality. He 
concluded that there is no necessary trade-off between equality and economic growth as long as an optimal balance of policy 
options are combined to create a fair economy.  
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it is also important to examine the symmetry of income mobility to be able to understand how 
people’s income mobility prospects change over time. A mobility process is said to be 
symmetric when the group that experienced better (inferior) income mobility outcomes during 
a specific time period experiences inferior (better) mobility outcomes in the subsequent period. 
A good example of a symmetric income mobility process is when the rich benefits 
disproportionately more during episodes of economic growth but they also lose more during 
episodes of economic turmoil (Fields et al. 2007). It can be observed during financial markets-
induced crises when the rich bear its negative impact more than the poor because of their higher 
exposure to credit markets.60  Analogously, an income mobility process could also be 
considered symmetric when the poor benefits more during episodes of economic growth but 
they also lose more during periods of economic uncertainties probably because they have 
limited access to social safety nets that can cushion them from large income losses.  
Testing whether income mobility is converging or diverging and whether it is symmetric 
or asymmetric will help us understand how the economic development processes in the 
Philippines allow the initially disadvantaged to catch up with the rich, or  whether these 
processes systematically exclude them from reaping the benefits of economic growth.  
6.3.  Methods 
6.3.1   Classifying Households According to Income Mobility Trajectories 
In this chapter, income mobility is measured in terms of changes in log per capita 
household consumption derived from the FIES. Convergence and symmetry of mobility are 
gauged in terms of how fast people’s incomes are growing with respect to its initial levels. 
Instead of simply looking at growth rates from 2003 to 2009, I estimate the growth rates from 
2003 to 2006 and 2006 to 2009, separately to unmask interesting features about the household 
income flows that may otherwise be hidden if I simply look at the income differences between 
2003 and 2009. Compared to the approach used in Chapter 1, this analytical strategy further 
capitalizes on the longitudinal feature of the data. For instance, it is possible that some 
households that experienced high income growth rates between 2003 and 2009 also 
experienced very volatile income flows. As noted in Chapter 1, this is not necessarily a 
desirable outcome especially when households are averse to income fluctuations. Furthermore, 
it is possible that a high (low) income growth observed in 2006-2009 might offset a low (high) 
income growth observed in 2003-2006 which in turn may be mistakenly classified as 
                                               
60 Whether the rich or the poor suffer more during economic crises is a debatable issue. Some argue that the poor suffer more 
because the rich are more likely to be compensated by government bail outs (Halac & Schmukler 2004). 
150 
 
immobility if one simply relies on the income growth rate in 2003-2009. Estimating the growth 
rates for 2003-2006 and 2006-2009 separately also allows me to examine how income mobility 
changes over time and thus, test whether it is symmetric or asymmetric.  
Figure 6.1 shows the top view of the density plot of the annualized growth rates between 
2003 and 2006 in the x-axis and the annualized growth rates between 2006 and 2009 in the y-
axis.  The plot reveals a negative correlation between the two sets of growth rates, i.e., faster 
income growth between 2003 and 2006 tends to be followed by slower income growth between 
2006 and 2009, and vice-versa. It also shows that the density peaks near the origin which means 
that a significant fraction of the households experienced consistently slow income growth from 
2003 to 2009.  
 
Figure 6.1 Joint Distribution of Income Trajectories, 2003-2006 and 2006-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                 
                  Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal  
                    subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
I follow a heuristic approach in grouping households that have homogeneous income 
mobility trajectories. In particular, households that experienced slow to moderate income 
growth (at most +/- 5% per year) in both 2003-2006 and 2006-2009 periods are grouped in the 
first cluster.61 Households that observed consistently positive or consistently negative growth 
rates, wherein at least one growth rate exceeds 5%, are classified under the second or third 
cluster, respectively. Lastly, households that experienced highly positive income growth (>5%) 
in 2003-2006 yet highly negative income growth (< -5%) in 2006-2009 are classified in the 
                                               
61  The median absolute income growth rate for 2003-2006 and 2006-2009 is about 9% per year.  
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fourth cluster while households that experienced highly negative growth (< -5%) in 2003-2006 
followed by highly positive growth (> 5%) in 2006-2009 are classified in the fifth cluster. As 
illustrated in Figure 6.2, the first cluster corresponds to households with very modest income 
growth. The second and third clusters include households that experienced consistently upward 
and downward mobility, respectively. The last two clusters correspond to households that 
experienced high transitory income fluctuations. Section 6.3.4 provides the details about the 
empirical strategy on how these clusters are used to test convergence and symmetry of income 
mobility.   
Figure 6.2 Different Types of Income Trajectories, 2003-2009 
 
                          Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the  
                             longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
 
6.3.2  Measures of Socio-economic Advantage 
Since the objective of this study is to examine the extent to which a household’s initial 
level of socio-economic advantage predicts its subsequent income growth trajectory, it is 
essential to provide a measure of socio-economic advantage. To do this, I group the households 
using two methods. First, I use the quintiles of the observed income in 2003. In general, 
grouping households according to quantiles is a common approach in income distributional 
analysis (RC 2003). However, although this approach is useful for capturing how income is 
appropriated into different segments of the society, it is unable to capture polarization or the 
implicit clustering of individuals into groups (Chakravarty & Ambrosio 2010). While both 
income inequality and polarization are concerned of the variability of the income distribution, 
high income inequality does not always imply a “divided” or “polarized” society (Gochoco-
2003 2006 2009
Cluster1
2003 2006 2009
Cluster2
2003 2006 2009
Cluster3
2003 2006 2009
Cluster4
2003 2006 2009
Cluster5
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Bautista, Bautista, Maligalig & Sotocinal 2013).62 Thus, in addition to examining inequality, it 
is also important to study polarization because a segmented society is usually prone to conflict 
due to skewed distribution of opportunities (Gasparini et al. 2008). To capture polarization, I 
follow the approach proposed by Liao (2006) which entails fitting latent cluster models on 
initial income in 2003.63 Model-based clustering is one of the sophisticated statistical tools that 
has been increasingly used by researchers to stratify population units based on various 
characteristics of interest. Unlike conventional clustering methods, model-based clustering 
assumes that the underlying population is made up of different clusters, each following a 
different probability distribution (Stahl & Sallis 2012). In other words, the data is assumed to 
be a realization from a specific mixture probability density function and this reduces the 
clustering task into estimating the parameters of the assumed mixture distribution. One of the 
main advantages of using this approach in empirical application is that it allows researchers to 
find optimal clusters even with limited prior information about how the units are clustered in 
theory (Vermunt & Magidson 2002). Compared to conventional clustering methods, model-
based clustering uses a less arbitrary approach in minimizing within-cluster and maximizing 
between cluster-variations (Vermunt & Magidson 2002; Liao 2006). Furthermore, unlike group 
membership according to quintiles, the choice of the optimal number of clusters in model-
based clustering is less arbitrary because it is based on the values of the Bayesian Information 
Criterion computed from different candidate models.  
In empirical studies, it is common to find initial incomes to be negatively correlated with 
subsequent income growth (Khor & Pencavel 2008). However, as pointed out in Chapter 1, 
income data from household surveys is usually subject to measurement errors (Fields et al. 
2003, Forbes 2000, Khor & Pencavel 2008) and if left unaddressed, may lead to spurious 
correlation between income mobility and initial income. For instance, underestimated initial 
incomes may lead to mean reversion and the process would erroneously portray a convergent 
income mobility. To address this issue, I also consider the household’s permanent income as 
an alternative monetary measure of advantage. For each household, I approximate permanent 
income by taking its longitudinal average income from 2003, 2006 and 2009.  
 
                                               
62 For example, for an n-individual society where one individual has Z units of income (Z > n-1) while each of the n-1 
individuals has one unit of income only, the resulting inequality will be very high but polarization is low. Liao (2006) provided 
a more detailed discussion on how the notion of polarization can produce different trends of income variability than Gini-
based measures of inequality.  
63  I used the Mclust package available in R in estimating latent cluster models.  
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6.3.3  Other Correlates of Income Mobility 
In examining the impact of initial socio-economic advantage on income mobility, I 
control for the effect of gender, education, location as well as demographic and economic 
events. A demographic event is defined as changes in household composition while economic 
events refer to changes in income sources. Demographic events may affect income mobility 
systematically in several ways. First, it is a common assumption that individuals within a 
household pool their resources. Thus, income is expected to move in the same direction as the 
change in the number of household members who are engaged in paid employment. However, 
if income is fixed but the number of non-working members increases, then the need to allocate 
the pooled resources among more people might eventually manifest as negative income 
mobility. This is because these households are likely to have less savings. In turn, lower savings 
implies higher vulnerability to unexpected income shocks arising from illness, unemployment, 
among other factors that lead to reduced income flows. In general, the extent of negative effect 
of an additional non-working member depends on his/her age. An additional dependent child 
may limit the ability of women to engage in paid employment due to the amount of time needed 
for child rearing, leading to a reduced income flow for a significant period of time. On the other 
hand, the negative impact of an additional member could be less severe if the additional 
member is of working age because he/she has the potential to contribute to generation of 
additional income or provide unpaid work around the household should the need arise in the 
future.  Moreover, a significant portion of incomes of households from developing countries is 
generated from earnings related to paid employment (Dicken 2011). However, income mobility 
can’t be solely determined by the number of household members employed because each 
working member may be employed in different economic sectors which offer varying levels of 
income opportunities. In other words, the source of income is also an important factor that 
could explain one’s income trajectories. 
6.3.4  Statistical Models of Income Mobility 
To examine the convergence and symmetry of the income mobility regime that transpired 
in the Philippines over the past decade, I estimate a multinomial logistic model wherein the 
dependent variable corresponds to the propensity to be classified in each of the five clusters 
and the independent variables correspond to the different indicators of socio-economic 
advantage, as shown in (6.1). 
                        𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
 
𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗
 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1
) =  𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖 
𝑖𝑛𝑐   + 𝜃𝑗𝑊𝑖 
𝑛 𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑐   +  𝑗𝑍𝑖 
 𝑣 𝑛𝑡𝑠              (6.1) 
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where 𝑝𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑗 denotes the probability of falling in cluster j = 2,.., 5, while 𝑋𝑖 
𝑖𝑛𝑐    denotes a 
household’s initial monetary advantage, 𝑊𝑖 
𝑛 𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑐    denotes a household’s initial non-
monetary advantage, 𝑍𝑖 
 𝑣 𝑛𝑡𝑠 corresponds to the various demographic and economic events. To 
account for the potential varying impact when income is measured in terms of actual observed 
income or permanent income, two variants of (6.1) are estimated:  
                            𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
 
𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗
 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1
) =  𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖2003
𝑖𝑛𝑐   + 𝜃𝑗𝑊𝑖2003 +  𝑗𝑍𝑖 
 𝑣 𝑛𝑡𝑠                 (6.2) 
                           𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
 
𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗
 𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1
) =  𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑎𝑣 
𝑖𝑛𝑐   + 𝜃𝑗𝑋𝑖2003 +  𝑗𝑍𝑖 
 𝑣 𝑛𝑡𝑠                   
(6.3) 
 
In the context of the hypotheses about income mobility described in the previous section, 
the signs and the magnitude of the estimates for 𝛽𝑗 and 𝜃𝑗 after controlling for 𝑍𝑖 
 𝑣 𝑛𝑡𝑠can be 
used to determine whether income mobility is converging or diverging and whether it is 
symmetric or asymmetric. Recall that the first cluster corresponds to nil income growth 
throughout the observation period while the second and third cluster correspond to consistently 
positive and consistently negative growth rates, respectively. The fourth and fifth clusters 
correspond to a steep change in the income growth trajectories. Since convergence refers to the 
initially disadvantaged group catching up with the initially advantaged group, then I can argue 
that the income mobility in the Philippines is convergent throughout the past decade if the value 
of either 𝛽2 or 𝜃2 is higher for the initially disadvantaged households than the initially 
advantaged group. The mobility process can also be considered convergent if the value of either 
𝛽3 or 𝜃3 is lower for the initially disadvantaged households than the initially advantaged group. 
In other words, convergence occurs when the initially disadvantaged experience higher growth 
than the initially advantaged, or the initially disadvantaged experience less decline in growth 
than the initially advantaged. On the other hand, income mobility is said to be symmetric if the 
values of either 𝛽4, 𝜃4,  𝛽5 or 𝜃5 are significantly different between the initially advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups.  
 
6.4  Empirical Results 
6.4.1  Trends in Income Inequality and Polarization 
From the Lorenz curves derived from the distribution of income for each survey wave 
and the distribution of the longitudinally-averaged income, we can see that over the past 
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decade, both cross-sectional and long-run inequality barely moved (Figure 6.3).64  More recent 
studies also show that the country’s observed inequality has been accompanied by high levels 
of polarization or stratification of individuals into different income segments (Gochoco-
Bautista et al. 2013). The results presented in Table 6.1 confirm this finding. The numbers 
under the column labelled as “Total” correspond to the estimated value of the Gini coefficient 
for each of the survey year while the numbers under columns labelled as “%within” and 
“%between” correspond to the percentage share of the variability of incomes within and 
between segments that were formed using latent cluster analysis to the total value of the Gini 
coefficient, respectively. Here, I find that at least 70% of the observed cross-sectional 
inequality and about 80% of long-run inequality can be attributed to polarization.  
Which income source contributes significantly to the observed inequality? To answer 
this question, I adopt the method proposed by Shorrocks (1982) which entails doing the 
following steps. Suppose a household’s (total) income is denoted by Yi and Yik refers to the 
income from the kth income source. Thus,  
                                                              𝑌𝑖 = ∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑘𝑘                                                        (6.4) 
Shorrocks denotes by sk the relative factor inequality weight or the proportion of income 
inequality that can be attributed to the kth income source. Technically, Shorrocks showed that 
sk is equal to the covariance between the total income and the income from k
th source divided 
by the variance of the total income, i.e., 
                                            𝑠𝑘 = 
  𝑣(𝑌,𝑌𝑘)
𝜎𝑌
2    such that  ∑ 𝑠𝑘 =  𝑘                                  (6.5) 
Table 6.2 presents the estimates of the factor inequality weight 𝑠𝑘 (multiplied by 100%) 
for each income component. The results suggest that variations in employment income account 
for approximately 85% of the total inequality. Interestingly, the contribution of variations in 
income from self-employment or entrepreneurial income to total inequality seems to be 
increasing over the years. This pattern is probably driven by the impact of the global financial 
crisis (GFC) which started in 2008. As jobs were lost during the GFC, a significant fraction of 
household earnings derived from wage employment shifted to entrepreneurial or self-
employment (Yap, Reyes and Cuenca, 2009).  I turn to this issue in Chapter 8. 
 
 
 
                                               
64 The value of the Gini coefficient is equal to the area below the line of perfect equality and above the Lorenz 
curve wherein higher values suggest higher inequality.   
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Figure 6.3 Income Inequality in the Philippines, 2003-2009 
 
                             Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the  
                             longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
6.4.2  Income Mobility and Inequality 
In this section, I examine how initial advantage affects income mobility prospects. If 
advantage is gauged in terms of income, the GIC is a good graphical tool for examining pro-
poorness of growth. As discussed in Chapter 1, there are two ways of deriving GICs. The first 
approach entails comparing the income of a household with a certain income rank based on the 
distribution of initial period incomes with another household with the same income rank based 
on the distribution of final period incomes. The resulting curve is the conventional GIC. The 
alternative approach is to derive the IGIC by computing the income growth rates of the same 
respondents and plotting these growth rates with the quantiles of the initial income.  The solid 
lines in Figure 6.4 represent the IGICs while the broken lines represent the conventional GICs. 
Since the slopes for the IGICs are more negative than the slope of the conventional GICs, it 
implies that the development process has worked to the advantage of the initially poor more 
than what we can perceive based on conventional GICs. This is consistent with the result of 
the simple simulation experiment using pseudo-panel data presented in Chapter 2 which 
suggests that IGIC is likely to portray a more (relative) pro-poor growth than the conventional 
GIC. 
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Table 6.1 Decomposition of Inequality by Income Clusters 
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
Table 6.2 Decomposition of Inequality by Income Source 
 
                                                                 Source:  Author’s computations using household income per capita data from the longitudinal  
                  subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
                                                                              
Total %within %bet Total %within %bet Total %within %bet Total %within %bet
Philippines 42.84 30.00 70.00 44.28 15.68 84.32 42.15 28.96 71.04 41.14 15.96 84.04
Urban 39.26 38.62 61.38 42.18 43.89 56.11 40.38 27.89 72.11 38.43 28.73 71.27
Rural 39.28 28.47 71.53 38.8 27.09 72.91 37.43 27.36 72.64 36.28 27.68 72.32
NCR 37.12 38.95 61.05 42.78 39.81 60.19 38.65 46.6 52.4 36.93 33.37 66.63
Luzon 39.66 28.47 71.53 40.66 28.34 71.66 38.63 28.53 71.47 37.55 27.94 72.06
Visayas 41.73 37.14 62.86 42.98 38.68 61.32 42.40 26.04 73.96 40.36 26.01 73.99
Mindanao 41.96 27.25 72.75 42.02 26.01 73.79 41.70 27.45 72.55 39.89 27.02 72.98
Location
2003 2006 2009 Permanent Income
Income Source 2003 2006 2009
Permanent 
Income
Wage income 48.45 40.04 29.28 41.88
Entrepreneurial income 38.56 43.39 62.97 45.63
Asset income 7.34 5.43 3.31 5.87
Income from transfers 0.44 1.88 0.92 1.07
Remittance income 4.39 8.15 2.93 4.86
Other income 0.82 1.10 0.59 0.68
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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One of the main limitations of using IGIC is that it examines only two income vectors at 
a time. As explained earlier, this can be problematic if one wants to differentiate households 
that have experienced volatile income flows from households that have experienced more 
stable income changes. Table 6.3 summarizes how different levels of income growth rates are 
distributed in each time period. If short-distance move is defined as absolute income growth 
rate of less than 5%, it would account for less than one-third of the total observed mobility in 
2003-2006 as well as in 2006-2009. On the other hand, medium-distance moves or absolute 
income growth rates between 5% to 20% account for more than half of the observed mobility 
while long-distance moves or absolute income growth rates exceeding 20% contribute to about 
13% of the total observed mobility in 2003-2006 and 2006-2009. Interestingly, the distribution 
of growth rates in 2003-2009 is less varied wherein about half of the observed mobility is 
characterized by short-distance moves, 48% are medium-distance moves and only 2% are long-
distance moves. A possible reason for this is that the 2003-2006 growth rates offset the 2006-
2009 growth rates. Table 6.4 provides evidence for this hypothesis by showing that there is a 
non-negligible number of households that experienced consistently positive or consistently 
negative growth rates.  Overall, positive and negative changes in household income are both 
common throughout the observation period suggesting that the development process has 
created both “winners” and “losers”.  
6.4.3  Testing Convergence, Divergence and Symmetry of Income Mobility 
Using Income as a Measure of Advantage 
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the distribution of income trajectories from 2003 to 2009, by 
income quintile and income cluster. When initial income in 2003 is used, the latent cluster 
analysis produced two clusters which I labelled as “Poor” and “Non-poor” in Table 6.5 and 
when longitudinally-averaged income is used, the method produced three clusters which I 
labelled as “Poor”, “Middle” and “Rich” in Table 6.6.  If initial (monetary) advantage was 
independent of income mobility, the expected value in each cell should be approximately the 
same as the overall distribution of income trajectories depicted in Table 6.4. However, the 
results are characterized by mixed patterns. For instance, if households are grouped according 
to actual income in 2003, I find that the middle 60% households were more likely to be 
classified under the first cluster than the poorest 20% and richest 20% households. In terms of 
the groups formed by latent clustering method, I find that the poor are significantly more likely 
to fall in the second cluster while the non-poor are significantly more likely to fall in the third
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Table 6.3 Distribution of Income Growth Rates (%) 
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the 
                                longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
 
Table 6.4 Distribution of Income Trajectories (%) 
 
                             Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the 
                             longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
 
Table 6.5 Distribution of Income Trajectories (%), by Segments of Initial Income 
Group 
Cluster 
1 
Cluster 
2 
Cluster 
3 
Cluster 
4 
Cluster 
5 
Total% 
(Initial) quintile 1 9.75 54.38 9.16 11.40 15.31 100 
(Initial) quintile 2 12.94 33.39 18.88 13.74 21.05 100 
(Initial) quintile 3 11.24 26.57 28.43 14.23 19.54 100 
(Initial) quintile 4 11.34 24.33 29.31 14.07 20.95 100 
(Initial) quintile 5 8.17 16.01 36.01 17.03 22.79 100 
Poor cluster 11.34 39.02 18.23 12.99 18.41 100 
Non-poor cluster 9.72 20.27 32.55 15.56 21.90 100 
All 10.64 30.84 24.48 14.11 19.93 100 
     Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES     
     2003, 2006 and 2009. 
annualized growth (g) 2003-2006  2006-2009  2003-2009
-20%  ≥ g 7.07 5.56 0.55
-20%  < g ≤ -10% 16.21 11.39 7.36
-10%  < g ≤  -5% 14.12 10.43 13.72
  -5%  < g ≤   5% 29.7 31.88 50.52
   5%  < g ≤   10% 12.42 14.86 17.09
 10%  < g ≤   20% 13.94 17.99 9.97
 20% < g 6.55 7.9 0.79
Total 100 100 100
Type of income trajectory %Population
Cluster 1: slow to moderate growth 10.64
Cluster 2: generally positive income growth 30.84
Cluster 3: generally negative income growth 24.48
Cluster 4: high positive growth in 2003-2006, high 
negative growth in 2006-2009
14.11
Cluster 5: high negative growth in 2003-2006, high 
positive growth in 2006-2009
19.93
Total 100
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Figure 6.4 Anonymous and Non-Anonymous Growth Incidence Curves, 2003-2009 
 
          Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
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group. On the other hand, when households are grouped according to longitudinally-averaged 
income, it is the poorest 20% households who were most likely to be classified under the first 
cluster. 
Regardless whether households are grouped according to initial income in 2003, 
longitudinally-averaged income or income quintile or clusters formed from latent cluster 
analysis, the results suggest that the poorest group is more likely to be classified under the 
second cluster than the rest of the population. In other words, the poorest (on various 
definitions) experienced the best income mobility outcomes. On the other hand, I find mixed 
patterns when looking at households that experienced consistently negative income growth 
rates. In particular, when households are grouped according to initial income, the propensity to 
be classified under the third cluster increases as one moves up the income ladder.  However, 
when households are grouped according to longitudinally-averaged income, middle income 
households had the highest risk of experiencing consistently downward mobility. Lastly, I find 
that the richest households based on initial income in 2003 were more likely to be classified 
under the fourth and fifth clusters. However, when longitudinally-averaged income is used, the 
rich households were more likely to be classified under the fourth cluster but the poor 
households were more likely to be classified under the fifth cluster.   
 In terms of the income mobility patterns, the results provide empirical support for 
(unconditional) convergence of mobility when households are grouped according to either 
initial income in 2003 or longitudinally-averaged income, because poor households have the 
highest probability to be in the generally positive income growth cluster while the non-poor 
have the highest probability to be in the generally negative income growth cluster.  In addition, 
the results also provide evidence for (unconditional) symmetry of mobility when households 
are grouped according to longitudinally-averaged income because this suggest that the rich 
households were more likely to be in the high positive growth in 2003-2006 and high negative 
growth in 2006-2009 cluster while the poor households were more likely to be in the high 
negative growth in 2003-2006 and high positive growth in 2006-2009. 
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Table 6.6 Distribution of Income Trajectories (%), by Segments of Permanent Income 
Group 
Cluster 
1 
Cluster 
2 
Cluster 
3 
Cluster 
4 
Cluster 
5 
Total 
% 
(Ave.) quintile 1 12.50 37.83 19.55 7.64 22.48 100 
(Ave.) quintile 2 11.01 30.68 25.81 12.15 20.35 100 
(Ave.) quintile 3 10.66 29.02 27.37 13.23 19.71 100 
(Ave.) quintile 4 10.82 29.56 25.98 16.02 17.63 100 
(Ave.) quintile 5 8.11 26.58 24.22 21.80 19.29 100 
(Ave.) Poor cluster 11.58 34.81 22.52 9.58 21.50 100 
(Ave.) Middle income 
cluster 10.99 28.80 26.88 14.10 19.23 
100 
(Ave.) Rich cluster 9.12 27.80 24.65 19.82 18.62 100 
All 10.64 30.84 24.48 14.11 19.93 100 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES    
2003, 2006 and 2009.  
 
Table 6.7 Distribution of Income Mobility by Household Characteristics (%) 
Group 
(based on 2003 data) 
Cluster 
1 
Cluster 
2 
Cluster 
3 
Cluster 
4 
Cluster 
5 
Total 
% 
Female-headed hhld 7.21 30.92 26.33 17.23 18.31 100 
Male-headed hhld 11.15 30.83 24.20 13.65 20.17 100 
Marital status of hhld head: 
Single 
4.19 21.59 32.26 26.07 15.88 
100 
Married 11.23 31.23 24.10 13.44 20.01 100 
Widowed/Separated/Others 7.05 29.32 26.21 17.46 19.96 100 
Educational attainment of 
hhld head:  
Primary education 
 
 
10.88 
 
 
32.01 
 
 
23.11 
 
 
12.68 
 
 
21.33 100 
Secondary education 10.59 29.62 26.22 14.75 18.81 100 
Tertiary education 9.66 31.29 22.29 18.07 18.69 100 
Family size: 1 to 3 7.77 18.71 38.79 15.44 19.30 100 
4 to 5 12.29 25.96 25.79 15.22 20.75 100 
6 to 7 10.47 35.47 20.73 13.67 19.66 100 
8 to 9 10.56 40.00 17.21 12.59 19.63 100 
10 or more 8.87 45.85 16.61 10.03 18.64 100 
Rural 10.13 34.60 22.00 12.90 20.38 100 
Urban 11.16 26.97 27.03 15.37 19.47 100 
NCR 8.16 21.27 28.28 18.50 23.79 100 
Luzon 11.08 29.61 25.94 14.65 18.72 100 
Visayas 10.14 35.32 22.27 12.59 19.68 100 
Mindanao 11.25 33.01 22.04 12.66 21.03 100 
Main source of income:    
Non-Agriculture 
 
10.48 
 
28.89 
 
26.28 
 
15.19 
 
19.16 100 
Agriculture 11.07 36.27 19.48 11.11 22.07 100 
All 10.64 30.84 24.48 14.11 19.93 100 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES      
2003, 2006 and 2009. 
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Socio-demographic variables 
I use geographic location, household head’s sex, educational attainment, marital status, 
household size and main source of income as control variables. As pointed in Chapter 1, these 
variables are correlates of socio-economic well-being used in the existing literature.  Table 6.7 
shows the distribution of the types of income trajectories for each group (based on 2003 data). 
Here, I find that single, female-headed households experienced more volatile income flows 
than their married, male counterparts. The results also suggest that households with highly 
educated heads were more likely to experience very high income growth rates in 2003-2006 
but they also had the highest risk to incur high income losses in 2006-2009. In contrast, 
households headed by primary educated individuals were more likely to experience high 
income losses in 2003-2006 and high income gains in 2006-2009. Significant variations in 
income mobility outcomes are also apparent when households are grouped according to 
household size. In particular, households with more members were more likely to experience 
consecutive episodes of upward mobility while smaller-sized households were more likely to 
experience consecutive episodes of downward mobility. Furthermore, I also find that rural 
agricultural households, especially those from Visayas and Mindanao had better income 
mobility outcomes.  Overall, the results suggest that initially disadvantaged households 
especially with respect to family size, geographic location and employment sector experienced 
faster income growth rates than advantaged households. 
 
6.4.4 Estimated Statistical Models 
In the previous section, I find evidence that income mobility outcomes differ in terms of 
the marginal distribution of income status and other socio-demographic characteristics. This 
section measures the statistical significance of each of these factors in explaining mobility in 
the presence of other factors. Furthermore, it also examines the significance of demographic 
and economic events in explaining the variations in income mobility.   
Table 6.8 shows the coefficients of the multinomial logistic models based on (6.3) and 
(6.4) for the monetary indicators. The full regression results are provided in Appendix Table 
A6.1.  The coefficients are interpreted as follows. For instance, based on the first entry in Table 
6.8, the multinomial logit for households from the second quintile relative to those in the 
poorest quintile is 1.1 unit lower for being in the cluster of households that experienced 
consistently upward mobility (cluster 2) relative to the cluster that experienced nil income 
mobility (cluster 1). The other numbers can be interpreted analogously. Since the coefficients 
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for cluster 2 decrease as the income quintiles increase and the coefficients for cluster 3 increase 
as the income quintiles increase, we can conclude that the poorest 20% households had the 
highest (logged) odds to experience consistently upward mobility (cluster 2), followed by the 
middle income households and lastly by the richest 20% households. On the other hand, the 
richest quintile had the highest odds of experiencing consecutive episodes of downward 
mobility (cluster 3), followed by the middle-income households and lastly by the poorest 
quintile. These results support the finding described in the previous sections that households 
from the poorest quintile had experienced generally better income mobility outcomes than 
households from the richest quintile. Notably, the differences in the odds to experience either 
consistently upward or consistently downward mobility became less pronounced when 
longitudinally-averaged income was used as the measure of advantage rather than initial 
income. Furthermore, the data based on the longitudinally-averaged income also suggest that 
the richest two quintiles had the highest odds of experiencing the most volatile income 
movements (clusters 4 and 5).   
Appendix Table A6.1 also shows the impact of the control variables. When both income 
and socio-demographic variables are included in the model, the only significant patterns are 
that higher educational attainment (of the household head) and lower dependency ratio were 
positively correlated with the propensity to experience better income trajectories. Furthermore, 
after adding the different indicators of demographic and economic events in the models, I find 
that an additional non-working age family member is correlated with inferior income mobility 
outcome while an increase in the number of employed members improves a household’s 
income mobility prospects. Overall, the results of the estimated models suggest that while 
initial advantage is a significant determinant of a household’s income trajectory, it only 
explains a small fraction of the variations in the income mobility outcomes.  Changes in 
household composition and employment outcomes provide additional information in 
predicting a household’s income trajectory.  
 In summary, the empirical investigation presented in this chapter leads to mixed findings. 
First, if advantage is measured in terms of initial income (in 2003), I find that the households 
from the richest quintile had the lowest propensity to experience slow to moderate income 
changes and were most likely to experience consistently downward mobility throughout the 
observation period. Furthermore, initially advantaged households had the highest propensity to 
experience consistently upward mobility. Second, if advantage is measured in terms of 
longitudinally-averaged income, I still find that the richest quintile tend to be the least immobile 
and were most likely to experience the most erratic income fluctuations. In particular, the 
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richest quintile had the highest propensity to experience very high income growth rates in 2003-
2006, a period when average income was decreasing and very high income losses in 2006-
2009, a period when average income was increasing. In addition, the poorest quintile had the 
lowest propensity to experience consistently downward mobility. Nevertheless, although the 
results suggest that advantage is a significant determinant of income mobility, I also find that 
demographic changes (e.g., changes in household composition) and economic events (e.g., 
employment transitions) are also important determinants of mobility.  
6.5  Summary and Discussion 
 How does income segmentation affect income mobility? Does economic growth allow 
initially disadvantaged people to catch up through faster income growth or are they left out 
because of the cumulative effect of advantage over time? These are the questions that I tried to 
address in this paper. The results provided in the last two sections show that income advantage 
is an important correlate of subsequent income trajectories. In particular, initial income has a 
negative correlation on income growth rates such that households starting with lower initial 
income were more likely to experience higher income growth rates than those who had higher 
initial income. However, this result needs to be interpreted with care because it is possible that 
those who were either below or above their permanent income in 2003 only regressed towards 
their longitudinally-averaged income in the subsequent years. In other words, the consistently 
significant negative relationship between initial income and income growth rates may simply 
be an artefact of the regression to the mean phenomenon as previous studies suggest that initial 
income’s explanatory power can be a mix of genuine income dynamics and measurement errors 
(Fields et al. 2003).  To examine the robustness of the findings, I also considered using the 
longitudinally-averaged income instead of initial income as a measure of advantage.  After 
doing this, I still find that the lower income households experienced (slightly) better income 
mobility outcomes. However, their edge over higher income households was much smaller 
when longitudinally-averaged income was used.  Although these patterns portray convergence, 
it can be argued that part of this convergence can be attributed to temporal income fluctuations. 
Furthermore, the results also point to symmetry of mobility based on initial incomes and 
longitudinally-averaged incomes. In particular, the data shows that based on initial income, the 
richest households had the greatest propensity to experience the highest income losses during 
economic contraction in 2003-2006 and highest income gains during economic expansion in
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Table 6.8 Regression Coefficients of Multinomial Logistic Models 
(Reference category: Cluster 1 (slow to moderate growth)) 
  
                       Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
cluster 2 cluster 3 cluster 4 cluster 5 cluster 2 cluster 3 cluster 4 cluster 5
Cluster                        
(base: 1st quintile)
   2nd quintile -1.077*** .8009*** -.4979*** .3609** -0.0101 .4144*** .536*** 0.2296
   3rd quintile -1.434*** 1.573*** -.6894*** .6826*** 0.1281 .4823*** .633*** 0.264
   4th quintile -1.79*** 1.849*** -.8973*** .9757*** 0.2813 .4459** .9259*** .4173**
   5th quintile -2.233*** 2.604*** -.7946*** 1.677*** .4677** .6626*** 1.536*** .899***
Cluster                        
(base: Poor cluster)
Middle income  cluster 0.0901 0.1671 0.3166** 0.1171
Rich cluster .3053* 0.1537 0.7754*** 0.4317**
Income Segment
Initial income in 2003 Permanent income
-0.7121* 0.8753*** -0.259* 0.6719***
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2006-2009. In contrast, based on longitudinally-averaged income, the data suggest that the 
richest quintile had the highest probability of observing very high income growth rates even if 
the rest of the population experienced decreasing incomes in 2003-2006 and incurred income 
losses when the rest of the population observed positive income growth in 2006-2009.  
In terms of policy implications, the result that income trajectories of the poor, middle 
income and rich households are statistically different, reiterates that the impact of economic 
development is not uniform. Thus, policies should be tailor-fitted according to the diverse 
circumstances confronting different population groups. Similar to the findings presented in the 
previous chapters, I find evidence to suggest that low income households are more likely to 
experience better income mobility outcomes than the rest of the population even after 
controlling for temporary income fluctuations. Nevertheless, the finding that significant 
fraction of low income households experienced income losses during the observation period 
suggests that existing poverty reduction programs could be improved further. This re-echoes 
what I have argued in Chapter 5 that to speed up the poverty reduction, it is important that 
intervention programs should be responsive to the long-term human capital development needs 
of the chronically poor and social protection needs of the transiently poor. 
Like the poor, the significant gains experienced by some middle income households were 
offset by the losses incurred by others. This contributed to the slow income growth of middle 
income households. If such trend continues, this may push the country to a middle income trap 
like many countries in Latin America (Jankowska, Nagengast & Perea 2012).  If the middle 
income households remain stagnant, it will be difficult for the Philippines to really take-off 
because a strong middle class is usually the engine for growth. To minimize this danger, one 
of the steps that the government can take is to create more jobs of better quality not only for 
college graduates but also for non-college graduates which comprise a significant fraction of 
the middle class. Although this is easier said than done as job creation often requires 
strengthening the competitiveness of local firms in the global production chain which usually 
comes at the expense of quality of employment, this feat is not impossible as seen in the 
experiences of other Asian countries like Singapore and South Korea which have improved the 
quality of jobs held by workers without college degrees (Li 2002).  Economists reckon that the 
first step is to build a strong manufacturing sector because without a strong manufacturing 
sector, non-college graduates are often left to take low paying jobs in the services sector which 
can hardly sustain upward mobility in the long-run (Usui 2011, 2012). However, this may also 
require upgrading the skills of workers in the traditional manufacturing sector so that they will 
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remain competitive in the labour market as the country transitions from traditional to modern 
manufacturing. For higher income households, this study finds that they experienced the most 
erratic income fluctuations. Although higher income households may be better-off in handling 
income fluctuations because they suffer less from liquidity constraints than lower income 
households, it is important that policies should still aim to minimize these volatilities. One way 
to address this issue is to facilitate a socio-economic climate conducive for business as majority 
of high income households rely on income from entrepreneurial activities.  A WB study shows 
that the business regulations in the country are among the most complicated and costliest in 
Southeast Asia (WB 2013). This should prompt policymakers to review how the existing rules 
and regulations in doing business in the country can be simplified.   
Interestingly, my findings that demographic and economic events are significant 
correlates of income trajectories resonate some of the advances in the literature of socio-
economic stratification. Traditionally, sociologists and economists have been interested in 
understanding the patterns of social segmentation due to income, social class, gender or 
educational level and how these factors shape a person’s socio-economic prospects. Lately, the 
research focus has shifted to the importance of life course events as predictors of income 
trajectories (Vandecasteele 2010). This calls for the need to collect more relevant data on life 
course events to be able to assess their structuring effect on a person’s socio-economic well-
being.
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Appendix Table A6.1 Regression Coefficients of Multinomial Logistic Models for Income Growth Trajectories in the Philippines 
Variable 
Initial Income in 2003 Permanent Income 
Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
Male-headed hhld -0.2998 -0.2744 0.0235 -0.1082 -0.2951 -0.2558 0.0189 -0.0911 
Hhld head's age 0.0247 0.0092 0.0190 -0.0032 0.0110 0.0205 0.0050 0.0010 
Hhld head's age squared -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
Marital status of hhld head              
(base = Married) 
                
Single -0.0722 -0.2082 -0.1912 -0.1505 -0.2944 -0.0685 -0.3789 -0.0867 
Separated/widowed/others 0.1257 -0.1301 0.1157 0.2155 -0.0780 -0.0317 -0.0624 0.2591 
Hhld head's educational attainment                 
Primary education .4796*** -.321** .3327** -.2492** 0.0618 -0.0326 -0.0229 -0.1224 
Tertiary education .9064*** -.9734*** 0.3552 -.5875** 0.0462 -.4324* -0.3180 -0.3676 
Region (base = NCR)                 
Luzon -0.0324 0.0056 -0.1405 -0.2897 0.1175 -0.0822 -0.0413 -0.3216 
Visayas 0.0737 0.1643 -0.2562 -0.0160 .4972** -0.0741 0.0587 -0.1204 
Mindanao -0.1536 0.0964 -0.3340 -0.1249 0.2978 -0.1606 0.0193 -0.2248 
Urban -0.0728 -.3324*** -0.0768 -.4153*** -.326*** -0.1309 -.2855** -.3209*** 
Hhld type                                      
(base = Single Family) 
                
Extended family 0.1876 0.1757 0.0754 -0.0360 0.0606 .266* -0.0348 0.0052 
Two or more non-related 
individuals 
13.0900 12.2300 12.6800 12.8000 13.8700 13.6700 13.5300 14.0900 
Proportion of hhld members who 
are young 
-1.301*** .8153** -1.555*** 0.4440 -0.3063 0.1972 -.7377* 0.2106 
Family size -.05809* 0.0442 -.08264** 0.0524 0.0474 -0.0329 0.0098 0.0202 
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Appendix Table A6.1 Regression Coefficients of Multinomial Logistic Models for Income Growth Trajectories in the Philippines 
Variable 
Initial Income in 2003 Permanent Income 
Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
Main source of income is 
Agriculture 
-.2153* 0.0700 -.3374** 0.1834 0.1230 -0.1632 -0.0355 0.0800 
Hhld head is employed -0.0443 -0.0753 -0.5284 0.0957 -0.1522 -0.0175 -0.5917 0.1653 
At least one hhld member is 
working abroad 
.356*** -0.2200 0.1607 -0.0786 0.0283 -0.0046 -0.1129 0.0149 
Hhld income quintile                          
(base = 1st quintile)  
                
2nd quintile -1.077*** .8009*** -.4979*** .3609** -0.0101 .4144*** .536*** 0.2296 
3rd quintile -1.434*** 1.573*** -.6894*** .6826*** 0.1281 .4823*** .633*** 0.2640 
4th quintile -1.79*** 1.849*** -.8973*** .9757*** 0.2813 .4459** .9259*** .4173** 
5th quintile -2.233*** 2.604*** -.7946*** 1.677*** .4677** .6626*** 1.536*** .899*** 
Proportion of hhld members who 
are employed 
0.1016 0.3492 .415* .4722** 0.1962 0.2934 .4838** .4457* 
Proportion of employed hhld 
members with permanent job 
0.0151 -0.0474 0.0371 -0.0656 -0.0429 -0.0074 -0.0180 -0.0452 
Proportion of employed hhld 
members with formal job 
0.0417 0.1503 .363** -0.0411 -0.1728 .2905* 0.1765 0.0157 
Proportion of employed hhld 
members with multiple jobs 
-.3544** -0.1265 -0.2858 -0.1841 -.2788* -0.1751 -0.2310 -0.2169 
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Appendix Table A6.1 (con’t) Regression Coefficients of Multinomial Logistic Models for Income Growth Trajectories in the Philippines 
Variable 
Initial Income in 2003 Permanent Income 
Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
Hhld head's sex changed (2003-2006) 0.2852 0.0852 .6397** 0.3313 0.2402 0.0693 .588** 0.3163 
Hhld head's sex changed (2006-2009) -.3587* -0.0628 -.5687** -.4354* -0.3414 -0.0884 -.5462** -.4567** 
Hhld head's marital status changed (2003-
2006) 
-0.1066 0.1113 -0.2411 -0.2356 -0.0630 0.1322 -0.2136 -0.2133 
Hhld head's marital status changed (2006-
2009) 
0.1633 -0.1201 0.2943 0.2741 0.1831 -0.1087 0.3007 0.2919 
 Hhld head's educational attainment  improved 
(2003-2009) 
0.2655 -.4082** 0.1668 -0.0437 0.0396 -0.2846 -0.0335 -0.0076 
 Hhld head's educational attainment  
deteriorated (2003-2009) 
-0.0638 0.3076 0.0452 0.2497 0.1301 0.1560 0.1987 0.1793 
Change in family size (2003-2006) -.2441*** .2704*** -.2545*** .1894*** -.2154*** .2552*** -.2144*** .1886*** 
Change in family size (2006-2009) -.2515*** .2358*** .2061*** -.2308*** -.2393*** .2334*** .2238*** -.2245*** 
Change in proportion of young members 
(2003-2006) 
-0.1521 0.1559 -1.073** 0.5103 0.0853 0.1086 -.8799** 0.4970 
Change in proportion of young members 
(2006-2009) 
-1.004*** .8568** 0.2630 -0.0610 -.7299** .6831* 0.5123 -0.1159 
Change in proportion of employed members 
(2003-2006) 
0.3623 -.7166** -0.2402 -0.1501 0.4545 -.7677** -0.1960 -0.1707 
Change in proportion of employed members 
(2006-2009) 
0.1369 -.9959*** -.7275*** 0.2938 0.1748 -.9815*** -.7338*** 0.3062 
Main source of income changed (2003-2006) 0.0245 0.2347 0.2020 0.1158 0.1130 0.1874 .2823* 0.1058 
Main source of income changed (2006-2009) 0.1641 0.2315 0.0937 .4979*** 0.2184 0.1659 0.1622 .4776*** 
Constant 2.375*** -1.0700 1.2440 -0.0516 0.7808 0.0758 -0.1508 0.3540 
Source: Author’s computations using data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
Note: The dependent variable is based on household expenditure per capita. The results based on the latent cluster analysis are qualitatively similar. To save space, I don’t present the results 
here. 
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Chapter 7 What Drives Income Distribution Dynamics in the Philippines? 
 
7.1  Introduction 
The previous two chapters examined the dynamics of poverty and inequality by taking 
into account the mobility of incomes. A good understanding of how much various factors affect 
poverty and inequality is important for strategic planning and policy making as it allows socio-
economic planners devise policy interventions that could help economic growth achieve 
maximum impact on reducing socio-economic deprivation. For instance, if one finds that 
changes in employment income drive upward mobility, labour market policies that promote 
growth in sectors where most of the poor are should become the focus. On the other hand, if 
economic shocks drive downward mobility, policymakers should strengthen social safety nets. 
In the Philippines, several studies have attempted to identify why poverty and inequality remain 
high despite faster economic growth (e.g., Balisacan & Hill 2003; Schelzig 2005; ADB 2007; 
Aldaba 2009) by identifying factors that correlate with these two phenomena. In the previous 
chapters, I have also implicitly focused on correlations between mobility and various socio-
economic variables. However, solely relying on correlations make it hard to gauge the extent 
to which perturbations in different factors would affect the distribution of household income. 
For example, although many of the existing studies in the recent years suggest that sub-optimal 
employment outcomes highly correlate with higher poverty (ILO 2009; ADB 2011b), they are 
silent about how much of the observed changes in poverty levels can actually be attributed to 
the changes in employment outcomes.  The main objective of this chapter is to contribute to 
the existing literature in identifying proximate determinants of poverty and inequality dynamics 
in the Philippines. Using a general Shapley (1953)-based accounting method proposed by 
Shorrocks (2013), the analysis presented in this chapter departs from the conventional 
correlation-based approaches by carrying out a series of counterfactual simulations to 
decompose the changes in poverty and inequality into the contribution of changes in various 
income correlates. While there are also limitations in the decomposition approach proposed by 
Shorrocks (2013), the result of such an accounting tool is easier to interpret and facilitates a 
more straightforward ranking of the relative importance of each factor in driving poverty and 
inequality because the estimated contributions sum up to the observed changes in poverty and 
inequality compared to the conventional correlation-based approaches. This exercise may be 
considered as a head start to better understand how to prioritize policy intervention programs 
to induce better household income distribution outcomes in the country.  
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In identifying the factors that have contributed to the observed household income 
distribution dynamics, I examine the extent to which changes in poverty and inequality depend 
on the changes in people’s socio-economic capital or to changes in the economic returns to 
these capital.  Simply put, a socio-economic capital (SEC) can be viewed as an economic tool 
that a person can use to extract the available wealth in the society to be able to improve his/her 
well-being. The type of education, employment and assets held are examples of SECs.65 In 
general, each SEC is valued differently. For example, having a college education does not 
necessarily have the same impact on a person’s well-being as having a small parcel of land. I 
refer to this value as socio-economic returns (SER).  In addition to employment, many studies 
have highlighted the importance of having higher skill set through better educational 
qualification in promoting upward mobility (Greenstone et al. 2013, Morgan et al. 2006). Some 
studies, particularly in the Philippines, have also stressed the limited access to basic social 
services and productive assets as underlying cause of poverty and inequality (Balisacan 2007). 
However, how changes in the returns to various forms of capital contribute to the evolution of 
household income distribution in the Philippines remains an empirical issue. For instance, as 
the supply of a specific form of socio-economic capital increases, it is tempting to expect for 
its corresponding economic returns to decline assuming that the demand for such capital 
remains fixed. This potential trade-off between capital and economic returns and the fact that 
either demand or supply of socio-economic capital hardly remains constant relative to the other 
make it less straightforward to infer how poverty and inequality would change over time. It 
may lead to either poverty reduction if low income households are acquiring additional capital 
faster than economic returns are dropping or increasing poverty if economic returns are 
deteriorating faster than the rate at which low income households are acquiring additional 
capital. Alternatively, poverty reduction will be much faster or lower than expected if both 
socio-economic capital and returns to capital are simultaneously increasing or decreasing, 
respectively. Counterfactual analysis allows me to investigate which of these scenarios hold in 
the Philippines. In particular, I address the following questions: 
(i) Are changes in households’ socio-economic capital and/or changes in returns to 
capital important in explaining the evolution of poverty and inequality in the 
Philippines?   
                                               
65  In other sociological literature, education is considered as an endowment while employment is considered as a type of 
functioning (i.e., capacity to translate an endowment to resources that can be used directly to improve one’s well-being). In 
this study, I considered both education and employment as different types of socio-economic capital to account for the fact 
that people have different capacities to make endowments function towards improving one’s living standards.  
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(ii) What are the socio-economic factors that have contributed significantly to changes 
in poverty and inequality in the Philippines over the past decade?   
Like in other chapters, I use the longitudinal subsample data from the FIES-LFS to 
answer these questions. Throughout the study, estimates are presented at the national and 
(broad) regional levels.  
 
7.2    Concepts and Methods 
7.2.1     Drivers of Income Distribution Dynamics 
Following the convention used in the previous chapters, I use the (log) household 
expenditure per capita as the main measure of well-being and I refer to this as income. To be 
able to measure the contribution of changes in SECs and changes in SERs to the observed 
trends in poverty and inequality, equation (7.1) decomposes (log) per capita income as a 
stochastic function of several correlates of a household’s well-being that are typically used in 
the existing literature (Canlas et al. 2009).  
𝑌𝑖𝑡
 𝑐 = 𝛽𝑡
𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖 𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖 𝑛 + 𝛽𝑡
ℎℎ𝑙𝑑𝑐   𝑋𝑖𝑡
ℎℎ𝑙𝑑𝑐   +  
                                             𝛽𝑡
   𝑙 𝑦𝑋𝑖𝑡
   𝑙 𝑦 +  𝛽𝑡
𝑠𝑣𝑐𝑠𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑠𝑣𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽𝑡
𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑠𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                             (7.1) 
 
Similar to how I categorized the proximate determinants of poverty dynamics in Chapter 
5, the SECs are broadly grouped into (i) (geographic) location, (ii) education, (iii) employment, 
(iv) access to (basic) services and (v) physical assets.66 Although all of these SECs are 
important, identifying which of them have the most significant impact on household income 
distribution outcomes will enable policymakers prioritize intervention programs. In a 
developing country like the Philippines, setting policy priorities and channelling the limited 
resources available to areas where interventions could have optimal impact is critical.  
How does the relationship between SEC and SER affect household income distribution 
outcomes? It is worth pointing out that simply increasing households’ capital levels would not 
necessarily guarantee better living standards (King, Montenegro, & Orazem 2012; Schultz 
1975).  For instance, if the labour force had higher stockpile of skills, it is not absolutely 
consequential that this would result in upward economic mobility across the board unless the 
demand for better-skilled workers also increases. A higher supply of skilled workers with a 
fixed demand for such type of labour would likely result in lower SERs. The same can be said 
about the other types of SECs. In this simple example, (absolute) poverty would increase if 
                                               
66As mentioned earlier, there are other forms of socio-economic capital (e.g., health, social networks, etc.) that can influence 
the household income distribution based on the existing literature but they are not included here due to data limitations.  
175 
 
SER falls faster than the rate at which SEC is increasing for low income households and it 
would decrease if SEC increases faster than the rate at which SER is falling. On the other hand, 
inequality would increase when SEC is increasing disproportionately faster in high income 
households or SER is decreasing disproportionately faster in low income households. The 
following section outlines the methodology for estimating the contribution of each of these 
factors on income distribution dynamics, separately.   
 
7.2.2     Estimating the Contribution of SECs and SERs to the Evolution of the Income 
Distribution 
Since the pioneering work of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) who proposed methods 
for decomposing group differences in income into various components, substantial progress 
has been made in terms of understanding what contributes to income distributional variations 
across space and over time. The main idea behind the Oaxaca-Blinder method is to decompose 
income differentials (between groups) into factors that are attributable to differences in SECs 
and variations in the SERs. To illustrate the approach, assume the income of individual i from 
the gth group, denoted by 𝑌𝑖
(𝑔)
, is a function of his/her SEC 𝑋𝑖
(𝑔)
, SER 𝛽(𝑔), and an unobserved 
error term 𝜀𝑖
(𝑔)
as shown in Equation 7.2.67 For simplicity, suppose we have two groups, g = 0, 
1. The main objective of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method is to explain the difference 
in group averages denoted by ?̅?( )   ?̅?(0). This is done by constructing income for one group, 
denoted by ?̅?(𝑐), by assuming that it has the same income structure (i.e., same SER) as the other 
group as shown in Equation 7.3. Equation 7.4 shows that the difference ?̅?( )   ?̅?(0) can be 
arithmetically expressed as a sum of two components where the first term corresponds to the 
gap in the average SEC in each group while the second term corresponds to the variation in the 
SER.         
 
                    𝑌𝑖
(𝑔)
= 𝛽(𝑔)𝑋𝑖
(𝑔)
+ 𝜀𝑖
(𝑔)?̅?(0) = ?̂?(0)𝑋𝑖
(0)
and  ?̅?( ) = ?̂?( )𝑋𝑖
( )
          (7.2)                                                                                  
                         ?̅?(𝑐) = ?̂?( )𝑋𝑖
(0)
                                                 (7.3) 
?̅?( )   ?̅?(0) = (?̅?( )   ?̅?(𝑐)) + (?̅?(𝑐)   ?̅?(0)) 
= (?̂?( )𝑋𝑖
( )   ?̂?( )𝑋𝑖
(0)) + (?̂?( )𝑋𝑖
(0)   ?̂?(0)𝑋𝑖
(0)) 
                         = ?̂?( )(?̅?( )  ?̅?(0)) + (?̂?( )  ?̂?(0))?̅?(0)                                 (7.4) 
 
                                               
67 Here, income is expressed in the natural logarithmic form.   
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Since its inception, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique has been used extensively to 
estimate the separate contributions of group differences in outcomes of interest with respect to 
observable characteristics like sex, education, race, and location. Nevertheless, although the 
method was originally proposed to explain income discrimination between two groups for a 
fixed time period, the procedure can also be applied to explain temporal changes in average 
income of the same group. In general, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method is very 
straightforward to apply as it only entails estimation of the coefficients of a linear regression 
model and the sample means of the underlying independent variables. However, the approach 
has two main shortcomings. First, it is limited to explaining differences in average income 
while differences in other parts of the income distribution are left unexplained. Second, the 
decomposition depends on the choice of a reference group. For example, when estimating 
separate wage regressions for five geographic locations, the results where the first geographic 
location is left-out would not necessarily be the same when the last geographic location were 
left-out. This portrays an identification problem wherein the results depend on an arbitrarily 
chosen reference group (Jones & Kelly 1984; Oaxaca & Ramson 1999). Over the years, several 
alternative decomposition methodologies have been proposed to address these limitations. To 
save space, I do not discuss them here but see Bourguignon, Ferreira & Lustig (2004) and 
Bourguignon & Ferreira (2008). More recently, Shorrocks (2013) provide a unified framework 
for different decomposition methods aiming to assess the contribution of a set of factors which 
together account for the observed value of some aggregate statistic.  
This study adopts the procedure proposed by Shorrocks (2013) also known as the 
Shapley-Shorrocks (SS) approach using the Stata implementation developed by Azevedo, 
Nguyen & Sanfelice (ANS) (2012).68  To illustrate the procedure, suppose we treat households 
as the unit of analysis and assume that there are two time periods. For notation purposes, I 
express (log) income Yit as a function of C components where each component is denoted by 
𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑐 , c = 1, 2, …, C; t= 0, 1 (7.5) and the term 𝑀(𝑌𝑡) is used to denote a specific characteristic 
feature of the household income distribution. The main interest is to decompose the change in 
the characteristic feature of the income distribution between time 0 and time 1, 𝑀(𝑌 )  𝑀(𝑌0), 
into the contribution of changes 𝐹𝑖 
𝑐  - 𝐹𝑖0
𝑐 . As argued by ANS (2012), this can be done by 
simulating the income distribution by changing each 𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑐  one at a time. The step-by-step 
procedure is outlined below.  
 
                                               
68 The Stata routine is called ADECOMP.   
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                                                  𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐹𝑖𝑡
 , 𝐹𝑖𝑡
2, … . , 𝐹𝑖𝑡
 − , 𝐹𝑖𝑡
 )                                    (7.5) 
                                          𝑀(𝑌𝑖𝑡) =  ∅(𝑓(𝐹𝑖𝑡
 , 𝐹𝑖𝑡
2 , … . , 𝐹𝑖𝑡
 − , 𝐹𝑖𝑡
 ))                              (7.6) 
 
 
Shapley-Shorrocks’ Algorithm for 
Estimating the Contribution of 𝐹𝑐 on 𝑀 (𝑌 )   𝑀0(𝑌0) 
 
Step #1: Using the formula provided below, compute the counterfactual income distributions 
at the initial time period and the corresponding parameter of interest M(Y0)
(c)  for each factor 
Fc.  
𝑀(𝑌0)
(0) =  ∅ (𝑓(𝐹𝑖0
 , 𝐹𝑖0
2 , … . , 𝐹𝑖0
 − , 𝐹𝑖0
 )) =  𝑀(𝑌0) 
𝑀(𝑌0)
( ) =  ∅(𝑓(𝐹𝑖 
 , 𝐹𝑖0
2 , … , 𝐹𝑖0
 − , 𝐹𝑖0
 )) 
𝑀(𝑌0)
(2) =  ∅(𝑓(𝐹𝑖 
 , 𝐹𝑖 
2 , … , 𝐹𝑖0
 − , 𝐹𝑖0
 )) 
: 
𝑀(𝑌0)
( − ) = ∅(𝑓(𝐹𝑖 
 , 𝐹𝑖 
2 , … , 𝐹𝑖 
 − , 𝐹𝑖0
 )) 
𝑀(𝑌0)
( ) = ∅(𝑓(𝐹𝑖 
 , 𝐹𝑖 
2 , … , 𝐹𝑖 
 − , 𝐹𝑖 
 ) =  𝑀(𝑌 ) 
 
Step #2: Compute the contribution of Fc by subtracting M1(Y)
(c-1) from M1(Y)
(c).  
    
                                𝑜 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐹𝑖 
𝑐   𝐹𝑖0
𝑐 ) = 𝑀(𝑌0)
(𝑐)   𝑀(𝑌0)
(𝑐− )                (7.7)  
                     % 𝑜 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐹𝑖 
𝑐   𝐹𝑖0
𝑐 ) =
𝑀(𝑌0)
(𝑐)− 𝑀(𝑌0)
(𝑐−1)
𝑀(𝑌1)− 𝑀(𝑌0)
                       (7.8) 
 
Step #3: Repeat Steps #1 and #2 for all possible orderings of Fc’s and then take the average of 
(7.7) and (7.8).  
At this point, important remarks are in order. First, like the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition method, the procedure outlined in the first two steps is path-dependent. Suppose 
the income measure 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is expressed as a function of 𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑐 ’s and the characteristic feature of the 
income distribution is some function M() of Yit, the idea behind the SS algorithm is to construct 
a counterfactual distribution of income by changing the values of the 𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑐  from the observed 
value at the initial time period to the observed value at the succeeding time period, one at a 
time. In the example above, I started chronologically from 𝐹𝑖𝑡
  to 𝐹𝑖𝑡
 . Thus, the values of (7.7) 
and (7.8) depend on this specific ordering of the factors. However, had I started from 𝐹𝑖𝑡
  to 𝐹𝑖𝑡
  
or followed any other ordering, the results would have been different. To address this issue, the 
third step entails computing the contribution of each factor across all possible permutations or 
“paths” and using the average to estimate the factor’s contribution on 𝑀 (𝑌 )   𝑀0(𝑌0).  
Second, the approach entails estimating the contribution of one factor at a time by holding 
the values of all other factors constant. Hence, the decomposition methodology does not reflect 
economic equilibrium because it employs a simplistic assumption that each factor can be 
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changed one at a time while the rest can be held fixed (Azevedo et al. 2013). Nevertheless, the 
potential interactions between factors are partially taken into account by estimating the 
contribution of a specific factor as the difference between the cumulative counterfactuals.  
Third, unlike the Oaxaca-Blinder method and other conventional decomposition tools 
which are mostly based on the means, the SS algorithm flexibly accommodates quantiles, 
variance and any other characteristic features of an income distribution. Although the 
methodology can be used to explain the temporal differences in various forms of 𝑀(𝑌𝑡), this 
study defines 𝑀𝑡(𝑌𝑡) in terms of poverty and inequality only, in particular, I focus on US$2 
poverty gap and Gini coefficient (i.e., ∅(𝑓) = ⋯ ).69 
Fourth, to be able to construct counterfactual income distributions, the SS algorithm 
requires panel data. If repeated cross-sectional data is available, the algorithm can be modified 
by making additional assumptions as outlined in Azevedo et al. (2013).  
To estimate the contribution of the changes in SEC and SER to poverty and inequality 
dynamics using the SS algorithm, each of the 𝑋𝑖𝑡
𝑐  (SEC) and the parameter 𝛽𝑡
𝑐 (SER) as well as 
the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 can be considered as one of the 𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑐 ’s. Note that each SEC could have multiple 
indicators, for example, access to services can be measured in terms of access to either 
electricity, clean water or sanitary toilet, estimation of (7.7) and (7.8) could be very 
computationally-intensive due to the iterative nature of the SS algorithm if each indicator is 
treated as a separate 𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑐 . To address this issue, I reduce the dimension of (7.1) by constructing 
an index for each SEC by following the approach outlined in UN (2005) and estimating a 
regression model (of income) and using the corresponding coefficients as weights for the index. 
In particular, I regress (log) income on the various indicators of SECs. Since I am interested to 
measure the impact of changes in SEC levels to poverty and inequality dynamics, I do not want 
the changes in the SEC indices to be artificially contaminated by the changes in the weights of 
the component indicators. Thus, I use the data from the initial survey year only to derive the 
weights for each component indicator. These weights are then multiplied to the value of each 
component indicator for the initial survey year and the succeeding time periods. The resulting 
indices are then used as inputs for the SS algorithm. Although the indicators included in the 
construction of the SEC indices in this study are similar to the ones commonly used in the 
existing literature (Montgomery et al. 2000; Aldaba 2009), these were chosen on an ad-hoc 
basis, subject to data availability and the results of descriptive analysis. In general, 
Montgomery et al. (2000) argued that in the empirical literature, indicators are usually chosen 
                                               
69  Results for other poverty and inequality indices are provided in Appendix Tables A7.2 and A7.3.  
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on an ad-hoc basis due to lack of “best practice” approach of selecting indicators that can proxy 
living standards comprehensively.  
Furthermore, I treat the model residuals as a separate component that gauges the level of 
socio-economic shocks. In general, while variations in household incomes across space and 
over time can be mostly explained by differences in stock of socio-economic capital and 
economic returns, incomes could also fluctuate significantly due to unexpected shocks. As 
pointed out in the previous chapters, a quick review of the Philippines’s economic history 
would reveal that socio-economic shocks (e.g., environmental disasters, financial crisis, etc.) 
have been prominent features of the country’s development landscape (Bayudan-Dacuycuy & 
Lim 2013) but not much has been said about the magnitude of impact of these shocks on 
poverty and inequality dynamics using a longitudinal perspective in the country. By treating 
the model residuals as an approximate measure of shock, I can explicitly gauge how much of 
the changes in poverty and inequality observed in the past decade are attributable to shocks in 
household incomes, after accounting for the changes in SECs and SERs.70 
7.2.3  Constructing Indices of Socio-Economic Capital 
In constructing the SEC indices (i.e., Location, Education, Employment, Services and 
Assets), I derive the weights by estimating several regression models with the (log) income as 
the dependent variable and the various indicators of SEC that are available from the survey as 
independent variables. On the basis of preliminary analyses, I drop indicators that are not 
statistically significant and have counterintuitive signs of model coefficients to be able to come-
up with sound and parsimonious SEC indices. The final SEC index Location consists of four 
dummy variables: (i) whether the household is living in urban area, (ii) whether the household 
is living in the National Capital Region (NCR), (iii) whether the household is living in Luzon 
and (iv) whether the household is living in Visayas. The index Education has three sub-
component indicators: (i) proportion of working-age household members with primary 
education, (ii) proportion of working-age household members with secondary education, and 
(iii) proportion of working-age household members with post-secondary education. Similarly, 
the index Employment consists of three indicators: (i) proportion of working-age household 
members who are employed, (ii) proportion of employed household members working in the 
non-agriculture sector, (iii) proportion of employed household members with formal 
                                               
70  Here, since the model residuals are used to approximate shocks, these also contain household-specific effects and other 
factors that were not controlled in the model.  
180 
 
employment.71 The index Services has four dummy variables: (i) whether household has 
electricity at home, (ii) whether household has water faucet at home, (iii) whether household 
has a sealed-toilet facility and (iv) whether household has closed-pit toilet facility. Lastly, the 
index Assets consists of four dummy variables: (i) whether household owns house/lot, (ii) 
whether household owns a refrigerator, (iii) whether household owns a phone and (iv) whether 
households owns a car.72 Overall, although the resulting indices are not comprehensive, they 
provide a good starting point for a more nuanced understanding of how changes in SEC levels 
interplay with the changes in SER in driving household income distribution dynamics.  
7.3    Results 
7.3.1    Drivers of Household Income Distribution Dynamics in the Philippines 
The objective of this section is to examine whether the observed changes in poverty and 
inequality can be attributed to changes in households’ SECs or changes in the SERs. As pointed 
out earlier, the household income distribution dynamics is potentially shaped by how much the 
pace at which SECs and SERs are changing differ from each other. 
 
Figure 7.1 Temporal Changes in the Levels of Socio-Economic Capital 
             
         Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of  
         FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
                                               
71  Here, formal employment refers to jobs held by government employees, professionals and wage workers employed in 
private businesses. Further details are provided in Chapter 8. 
72  As pointed out in Chapter 5, the variables that make up the Assets and Services indices could be considered as proxy 
measures of material deprivation. Since they could be endogenous with income poverty, I avoid inferring causal relationships 
in most of the succeeding discussions.  
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Figure 7.1 summarizes the evolution of the distribution of each SEC index over time. 
The bars correspond to the mean levels of each SEC while the bands correspond to 95% 
confidence intervals.  In the case of Location, the distribution does not change because I am 
using data from households that did not move residential location throughout the observation 
period. On the other hand, I observe no changes in Education and Employment. This is 
consistent with the findings from previous studies which have attributed the low growth 
elasticity of poverty to its lack of enabling capacity to expand economic opportunities for the 
poor (Aldaba 2009). In contrast, significant improvements can be observed in Services from 
2003 to 2009 and in Assets across all survey years.  
 
Figure 7.2 Temporal Changes in the Socio-Economic Returns to Capital 
 
         Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of  
         FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
To estimate the SERs, I regress (log) per capita income on the SEC indices for each 
survey year.  The coefficients of the SECs are used as estimates of the SERs. Figure 7.2 shows 
how these SERs have changed over the past decade. Except for REducation and REmployment, 
the results provide empirical support to the hypothesis that improved SEC levels usually lead 
to lower SERs. In the case of REducation, there is a slight downward trend but the changes are 
not as remarkable as that of other SERs. Interestingly, I find that the REmployment have 
uniformly increased over the past ten years.  
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The estimated contribution of the changes in SECs and SERs to poverty and inequality 
dynamics are presented in Figure 7.3.73 The bars represent how much each factor has 
contributed to the increase/decrease in poverty and inequality. Positive values indicate 
inflationary impact while negative values indicate deflationary impact on our income 
distributional measures. The number on top of each bar indicates the total change in poverty or 
inequality observed during the period under consideration.  
Between 2003 and 2006, the results of the counterfactual simulations based on the SS 
algorithm suggest that the SEC levels in terms of Education, Employment and Services had 
minimal inflationary effect on the overall poverty gap. In particular, the observed changes in 
Education, Employment and Services would have increased the overall poverty gap by 0.1, 0.4 
and 0.5 percentage points, respectively, if all other factors remained constant. On the other 
hand, the observed changes in Assets had negative effect on poverty from 2003 to 2006. In 
particular, the changes in Assets would have coincided with reduction in poverty gap by 2.4 
percentage points if all other factors were held fixed. In terms of the changes in SERs, I find 
that the changes in REducation and RServices between 2003 and 2006 had strong correlation 
with increase in poverty. In particular, the observed changes in REducation and RServices 
would have coincided with an increase in the overall poverty gap of 3.7 and 2.4 percentage 
points, respectively, if the values of all other components were held constant during this period. 
Similarly, the changes in RLocation and RAssets had increasing, albeit slightly weaker, 
correlation on poverty gap. In contrast, the changes in REmployment had a strong correlation 
with poverty reduction, contributing to a 3.6 percentage point reduction in poverty gap between 
2003 and 2006, ceteris paribus.  
On the other hand, the increase in the Gini coefficient from 42.8 in 2003 to 44.3 in 2006 
can be mostly attributed to changes in SEmployment. Changes in Education and Employment 
also contributed positively to higher inequality during this period. However, this was largely 
offset by the inequality-reducing impact of changes in Services, Assets, RLocation, 
REducation, RServices and RAssets.  
From 2006 to 2009, the US$2 poverty gap dropped from 16.3 to 13.6. The poverty-
inflationary impact of the changes in RLocation, REmployment, RServices and RAssets have 
been largely offset by the changes in SECs, particularly Assets and Employment which together 
have contributed to a 3.0 percentage point reduction in US$2 poverty gap while  the reduction 
in inequality during this period could be mostly attributed to the changes in Assets.   
                                               
73 The estimates are provided in Appendix Tables A7.2 and A7.3.  
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Figure 7.3 Estimates Contribution of Different Factors on Poverty and Inequality 
        
         Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of  
         FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
In summary, the results suggest that the changes in poverty gap between 2003 and 2009 
coincided mostly with changes in returns to education, returns to access to basic services, 
returns to employment and levels of asset ownership. The last two factors are positively 
correlated with poverty reduction while the first two factors are positively correlated with 
increase in poverty. Interestingly, this has occurred at the backdrop of trivial changes in human 
capital (i.e., education and employment). While the results of these study have not established 
causal relationship with poverty and inequality, the findings seem to depart from the 
conventional wisdom that the underlying cause of the country’s poverty and inequality in the 
1980s and 1990s is the limited access to basic social services and productive assets (Balisacan 
2007). Instead, the results may be indicative of the need to improve human capital outcomes. 
For instance, given the way how Employment index has been constructed, the finding that it 
did not contribute significantly to poverty reduction suggests that the poor did not experience 
improvements in their chance to be employed in the non-agriculture and formal sectors. This 
portrays a labour market segmentation wherein the poor workers continuously experience 
difficulty in moving to formal, non-agriculture sectors. Since more productive sectors require 
higher levels of skills, the stagnant education levels, which can be used to proxy skills, could 
probably explain why a significant fraction of poor workers were unable to move away from 
less productive sectors. Nevertheless, the finding that those who successfully transitioned to 
formal and non-agriculture jobs have experienced improved living standards due to higher 
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economic returns of working in these sectors highlight the importance of improving 
employment outcomes for tackling poverty in the Philippines.  
The results also confirm that the contribution of changes in the SECs and SERs to poverty 
and inequality generally offset one another. This usually happens when the demand for a 
specific type of SEC is fixed. To explicitly show this, I summed up the contribution of SEC 
and SER for the five correlates of well-being considered in this study and present the results in 
Table 7.1. Here, I find that assets and employment outcomes have contributed to lower poverty 
gap, leading to a 4.2 and 3.6 percentage point reduction, respectively. However, this gain has 
been partially offset by education and services outcomes. In terms of inequality, both SECs 
and SERs have generally contributed to a reduction in inequality. Assets and services outcomes 
have the highest poverty-reducing impact while employment outcomes have contributed to 
increasing inequality.  
 
Table 7.1 Trade-off between Socio-Economic Capital 
and Socio-Economic Returns, 2003-2009 
Factor 
Poverty Gap (%) Gini (%) 
SEC SER 
Total 
Contribution 
SEC SER 
Total 
Contribution 
Location 0.00 0.74 0.74 0.00 -0.57 -0.57 
Education 0.00 3.34 3.34 0.30 -0.07 0.23 
Employment 0.00 -3.57 -3.58 0.22 1.92 2.14 
Services -1.02 2.69 1.68 -0.59 -1.21 -1.80 
Assets -4.65 0.50 -4.15 -1.48 -1.31 -2.80 
Total 
Contribution  
-5.67 3.70 -1.97 -1.55 -1.24 -2.80 
   Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of  
   FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
In addition to SECs and SERs, I also disentangle the contribution of socio-economic 
shocks on the observed changes in poverty and inequality. This computational exercise is 
important because previous studies suggest that household income is subject to different forms 
of socio-economic risks. For instance, Dercon & Krishnan (2002) noted that income from 
employment may be heavily affected by ill-health or financial crisis-induced unemployment. 
Income transfers may be reduced due to uncertain access to public goods. Income reduction 
and value of assets, especially in the agriculture sector, may deteriorate due to war, theft, 
uncertainty in land tenure or environmental shocks like earthquakes or typhoons. While the 
impact of these shocks is usually transient, it can also have long-term effects on a household’s 
future economic prospects (Albert, Elloso & Ramos 2009). Worryingly, socio-economic 
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shocks may push poor and economically vulnerable households to further risk-induced poverty 
traps. In the Philippines, there are several sources of socio-economic shocks. Environmental 
hazards are good example. On average, about 20 tropical cyclones hit the country every year 
(PAG-ASA 2014) and these cost about 0.8% of GDP in damages (Oxford Economics 2013). 
Other sources of shocks that are commonly experienced by Filipino households are brought by 
illness, accident, unemployment, and economic crises (Albert et al. 2009). 
7.3.2  Robustness Checks 
Regional Estimates  
In this section, I briefly examine the regional variations in terms of the contribution of 
SECs, SERs and socio-economic shocks to poverty and inequality dynamics over the past 
decade. As pointed out in the earlier chapters, the Philippines consists of three major island 
groups, Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (Figure 3.1 in page 84). Although NCR is within Luzon, 
I separate the two in our analysis because NCR differs significantly from the rest of Luzon in 
terms of average income levels.  
The results of the counterfactual simulations by region are presented in Appendix A7.3. 
Although the list of major contributing factors to the observed poverty and inequality dynamics 
is similar across regions, there are some spatial differences that are worth pointing out. First, 
the changes observed in SECs and SERs have significantly bigger impact on poverty in poorer 
regions of Visayas and Mindanao while socio-economic shocks played a more pronounced role 
in driving the changes in poverty and inequality in NCR and Luzon. Second, for low income 
households in Visayas and Mindanao, the level of SECs improved much faster than the rate at 
which its corresponding SERs declined, thus contributing to reduction in poverty gap. The 
same can be said for Luzon although the offsetting effect between its SEC and SER was 
stronger, leading to lower reduction in poverty gap. In contrast, poverty gap in NCR slightly 
increased between 2003 and 2009 and this can be explained by SERs declining faster than the 
rate at which SECs of low income households increased.   
 
Other Measures of Poverty and Inequality 
To examine the robustness of the results to the type of poverty and inequality indicators 
used, I also estimate the contribution of the changes in SECs, SERs and economic shocks to 
household income distribution dynamics using the proportion of population with income below 
US$2 a day (headcount poverty rate) and the average squared income shortfall (poverty 
severity) as alternative measures for poverty and the Theil coefficient as an alternative measure 
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for inequality. The estimates are presented in the appendix. The results based on poverty gap 
and Gini coefficient are mostly similar with the results for poverty severity and Theil 
coefficient, respectively. However, there are some remarkable differences when one looks at 
US$2 headcount poverty rates. In particular, the impact of economic shocks are more 
pronounced when US$2 headcount poverty rates are used instead of poverty gap. For example, 
it has been mentioned earlier that the economic shocks had minimal deflationary effect on 
poverty gap between 2003 and 2006. However, when poverty headcount is used, I find that 
socio-economic shocks had a significant inflationary impact, contributing to a 2.2 percentage 
point increase in poverty gap between 2003 and 2006. This is equivalent to a +73% contribution 
to the observed increase in poverty headcount during this period, compared to its –3.9% 
contribution to the observed increase in poverty gap. A possible reason for this is that many of 
those who fell into poverty due to economic shocks between 2003 and 2006 were households 
that had incomes that were just a little lower than the poverty line. In such case, headcount 
poverty is more sensitive to capture these changes than poverty gap. On the other hand, the 
impact of socio-economic shocks on poverty between 2006 and 2009 is consistent, regardless 
of the poverty measure used. In terms of the qualitative results about income inequality, I did 
not find significant differences when inequality is measured using Theil index instead of the 
Gini coefficient.  
7.3.3  Potential Limitations of the Accounting Exercise74  
The decomposition approach adopted in this study is not a perfect tool for analysing 
determinants of income mobility. For instance, it falls short in capturing general equilibrium 
effects that can affect income distribution dynamics. A good example is a policy initiative that 
raises average wages. If higher wages also increase the prices of basic commodities up to the 
point that the purchasing power of people is where it was before the policy was implemented, 
it will be hard for such a decomposition exercise to capture this process.  Another potential 
limitation of this study is that the measurement of socio-economic capital and returns to capital 
falls short in capturing the exact economic meaning of these concepts.  If the statistical models 
suffer from severe omitted variable bias, then it will be difficult to assume that the model 
coefficients capture the socio-economic returns to capital. Taking into account all these 
limitations, adequate caution should be taken from inferring causal relationships from the 
                                               
74  I thank the external referees who reviewed this thesis for pointing out the issues of the decomposition approach 
adopted in this chapter.  
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results presented in this chapter. At best, it can be considered as a modest advance in probing 
beyond correlations.    
7.4   Summary and Discussion 
To be able to devise policies and intervention programs that could address poverty and 
inequality effectively, socio-economic planners need to understand the factors that shaped the 
household income distribution in the country.  In this chapter, I use counterfactual simulations 
as an accounting tool to approximate the contribution of various factors to changes in poverty 
and inequality over the past decade and in turn, direct us to priorities for policy. I classify the 
hypothesized correlates into three broad factors: socio-economic capital, socio-economic 
returns to capital and socio-economic shocks. Analysis of the survey data suggests that while 
the correlates of income poverty and inequality are diverse, there is empirical evidence that the 
higher levels of ownership of assets and higher economic returns to formal, non-agricultural 
employment are correlated to lower income poverty while much work needs to be done so that 
income poverty reduction would coincide with education, employment and access to basic 
services. The results also re-echo the findings in the previous chapters about the existence of 
strong offsetting forces that lead to small changes in poverty and inequality at the aggregate-
level over the past decade. In particular, I find that while the levels of socio-economic capital 
increased in some cases, the corresponding economic returns also declined at approximately 
the same pace. This departs from conventional wisdom that only portrays income poverty and 
inequality as a simple lack of socio-economic capital of those who are at bottom of the social 
pyramid because the changes in the various forms of capital held by Filipino households 
interact with the changes in its corresponding economic returns in driving the household 
income distribution.  
The results of this chapter point to the need to ensure that the welfare-improving effect, 
i.e., the changes in SERs, do not work to the disadvantage of the poor is probably as important 
as providing access to SECs. There are several ways to do this. In terms of human capital, it is 
important that socio-economic planners provide enabling opportunities for the poor to get 
access to skills needed in higher-productivity sectors for the country’s poverty reduction to 
speed up (ADB 2012b). At the same time that workers are stockpiling skills, it is also important 
that economic growth would be used to create high quality jobs continuously so that the 
economic returns to formal and non-agricultural employment will not deteriorate as the supply 
of high skilled workers increases. This is discussed further in the next chapter. On the other 
hand, the finding that the returns to basic services dropped faster than the rate at which access 
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to basic services increased, contributing to higher income poverty, could be indicative of higher 
cost that low income households have to pay to access basic services due to the hike in 
electricity tariffs and expanded value added tax in utilities which started in 2006. Thus, to 
strengthen the correlation of increased access to basic services with poverty reduction, it is 
important to minimize the cost needed to provide such services. This can be done by investing 
more on infrastructure that can make the delivery of such services more efficient. However, 
although there are signs of improvement, the availability of key infrastructure in the country 
compares unfavourably with that in many of its Southeast Asian neighbours at present (ADB 
2007, WB 2014).75 Nevertheless, given the high economic growth and higher liquidity in the 
financial market nowadays, the government can respond to this problem by initiating more 
infrastructure investment and providing a socio-economic environment that will attract non-
government players to play more actively in this role. In terms of access to assets, I find that 
access to assets increased much faster than the rate at which the returns to asset ownership 
dropped which in turn, contributed to lower poverty and inequality. For policy-makers, the 
challenge is to provide an economic environment that will sustain this trend by ensuring that 
access to productive assets is equitable and knowledge on how to use these assets for income-
generation is easily accessible to everyone.  
By using the residuals from the estimated models as proxy to socio-economic shocks, 
this chapter has also briefly examined the impact of shocks to poverty and inequality. At the 
national-level, the results suggest that shocks have smaller impact on poverty gap relative to 
the contribution of the changes in SECs and SERs between 2003 and 2006. In contrast, the 
impact of shocks on the change in poverty gap between 2006 and 2009 is comparable with the 
impact of changes in other factors, particularly the changes in returns to access to basic services 
and returns to asset ownership. In addition, socio-economic shocks have also contributed to 
increasing inequality.  To some extent, this could mean that the shocks experienced by Filipino 
households over the past decade had debilitating impact for the poor. To minimize the adverse 
impact of economic shocks on poor and vulnerable households, social safety nets should be put 
in place. Often, this is the responsibility of the government. However, some studies suggest 
that the efforts of the government fall short in this respect. For instance, an ADB report 
surmised that despite the country being used to environmental disasters, the relief provided 
during such episodes remains inadequate (ADB 2007). Some studies also suggest that the weak 
                                               
75  According to the 2013-2014 Global Competitiveness Index compiled by World Economic Forum, the Philippines is ranked 
96th out of 148 countries based on the Infrastructure pillar. Its Southeast Asian neighbours rank higher: Malaysia (29th), 
Thailand (47th) and Indonesia (61st) (WB 2014).  
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impact of the social protection programs in poverty reduction can be partially explained by the 
low coverage and limitations in targeting appropriate recipients (ADB 2007, Bird and Hill 
2009, Reyes et al. 2011). When formal social safety nets are not working effectively, low 
income households would often turn to informal risk sharing networks where funds are raised 
through gifts and loans among members (Fafchamps & Lund 2003). However, informal risk-
sharing is not always optimal for the poor (Fafchamps & Gubert 2007). In particular, although 
some loans made through this channel are usually subjected to zero interest rates or do not have 
to be repaid fully, others expect much higher payments leading the poor to further debts 
(Platteau 1997). In addition, members of a risk-sharing network may have a hard time raising 
funds if all of them are experiencing income shocks (Landmann, Vollan & Frolich 2012). 
Furthermore, the funds raised through this channel may only cover a fraction of the income 
shocks (Townsend 1994). Thus, it is important that policymakers examine the effectiveness of 
both formal and informal social safety nets that exist today. Nevertheless, this topic warrants 
further investigation using more sophisticated statistical tools to be able to better understand 
the different short and long-run effects of shocks as it is highly probable that the different socio-
economic capital partially absorb the shocks with different timings.  
There are also some limitations in this study. First, as the socio-economic correlates of 
poverty and inequality that were used here could be considered as measures of material 
deprivation. Although I used counterfactual simulations to measure their contribution to 
changes in poverty and inequality, it is still difficult to conclude causal relationships. Second, 
I might be more appropriate to examine the impact of changes in socio-economic returns to 
capital using longer observation period.  
Nevertheless, the findings of this chapter are sufficient to highlight that the problem on 
poverty and inequality cannot be addressed by simply increasing the levels of socio-economic 
capital of the people living at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Without any intervention, the 
benefits of higher levels of socio-economic capital may just be washed out by lower economic 
returns. Thus, socio-economic planners should devise policies that would ensure that economic 
growth translates to improvement in socio-economic capital and creation of more opportunities 
where this capital can be used more productively. Throughout this process, the importance of 
providing access to social safety nets should not be taken for granted. In particular, although 
the results suggest that economic shocks between 2003 and 2006 did not contribute 
significantly to the observed changes in poverty gap, it drove US$2 headcount poverty rate to 
increase. Between 2006 and 2009, shocks contributed to higher poverty, regardless of the 
poverty index being used. In addition, economic shocks also contributed to higher income 
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inequality for all periods.  Given that the Philippines has a wide range of social safety nets in 
place (Ortiz 2001; Bird & Hill 2009; Reyes et al. 2011), the finding that income shocks have 
pushed (headcount) poverty and inequality up, should prompt socio-economic planners to re-
evaluate the effectiveness of existing social protection programs.  If left unaddressed, socio-
economic shocks may deter the country’s economic development.   
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Appendix Table A7.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Included in SEC Indices 
 
                          Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
Mean / 
Proportion
Standard 
Deviation
Mean / 
Proportion
Standard 
Deviation
Mean / 
Proportion
Standard 
Deviation
Urban 0.49 0.5 0.49 0.5 0.49 0.5
NCR 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
Luzon 0.46 0.5 0.46 0.5 0.46 0.5
Visayas 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41
(Mindanao) 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
(Proportion of working age hhld 
members who have at most 
primary education)
0.36 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.32 0.35
Proportion of working age hhld 
members who have at most 
secondary education
0.41 0.35 0.42 0.33 0.43 0.32
Proportion of working age hhld 
members who have postsecondary 
education
0.23 0.32 0.24 0.32 0.25 0.32
Proportion of employed hhld 
members working in the non-
agriculture sector
0.65 0.43 0.65 0.47 0.69 0.44
Proportion of employed hhld 
members with formal employment 
arrangement
0.27 0.37 0.28 0.37 0.32 0.39
Proportion of employed hhld 
members with permanent jobs
0.69 0.4 0.73 0.39 0.74 0.37
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Appendix Table A7.1 (con’t) Descriptive Statistics of Variables Included in SEC Indices 
SEC Indicators 
2003 2006 2009 
Mean / 
Proportion 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean / 
Proportion 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean / 
Proportion 
Standard 
Deviation 
B
A
S
IC
 S
E
R
V
IC
E
S
 Has access to electricity at 
home 
0.78 0.41 0.83 0.38 0.87 0.34 
Has access to water faucet at 
home 
0.44 0.5 0.44 0.5 0.49 0.5 
Has access to water-sealed 
toilet facility at home 
0.72 0.45 0.75 0.43 0.81 0.4 
Has access to closed pit toilet 
facility at home  
0.1 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.06 0.24 
A
S
S
E
T
S
 Owns a house/lot 0.72 0.45 0.76 0.42 0.75 0.43 
Owns a refrigerator 0.37 0.48 0.4 0.49 0.4 0.49 
Owns a phone 0.31 0.46 0.54 0.5 0.71 0.45 
Owns a car 0.12 0.33 0.18 0.39 0.25 0.43 
                                Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
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Appendix Table A7.2 Estimated Contribution of Different Factors on Changes in Poverty and Inequality in the Philippines 
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
 
 
 
FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil
Location 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Economic returns to location 0.90 0.38 0.19 -0.29 -0.54 0.84 0.39 0.19 -0.29 -0.53 1.81 0.74 0.37 -0.57 -0.96
Education 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.27 0.29 -0.26 -0.12 -0.06 0.02 -0.14 -0.19 0.00 0.03 0.30 0.21
Economic returns to education 6.95 3.71 2.16 -0.08 -0.14 -0.49 -0.27 -0.15 0.01 0.01 6.54 3.34 1.88 -0.07 -0.12
Type of employment 0.23 0.40 0.30 0.40 0.39 -1.15 -0.50 -0.28 -0.25 -0.51 -0.52 0.00 0.06 0.22 -0.02
Economic returns to type of employment -7.68 -3.61 -1.91 2.02 3.89 0.13 0.07 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -8.11 -3.57 -1.85 1.92 3.54
Access to services -0.69 -0.47 -0.28 -0.29 -0.71 -0.77 -0.45 -0.26 -0.25 -0.38 -1.64 -1.02 -0.58 -0.59 -1.10
Economic returns to access to services 5.82 2.44 1.24 -1.16 -1.94 0.52 0.25 0.13 -0.10 -0.16 6.60 2.69 1.33 -1.21 -1.95
Assets held -5.55 -2.31 -1.12 -0.23 -0.19 -4.45 -2.46 -1.34 -1.34 -2.66 -10.03 -4.65 -2.38 -1.48 -2.80
Economic returns to assets 0.80 0.27 0.12 -0.90 -1.53 0.56 0.22 0.10 -0.45 -0.74 1.47 0.50 0.22 -1.31 -2.13
Unobserved factors 2.21 -0.03 -0.42 1.71 2.18 0.71 0.29 0.04 0.56 1.96 2.75 0.26 -0.33 2.11 3.83
Total change 3.03 0.88 0.35 1.44 1.69 -4.36 -2.59 -1.60 -2.13 -3.20 -1.32 -1.71 -1.24 -0.68 -1.51
2003-2006 2006-2009 2003-2009
Factor
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Appendix Table A7.3 Estimated Contribution of Different Factors on Changes in Poverty and Inequality, by Region 
 
        
FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil
Location 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Economic returns to location 1.61 0.32 0.10 0.00 0.00 1.37 0.38 0.12 0.00 0.00 2.44 0.59 0.19 0.00 0.00
Education 0.40 -0.06 -0.03 -0.22 -0.34 -0.15 0.02 0.00 0.08 -0.43 0.39 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.61
Economic returns to education 4.34 0.93 0.29 -0.07 -0.09 -0.42 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.01 3.41 0.80 0.26 -0.06 -0.08
Type of employment 0.08 0.04 0.00 -0.17 -0.38 -1.05 -0.16 -0.03 -0.78 -1.57 -0.52 -0.13 -0.04 -0.39 -0.79
Economic returns to type of employment -5.16 -1.19 -0.36 1.63 2.20 0.09 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -5.39 -1.10 -0.34 1.44 1.74
Access to services -0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.11 -0.51 -0.14 -0.06 -0.18 -0.26 -0.49 -0.15 -0.05 -0.19 -0.34
Economic returns to access to services 4.39 0.93 0.29 -0.25 -0.33 0.47 0.11 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 4.25 0.99 0.32 -0.22 -0.26
Assets held -1.35 -0.44 -0.15 -0.30 -1.14 -4.30 -0.67 -0.17 -1.40 -2.27 -4.21 -0.92 -0.29 -1.38 -2.80
Economic returns to assets 0.55 0.10 0.03 -0.71 -1.00 0.25 0.07 0.02 -0.34 -0.47 0.80 0.15 0.05 -1.00 -1.34
Unobserved factors 0.84 0.05 -0.03 5.77 10.56 -1.00 -0.05 0.01 -1.48 -3.60 -0.29 -0.15 -0.06 3.34 5.19
Total change 5.64 0.66 0.15 5.66 9.36 -5.25 -0.50 -0.10 -4.13 -8.64 0.39 0.15 0.05 1.53 0.71
FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil
Location 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Economic returns to location 1.20 0.53 0.27 -0.10 -0.15 1.18 0.53 0.27 -0.11 -0.19 2.57 1.04 0.51 -0.21 -0.30
Education 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.29 0.21 -0.30 -0.09 -0.04 0.07 0.00 -0.13 0.03 0.04 0.34 0.15
Economic returns to education 7.36 3.25 1.67 -0.07 -0.13 -0.53 -0.23 -0.12 0.01 0.01 6.83 2.90 1.46 -0.07 -0.12
Type of employment 0.21 0.30 0.20 0.37 0.40 -1.36 -0.48 -0.22 -0.12 -0.33 -0.77 -0.06 0.02 0.17 -0.18
Economic returns to type of employment -7.94 -3.21 -1.55 1.77 3.66 0.13 0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -8.55 -3.22 -1.51 1.70 3.25
Access to services -0.67 -0.31 -0.17 -0.22 -0.73 -0.78 -0.44 -0.25 -0.24 -0.36 -1.65 -0.89 -0.48 -0.54 -1.11
Economic returns to access to services 6.24 2.28 1.04 -0.94 -1.48 0.51 0.23 0.11 -0.08 -0.12 7.03 2.53 1.15 -0.97 -1.47
Assets held -6.24 -2.28 -1.02 -0.22 1.03 -4.48 -2.03 -0.99 -1.10 -1.94 -10.94 -4.24 -1.95 -1.41 -1.50
Economic returns to assets 0.79 0.25 0.10 -0.87 -1.32 0.58 0.20 0.08 -0.43 -0.65 1.52 0.44 0.18 -1.28 -1.82
Unobserved factors 1.85 0.15 -0.09 0.99 -2.67 1.18 0.43 0.10 0.02 0.06 3.12 0.73 0.09 1.22 -1.68
Total change 2.92 1.09 0.56 1.00 -1.18 -3.88 -1.82 -1.03 -2.03 -3.58 -0.96 -0.73 -0.48 -1.03 -4.76
Luzon
Factor
2003-2006 2006-2009 2003-2009
Factor
2003-2006 2006-2009 2003-2009
National Capital Region
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Appendix Table A7.3 (con’t) Estimated Contribution of Different Factors on Changes in Poverty and Inequality, by Region   
 
 Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006 and 2009. 
FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil
Location 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Economic returns to location 0.64 0.33 0.19 -0.13 -0.17 0.57 0.34 0.19 -0.13 -0.20 1.32 0.67 0.37 -0.25 -0.37
Education -0.12 0.15 0.15 0.60 0.78 -0.30 -0.20 -0.11 0.12 0.07 -0.36 -0.01 0.03 0.68 1.01
Economic returns to education 7.32 4.52 2.80 -0.08 -0.13 -0.49 -0.33 -0.20 0.01 0.01 7.38 4.14 2.43 -0.07 -0.13
Type of employment 0.01 0.50 0.40 0.68 0.62 -0.86 -0.67 -0.39 -0.37 -0.68 -0.41 -0.06 0.04 0.35 -0.09
Economic returns to type of employment -8.69 -4.56 -2.56 2.14 3.60 0.14 0.08 0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -9.05 -4.58 -2.48 1.99 3.41
Access to services -0.87 -0.68 -0.43 -0.53 -0.88 -0.97 -0.59 -0.33 -0.29 -0.42 -2.09 -1.39 -0.81 -0.86 -1.32
Economic returns to access to services 5.90 2.86 1.54 -1.39 -2.10 0.57 0.30 0.16 -0.11 -0.17 7.04 3.21 1.67 -1.42 -2.14
Assets held -5.45 -2.50 -1.32 0.64 0.07 -4.31 -3.11 -1.80 -1.36 -2.12 -10.23 -5.61 -3.03 -0.53 -1.58
Economic returns to assets 0.84 0.30 0.14 -0.97 -1.61 0.62 0.26 0.12 -0.50 -0.82 1.49 0.60 0.28 -1.42 -2.37
Unobserved factors 2.12 0.01 -0.35 0.29 2.86 1.49 0.05 -0.29 2.09 5.56 3.06 0.10 -0.55 2.20 7.78
Total change 1.70 0.94 0.56 1.25 3.06 -3.55 -3.87 -2.61 -0.59 1.15 -1.85 -2.93 -2.05 0.66 4.21
FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil FGT(0) FGT(1) FGT(2) Gini Theil
Location 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Economic returns to location 0.24 0.13 0.07 -0.14 -0.20 0.21 0.13 0.07 -0.13 -0.21 0.47 0.25 0.14 -0.27 -0.43
Education -0.11 0.05 0.09 0.56 0.82 -0.17 -0.18 -0.10 -0.12 -0.21 -0.40 -0.09 0.01 0.45 0.62
Economic returns to education 6.82 5.03 3.32 -0.08 -0.13 -0.45 -0.37 -0.24 0.01 0.01 6.45 4.54 2.88 -0.08 -0.12
Type of employment 0.53 0.64 0.51 0.59 0.61 -1.05 -0.50 -0.38 -0.07 0.69 -0.12 0.21 0.20 0.49 1.06
Economic returns to type of employment -7.24 -4.50 -2.68 2.48 3.58 0.15 0.08 0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -7.44 -4.35 -2.55 2.35 3.80
Access to services -0.81 -0.78 -0.50 -0.40 -0.62 -0.69 -0.45 -0.30 -0.23 -0.38 -1.67 -1.28 -0.79 -0.62 -1.01
Economic returns to access to services 5.48 3.00 1.75 -1.66 -2.37 0.54 0.31 0.18 -0.15 -0.21 6.26 3.24 1.82 -1.76 -2.54
Assets held -5.98 -2.96 -1.55 0.20 -0.69 -4.59 -3.46 -2.11 -1.05 -2.51 -10.41 -6.11 -3.52 -0.92 -3.18
Economic returns to assets 0.90 0.35 0.17 -1.04 -1.58 0.61 0.30 0.15 -0.53 -0.78 1.61 0.66 0.33 -1.51 -2.37
Unobserved factors 3.62 -0.49 -1.34 -0.46 0.75 -0.29 0.36 0.27 2.01 8.64 2.96 -0.39 -1.07 1.62 9.34
Total change 3.44 0.48 -0.16 0.06 0.19 -5.73 -3.78 -2.40 -0.31 4.98 -2.28 -3.30 -2.56 -0.25 5.16
Factor
2003-2006 2006-2009 2003-2009
Mindanao
Factor
2003-2006 2006-2009 2003-2009
Visayas
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Chapter 8 Multiple Jobholding and Socio-Economic Mobility in the Philippines 
 
8.1  Introduction 
The results presented in the previous chapters have highlighted the importance of employment 
in inducing income mobility in the Philippines. Ideally, labour being one of the few assets available 
to everyone, should be a vehicle for upward mobility, especially for the poor. However, when a 
country’s labour market is highly segmented, the poorest of the poor may be trapped in long episodes 
of low productivity and precarious employment. In other words, being employed is not a sure ticket 
out of poverty. This is particularly true in developing countries whose labour markets largely operate 
outside the periphery of government regulation. In addition to this informal economy, non-standard 
employment arrangements are also increasing as globalization takes a stronghold on labour markets. 
Worryingly, sparse data suggest that workers with non-standard jobs are also prone to sub-optimal 
social protection coverage and work under precarious conditions (Addabbo & Solinas 2012; Ebisui 
2012). Nevertheless, non-standard jobs can also have potential benefits. For instance, structured and 
predictable flexibility associated with non-standard employment may enable workers to outline better 
work patterns that are more compatible with their other personal responsibilities. This dualistic nature 
and lack of a universally-accepted definition of non-standard employment makes it difficult to infer 
whether its emergence helps in promoting upward economic mobility or contributes to increasing 
labour market segmentation.76 In general, while policymakers need to better understand non-standard 
employment arrangements to be able to expand social mobility prospects for workers relying on such 
kinds of jobs, the literature is limited especially in developing countries (Ruyter et al. 2009).  
The Philippines provides a relevant case study for examining the relationship between non-
standard employment and socio-economic mobility. We have seen from the previous chapters that 
despite high economic growth, significant improvement in the overall income distribution remains 
elusive as reflected in the slow pace of poverty reduction and persistently high income inequalities. 
At the same time, labour market trends suggest that this occurs at the backdrop of stagnant job 
creation. The country has one of the highest unemployment rates in South East Asia (about 7.0% in 
2012).77 On the other hand, more than half of its employed population relies on jobs outside the formal 
economy (ILO 2012). If many of these jobs have non-standard employment arrangements, then the 
emergence of non-standard jobs provides opportunities to participate in economic activities for 
                                               
76 “Standard and non-standard employment arrangement” terms can hardly be characterized with a precise legal meaning and have no 
universally-accepted definition. However, some literature recognizes the following characteristics of standard employment: 1) 
indefinite or permanent; 2) full-time; and to some extent, 3) done at the employer’s workplace. Given these, the literature identifies 
three main sources of non-standard employment: casualization, informalization, and externalization.  
77 The latest unemployment rates in other Southeast Asian countries are as follows:  Indonesia (6.6%, 2011), Malaysia (3.0%, 2012), 
Singapore (2.8%, 2012),   Vietnam (1.8%, 2012), Lao PDR (1.4%, 2005),  Thailand (0.7%, 2012)  and Cambodia (0.2%, 2008) (WDI 
2014).   
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workers who would have been unemployed otherwise. Nevertheless, it is still important to examine 
the quality of employment of non-standard workers in the Philippines. For instance, if non-standard 
jobs are systematically characterized by inferior working conditions, this may offset the job creation 
benefits of non-standard employment in the long-run. For this study, I examine the case of multiple 
job holding or pluriactivity as a form of non-standard employment. Owing to its conceptual 
simplicity, the incidence of multiple job holding is a simple but valid indicator of the prevalence of 
non-standard employment (Riddell & St-Hilaire 2002).78 Moreover, I distinguish constrained from 
non-constrained pluriactivity to be consistent with the perceived dualistic nature of non-standard 
employment.  
Although labour force data suggest that a significant fraction of the Philippines’s employed 
population are relying on multiple jobs, about 14.3% in 2009, the characteristics and working 
conditions of multiple job holders have not been examined extensively in the existing literature.  
Using the merged FIES-LFS, this chapter seeks to answer the following questions: 
(i) What are the characteristics of multiple job holders? How do they differ from single job 
holders? 
(ii) Does multiple job holding improve a person’s socio-economic mobility prospects? 
 
8.2.  Theoretical Model for Multiple Jobholding and Income Mobility 
8.2.1  Determinants of Multiple Jobholding 
In general, evidence is mixed about whether multiple jobholding constitutes a temporary 
phenomenon or a more permanent feature of the labour market, particularly in industrialized countries 
(Wu, Baimbridge & Zhu 2009; Panos, Pouliakas & Zangelidis 2011; Casacuberta & Gandelman 
2012). Traditionally, multiple job holding is seen as a temporary strategy to address sub-optimal 
levels of utility derived from one’s primary job (Perlman 1966; Shisko & Rostker 1976; Krishnan 
1990) or as a hedge against the risk of unemployment (Bell, Hart & Wright 1997).  In other words, 
workers engage in multiple jobs to avoid experiencing downward economic mobility.  However, 
recent evidence from industrialized countries suggests that multiple job holding can also be used to 
develop further expertise and acquire new skills, which in turn, may lead to better occupational 
outcomes (Panos et al. 2011). This type of labour supply behaviour can be part of a worker’s portfolio 
of long-term strategies for career growth. Whether this also applies in developing countries is unclear 
as this multiple job holding has not been studied extensively outside industrialized countries.79 
                                               
78 Technically, multiple job holding can be a combination of standard and non-standard employment (i.e., office employee with a full-
time day job and another part-time night job). Aside from multiple job holding, other indicators of non-standard employment include 
part-time, self-, and short-tenure employment (Riddell & St-Hilaire 2002; De Bruin & Dupuis 2004).  
79  Theisen (2009) argues that studies on developing countries’ labour markets usually start under the presumption that multiple job 
holding is not a norm. This probably contributes to the dearth of studies examining this type of labour supply behaviour in developing 
countries.  
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Multiple job holding potentially has both negative and positive aspects for workers. It may 
provide additional income particularly useful for emergency purposes (Danzer 2011) and give 
additional satisfaction especially when the second job is related to one’s personal interests (Renna & 
Oaxaca 2006). It may also increase one’s productivity as it provides opportunities to acquire new 
skills and develop expertise (Panos et al. 2011). Hence, pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors may 
drive people to engage in multiple jobs. However, multiple job-holding has also some potential 
disadvantages for workers.  A second job may lessen one’s productivity by diverting a worker’s focus 
to a multitude of tasks. Having multiple jobs may also mean less time for finding more productive 
employment prospects. Moreover, this type of labour supply behaviour may have adverse 
consequences for one’s health and family relationships if having multiple jobs mean working longer 
hours (Alam, Biswas and Hassan 2009). Thus, even though multiple job holding has a potential to 
provide more economic opportunities and to strengthen labour force, it may also increase workers’ 
vulnerability to socio-economic uncertainties.  
The perceived positive and negative impacts of multiple job holding gave rise to a number of 
theoretical models about the determinants of multiple job holding. Such theoretical models include: 
hours constraint model, target income model, main job insecurity model, and heterogeneous job 
portfolio model. The hours constraint model by Shisko & Rostker (1976), Bell et al. (1997), Conway 
& Kimmel (1998) and Wu et al. (2009) provides a springboard to understand the other approaches.  
According to the hours constraint model, workers usually aim to maximize their “utility” or the 
level of satisfaction from consuming goods, services, or leisure. Consider an average worker with a 
well-behaved utility function denoted by: 
                                                                Utility = f(C, L)                                                 (8.1) 
 
where C is a composite consumption good and L is (time spent for) leisure.  The value of consumption 
is usually subject to a budget constraint equivalent to an individual’s wage and non-wage income. 
This can be represented as:  
                                                                 C = W + NW                                                   (8.2) 
where W corresponds to wage income and NW to non-wage income. The income from work is subject 
to hours constraint, i.e., the number of hours available to any worker is finite, 
                                                              W = (T – L)*w 
                                                                    = h*w                                                           (8.3) 
where T is the worker’s hours constraint, h is the number of hours spent for work and w is the hourly 
income rate. Graphically, this can be represented by indifference curves and budget constraints. An 
indifference curve is the combination of income and leisure which an individual would accept to 
maintain a given level of utility while a budget constraint is the combination of goods and services 
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that the worker can avail given his/her income budget. Note that the slope of the budget constraint is 
equal to the income rate.  
We can distinguish between two types of pluriactivity: constrained and non-constrained 
(Averett 2010). In constrained pluriactivity, the quality of the second job is usually inferior to the 
quality of the main job because under this scenario, a worker is willing to take any additional job to 
make ends meet. In contrast, in non-constrained pluriactivity, the quality of the second job can be at 
par or better relative to the primary job.80 Figure 8.1 illustrates these concepts under the hours-
constraint model. In particular, the figure illustrates three levels of utility that can be attained by a 
worker, depending on employment circumstances (Averett 2010). In this example, I3 denotes the 
highest level of utility that can be attained by a worker with an (hourly) income rate w1 who spends 
h1 + h2 hours for employment.  In the left side of Figure 8.1, the curve I1 denotes the lowest level of 
utility that the same worker can attain if he/she only spends h1 hours for employment. This happens 
when the main job prevents him/her from working for H = h1 + h2 hours. However, the left side of 
the figure also suggests that this worker can still attain a higher level of utility denoted by I2 if he/she 
is willing to take on a second job even if it offers a lower (hourly) income rate. This represents 
constrained pluriactivity in the sense that this pluriactive worker will earn less compared to a single 
job holder with basically the same qualification (and thus the same wage rate w1) who also works for 
H1+H2 hours. Under the hours constraint model, an inferior second job is one with a lower hourly 
wage rate than the primary job.  By contrast, the right side of Figure 8.1 represents non-constrained 
pluriactivity wherein the wage rate offered in the second job is higher. In other words, a multiple job 
holder will earn more relative to his counterpart with only one job. This may happen when the job 
quality (in this case, income-related dimensions) of the secondary employment exceeds the quality 
of the primary job. The case of a university professor or researchers engaged in part-time outside 
consultancy projects or workers accepting a part-time employment as a second job while waiting for 
a full-time employment opportunity to open up are some instances when this could happen.  
In addition to the hours-constraint model, there are several other models identifying the factors 
that drive workers into pluriactivity. For example, the target income model suggests that workers will 
allocate work on different jobs to meet a specific income goal assuming that jobs offer different 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits (Lundborg 1995; Wu et al. 2009). This perspective is supported 
by the findings of Krishnan (1990) who concluded that the propensity to take on multiple jobs 
                                               
80  In rural areas, a good example of constrained multiple job holding is the combination of agricultural production with small-scale 
non-farm entrepreneurial activities. In urban areas, workers may avail part time employment in different elementary occupations (e.g., 
working as an office cleaner in the morning and as a construction labourer in the evening). On the other hand, a university professor 
doing part time consultancy jobs in the industry is an example of non-constrained pluriactivity.  
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Figure 8.1 Constrained and Non-constrained Pluriactivity 
 
 
   Source: Adopted from Averett (2010) 
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declines as the level of income received from primary job increases. On the other hand, according to 
the main job insecurity model, workers whose main jobs are vulnerable or exposed to high risk of 
termination may actively participate in dual job holding to cushion the effects of possible 
unemployment (Bell et al. 1997). Boheim & Taylor (2004), for instance, found that the presence of a 
permanent work contract in the primary job, as a proxy indicator of job security, reduces the 
propensity of looking for a secondary job.  Danzer (2011) also provided empirical support for the 
main job insecurity model by concluding that having a secondary economic activity can be used as a 
coping strategy to smooth income and ensure uninterrupted employment during wage shocks. 
Alternatively, according to the heterogeneous job portfolio model, some workers may find incentives 
to take more than one job because different jobs are not perfect substitutes. This implies that the wage 
paid and utility lost from foregone leisure may not adequately reflect the benefits and costs of working 
(Conway & Kimmel 1998; Wu et al. 2009). For example, Renna & Oaxaca (2006) found that some 
workers have personal preferences for job differentiation, wherein they derive varying levels of 
satisfaction from different occupations.  
The determinants of multiple job holding described above can be summarized by estimating a 
logistic labour-supply model,  
                
                                                                       𝑙 (
 𝑖𝑡
𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡
 𝑖𝑡
0 ) =  𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡                                            (8.4) 
 
where 
0
itp  denotes the probability of having a single job while
mult
itp denotes the probability of taking 
multiple jobs, and Xit is a vector of factors affecting the i
th worker’s labour supply behaviour. We can 
further generalize (8.4) to distinguish constrained from non-constrained pluriactivity by estimating a 
multinomial logistic model denoted by:  
                                                               𝑙 (
 𝑖𝑡
𝑙
 𝑖𝑡
0 ) =  𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡                                                  (8.5)
 
 
where l = 1, 2, 
1
itp  denotes the probability of being engaged in constrained pluriactivity, while 
2
itp  
denotes the probability of being engaged in non-constrained pluriactivity. 
 
8.2.2   Socio-Economic Mobility and Multiple Job Holding 
In the previous chapters, each household member is assigned with the same level of welfare as 
measured by the household expenditure per capita. To be able to examine how individual-level 
occupation affects the socio-economic mobility prospects of a person, the analysis presented in this 
chapter departs from that convention. In particular, this chapter uses two measures of socio-economic 
mobility: mobility of employment income and occupational mobility. By using the person’s earnings 
from employment rather than household expenditure per capita, I can focus on individual-level 
mobility rather than joint socio-economic mobility of household members. On the other hand, 
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including occupational mobility in this context is also important for several reasons. First, even if it 
were true that multiple job holding provides opportunities to acquire new skills as hypothesized, it is 
possible that being equipped with new skills could take time before it translates to higher employment 
income. In some cases, the new skills acquired from pluriactivity first open up employment 
opportunities before leading to income mobility. Second, the fact that occupational mobility 
indicators are often less prone to measurement errors than income mobility indicators make the latter 
an attractive alternative indicator of socio-economic mobility.  
Income Mobility 
Standard human capital models express income as a function of skills or the capacity to 
contribute to production for a given rental rate of each unit of skill (Bowles, Gintis & Osborne 2001). 
Skill is traditionally measured in terms of years of education and labour market experience. Mincer 
(1974) first formalized this mathematical relationship by expressing log income as a sum of a linear 
function of years of education and a (quadratic) function of labour market experience such that: 
                                                     𝑙 (𝑌𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                             (8.6)
 
 
where Yit is the income of the i
th worker at time t, α1 measures the rate of return to education for each 
year in school Eit, α2 and α3  measure the return rate for each year of labour market experience Lit and 
εit is the stochastic disturbance term. Assuming that the return rates to education and labour market 
experience are fixed, this model suggests that income growth is a function of change in human capital 
stock Eit and Lit, 
                                           ititititit LLEY  
2
321ln                                (8.7) 
 
However, previous studies show that these conventional indicators of human capital stock only 
explain a small fraction of the total variation in individual income (Atkinson, Bourguignon & 
Morrisson 1988). In other words, workers with the same amount of human capital can have 
substantially different incomes. Similarly, changes in human capital stock over time would also 
explain little variation in income growth. Over the years, researchers have identified that factors like 
intergenerational reproduction of advantage (e.g., proxied by parental education), unobserved 
individual heterogeneity (e.g., unobserved variations in effort) and spatial externalities could have 
stronger effect on income and income growth (Engel, Rigobon, & Ferreira 2007) than changes in 
schooling and labour market experience. In this study, I extend (8.7) to account for the quality of 
employment within the context of multiple job holding. As mentioned earlier, I hypothesize that the 
income mobility-effect of multiple job holding is asymmetric. For instance, for non-constrained 
multiple job holders, I suspect that the arguments of Paxson & Sicherman (1996) and Panos et al. 
(2011) may apply. In particular, secondary employment may accelerate the accumulation of skills 
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through additions to the job portfolio. This is because non-constrained multiple job holders have high 
quality jobs that could induce positive human capital spill-over effects between primary and 
secondary employment leading to higher productivity. Standard microeconomic theory suggests that 
increasing productivity will also be compensated with faster income growth (Solow 1956). On the 
other hand, for constrained pluriactive workers, I suspect that this type of labour supply behaviour is 
not significantly correlated with increased income mobility. By definition, constrained pluriactive 
workers do not maximize their income potential since the second job is usually paid at a lower wage 
rate. In more equal societies where economic growth is uniformly distributed, having a lower initial 
income may be correlated with faster income growth. However, for societies with high levels of 
inequality, the inferior quality of the second job is less likely to induce income mobility for 
constrained multiple job holders.  To formally test these hypotheses, this chapter estimates a standard 
income mobility model denoted by: 
                               
                         𝑙 (
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
) =   𝑌𝑖𝑡− + 𝛼 ∆𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3∆𝐿𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑙𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑙 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡             (8.8) 
 
where LSlit is the i
th worker’s labour-supply behaviour l where l = 1 represents constrained 
pluriactivity and l = 2 represents non-constrained pluriactivity. The parameter βl measures the impact 
of specific type of labour supply behaviour on income mobility after controlling for initial income 
and changes in human capital stock.  
Occupational Mobility 
To be able to examine occupational mobility, it is important to provide a yardstick of job 
quality.81 In general, identifying the features of quality employment is not straightforward as the 
concept may have different meanings for varying levels of development (ADB 2011b). For Filipinos, 
findings from the World Values Survey show that income and job security are among the most 
important factors that individuals identify when asked about the qualities they look for in a job. Except 
for few factors, a stylized pattern also emerges where those in higher income brackets demand more 
job benefits. However, other than people’s subjective beliefs about job attributes that are associated 
with high quality jobs, there are limited objective data that can capture all of the multidimensional 
features of job quality. For instance, the LFS only collects basic information about occupation type, 
wages, and income. A way around this problem is to link the concept of employment quality with the 
concepts of formal and informal jobs, that is jobs covered by the formal labour market regulations, 
and those operating outside of such regulations. In this context, one can associate high quality 
                                               
81 Under the hours-constraint model of multiple job holding, job quality is gauged with respect to income levels. In other words, I can 
distinguish constrained from non-constrained pluriactivity by comparing the hourly wage rate of one’s primary and secondary job.  
However, I decided to use the concept of formal and informal jobs to provide a more multi-dimensional concept of job quality.  
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employment with having a formal job and low quality employment with having an informal job. 
Certainly, this normative assumption is not without limitations.  In some cases, skilled workers 
voluntarily enter the informal economy for prospects of higher economic returns. In other words, 
participation in the informal economy could also be an optimal choice for some workers who are 
capable of getting jobs in the formal economy. This represents voluntary informal employment. On 
the other hand, workers who have no choice but to take on low quality jobs in the informal economy 
due to the lack of skills and structural barriers on entry to the formal sector represent involuntary 
informal employment82. Nevertheless, empirical evidence from the Philippines as well as other 
developing countries suggest that a significant number of informal workers are trapped in jobs with 
inferior working conditions (WB 2010; ADB 2011b). With significantly lower income, informal 
workers in the country are more likely to fall into poverty. In addition, a lack of social protection 
coverage exposes them to greater socio-economic risks that may eventually lead to chronic poverty. 
This provides a good motivation to use formal and informal employment as a rough measure of 
quality of employment  
To examine the relationship between occupational mobility and labour supply behaviour, 
occupational mobility can be defined as a multinomial outcome which assumes a value of 0 if a 
worker keeps the same type of job for two consecutive survey waves, 1 if a worker moves from an 
informal main job to a formal main job and 2 if a worker moves from a formal main job to an informal 
main job. 
                            
                      𝑙 (
 𝑖𝑡
𝐽
 𝑖𝑡
0) =   𝑗𝑌𝑖𝑡− + 𝛼 𝑗∆𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑗∆𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑗∆𝐿𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑗
𝑙𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑙 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡             (8.9) 
 
where
0
itp  denotes the probability of staying in the same type of employment arrangement between 
time t and t+1, 
1
itp  denotes the probability of moving from an informal to a formal  main job while 
2
itp  denotes the probability of moving from a formal to an informal main job.  
 
8.3.       Data and Implementation of Concepts 
8.3.1  Merged FIES-LFS 
The analyses are based on the data from the FIES-LFS conducted by the NSO.  As pointed out 
in Chapter 3, the LFS is a quarterly survey that collects information on household members’ 
employment. Unlike in other chapters where households are used the main units of analysis and they 
are weighted proportionally to the household size, this chapter uses individual-level data. In 
particular, the data of all working-age members who are employed for at least two consecutive waves 
from the 6,519 households that appear in all three waves of FIES-LFS (2003, 2006 and 2009) is 
                                               
82 Kucera & Xenogiani (2009) provide a good discussion of voluntary and involuntary informal employment by comparing the quality 
of formal and informal jobs.  
 205 
 
used.83 Although this data comprises a balanced sample of households, it does not have complete 
longitudinal information for every member since individuals moving out of a sample household are 
not tracked over time. As explained in Chapter 3, survey weight adjustments are used to account for 
the potential bias that may be induced by attrition in all computations.  
8.3.2   Measuring Socio-Economic Mobility 
While the labour force survey collects various indicators of labour market participation of all 
sampled household members, the survey collects earnings data from workers in wage or salaried 
employment only. Employers, self-employed and unpaid family workers do not report any income in 
LFS. Thus, income mobility can only be estimated for wage workers. In this context, income mobility 
is defined as the annualized growth in wage workers’ earnings.84  On the other hand, occupational 
mobility is gauged in terms of formal-informal job transitions.  
According to the 17th International Conference of Labour Statisticians, jobs are considered 
informal if the corresponding employment relationship is, “in law or in practice, not subject to labour 
legislation, income taxation, social protection or entitlement to certain employment benefits (advance 
notice of dismissal, severances of pay, paid annual or sick leave, etc)” (ILO 2004).  In other words, 
informal work refers to jobs which are typically outside formal labour regulation. However, 
implementing this definition is not straightforward given data constraints.85 To operationalize this 
definition in LFS, this study adopts a classification system that is similar to the one used in Heriawan 
(2004) and Martinez et al. (2014). In particular, the criteria used in distinguishing formal and informal 
jobs are based on cross tabulating employment status and type of occupation (Table 8.1). Formal 
workers correspond to all employers with permanent workers. This includes self-employed workers, 
who are assisted by family members in the non-agriculture sector. Formal workers also include all 
government employees and those who are employed as professionals. The rest are classified as 
informal workers.  
 
 
 
                                               
83 BLES defines the working age population as the household population 15 years and over (BLES 2011).  
84 Although it is possible to use the household expenditure per capita as income measure for non-wage workers, it would be hard to 
directly link the impact of multiple job holding on mobility if such income measure is used.  
85 Depending on the available data, there are various ways of implementing the official definition and each approach may produce 
different estimates. For example, by treating casual workers and unpaid family workers as informally employed, Cuevas et al. (2009) 
estimated that at least 29% of all the employed in Indonesia are working in the informal economy based on 2007 Sakernas. However, 
most sources put the estimates at a much higher level.  For example, using the presence or absence of work contracts and information 
about bookkeeping records reported in the 2009 Informal Sector Survey, ADB and BPS (2011) estimated that 89% of the employed 
population in the predominantly agricultural province of Yogyakarta is informal, while 76% of total employment in the predominantly 
urbanized province of Banten has informal employment arrangements. Furthermore, OECD (2010) estimates the informal employment 
in Indonesia to be at least 70%. On the other hand, according to BPS Indonesia, about 68% of Indonesians were employed in the 
informal economy in 2009. 
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Table 8.1 Definition of Formal and Informal Employment 
Professional, 
technical and 
related worker
Administrative 
and 
managerial 
worker
Clerical and 
related 
workers
Sales workers
Services 
worker
Agriculture, 
animal 
husbandry, 
forest, 
fishermen, 
hunters 
Production 
and related 
workers, 
Transport 
operators and 
labourers
Others
Own account worker F F F I I I I I
Self-employed 
assisted by family 
worker
F F F F F I F I
Employer F F F F F F F F
Government worker F F F F F F F F
Private worker
Casual worker in 
agriculture
Casual worker in 
non-agriculture
Unpaid family 
worker
I I I I I I I I
F I I I I IF F
 
     Source: Martinez et al. (2014) 
 
8.3.3  Distinguishing between Constrained and Non-Constrained Pluriactivity 
As mentioned earlier, constrained pluriactivity refers to instances when a worker is willing to 
take a second job with inferior quality relative to the characteristics of his/her first job. Non-
constrained pluriactivity refers to the opposite case. However, being able to implement this definition 
depends on data availability. For instance, Martinez et al. (2014) defined that a multiple job holder in 
Indonesia is engaged in constrained pluriactivity (relative to a single job holder with the same type 
of primary job) if he/she is either (i) holding a formal main job and an informal secondary job, or (ii) 
holding two informal jobs. On the other hand, a multiple job holder is engaged in non-constrained 
pluriactivity if he is either (iii) holding two formal jobs or (iv) holding an informal main job and a 
formal secondary job. However, following this definition in the Philippine context is problematic for 
two reasons. First, the LFS data provide limited information about the second job which prevents me 
from classifying whether the second job has a formal or an informal arrangement. Second, defining 
constrained and non-constrained pluriactivity in terms of formal and informal job could create 
circularity problems since our measure of occupational mobility also depends on the 
formality/informality of a worker’s job. In this study, I follow an indirect approach. A worker is 
considered to be in constrained pluriactivity if he/she has multiple jobs and comes from a household 
who are consuming more than what they are earning (i.e., household expenditure exceeds household 
income).  This definition is premised on the argument that liquidity constraints affect occupational 
choices (Giannetti 2011). In particular, those who are exposed to higher risks of liquidity constraint 
may not have the leisure to choose better quality jobs.  
Following the definitions outlined above, survey estimates show that about 7 in 10 workers 
were informally employed in their main jobs. Among the employed in 2009, approximately 11% had 
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multiple jobs. Of these multiple job holders, about 43% are in constrained pluriactivity while the 57% 
are in non-constrained pluriactivity.  
 
8.4  Empirical Results 
8.4.1     Background on the Philippines’s Labour Market Over the Past Decade 
One possible reason why the high incidence of poverty and pervasive income inequalities have 
remained prominent features of the Philippines’s development process despite strong economic 
growth rates is that the quality of jobs held by workers at the bottom of the income pyramid has not 
improved significantly. Previous studies show that to be able to move forward into a higher and 
sustained level of development, it is important to expand good quality employment opportunities to 
the poor (ADB 2011b, WB 2013 and 2014). This section examines how the quality of employment 
in the country has changed over the past decade.   
Table 8.2 provides a summary of the employment trends based on key labour market indicators 
since 2003. On the positive side, one can find a noticeable drop in the proportion of the labour force 
without jobs during this period. Despite this progress, underemployment rates or the proportion of 
employed persons who are either looking for a second job, a new job with longer work hours or wants 
additional work hours in their current jobs, increased. In a developing country like the Philippines, 
the underemployment rate is probably a more telling indicator than unemployment rate because the 
poor which comprises a significant fraction of the population cannot afford to remain unemployed 
for extended period of time. The results also portray a declining trend in labour participation rates for 
both men and women. This is in sharp contrast to the trends observed in previous years when labour 
participation rates, especially among women, were increasing (KILM 2014). Survey estimates 
suggest that labour participation rate among men dropped from 82% in 2003 to 79% in 2012 while 
the proportion of working age women entering the labour market declined from 51% to 50% during 
the same period. Taken in a comparative context, although the Philippines’ labour market can be 
characterized with higher participation rate, higher incidence of unemployment and 
underemployment are more prominent features of its labour market structure compared to other Asian 
countries (Montalvo 2006).  
Tables 8.3 to 8.5 describe the distribution of the proportion of workers employed by production 
sector, occupation group and type of employment, respectively. Interestingly, while agriculture 
remains to be the sector with the highest contribution to total employment, its share has dropped from 
35% in 2003 to 30% in 2012. The declining role of agriculture sector has translated to an expanding 
employment in service-oriented sectors whose share to total employment increased by 5.3 percentage 
points over the past decade. On the other hand, the contribution of the industry sector has become 
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Table 8.2 Trends in Key Labour Market Indicators, 2003-2012 
 
      Source: Author’s computations using data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES-LFS 2003, 2006, 2009, BLES  
      data and KILM (2014) 
 
stagnant as its share to total employment decreased by roughly 0.5 percentage points. In terms of 
occupations, the past decade has seen a moderate increase in the number of workers holding 
managerial positions. This is also accompanied by a consistent increase in the share of clerical and 
sales. On the other hand, the proportion of employed who are production workers (i.e., trades and 
related workers, plant and machine operators and assemblers) has declined significantly while the 
proportion of labourers and unskilled workers has observed a small increase. In terms of type of 
employment, the previous decade has witnessed a significant shift from self-employment to wage and 
salaried employment. In particular, self-employment dropped by 7 percentage points from 2003 to 
2012 while the proportion of employed in wage and salaried jobs increased by the same amount. 
However, the country continues to operate with a significant share of unpaid family work. From 2003 
to 2012, the proportion of employed people in unpaid work barely changed from 10% to 9%. Overall, 
while non-agricultural employment is expanding, the pace of reduction of employment in agriculture 
sector has been much slower compared to the marked shift from agricultural to non-agricultural 
employment that transpired before the Asian financial crisis (WDI 2014). In addition, the increasing 
role of the services sector to total employment can be mostly attributed to the higher proportion of 
persons employed in low-paying service-oriented jobs.     
Tables 8.6 and 8.7 provide further insights on how the quality of employment in the country 
has evolved over the years. For instance, the estimates suggest that real incomes of workers with 
wage and salary jobs increased by approximately 1.7% per year from 2003 to 2012. Paid workers 
from family-operated activities noted the fastest annual income growth (3.3%) while those working 
for private households experienced the lowest rate of increase in income (0.9%).  Furthermore, there 
has also been a gradual increase in the proportion of the labour force who have formal employment 
arrangements. Interestingly, the proportion of those who take multiple jobs, an approximate indicator 
Employment Indicator 2003 2006 2009 2012
Labour Force (in million) 34570.8 35464.1 37894 40432
Labour participation rate, total                                  
(% of total population ages 15+)
66.7 64.2 64 64.2
Labour participation rate among men 82.2 79.3 78.7 78.5
Labour participation rate among women 51.4 49.3 49.4 50
Unemployment rate                               
(% of the labour force)
11.4 8 7.5 7
Underemployment rate                         
(% of the employed)
17.5 21.5 19.7 20.9
 209 
 
of the prevalence of non-standard employment arrangements, comprise a non-negligible portion of 
the labour force and more importantly, have shown signs of increasing trend.  
In summary, a quick examination of key labour force indicators reveals that unlike its macro-
economic growth, the country’s performance in the employment front portrays a mixed picture. On 
the positive side, the statistics show increasing non-agricultural and formal employment. However, 
the improvement in the quality of jobs held by those who are at the bottom of the occupational ladder 
has been less remarkable with the unemployment and informal employment rates remaining high. In 
other words, the issue is less about a significant fraction of the country’s population not having jobs 
but more on the observed pattern that many of those who are employed remain in low quality 
employment. Worryingly, a quick examination of the labour force survey also reveals that moving 
into better jobs is not an easy task. For instance, only about three in five of the initially non-employed 
(i.e., unemployed and not in the labour force) reported having a job in the succeeding wave.  
In addition, not everyone who gets a job always remain employed, wherein approximately 10% 
of those who initially had a job were found to be either unemployed or not in the labour force in the 
following survey period. Furthermore, I also find that only about one in five who were initially  
 
Table 8.3 Distribution of Workers (%), by Production Sector of Main Job  
Production Sector 2003 2006 2009 2012
Agriculture 35.4 34.7 32.8 30.4
Mining 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7
Manufacturing 9.9 9.3 8.4 8.3
Electricity, Gas and Water 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
Construction 5.4 5.2 5.4 6
Wholesale and Retail Trade 18.5 18.5 19.6 18.8
Hotels and restaurants 2.6 2.7 3.1 4.1
Transport, storage and 
communication
7.7 7.9 7.6 8.1
Financial intermediation 1 1 1.1 1.1
Real estate, renting, and business 
activities
2.2 2.3 3.1 3.3
Public administration and defence, 
compulsory social security
4.7 4.4 5.1 5.2
Education 3 3.1 3.2 3.4
Health and social work 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2
Other community, social and 
personal service activities
2.8 2.4 2.6 2.6
Private households with employed 
persons
4.9 4.9 5.9 6.1
 
                     Source: Author’s computations using data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES-LFS 2003,  
                           2006, 2009 and BLES data. 
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Table 8.4 Distribution of Workers (%), by Main Occupation  
 
                    Source: Author’s computations using data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES-LFS 2003, 2006,  
                           2009 and BLES data. 
 
 
 
Table 8.5 Distribution of Workers (%), by Status of Main Employment 
 
                                  Source: Author’s computations using data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES-LFS  
                                  2003, 2006, 2009 and BLES data. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Occupation 2003 2006 2009 2012
Officials of government and special 
interest organizations, corporate 
executives, managers, managing 
proprietors, and supervisors
12.3 12.1 14.5 16.1
Professionals 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.9
Technicians and associate 
professionals
2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8
Clerks 4.3 4.9 5.3 5.7
Service workers and shop and 
market sales workers
9.3 9.8 10.7 12.6
Farmers, forestry workers and 
fishermen
18.6 17.6 15.4 12.7
Trades and related workers 9.2 8.1 7.7 6.8
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers
7.6 7.7 6.1 5.3
Labourers and unskilled workers 31.3 32.3 32.7 32.9
Special occupations 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2
Type of worker 2003 2006 2009 2012
Wage and salary workers 53 53.4 55.8 60.2
    Private household 5.7 5.9 5.6
    Private establishment 39.4 41.3 46.1
    Government 7.8 8.2 8
    Family owned business 0.5 0.3 0.4
Self-employed 37.1 35.1 33.6 30.4
    Own-account worker 30.4 29.4 26.9
    Employer 4.7 4.2 3.5
Unpaid family worker 10 11.5 10.6 9.4
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Table 8.6 Average Daily Basic Pay of Wage and Salary Workers  
(in 2005 PPP US$) 
 
                                       Source: Author’s computations using data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES-LFS  
                                       2003, 2006, 2009 and BLES data. 
                                    
 
Table 8.7 Distribution of Employment Status (%), 2003-2009 
 
                                               Source: Author’s computations using data from the longitudinal subsample  
                                               of FIES-LFS 2003, 2006, 2009 
 
employed in the informal sector finds a job in the formal sector in the following survey wave. These 
results set the tone for the need to investigate the mechanisms through which social mobility can be 
facilitated. In this study, I examine the case of non-standard arrangements, particularly, multiple job 
holding.  
 
8.4.2    Discussion of Empirical Results 
Descriptive Trends 
Survey estimates suggest that multiple job holding is a significant part of total production in the 
Philippines, increasing from 10.4% in 2003 to 11.1 in 2009. In 2009, empirical data suggests that 
about 62% of pluriactive workers in the Philippines were in paid employment in their main jobs while 
the remaining 38% were in self-employment (including unpaid family work). On the other hand, 
about 57% of multiple job holders held their main jobs in the agricultural sector, 10% in industry and 
33% in service-oriented sectors. Furthermore, 65% of multiple job holders were engaged in 
elementary occupations for their main jobs (including agricultural work), while 15% were in sales 
Type of worker 2003 2006 2009 2012
All Wage and Salary 
Workers
10.97 11.7 12.78 12.76
Private household 5.15 5.22 5.76 5.59
Private establishment 10.3 11.32 12.41 12.02
Government / 
Government 
Corporation
18.78 19.48 21.04 22.42
Family-operated 
business
7.32 7.31 8.17 9.86
Type of worker 2003 2006 2009
Single job holder with 
formal job
22.88 23.09 25.66
Multiple job holder with 
formal main job
2.59 2.53 2.87
Single job holder with 
informal job
56.44 55.86 53.28
Multiple job holder with 
informal main job
6.78 7.27 7.12
Unemployed 11.31 11.23 11.08
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and other service oriented positions. About 20% of multiple job holders in the sample were engaged 
in professional, administrative and managerial jobs.   
Interestingly, 63% of pluriactive workers reported a different secondary occupation, while 37% 
had the same line of work for their main and secondary jobs. Table 8.8 summarizes what kind of work 
multiple job holders in the Philippines take as their second jobs. In particular, agricultural work as a 
secondary activity is quite common among workers especially those holding elementary occupations 
in their primary jobs. Conversely, combining agricultural work is least common among professionals, 
technical workers and those holding administrative and managerial positions. This is not surprising 
considering that professionals and technical workers are more likely to be in urban areas, where 
agricultural employment is not common. Furthermore, agricultural workers and labourers are more 
likely to be engaged in the same occupation for their second jobs.86  
 
Determinants of Multiple Job Holding87 
To identify the determinants of pluriactivity, equations (8.4) and (8.5) are estimated using 
logistic regression with robust standard errors to adjust for the correlation among repeated 
observations for the same individual. The results show that Filipino men are more likely to have a 
second job than their female counterparts (Table 8.9). This is different from the findings in other 
countries which typically report that women are more likely to get a second job than men. 
Nevertheless, the gender difference in multiple job holding rates has slightly decreased over the years 
with the proportion of pluriactive women increasing from 8.1% in 2003 to 9.7% in 2009, while that 
of men increased only from 16.3% to 16.8%. Household composition also seems to matter. As the 
family size increases, the propensity to take multiple jobs tends decrease but the average age of other 
household members is negatively correlated with the propensity to be pluriactive.  Moreover, the 
burden of getting a second job is usually left to the head of the household.  
Less educated workers are more likely to get a second job in the Philippines. For instance, 
those who only had primary education were approximately 1.5 times more likely to get a second job 
than those who had secondary or college education. On the other hand, there is a declining propensity 
to get a second job as an individual moves up the income ladder – a pattern consistent with the target  
income model of pluriactivity. In particular, workers from the poorest 20% households are 
approximately three times more likely to get a second job than workers from the richest 20% 
households.   Nevertheless,   the fact that as   many as 8% from richest quintile are also engaged  in 
 
                                               
86  An interesting avenue for future research is to focus on multiple job holding in the agriculture sector using detailed 
income data from agricultural sources. In particular, future research may examine the interaction between “push” and 
“pull” factors and how this affects an individual’s income mobility prospects through pluriactivity.  
87  Because of the limited number of survey waves, the statistical models do not control for individual-specific effects. 
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Table 8.8 Distribution of Multiple Job Holders (%), by 
Type of Occupation in Main and Secondary Jobs 
 
Source: Author’s computations using 2003 data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES-LFS 2003, 2006, 2009 
Note: Detailed information about the secondary job is not available from 2006 round onwards.   
 
Main Job \ Secondary Job
Special 
Occupations
Officials of 
Government 
and Special 
Interest 
Organizations
Professionals
Technicians 
and Associate 
Professional
Clerks
Service 
Workers
Agricultural 
Workers
Trades and 
Related 
Workers
Plant and 
Machine 
Operators 
and 
Assemblers
Laborers and 
Unskilled 
Workers
# obs
Special Occupations 0 38.46 0 0 0 0 41.03 0 0 18.46 5
Officials of Government and 
Special Interest 
Organizations
0 26.96 0.17 1.48 3.14 8.81 30.98 6.72 5.58 16.14 151
Professionals 0 32 6 25.6 0 11.2 22.4 0 2.48 0.54 22
Technicians and Associate 
Professional
0 2.11 0 9.31 0 19.61 13.73 17.65 7.84 30.39 28
Clerks 0 20.9 0 15.67 5.22 4.85 40.3 0 2.95 9.7 29
Service Workers 0 20.18 0 2.39 0 10.7 21.1 12.23 5.81 27.83 42
Agricultural Workers 0.17 9.85 0 0.83 1.33 3.87 45.56 6.31 3.24 28.83 652
Trades and Related 
Workers
0 5.73 0 1.86 0 7.28 40.56 10.84 7.74 26.01 83
Plant and Machine 
Operators and Assemblers
1.73 15.45 0 1.91 0 2.24 39.43 9.96 12.4 16.87 53
Laborers and Unskilled 
Workers
0.47 4.47 0.43 2.27 0.31 5.62 29.09 6.31 2.52 48.56 420
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multiple job holding suggests that dual job holding is not always a matter of constrained pluriactivity 
as previously inferred. Multiple job holding rates also differ across geographic locations. Workers 
from urban areas are less likely to take multiple jobs compared to their rural counterparts. In 
particular, self-employed agricultural workers are more likely to be pluriactive than paid workers in 
the non-agriculture sectors.  
The results also confirm the hours-constraint hypothesis. In general, multiple job holders are 
more likely to work for less than 35 hours in their main jobs compared to single job holders. 
Interestingly, while the prevalence of multiple job holding is generally higher among those engaged 
in fewer hours of work in their primary job, multiple job holding is still quite high for those who are 
working for at least 35 hours per week in their primary jobs.88 In particular, about 9.5% of those who 
are working for at least 35 hours per week in their main jobs are engaged in multiple economic 
activities.   
Consistent with the findings from existing literature, the estimated models show that the 
motivation to have multiple jobs in the Philippines is generally associated with the presence of 
constraints in one’s primary job. Both income and non-income factors make up such constraints. For 
instance, both wage employment and the number of hours worked in a person’s main job decrease 
the propensity to be pluriactive while living in rural agricultural areas and being engaged in the 
agriculture sector tend to increase the propensity of an individual to take multiple jobs. Nevertheless, 
as pointed out earlier, multiple job holding is not always a case of constrained pluriactivity which 
could be indicative that the determinants of constrained and non-constrained pluriactivity are 
different.  Estimation of (8.5) allows me to examine this hypothesis. The results suggest that higher 
educational attainment increases the propensity to be engaged in non-constrained pluriactivity but 
decreases the odds of becoming a constrained multiple job holder. Wage employment decreases the 
odds of falling into constrained pluriactivity while self-employment increases it.  
 
Relationship between Economic Mobility and Multiple Job Holding 
I argued earlier that being employed is not a sure ticket out of poverty and in most cases, the 
quality of jobs held is important. However, landing a job with satisfactory quality that is enough to 
lift poor workers out of poverty is often a function of origins, skills, effort and luck (Piketty 1995; 
Kochar 1999). To some extent, a worker’s decision to be pluriactive could be a sign of effort that is 
motivated by the   desire to improve one’s  living  standards.   Moreover,   recent   evidence   from 
 
                                               
88 Compared to industrialized countries, I consider 15% as a high proportion of the population with multiple jobs. In industrialized 
countries, the incidence of multiple job holding is about 5% to 10% (Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 2009; Wu et al. 2009;  
Campbell 2011;).  
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Table 8.9  Regression Coefficients of Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Models on the 
Propensity to Take Multiple Jobs 
 
           Source: Author’s computations using data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES-LFS 2003, 2006, 2009 
          Notes: *** - p< 0.01, ** p <0.05, * - p < 0.1  
 
industrialized countries suggest that pluriactivity provides a good venue to acquire new skills or 
improve existing ones which could eventually open up an avenue of better economic opportunities. 
Nevertheless, this type of labour supply behaviour may not always result in a worker’s improved 
living standards through acquisition of new skills. For one, high inequalities lead to labour market 
segmentation wherein access to high quality jobs is limited to a privileged few. This makes the 
relationship between socio-economic mobility and multiple job holding an empirical issue.  
Logistic Model 
Pluriactive
Non-constrained 
pluriactivity
Constrained 
pluriactivity
Urban -.54*** -.43*** -.74***
Hhld head .58*** .59*** .53***
Male .26*** .28*** .28***
Age .083*** .081*** .087***
Age squared -.00089*** -.00085*** -.00095***
Educational attainment              
(base = primary education)
secondary education -.026*** -.049*** 0.0093
tertiary education -.072*** 0.0045 -.25***
Main job is formal .53*** .5*** .55***
Employer in main job
Wage/salaried job -.041*** -0.0012 -.13***
Self-employed .19*** .13*** .25***
Unpaid family work .22*** .056*** .4***
Main job is in agriculture sector
Manufacturing -.52*** -.44*** -.64***
Services sectors -.42*** -.29*** -.6***
Number of hours in main job -.023*** -.022*** -.026***
Wants to work more hours 1.2*** 1.2*** 1.2***
Family size -.014*** -.011*** -.021***
Has spouse .2*** .092*** .4***
Average age of other household 
members
-.0099*** -.0039*** -.021***
Income quintile                        
(base = 1st quintile)
2nd quintile -.14*** -.17*** -.091***
3rd quintile -.093*** -.037*** -.13***
4th quintile -.1*** .032*** -.3***
5th quintile -.2*** -.096*** -.39***
Intercept -3.2*** -4*** -3.8***
Variable
Multinomial Logistic Model
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After holding other factors such as changes in sectoral transitions fixed, the results suggest that 
among workers in wage or salaried jobs, non-constrained multiple job holders experienced faster 
income growth than either constrained multiple job holders or single job holders. Given that the 
statistical model from which this conclusion has been drawn is based on data from workers who 
remain in wage or salaried jobs in two consecutive waves only, one should be cautious in concluding 
that multiple job holding leads to economic mobility that would allow the poor workers to catch-up 
with the rest. In the Philippines, more than half of the poorest 40% are workers who are either self-
employed or engaged in unpaid family work. To include them in the analyses, I also estimated the 
occupational mobility model described in Section 8.2. The results suggest that after holding other 
factors fixed, having multiple jobs is weakly correlated with higher income growth but strongly 
correlated with formal to informal or informal to formal job transitions. Interestingly, compared to 
single job holders, unconstrained pluriactivity decreases the odds of moving from informal to formal 
jobs and increases the odds of moving from formal to informal jobs. On the other hand, constrained 
pluriactivity increases the odds of both informal to formal and formal to informal job transitions. In 
other words, the results are indicative that the impact of multiple job holding on Filipino workers’ 
prospects of economic mobility is mixed. For some, multiple job holding leads to faster income 
growth while for others, this type of labour supply behaviour increases occupational mobility but the 
accompanying mobility is not necessarily an upward mobility.  There are several possible 
explanations for this. The most intuitive explanation is that having multiple jobs serves as a coping 
response and tool to avoid experiencing more severe forms of poverty during times of economic 
uncertainties. It could also be the case that some multiple job holders are more interested in the non-
pecuniary benefits of having multiple jobs that is not adequately captured in the model of occupational 
mobility. For example, a worker may take a second job that is related to his/her personal hobbies. In 
some cases, having multiple jobs may also lead to more flexible schedule that would allow one to 
balance work and other personal responsibilities. However, it is hard to test this hypothesis due to 
data limitations. Another possible reason why pluriactivity is giving mixed signals in terms of its 
relationship with socio-economic mobility is that our data only allows us to estimate mobility between 
two time periods that are three years apart. It is possible that the effect of multiple job holding 
gradually tapers off over time. If this is true, then we may need to rely on longitudinal data which are 
collected more frequently to be able to draw more conclusive inferences. 
8.5     Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Amidst rapid economic development, the Philippines confronts the challenges of jobless 
growth, slow reduction of poverty and income inequalities. These trends could have adverse  
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Table 8.10 Regression Coefficients of Economic Mobility Models 
 
Source: Author’s computations using data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES-LFS 2003, 2006, 2009 
Notes: The dependent variable for the wage growth model is employment earnings.  
*** - p< 0.01, ** p <0.05, * - p < 0.1 
 
 
consequences for the long-term growth prospects of a country, as well as for a broad range of human 
welfare outcomes (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). 
Increasing inequalities and labour market segmentation are mutually reinforcing. Thus, labour 
market policies are important tools for addressing the adverse consequences of increasing 
inequalities. For this, policymakers need sufficient data to identify the vulnerable workers. Previous 
studies show that a bulk of these vulnerable workers have non-standard employment arrangements. 
An important form of non-standard employment practices that has been identified in the literature is 
Income Mobility 
Model
Wage growth
Informal to Formal 
Main Job Transition
Formal to Informal 
Main Job Transition
Urban 0.014 -.11*** 0.0061
Hhld head -.029* -.066*** .088***
Male .046*** -0.0055 -.032*
Age 0.0002 .041*** .073***
Age squared -0.0000094 -.00036*** -.0006***
Educational attainment                
(base = primary education)
secondary education -0.018 .2*** .17***
tertiary education -0.029** -0.038*** .15***
Sector of employment remained 
(main job)
Moved from agriculture to non-
agriculture
.055*** 1.7*** -.46***
Moved from non-agriculture to 
agriculture
-.12*** -.14*** 1.5***
Change in family size 0.00049 .01*** .0044*
Change in the proportion of hhld 
members who are employed
-0.034 .13*** -.36***
Income quintile                         
(base = 1st quintile)
2nd quintile .041** .36*** .22***
3rd quintile .065*** .52*** .24***
4th quintile .088*** .88*** .34***
5th quintile .15*** .73*** .057***
Single job holder
Non-constrained multiple job 
holder
.032* -.065*** .26***
Constrained multiple job holder 0.0034 .023** .36***
Intercept -0.0025 -3.6*** -4.6***
Variable
Multinomial Logistic Model
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multiple job holding. Previous studies suggest that this labour supply behaviour is typically used as a 
coping mechanism against risk of unemployment or income shortfall. However, recent evidence from 
industrialized countries suggests that it can also be used as a means to move into better occupations. 
The present paper adds to the existing literature by offering a detailed examination of multiple job 
holders in the Philippines – a country for which the empirical evidence of the patterns of pluriactivity 
is scarce. 
The analysis of a nationwide panel data from the FIES-LFS, reveals that multiple job holding 
is quite prevalent in the Philippines, accounting for more than 10% of the employed between 2003 
and 2009. In addition, the results suggest that men, especially those who are head of households, 
those less educated, rural agricultural workers, underemployed and workers from the lower income 
quintile are more likely to get a second job. This confirms that the propensity to be pluriactive is 
primarily driven by socio-economic constraints. In particular, almost half of multiple job holders are 
engaged in constrained pluriactivity, that is having multiple jobs to be able to make ends meet. Despite 
the fact that constrained pluriactivity can be a potent tool for avoiding socio-economic vulnerabilities 
in the short-run, the estimates provided in this chapter show that it is not strongly correlated with 
better mobility outcomes. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that highly skilled workers 
who are already on top of the socio-economic hierarchy observe immediate increase in income from 
multiple job holding. If this pattern holds for other forms of non-standard employment, then it can be 
argued that non-standard employment contributes to further segmentation of the labour market 
wherein the benefits are being channelled disproportionately to those who are already on top of the 
socio-economic hierarchy. In this context, the challenge confronting policymakers is to ameliorate 
the expanding labour market segmentation in the country. This entails improving the working 
conditions of individuals with non-standard jobs, particularly those who combine multiple precarious 
employment. For instance, a system could be considered to compensate for the risks associated with 
non-standard jobs using higher incomes or provision of other non-pecuniary benefits, across all 
segments of the labour market. Finally, to be able to better respond to the needs of researchers and 
policy-makers, there is a need to improve existing data collection systems on labour market 
indicators. In particular, there is a need to collect more reliable indicators of working conditions 
within the context of continuously changing labour markets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 219 
 
Chapter 9 Evaluating the Feasibility of Using Pseudo-Panel Data to Measure Income Mobility 
 
9.1  Introduction 
Using the Philippines as case study, the previous chapters underscored the usefulness of income 
mobility analysis for understanding how income distribution evolves over time. Despite the 
advantages of examining income mobility, it was almost an uncharted field in developing countries 
until recently and most of the existing studies (including this thesis) cover short periods of time only 
(Fields 2011). One of the main factors that contribute to the dearth of income mobility studies in 
developing countries is the high cost of collecting panel data from where information on the income 
of each person or household, and changes in income over time, can be derived (Deaton 1997; 
Bourguignon, Goh & Kim 2004; Antman & McKenzie 2007; Fields et al. 2007; Cuesta, Nopo & 
Pizzolitto 2011). In this chapter, I evaluate the performance of different pseudo-panel estimation 
techniques that have been proposed in the literature in measuring different income mobility indicators 
when panel data is not available. Moreover, I further develop these methods to estimate a wider range 
of mobility indices in addition to the ones that these methods were originally designed to measure.  
Over the years, a number of researchers have attempted to reconcile the need for examining 
income mobility with the lack of panel data by exploiting the information provided by other data 
sources. In particular, methodological research has focused on exploring the usefulness of repeated 
cross-sectional surveys because many developing countries regularly collect income (and non-
income) indicators of development at the micro-level through cross-sectional surveys. The main issue 
in working with cross-sectional surveys in the context of income mobility analysis is that it is not 
straightforward to measure the amount of temporal dynamics in each person’s or household’s income 
given that cross-sectional surveys do not follow the same set of respondents over time.  
To address this issue, researchers proposed a methodology called pseudo-panel estimation 
which entails constructing synthetic panels from repeated cross-sectional survey data. There are 
several variants of pseudo-panel estimation. Four of the most recent developments in the literature 
are the methods proposed by Bourguignon, Goh & Kim [BGK] (2004), Antman & McKenzie [AM] 
(2007), Dang, Lanjouw, Luoto & McKenzie [DLLM 1] (2011) and Dang, Lanjouw, Luoto & 
McKenzie [DLLM 2] (2014). These methods employ different procedures for creating synthetic 
panels and are originally designed to measure different aspects of income mobility. For instance, the 
AM approach is designed to examine the origin-independence perspective by extending the procedure 
initially proposed by Deaton (1985) which entails grouping all observations into different mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive cohort groups. The characteristics of interest are then averaged for each 
cohort group, and in turn, the cohort averages serve as the pseudo-panels. On the other hand, the 
BGK, DLLM 1and DLLM 2 approaches are designed to measure poverty dynamics or the amount of 
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income movements at the low-income range. All three approaches involve estimating structural 
models to impute the unobserved incomes of respondents from a specific cross-sectional survey wave 
while maintaining the original respondents as the units of analysis. The main objective of this study 
is to demonstrate how these four methods can be extended to be able to estimate a wider array of 
income mobility measures.89 In particular, the chapter addresses the following questions:  
(i) Are the proposed pseudo-panel techniques useful for measuring income mobility? In general, 
which of the techniques are most desirable? 
(ii) Does the performance of the pseudo panel techniques’ depend on the type of income mobility 
measure being estimated? 
(iii)How can the existing pseudo-panel techniques be improved? 
9.2  Developments in Income Mobility Estimation using Repeated Cross-Sectional Data 
Several researchers have proposed a variety of statistical techniques which use information 
from repeated cross-sectional surveys to create synthetic panel data. This section reviews the 
methodological developments in measuring income mobility using pseudo-panel methods.  The 
discussions begin with a review of the classical pseudo-panel estimation methodology pioneered by 
Deaton (1985) followed by the presentation of four contemporary pseudo-panel approaches that are 
designed to answer specific income mobility-related questions.90 
9.2.1     What is Pseudo-Panel Estimation? 
In general, the pseudo-panel approach refers to a class of statistical and econometric methods 
that use repeated cross-sectional surveys to estimate indices or models that are typically suitable for 
longitudinal studies. For exposition, consider the following time-indexed static model 
                                 itiitit fXY        i = 1, 2,…,N,    T= 1, 2, …, T                     (9.1)                                            
where Yit  is the response outcome for unit i at time t, Xit is a vector of explanatory variables, fi is an 
unobserved unit specific effect and εit is a random disturbance term. Conventionally, the parameters 
of this model can be estimated using fixed-effects (FE) or random effects (RE) methods when 
longitudinal data is available.91 However, estimation complexities arise when only repeated cross-
                                               
89 A similar study has been done by Cruces, Fields & Violaz (2013) which examined the usefulness of AM, BGK and DLLM 1 methods 
in estimating various indices of mobility using Chilean panel data. This chapter extends Cruces et al.  (2013) in several ways. First, in 
addition to the three methods that they examined, I also included DLLM 2 in the analysis. Second, I used a wider set of income mobility 
indices. Third, I explained in greater detail how these pseudo-panel estimation approaches can be extended to construct synthetic micro-
based income data.  
90 Another strand of literature in pseudo-panel estimation is based on Age-Period-Cohort (APC) models. The APC models 
are generally used for assessing the impact of age, period and cohort for demographic and epidemiological variables such 
as disease incidence or mortality rates. Since the APC model is not used for poverty estimation, I do not discuss it here. 
Interested readers may refer to Yang, Fu & Land (2004) and Mason and Wolfinger (2002).    
91 Even in the presence of genuine panel data, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of (9.1) will produce inconsistent estimates for 
β if fi is correlated with Xit . On the other hand, even if fi can be reasonably assumed to be orthogonal with Xit, OLS estimators will 
still be non-optimal due to the serial correlation induced by the term fi. In lieu of this, a fixed effects (FE) (or a random effects in the 
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sectional survey (RCS) data is available because in such case, Yit and Xit are not fully observed. As 
an alternative to (9.1), one can consider the following model,  
                               ttitittitti fXY )()()()(    i(t) = 1, 2,…,Nt,    T= 1, 2, …, T              (9.2) 
Notice the change in subscripts used to denote the sampled units when comparing (9.1) and 
(9.2). The subscript i(t) corresponds to the ith respondent at the tth cross-sectional survey wave while 
the subscript t correspond to the time period t. Conventional RCS designs imply that i(τ)t ≠ i(Ψ)t for 
every pair (i(τ)t, i(Ψ)t) in {1,2,…,Nt}, t = {τ, Ψ}. In other words, the ith sampled unit at time period τ 
is not necessarily the same with the ith unit at time period Ψ. If we simply use the pooled RCS data 
and proceed to ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the model, the parameter estimates will be 
inconsistent if fi(t) is correlated with Xi(t)t. One way of addressing this issue is to find suitable 
instruments for Xi(t)t, i.e., variables that are correlated with Xi(t)t but are asymptotically uncorrelated 
with the unobserved terms of (1). In a seminal work, Deaton (1985) proposed an approach which uses 
cohort-averaging as an indirect form of instrumentation. In particular, Deaton (1985) proposed the 
following model,  
                                 ctctctct fXY        c = 1, 2,…, C , T = 1, 2,…, T                 (9.3) 
where  
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This approach groups the sampled units into C mutually exclusive classes such that each class 
is always represented from every cross-sectional survey round and that class membership is fixed 
over time. Since we do not observe the same set of units in RCS, the term fct is not fixed over time.92  
Thus, we cannot readily rely on conventional panel data estimation techniques such as the FE 
estimator to difference out this term. However, when nc is sufficiently large (in proportion to Nc, the 
number of individuals in the population who are in the cth class), Deaton (1985) argued that we can 
conveniently assume that the term fct will be constant. In such case, it will be straightforward to 
remove this term using data transformation. Moreover, Deaton (1985) introduced further adjustments 
to the conventional FE estimator to take into account that Yct and Xct are error-ridden estimators of 
their population counterparts.  Furthermore, Verbeek & Nijman (1993) proposed a general class of 
estimators that can be considered when estimating (2). This class of estimators employs a “within 
transformation” on the pseudo-panel and adjusts the moment matrices in the least squares to account 
for measurement error due to data aggregation. Verbeek & Nijman (1993) also improved Deaton’s 
                                               
case that fi is uncorrelated with Xit) estimator can be considered. The FE estimator implements a data transformation that removes the 
correlation between the explanatory variables Xit with the unobserved terms of (9.1). 
92  Note that at the population-level, this term is fixed under the assumption that the population is closed.  
 222 
 
estimator after showing that the latter performed poorly in terms of the mean squared error when the 
cohort sample size is small.   
The static model described in (9.1) can be extended to include a lagged term of the dependent 
variable (9.4). There are two estimation issues for (4). First, the term Yi(t)t-1 is unobserved when using 
RCS dara. Second, fi(t) is likely to be correlated with both Yi(t)t-1 and Xi(t)t  prompting the need to find 
suitable instruments.  
                                                 ttitittittitti fxYY )()()(1)()(                                     (9.4) 
To be able to estimate (4), Moffitt (1993) ignored the term fi(t) and proposed using an instrument 
for Yi(t)t-1 in the form of (9.5) where Wi(t)t-1 is vector of exogenous variables whose historical time-
series are provided in the data and Zi(t-1) is a vector of time-invariant exogenous variables. In other 
words, Moffitt’s (1993) idea is to first estimate a static model and use the predicted values as 
instrument for Yi(t)t-1. 
                                                      )1(21)(11)(   tittitti ZWy 

                                       
(9.5) 
Moffitt’s approach is anchored on a strong data requirement that the historical time-series of 
Xi(t)t is observed. This is hardly satisfied in most of the existing RCS designs. In turn, Collado (1997) 
improved Moffitt’s (1993) approach by using less stringent data requirements and going back to the 
conventional cohort-based approach. In particular, Collado (1997) proposed a Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) estimator corrected for measurement error for the following model,  
                                               ttctcttcttcttc fxyy )()()(1)1()(                                (9.6) 
Unlike Moffitt (1993), Collado (1997) did not assume that the unit-specific effects cancel out 
at the cohort-level. The author also argued that in the cohort-based approach, there is a trade-off 
between the number of cohort groups and the sample size per group. In particular, when the number 
of sampled units per cohort becomes large, the issue on measurement error becomes less relevant. 
However, this may have potential costs on efficiency since in finite sample sizes, increasing the 
number of units per cohort calls for fewer cohort groups to be formed.  
Like Moffitt (1993), Girma (2000) departed from the conventional cohort-based approach and 
argued that a unit-based estimation method (i.e., maintaining the original observations as the units of 
analysis) will better optimize the use of available information from repeated cross-sectional data. 
Although he still grouped the units into cohorts, he did not involve transforming the data to cohort 
averages. Instead, he argued that different units within the same cohort (even across different time 
periods) exhibit non-zero correlations. In turn, such information can be used to find a suitable 
instrument when estimating (9.4). In particular, he proposed a pairwise quasi-differencing approach 
for the following model,  
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                                             ttitittittjtti fxyy )()()(1)1()(                                  (9.7) 
where i and j are units from the same cohort group. Implicitly, (9.7) suggests that any past and present 
value of y and x can be used as instruments. Without imposing other conditions, this would create an 
infinite number of candidate instruments. However, subsequent studies argued that relying on 
arbitrarily chosen units from the same cohort as instruments could be a noisy approximation of the 
unobserved value of yi(t)t-1 which might lead to inaccurate estimation of (9.4) (Verbeek & Vella 2005).  
McKenzie (2004) extended (9.4) to allow for different covariate effects across cohorts. This 
heterogeneous dynamic pseudo-panel model can be denoted by (9.8) and its corresponding cohort-
level model is denoted by (9.10). The author also argued that a GMM estimator similar to the one 
adopted by Collado (1997) which is consistent as the number of cohort groups increases, may not 
work since the number of parameters to be estimated also increases with the former. Instead 
McKenzie (2004) used an approach analogous to the Arellano-Bond estimator typically used in 
genuine panel models wherein  ?̅?𝑐(𝑡−2)𝑡−2 is used as an instrument for ?̅?𝑐(𝑡− )𝑡−2 which in turn as 
unbiased estimator of ?̅?𝑐(𝑡)𝑡−2. Although this instrumentation approach addresses the bias arising from 
the measurement error induced by not observing the same individuals for each time period, the author 
pointed out that this estimator may be less efficient relative to the OLS estimator. In other words, an 
OLS estimator may still be superior (with lower variability) unless the number of time periods and 
the cohort sample sizes are both large. 
                                               ttititticttictti fxyy )()()(1)()(                              (9.8) 
                                              ttctcttccttccttc fxyy )()()(1)()(                             (9.9) 
Inoue (2008) further extended the discussion of pseudo-panel estimation of dynamic models by 
considering a model that contains time-invariant unit-specific and (cohort) group-specific fixed 
effects denoted by (10) where Zc(t) are cohort-level explanatory variables and δc is the time-invariant 
group specific effect. Inoue (2008) proposed a GMM-based estimator for (9.10) which is consistent 
under some stringent orthogonality and rank conditions.  
                                  ttcctctcttcttccttc fZxyy )()()()(1)()(                     (9.10) 
In summary, there are two broad types of pseudo-techniques that have been proposed in the 
literature. The first type or what I refer to as Type I method in the succeeding discussions, uses cohort-
averages as a form of instrumentation. In particular, all sampled units are grouped into mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive cohort classes. The cohort averages of the characteristics of interest are then 
used as the analytical units. In this context, the cohort averages act as the pseudo-panels. The 
approaches proposed by Deaton (1985), Verbeek & Nijman (1993), Collado (1997), McKenzie 
(2004) and Inoue (2008) can be considered as Type I methods. On the other hand, what I refer to as 
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Type II methods maintain the original sampling units as the analytical units. Following this definition, 
the approaches developed by Moffitt (1993) and Girma (2000) can be considered as Type II methods. 
Overall, each type has its own advantages and limitations. For instance, the main advantage of Type 
I method is that its underlying statistical theory, particularly how the model parameters can be 
estimated consistently, has been discussed extensively in the literature (Verbeek 2008). However, 
aggregating the units into cohorts can lead to significant loss of information. In particular, it becomes 
less straightforward to examine variations of the characteristics of interest within cohorts.  On the 
other hand, Type II method addresses this limitation as it maintains the original observations as the 
units of analysis. However, unlike the Type I methods, the underlying statistical theory of Type II 
methods has not been extensively discussed in the literature. Over the years, both methods have been 
used in different empirical applications. In the next section, I discuss four recently proposed pseudo-
panel techniques falling under either Type I or Type II method, that are specifically designed to 
measure income mobility.  
 
9.2.2   Estimation of Income Mobility using Pseudo-Panel Data 
Antman & McKenzie’s (AM) Approach 
As pointed out in Chapter 1, one of the ways of viewing mobility is to conceptualize it as the 
temporal dependence between previous and current income. There are two ways of measuring 
temporal dependence. First, we can estimate the correlation between previous and current income. 
Subtracting this correlation from unity yields the Hart’s index described in Chapter 1. Alternatively, 
we can use income elasticity which entails expressing each unit’s current income Yi(t) as a function of 
its lagged income Yi(t)t-1, a vector of socio-demographic characteristics Xi(t)t and a unit-specific effect 
fi(t). This is the approach followed by Antman & McKenzie (2005 and 2007) in measuring income 
mobility in Mexico. Equation (9.11) shows the underlying statistical model. Here, α is the mobility 
parameter of interest. In general, a large absolute value for α portrays strong temporal dependence, 
i.e., low mobility, while small values mirror weak relationship between previous and current incomes, 
i.e., high mobility.  
                                                 ttcttcttcttcttc fxyy )()()(1)1()(                                        (9.11)   
where                                      
λ𝑐(𝑡)𝑡 =  𝛼[?̅?𝑐(𝑡)𝑡−  ?̅?𝑐(𝑡− )𝑡− ] 
 
McKenzie (2004) argues that the term λc(t)t can be ignored when the number of sampled units for 
every cohort is sufficiently large. Noticeably, (9.11) is an extension of (9.6). Thus, as can be inferred 
from the discussions in the previous section, consistent estimation of the parameters of (9.11) depends 
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on the assumptions about the unobserved unit-specific effect as well as the sample size for each 
cohort.93 Following Antman & McKenzie (2005 and 2007), a number of studies have applied this 
approach in estimating the temporal dependence-based concept of income mobility (Calonico 2006; 
Navarro 2006; Cuesta et al. 2011). 
 
Bourguignon, Goh & Kim’s (BGK) Approach 
Bourguignon, Goh & Kim (2004) proposed a method of estimating the probability of falling 
into poverty using the following model,  
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where 𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝑡)
𝑐  is the income of unit i from (cohort) group c at time t, 𝑋𝑖𝑡(𝑡)
𝑐  is a vector of explanatory 
variables, 𝛽𝑡
𝑐 is the corresponding vector of covariate effects and 𝜀𝑖(𝑡)𝑡
𝑐  is and AR(1) error term such 
that 𝑉(𝑒𝑖(𝑡)𝑡
𝑐 ) =  𝜎 𝑐𝑡
2 . With RCS data, 𝜀𝑖(𝑡)𝑡
𝑐  and 𝜀𝑖(𝑡)𝑡− 
𝑐  are not observed simultaneously. Nevertheless, 
the authors argued that the parameters of (9.12) can be estimated using RCS data using the variance 
of the residuals as shown in (9.13).  
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In particular, for each group c and time t, (9.12) can be estimated using OLS. The variance of the 
resulting residuals from (9.12) can then be used to estimate (9.13) while the residuals of (9.13) can 
be used 
as estimates of 𝜎 𝑐𝑡
2 . Given these parameter estimates and under the assumption that  
𝑒𝑖(𝑡)𝑡
𝑐  ~ (0, 𝜎 𝑐𝑡
2 ), then the probability of falling into poverty at time t+1 is given by  
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While the estimation methodology is quite straightforward to implement, there are several issues with 
this approach. First, estimating heterogeneous models with varying parameters across cohort groups 
reduces the effective sample size. If some cohort groups comprise only few observations, then the 
corresponding parameter estimates might not be reliable. Second, to be able to estimate the 
probability of falling into poverty in the future, the formula calls for the availability of estimates for 
𝛽𝑡+ 
𝑐 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡+ 
𝑐  and 𝜎 𝑐𝑡+ 
2 . In the absence of this information, a simple approach is to assume that these 
parameters and variables are time-invariant throughout the observation period.  
 
 
 
                                               
93 In the next section, I adopt the simplifying assumption that conditional on previous income, there is no persistent unit-specific effect. 
Hence, the model parameters can be estimated using OLS.   
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Dang, Lanjouw, Luoto & McKenzie’s (DLLM 1) Approach 
Like Bourguignon, Goh & Kim, Dang, Lanjouw, Luoto & McKenzie (2011) focused on 
measuring dynamics in the low income range. In particular, consider the following models,  
                                                             1)1(1)1(11)1( iii XY                                                      (9.15) 
                                                             2)2(2)2(22)2( iii XY                                                   (9.16) 
 
where Y is individual (or household) income and X is a vector of individual (or household) 
characteristics whose values are fixed over time. These models can be estimated using two waves of 
RCS. However, to be able to estimate indicators of poverty dynamics, we need either Yi(1)2 or Yi(2)1, 
both of which are unobserved in RCS data. Thus, the main idea behind the DLLM approach is to 
impute the values of Yi(2)1 or Yi(1)2 using the information provided in (15) and (16). Without loss of 
generality, I will focus on the imputation of Yi(2)1.Following the approach initially developed by 
Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2003) for small area estimation of poverty, DLLM (2011) proposed 
the “out-of-sample” imputation formula depicted in (9.17) which assumes that the explanatory 
variables are constant over time (i.e., Xi(t)t = Xi(t)t+1).  
                                                               1)2(1)2(11)2(
~ˆ
iii vXY  

 
                                                                       1)2(2)2(1
~ˆ
ii vX                                                     (9.17) 
In addition to β1 and Xi(2)2, (17) calls for an estimate of the error term vi(2)1. To do this, DLLM (2011) 
first assumed that (vi(2)1 and vi(2)2) ~ BVN(0, ∑ϑ) such that94 
                                                              ∑ϑ = [
𝜎𝜗 
2 𝜌𝜎𝜗 𝜎𝜗2
𝜌𝜎𝜗 𝜎𝜗2 𝜎𝜗2
2 ]                                                           (9.18) 
The parameters ?̂?𝜗 
2  and ?̂?𝜗2
2  can be estimated from (9.15) and (9.16). On the other hand, the authors 
adopted a naïve approximation for ρ by assuming that it is either equal to zero or one. This produces 
lower and upper bounds for different indicators of poverty dynamics (DLLM 2011) as shown below.  
∅( 
𝑧−𝛽1𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗1
 ,
𝑧−𝛽2𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗2
 | 𝜌 = 0)    ≤  P(?̂?i(2)1< z, Yi(2)2< z)   ≤   ∅( 
𝑧−𝛽1𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗1
 ,
𝑧−𝛽2𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗2
 | 𝜌 =  )            (9.19)    
∅( 
𝑧−𝛽1𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗1
 ,   
𝑧−𝛽2𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗2
 | 𝜌 =  )  ≤  P(?̂?i(2)1< z, Yi(2)2> z)   ≤   ∅( 
𝑧−𝛽1𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗1
 ,   
𝑧−𝛽2𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗2
 | 𝜌 = 0)      (9.20)          
∅( 
𝑧−𝛽1𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗1
 ,
𝑧−𝛽2𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗2
 | 𝜌 =  )    ≤  P(?̂?i(2)1> z, Yi(2)2< z)   ≤   ∅( 
𝑧−𝛽1𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗1
 ,
𝑧−𝛽2𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗2
 | 𝜌 = 0)      (9.21)   
∅( 
𝑧−𝛽1𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗1
 ,  
𝑧−𝛽2𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗2
 | 𝜌 = 0) ≤  P(?̂?i(2)1> z, Yi(2)2> z)   ≤   ∅( 
𝑧−𝛽1𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗1
 ,   
𝑧−𝛽2𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝜎𝜗2
 | 𝜌 =  )  (9.22)  
 
 
 
 
                                               
94 DLLM (2011) also proposed an analogous non-parametric approach.  
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Dang, Lanjouw, Luoto & McKenzie’s (DLLM 2) Approach 
The DLLM 1 approach which entails constructing lower and upper bounds using ρ = 0 and ρ = 
1 for poverty dynamics is intuitive. A value of zero for ρ implies that after accounting for correlates 
of income, the temporal fluctuations in each unit’s income are independent. This (temporal) 
independence is expected to induce more mobility, i.e., more movements into or out of poverty. On 
the other hand, if ρ is equal to one, then there is perfect inertia in the temporal fluctuations in one’s 
income which is expected to minimize mobility, i.e., less movements into or out of poverty.   
The good thing about DLLM 1 approach is that it maintains the original observation as the unit 
of analysis, making it straightforward to estimate the bounds depicted in (9.19) to (9.22) for different 
sub-population groups which in turn, enriches the analysis.95 In addition, since this approach allows 
for heterogeneous covariate effects wherein the parameters β1 and β2 are estimated separately, it may 
be able to capture structural changes in the income distribution96. However, one of the obvious 
limitations of DLLM 1 method is that it does not provide point estimates for the different poverty 
indicators. In addition, the width of the bounds depend on how much income variation can be 
attributed to differences in time-invariant individual or household characteristics. As the model fit 
improves (higher R2), the bounds become narrower (DLLM 2011). However, R2 is high when the 
underlying income distribution regime is rigid wherein differences in time-invariant characteristics 
are the primary determinants of income variation. In other words, when much of the income variations 
arise from factors other than these fixed characteristics, the DLLM 1 approach may not provide 
optimal estimates of poverty dynamics. To address this issue, Dang et al. (2014) proposed a point 
estimator for ρ which they derived as follows 
 
𝜌(𝑌𝑖(2) , 𝑌𝑖(2)2) =
 𝑜𝑣(𝑌𝑖(2) , 𝑌𝑖(2)2)
√𝑉(𝑌𝑖(2) )𝑉((𝑌𝑖(2)2)
 
𝜌(𝑌𝑖(2) , 𝑌𝑖(2)2) =
 𝑜𝑣(𝛽 
′𝑋𝑖(2) + 𝜗𝑖(2) , 𝛽2
′𝑋𝑖(2)2 + 𝜗𝑖(2)2 )
√𝑉(𝑌𝑖(2) )𝑉((𝑌𝑖(2)2)
 
=
𝛽 
′𝑉(𝑋𝑖(2))𝛽2 + 𝜌√𝜎𝜗1
2 𝜎𝜗2
2
√𝑉(𝑌𝑖(2) )𝑉((𝑌𝑖(2)2)
 
𝜌 =
ρ(𝑌𝑖(2) , 𝑌𝑖(2)2)√V(Yi )V(Yi2)  β 
′ V(Xi)β2
σ𝜗1𝜎𝜗2
 
 
                                               
95  Intuitively, this is subject to the sample size available for the sub-population group under consideration.  
96 For instance, if the level of importance that a (social) opportunity structure attributes to fixed individual characteristics 
like race, ethnicity, religion and parental education changes significantly over time, then such changes are implicitly 
incorporated in the estimation of the model parameters. 
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                                                       ρ̂ =
ρ̂y̅c1y̅c2√V(Yi1)V(Yi2)−β̂1
′V(Xi)β̂2
σ̂ϑ1σ̂ϑ2
                             (9.23)                
As shown in (9.23), the point estimator is a function of the parameter estimates of (9.15) and (9.16), 
variance of the observed incomes as well as the variance of the cohort means of the observed incomes. 
To arrive at this formula, the authors used the correlation between the two sets of cohort averages as 
a rough approximation of 𝜌(𝑌𝑖(2) , 𝑌𝑖(2)2). Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that when β̂ 
′ = β̂2, 
ρ̂ can be re-expressed as a function of the correlation between the cohort means and the coefficient of 
determination of each cross-sectional model. In addition to (9.24), Dang et al. (2014) also provided 
more informative lower and upper bounds for 𝜌 as shown in (9.25) and (9.26). In turn, formula 
analogous to (9.19) to (9.22) can be derived using the estimated values of 𝜌.  
                                                                               ?̂? =  
ρ̂y̅c1y̅c2− √𝑅1
2𝑅2
2
√( −𝑅1
2)( −𝑅2
2)
                                             (9.24) 
                                                                                    ?̂?𝐿𝐵 = ρ̂y̅c y̅c2
                                              (9.25) 
                                                      ?̂?𝑈𝐵 = 
β̂ 
′
V(Xi)β̂2
√V(Yi )V(Yi2)
                                            (9.26) 
9.2.3  Extending Pseudo-Panel Methods to Measure Broad Class of Income Mobility 
Measures 
Can the pseudo-panel estimation methods discussed in the previous section be used to measure 
a broader class of mobility indicators other than those for which these methods are originally designed 
to measure? A previous study by Cruces et al. (2013) asked the same question and found that the AM, 
BGK and DLLM 1 did not perform well in capturing the income mobility patterns in the Chilean 
panel data. Whether this provides conclusive proof undermining the usefulness of pseudo-panel 
methods in estimating income mobility merits further investigation. For one, the Chilean panel data 
is not representative of the population of data sets to which the pseudo-panel techniques can be 
applied.   In other words, this panel data could have specific characteristics that make pseudo-panel 
techniques less attractive. To further investigate this issue, I completed a similar exercise using the 
panel data from the Philippines.  
As explained earlier, the AM, BGK, DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 methods are designed to answer 
different income mobility-related questions. In particular, the AM approach answers the question, 
“up to what extent can previous income predict current income?” On the other hand, the BGK 
approach is designed to answer the question, “what is the risk of falling into poverty in the future,” 
while both DLLM 1 and DLMM 2 approaches answer “what is the probability of staying, moving 
into or moving out of poverty?” (Cruces et al. 2013). Similar to Cruces et al. (2013), the objective of 
this study is to examine the feasibility of using these approaches in estimating a wider array of income 
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mobility measures. To do this, it is essential to first construct a micro-based pseudo-panel data of 
incomes. For simplicity, suppose we have two cross-sections denoted by {Yi(1)1} and {Yi(2)2}. The 
main task is to provide imputed values for either {Yi(1)2} or {Yi(2)1} that can be used to estimate any 
mobility measure denoted by M(Yi(1)1, Yi(1)2) (or M(Yi(2)1, Yi(2)2)). This section provides the step-by-
step procedures of extending the algorithms of AM, BGK, DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 to be able to 
estimate other mobility indices which these techniques were not originally designed for.  
 
AM Approach 
 
Step 1: For each time period t = 1, 2, group all sampled units into different cohort groups.97 
Step 2: Compute the average income of each cohort. Do the same for other characteristics of interest.  
Step 3: Estimate the model ttcttcttc yy )(1)1()(    using OLS (Note: This model can be expanded to 
include other control factors).  
Step 4: Compute the variance of the residuals V(𝜀?̂?(𝑡)𝑡). 
Step 5: Estimate ?̂?𝑖( )2 = ?̂?𝑌𝑖( ) + 𝜀?̃?( )2 where 𝜀?̃?( )2 is a randomly drawn data point from N(0, 
Var(𝜀?̂?(𝑡)𝑡)).  
Step 6: Estimate the mobility measure M(𝑌𝑖( ) , ?̂?𝑖( )2). 
Step 7: Repeats Steps 5 and 6 for R times.  
Step 8: Take the average and standard deviation of M(𝑌𝑖( ) , ?̂?𝑖( )2) across all iterations.  
 
BGK Approach 
 
Step 1: For each time period t = 1, 2, 3, group all sampled units into different cohort groups.  
Step 2: For each cohort group c, estimate 𝑌𝑖( ) 
𝑐 = 𝛽𝑡
𝑐𝑋𝑖( ) 
𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖( ) 
𝑐  , 𝑌𝑖(2)2
𝑐 = 𝛽𝑡
𝑐𝑋𝑖(2)2
𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖(2)2
𝑐  and 
𝑌𝑖(3)3
𝑐 = 𝛽𝑡
𝑐𝑋𝑖(3)3
𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖(3)3
𝑐 .  
Step 3: Retrieve the residuals 𝜀?̂?( ) 
𝑐 , 𝜀?̂?(2)2
𝑐 , 𝜀?̂?(3)3
𝑐  from the models estimated in Step 2. Compute their 
respective variances ?̂?𝜀𝑐1
2 ,  ?̂?𝜀𝑐2
2 ,  ?̂?𝜀𝑐3
2 .  
Step 4: For each cohort c, estimate 21)(
22 )()( ect
c
tti
c
ct V     .  
Step 5: From the model in Step 4, retrieve the residuals ?̂? 𝑐𝑡
2 .  
Step 6: Estimate 𝑌𝑖( )2
𝑐 = ?̂?2
𝑐𝑋𝑖( ) 
𝑐 + ?̂?𝑐𝜀?̂?( ) 
𝑐 + ?̃?𝑖(𝑡)𝑡
𝑐   where ?̃?𝑖(𝑡)𝑡
𝑐  is a randomly drawn data point from 
N(0, ?̂? 𝑐𝑡
2 )98.  
Step 7: Estimate the mobility measure M(𝑌𝑖( ) , ?̂?𝑖( )2). 
Step 8: Repeats Steps 6 and 7 for R times.  
Step 9: Take the average and standard deviation of M(𝑌𝑖( ) , ?̂?𝑖( )2) across all iterations.  
 
 
DLLM 1 Approach 
 
Step 1: For each time period t, estimate 𝑌𝑖(𝑡)𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖(𝑡)𝑡. Retrieve the parameter estimates ?̂?𝑡, 
and the residuals 𝜀?̂?(𝑡)𝑡.  
Step 2: Compute the mean and the variance of the residuals, ?̂?𝜗𝑡 and ?̂?𝜗𝑡
2 .  
Step 3: Set the residual correlation ?̂?𝑗 , j   {LB, UB}, such that ?̂?𝐿𝐵 = 0 and ?̂?𝑈𝐵 =  . 
Step 4: Sort the residuals 𝜀?̂?(2)2 from lowest to highest.  
                                               
97 As discussed earlier, cohort grouping should be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. In addition, cohort membership should be fixed 
over time. Furthermore, it is ideal to strike a balance between the number of cohorts and the sample size per cohort. A common 
approach used in the literature is to form cohorts based on gender and year of birth.   
98 This assumes that 𝑋𝑖( ) 
𝑐 =  𝑋𝑖( )2
𝑐  
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Step 5: Draw n2 pairs of residuals (𝜀?̃?(2) , 𝜀?̃?(2)2)  from BVN(0, ∑̂𝜗) where                                                                             
∑̂𝜗= [
?̂?𝜗 
2 ?̂?𝑗?̂?𝜗 ?̂?𝜗2
?̂?𝑗?̂?𝜗 ?̂?𝜗2 ?̂?𝜗2
2 ] 
Rank the residual pairs (𝜀?̃?(2) , 𝜀?̃?(2)2)  in ascending order according to the values of 𝜀?̃?(2)2.  
 
Step 6: Pair the first element 𝜀?̃?(2)  of each sorted residual pair (𝜀?̃?(2) , 𝜀?̃?(2)2) with the sorted  𝜀?̂?(2) 
𝑗 .  
Step 7: For each j   {Est, LB, UB}, estimate ?̂?𝑖(2) 
𝑗 = ?̂? 𝑋𝑖(2)2 + 𝜀?̃?(2) 
𝑗 .  
Step 8: Estimate the mobility measure Mj(?̂?𝑖(2) 
𝑗 , 𝑌𝑖(2)2). 
Step 9: Repeats Steps 5 to 8 for R times.  
Step 10: For each j   {LB, UB}, take the average and standard deviation of Mj(?̂?𝑖(2) 
𝑗 , 𝑌𝑖(2)2) across all 
iterations.  
 
DLLM 2 Approach 
 
Step 1: For each time period t = 1, 2, group all sampled units into different cohort groups. Compute 
the correlation of ?̅?𝑐( )  and ?̅?𝑐(2)2 and denote it by ρ̂y̅c1y̅c2.  
Step 2: Compute the variances V(Yi(1)1) and V(Yi(2)2).  
Step 3: For each time period t, estimate 𝑌𝑖(𝑡)𝑡 = 𝛽𝑡𝑋𝑖(𝑡)𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖(𝑡)𝑡. Retrieve the parameter estimates ?̂?𝑡, 
residuals 𝜀?̂?(𝑡)𝑡, and the coefficients of determination 𝑅𝑡
2.  
Step 4: Compute the mean and the variance of the residuals, ?̂?𝜗𝑡 and ?̂?𝜗𝑡
2 .  
Step 5: Compute the residual correlation ?̂? 𝑠𝑡, ?̂?𝐿𝐵, and ?̂?𝑈𝐵. 
?̂? 𝑠𝑡 =
ρ̂y̅c y̅c2
√V(Yi )V(Yi2) β̂ 
′
V(Xi)β̂2
σ̂ϑ σ̂ϑ2
 
 
?̂?𝐿𝐵 = ρ̂y̅c y̅c2
 
 
?̂?𝑈𝐵 = 
β̂ 
′
V(Xi)β̂2
√V(Yi )V(Yi2)
 
 
Step 6: Rank the residuals 𝜀?̂?(2)2 from lowest to highest.  
Step 7: Draw n2 pairs of residuals (𝜀?̃?(2) , 𝜀?̃?(2)2)  from BVN(0, ∑̂𝜗) where                                                                             
∑̂𝜗= [
?̂?𝜗 
2 ?̂?𝑗?̂?𝜗 ?̂?𝜗2
?̂?𝑗?̂?𝜗 ?̂?𝜗2 ?̂?𝜗2
2 ] 
Rank the residual pairs (𝜀?̃?(2) , 𝜀?̃?(2)2)  in ascending order according to the values of 𝜀?̃?(2)2.  
 
Step 8: Pair the first element 𝜀?̃?(2)  of each sorted residual pair (𝜀?̃?(2) , 𝜀?̃?(2)2) with the sorted  𝜀?̂?(2) 
𝑗 .  
Step 9: For each j   {Est, LB, UB}, estimate ?̂?𝑖(2) 
𝑗 = ?̂? 𝑋𝑖(2)2 + 𝜀?̃?(2) 
𝑗 .  
Step 10: Estimate the mobility measure Mj(?̂?𝑖(2) 
𝑗 , 𝑌𝑖(2)2). 
Step 11: Repeats Steps 7 to 10 for R times.  
Step 12: For each j   {Est, LB, UB}, take the average and standard deviation of Mj(?̂?𝑖(2) 
𝑗 , 𝑌𝑖(2)2) across 
all iterations.  
 
9.3  Data  
Consistent with the existing literature on pseudo-panel data, the final sample is restricted to 
households whose heads were born between 1933 and 1978, or equivalently, those who were aged 25 
to 70 in 2003. The reason for doing this is to be able to have a relatively in-scope population. If I 
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included younger or older households, I would be dealing with households that can change 
dramatically in the succeeding time periods. It would then be difficult to identify which population is 
being represented by the results.  From the panel sample consisting of 6519 households, I drew 
independently a smaller (50%) random subsample for each wave, to create cross-sectional data to be 
used in pseudo-panel estimation. I decided not to use the full cross-sectional data of FIES so that I 
can treat the estimates based from the panel subsample as the actual values of the target “population” 
parameters.  
Following the convention in the previous chapters, the household expenditure per capita is used 
as the income measure. For the AM approach, the cohorts are constructed by grouping households 
according to the heads’ year of birth and gender.  In particular, I followed the approach of Cruces, 
Fields & Viollaz (2013) which uses two-year span to be able to strike a balance between the number 
of cohorts and sample size per cohort. In estimating the conditional models, I included the cohort’s 
average family size, average proportion of household members less than 15 years old, average 
proportion of household members who are employed and proportion of households relying on 
agricultural income. For the BGK, DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 approaches, the income correlates included 
in the model are provincial dummies, household head’s age and its square, gender of the household 
head and educational attainment of the household head.   Furthermore, estimates of poverty dynamics 
are based on US$2/day poverty line.  
 
9.4  Discussion of Empirical Results 
Following the procedures outlined in Section 9.2.3, I estimated four measures of poverty 
dynamics which include the proportion of population moving into poverty, moving out of poverty, 
staying in poverty and staying non-poor.  In addition, I also estimated seven of the most commonly 
used income mobility indices as described in Chapter 1. They cover three different mobility concepts 
– movement (average rank jump, Fields-Ok’s, King’s indices), temporal dependence (Hart’s index) 
and equalizer of income (CDW, Fields’ and Shorrocks’ indices). Before proceeding to the discussion 
of the results, some remarks are in order. First, when computing income mobility from time t to t+1, 
I always chose a reference period. For the chosen reference period, the actual income data from FIES 
is used. On the other hand, the income values for the other time period are imputed following the 
approach outlined in Section 9.2.3. In general, the choice of reference period is different for each 
method. For the AM and BGK approaches, the initial time period is always chosen as the reference 
period while the income values for the final time period are imputed. In contrast, the DLLM 1 and 
DLLM 2 approaches use the final time period as the reference while the income values for the initial 
time period are imputed. Given that the final sample for each cross-sectional wave is representative 
of the same population, I suspect that the differences in the estimates will not depend on the choice 
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of reference period. Second, unlike the original AM, BGK, DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 methods which 
strictly use either parametric or non-parametric procedures, I adopt a semi-parametric approach. As 
outlined in Section 9.2.3, the semi-parametric algorithm for estimating income mobility entails 
iteratively drawing random disturbance terms from the Gaussian distribution with pre-specified 
parameters. For each mobility index, every iteration corresponds to an estimated value. The results 
provided in the succeeding discussions are based on 100 replicates. Third, I derived a point estimate 
for the DLLM 1 approach by taking the midpoint of the lower and upper bounds. Fourth, to be able 
to fine-tune the estimates for the DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 approaches, I introduce a structure preserving 
technique that takes into account the rank of the residuals from the reference period. Lastly, there are 
three components that contribute to the estimated standard error of the mobility estimates - sampling 
error, model error and the iterative sampling procedure for the stochastic disturbance term.  
 
Dynamics in the Low Income Range 
As noted in Chapter 5, the gross outflow from US$2/day poverty from 2003 to 2009 is 
approximately 10% of the population while the gross inflow accounts for 9% (Table 9.4). The 
proportions of the population who remained poor and non-poor during these two periods are 34% and 
47%, respectively. Tables 9.1 to 9.3 compare the estimated proportion of each category of poverty 
status across the different pseudo-panel methods. The performance of the AM approach is not 
consistent. For some years, the pseudo-panel estimates are reasonably close to the estimates based on 
actual panel data but there are cases when both the unconditional and conditional pseudo-panel 
estimates are quite different from the proportions estimated from the actual panel data. Interestingly, 
the unconditional estimates for the poverty outflow and inflow are generally lower than the actual 
panel data-based estimates while the proportion of persistent poverty and non-poverty are consistently 
higher. A slightly different pattern emerges when we look at the conditional estimates of the AM 
approach. In particular, pseudo-panel estimates of poverty outflow and persistence of non-poverty 
are consistently higher while poverty inflow and poverty persistence are consistently lower than the 
panel estimates. On the other hand, the performance of the BGK approach yields mixed results. For 
instance, while the pseudo-panel estimates for poverty inflow and persistence of non-poverty are quite 
close to the estimates derived from actual panel data, the pseudo-panel estimates for poverty outflow 
and persistence of poverty are quite disparate. Compared to the AM and BGK approaches, the DLLM 
1 and DLLM 2 methods performed better. For instance, the estimates using the actual panel data fall 
in between the estimated lower and upper bounds produced by DLLM 1. While these bounds could 
be restrictively wide as pointed out by Cruces et al. (2013), taking its midpoint yields estimates that 
are quite close to the actual panel-based estimates. Furthermore, the bounds estimated using the 
DLLM 2 method are much narrower compared to that of the DLLM 1. This is expected given that 
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the DLLM 2 approach uses more informative estimates of the residual correlation. The point estimates 
using the DLLM 2 approach are also reasonably close to the actual panel-based figures. Nevertheless, 
it is worth noting that the point estimates of the DLLM 2 approach are always lower for movements 
into and out of poverty and always higher for poverty immobility.   
 
Other Dimensions of Income Mobility  
As pointed out in the earlier chapters, from 2003 to 2009, average per capita consumption barely 
moved, changing by approximately 2%. This is also accompanied by a small reduction in income 
inequality where the Gini coefficient changed from 0.44 in 2003 to 0.43 in 2009. However, turning 
to a broader set of income mobility measures, I find a much more dynamic income distribution over 
the six-year period, especially when viewed in terms of income movements. In particular, the mean 
absolute percentage change in per capita consumption is about 36%. This is equivalent to a 14-step 
change in income ranks, on the average. On the other hand, mobility is less pronounced when viewed 
in terms of temporal dependence and equalizer of income. For instance, the correlation of the 
logarithm of incomes in 2003 and 2009 is about 0.8. Furthermore, the observed income mobility 
reduces long-run inequality by only 6%.  
Tables 9.4 to 9.6 compare the estimated values of different mobility indices using the actual 
panel and pseudo-panel data. For the AM approach, I find that the estimates derived from the 
conditional models are closer to the actual panel-based figures for indices designed to gauge 
movement and temporal dependence of incomes. In contrast, the unconditional models performed 
better than the unconditional models in estimating income mobility indices under the equalizer of 
income perspective. On the other hand, the pseudo-panel estimates computed using the BGK 
approach are at least twice as high than the values estimated using actual panel data. Turning to the 
DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 approaches, I find that the values of all mobility indices using actual panel 
data fall in between the lower and upper bounds estimated using the pseudo-panel approach. Unlike 
the indices of poverty dynamics for which DLLM (2011) provided a theoretical proof that the 
approach produces valid lower and upper bounds, we have not done so for the mobility indices 
considered in this section. Thus, this result is encouraging. In other words, it provides us reason to 
believe that the DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 approaches can also be useful for estimating mobility indices 
other than what they were originally designed to measure. Furthermore, comparing the midpoint of 
the bounds derived using DLLM 1 with the DLLM 2’s point estimator, I find that for 2003-2006 and 
2006-2009 periods, the estimated values from DLLM 1 are quite a bit closer to the movement-based 
indices computed using the actual panel data. For the rest, the DLLM 2 estimates performed better. 
In addition, I find that the midpoints from the DLLM 1 approach consistently overestimate mobility 
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while the DLLM 2’s point estimates are usually lower than the values of indices computed from 
actual panel data.  
 
In summary, the results of these analyses allow me to address the three research questions:  
 
1. Are the proposed pseudo-panel techniques useful for measuring income mobility? In general, 
which of the pseudo-panel techniques are most desirable? 
Overall, the results using Philippine data suggest that the DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 approaches 
performed reasonably well in estimating poverty dynamics and other measures of mobility.  On the 
other hand, the AM and BGK approaches provided satisfactory results for selected indicators only; 
the proportion of population moving into poverty and proportion of population remaining non-poor 
for BGK and indices under the equalizer of income perspective for AM. There are several possible 
explanations for this. For instance, the pseudo-panel approaches considered in this study are not 
originally designed for estimating varied income mobility measures. Rather, these methods are 
proposed for specific mobility indicators only.  If the structural parameters of the underlying models 
are not flexible enough, it would not be surprising to note that the pseudo-panel estimators will not 
always perform well for all types of income mobility measures. Of the four pseudo-panel methods 
considered here, I argue that the DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 approaches use more flexible model 
specifications than the AM and BGK methods.  
 
2. Do the pseudo panel techniques’ performance depend on the type of income mobility measure 
being estimated? 
My empirical findings suggest that in most cases, the pseudo-panel methods performed better 
when estimating indices under the mobility as income movement perspective. On the other hand, 
indices measuring temporal dependence of income and its inequality-reducing effect are harder to 
impute using the pseudo-panel methods considered here. A possible reason why this is the case is that 
unlike the temporal dependence and equalizer of income-based measures, most of the movement-
based indices are less sensitive to the detailed features of the joint temporal distribution of incomes.  
 
3. How can the existing pseudo-panel techniques be improved? 
Compared to the findings by Cruces et al. (2013) using the Chilean panel data, the use of 
pseudo-panel methods especially the DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 approaches in estimating income 
mobility in the Philippines produced more encouraging results. I suspect that the differences in the 
characteristic features of the income distributions of the two countries contribute to the diverging 
findings about the usefulness of the pseudo-panel methods. For instance, the Chilean panel data spans 
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a ten-year period while the Philippine data covers a shorter six-year period. Given this, it is reasonable 
to expect that there is more mobility in the Chilean panel data than in the Philippine data. However, 
as I have initially pointed out, the use of time-invariant variables in DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 are 
probably more suitable when the true income mobility regime is low because it imputes the value of 
permanent income. This could potentially justify why I have noted more satisfactory results than 
Cruces et al. (2013) found. Nevertheless, it is difficult to provide a conclusive explanation without 
doing further studies. To be able to move forward, I recommend doing simulation studies that will 
outline a more objective characterization of the performance of each pseudo-panel method considered 
in this paper.  
There are several areas for improvement that could be explored further. First, it would be 
worthwhile to extend the BGK, DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 algorithms to allow the use of time-varying 
correlates of income in the model specification. Adding time-varying correlates may significantly 
improve the prediction power of the models and in turn, improve the pseudo-panel estimates of 
income mobility. Second, incorporating structural preserving techniques in the existing pseudo-panel 
algorithms may prove useful in estimating a wider array of income mobility indices. At present, it 
appears that income mobility measures which are sensitive to the overall structure of the income 
distribution are harder to impute than indices which focus on capturing movements of individual 
incomes. Third, statistical inference will enrich the income mobility analysis because it will allow 
comparison of income mobility across space and over time. However, much of the existing 
discussions are centred on estimation of mobility indices. Thus, further research is needed to be able 
to provide a theoretical framework that will serve as a practical guide for conducting statistical 
inference in the context of income mobility estimation using pseudo-panel data.  
 
9.5  Summary and Future Directions 
Measures of income mobility are commonly used in socio-economics literature as analytical 
tools for examining the evolution of the income distribution. In general, proponents of these measures 
believe that incorporating a longitudinal perspective enriches the analysis of income distribution. In 
particular, they argue that income mobility measures provide a more dynamic perspective of the 
evolution of a country’s living standards than simply examining changes in cross-sectional indices of 
poverty and inequality over time. Panel data that tracks the incomes of the same set of households or 
individuals is the appropriate data source for measuring income mobility. However, factors like cost 
and risks of attrition often lead to the use of cross-sectional data.  
Unlike panel surveys, cross-sectional surveys do not necessarily follow the same set of 
households or individuals. Recently, several pseudo-panel estimation methods have been proposed in 
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estimating different concepts of mobility. The development of pseudo-panel methods reconciles the 
need for incorporating a longitudinal perspective when examining income distribution with the 
absence or lack of panel data. In particular, it offers researchers with the opportunity to depart from 
conventional methods of examining static indicators of well-being and delve deeper into the multi-
dimensional issue of equality of socio-economic opportunities using cross-sectional survey data.   
There are several ways of creating synthetic or pseudo-panels out of repeated cross-sectional 
data. This chapter reviewed four recent developments in the pseudo-panel estimation of income 
mobility literature. The first method proposed by AM (2007) entails transforming the unit-level data 
into cohort averages. These cohort averages serve as the synthetic panels. On the other hand, the 
approaches proposed by BGK (2004), DLLM (2011) and DLLM (2014) estimates income models 
while maintaining individuals or households as the units of analysis. Originally, these methods are 
designed to answer varying concepts of mobility. In this study, I outlined algorithms which extend 
these approaches to be able to measure a wider array of income mobility indices. The results suggest 
that the proposed methods by DLLM (2011) and DLLM (2014) which employ the weakest 
assumption about the structural parameters and functional form of the income models performed 
satisfactorily in terms of estimating different mobility concepts. Nevertheless, several areas for 
improvement remain. These include exploring techniques that would accommodate time-varying 
correlates for the BGK, DLLM 1 and DLLM 2 income models, employing structural preserving 
strategies to provide better estimates of mobility indices which are sensitive to the overall structure 
of the income distribution and outlining the framework for carrying out statistical inferences.  
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Table 9.1 Estimates of Poverty Dynamics in the Philippines, 2003-2006 
AM (A) AM (B) BGK DLLM 1 (A) midpt DLLM 1 (B) DLLM 2 (A) DLLM2 (B) DLLM2 (C)
Poverty outflow 6.19 2.65 5.52 19.21 2.81 8.41 14 6.25 7.79 10.61
Poverty inflow 9.11 2.18 7.76 11.58 1.98 10.18 18.38 5.98 8.39 12.68
Stay in Poverty 35.08 39.16 33.57 22.12 25.1 33.3 41.5 30.8 35.08 37.49
Stay Non-Poor 49.62 56.02 53.15 47.09 42.52 48.12 53.72 45.92 48.73 50.27
Indicator PANEL
PSEUDO-PANEL
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006, 2009 
 
Table 9.2 Estimates of Poverty Dynamics in the Philippines, 2006-2009 
AM (A) AM (B) BGK DLLM 1 (A) midpt DLLM 1 (B) DLLM 2 (A) DLLM2 (B) DLLM2 (C)
Poverty outflow 10.49 0.85 6.92 22.84 8.9 13.36 17.82 11.43 13.03 14.61
Poverty inflow 5.93 8.39 10.95 11.31 0.38 8.42 16.46 4.33 7.32 10.39
Stay in Poverty 33.7 34.82 32.26 20.36 23.69 31.73 39.77 29.76 32.83 35.82
Stay Non-Poor 49.88 55.94 49.88 45.48 42.03 46.49 50.95 45.24 46.82 48.42
Indicator PANEL
PSEUDO-PANEL
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006, 2009 
 
Table 9.3 Estimates of Poverty Dynamics in the Philippines, 2003-2009 
AM (A) AM (B) BGK DLLM 1 (A) midpt DLLM 1 (B) DLLM2 (A) DLLM2 (B) DLLM2 (C)
Poverty outflow 10.22 1.15 1.19 20.63 7.07 11.79 16.52 10.59 12.3 13.43
Poverty inflow 8.58 7.48 7.41 11.54 0.62 8.81 16.99 5.91 9.25 11.17
Stay in Poverty 31.05 33.85 33.92 20.7 23.16 31.34 39.53 28.97 30.89 34.24
Stay Non-Poor 50.15 57.52 57.48 47.13 43.34 48.06 52.78 46.42 47.55 49.26
Indicator PANEL
PSEUDO-PANEL
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006, 2009 
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Table 9.4 Estimates of Income Mobility in the Philippines, 2003-2006 
AM (A) AM (B) BGK DLLM1 (A) midpt DLLM1 (B) DLLM2 (A) DLLM2  (B) DLLM2  (C)
Movement
Ave. Rank Jump 11.78 3.51 10.17 23.13 4.17 13.63 23.1 8.87 11.71 16.7
Fields-Ok 31.77 9.33 28.18 126.55 11.87 36.4 60.92 24.07 31.44 44.52
King 29.87 8.68 24.85 61.91 13.75 32.12 50.49 24.28 30.29 40.01
Temporal dependence
Hart 15.08 1.2 12.9 72.8 2.39 27.01 51.63 8.32 14.05 27.82
Equalizer of income 
CDW 1.61 -0.88 7.83 -32.82 -2.62 2.22 7.06 -1.44 -0.33 2.45
Fields 1.31 -0.91 8.63 -27.91 -3.46 1.91 7.27 -2.31 -1.22 1.78
Shorrocks 6.58 0.56 6.37 41.64 1.17 11.71 22.25 3.82 6.36 12.35
Indicator PANEL
PSEUDO-PANEL
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006, 2009 
 
Table 9.5 Estimates of Income Mobility in the Philippines, 2006-2009 
AM (A) AM (B) BGK DLLM1 (A) midpt DLLM1 (B) DLLM2  (A) DLLM2 (B) DLLM2 (C)
Movement
Ave. Rank Jump 11.8 4.91 13.34 24.35 4.33 14.23 24.13 10.9 14.38 17.83
Fields-Ok 31.59 17.63 35.26 142.41 19.81 40.6 61.38 31.14 38.71 46.72
King 29.63 9.88 30.1 62.05 13.39 31.52 49.65 27.45 33.89 39.84
Temporal dependence
Hart 15.27 2.27 19.66 77.81 2.4 28.88 55.36 12.35 20.81 31.41
Equalizer of income
CDW 5.43 9.57 11.5 -22.86 -0.43 4.75 9.93 1.74 3.41 5.46
Fields 5.37 9.66 11.51 -16.91 -1.08 4.93 10.93 1.22 3.1 5.45
Shorrocks 6.66 2.56 9.51 47.12 1.09 12.46 23.83 5.54 9.24 13.85
Indicator PANEL
PSEUDO-PANEL
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006, 2009 
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Table 9.6 Estimates of Income Mobility in the Philippines, 2003-2009 
AM (A) AM (B) BGK DLLM1 (A) midpt DLLM1 (B) DLLM2 (A) DLLM2 (B) DLLM2 (C)
Movement
Ave. Rank Jump 13.9 5.1 5.1 23.61 5.15 14.5 23.86 11.9 15.57 17.63
Fields-Ok 36.13 16.19 16.19 129.34 17.95 39.13 60.3 32.16 40.63 45.54
King 32.76 10.56 10.6 60.28 16 32.84 49.69 29.55 36.26 39.73
Temporal dependence
Hart 19.86 2.52 2.53 74.8 3.41 28.81 54.21 14.66 24.34 30.77
Equalizer of income
CDW 4.72 6.88 6.86 -20.91 -0.76 4.13 9.01 1.53 3.41 4.64
Fields 4.7 7.68 7.65 -18.68 -1.58 4.32 10.21 0.97 3.14 4.63
Shorrocks 8.69 2 2 44.76 1.55 12.48 23.42 6.57 10.83 13.62
Indicator PANEL
PSEUDO-PANEL
 
Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006, 2009 
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Appendix Table A9.1 Standard Error of Estimates of Poverty Dynamics, 2003-2006 
(standard deviation across iterations) 
AM (A) AM (B) BGK DLLM 1 (A) DLLM 1 (B) DLLM 2 (A) DLLM2 (B) DLLM2 (C)
Poverty outflow 0.2534 0.2286 0.2333 0.1546 0.5406 0.4751 0.5733 0.5244
Poverty inflow 0.2652 0.2669 0.2697 0.2865 0.5965 0.4719 0.5303 0.596
Stay in Poverty 0.2652 0.2669 0.2333 0.5965 0.2865 0.596 0.5303 0.4719
Stay Non-Poor 0.2534 0.2286 0.2697 0.5406 0.1546 0.5244 0.5733 0.4751
Indicator
PSEUDO-PANEL
 
           Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006, 2009 
 
Appendix Table A9.2 Standard Error of Estimates of Poverty Dynamics, 2006-2009 
(standard deviation across iterations) 
AM (A) AM (B) BGK DLLM 1 (A) DLLM 1 (B) DLLM 2 (A) DLLM2 (B) DLLM2 (C)
Poverty outflow 0.1604 0.3033 0.2629 0.5229 0.5994 0.6331 0.608 0.6562
Poverty inflow 0.4075 0.2902 0.2152 0.0856 0.6226 0.4414 0.5588 0.5147
Stay in Poverty 0.4075 0.2902 0.2629 0.6226 0.0856 0.5147 0.5588 0.4414
Stay Non-Poor 0.1604 0.3033 0.2152 0.5994 0.5229 0.6562 0.608 0.6331
Indicator
PSEUDO-PANEL
 
            Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006, 2009 
 
Appendix Table A9.3 Standard Error of Estimates of Poverty Dynamics, 2003-2009 
(standard deviation across iterations) 
AM (A) AM (B) BGK DLLM 1 (A) DLLM 1 (B) DLLM 2 (A) DLLM2 (B) DLLM2 (C)
Poverty outflow 0.2404 0.2152 0.2227 0.3586 0.6503 0.5557 0.5706 0.6197
Poverty inflow 0.3927 0.39 0.2814 0.1017 0.5658 0.4808 0.5234 0.6384
Stay in Poverty 0.3927 0.39 0.2227 0.5658 0.1017 0.6384 0.5234 0.4808
Stay Non-Poor 0.2404 0.2152 0.2814 0.6503 0.3586 0.6197 0.5706 0.5557
Indicator
PSEUDO-PANEL
 
            Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006, 2009 
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Appendix Table A9.4 Standard Error of Estimates of Income Mobility, 2003-2006 
(standard deviation across iterations) 
AM (A) AM (B) BGK DLLM1 (A) DLLM1 (B) DLLM2 (A) DLLM2  (B) DLLM2  (C)
Ave. Rank Jump 0.0644 0.0724 0.0799 0.0581 0.3343 0.1589 0.2152 0.286
Fields-Ok 0.1619 0.1336 0.3415 0.2303 0.8638 0.3897 0.4724 0.7788
King 0.201 0.1306 0.1835 0.3335 0.7313 0.6343 0.7348 0.6688
Hart 0.0371 0.1039 0.1763 0.0663 1.283 0.2561 0.4382 0.8969
CDW 0.2281 0.0832 0.553 0.2475 0.808 0.3507 0.4218 0.631
Fields 0.244 0.1072 0.4779 0.3303 0.7042 0.4582 0.5394 0.6992
Shorrocks 0.0179 0.0495 0.1085 0.0471 0.548 0.1261 0.2008 0.4104
Indicator
PSEUDO-PANEL
 
          Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006, 2009 
 
Appendix Table A9.5 Standard Error of Estimates of Income Mobility, 2006-2009 
(standard deviation across iterations) 
AM (A) AM (B) BGK DLLM1 (A) DLLM1 (B) DLLM2 (A) DLLM2  (B) DLLM2  (C)
Ave. Rank Jump 0.0777 0.1026 0.0798 0.0368 0.3356 0.1863 0.2448 0.291
Fields-Ok 0.1963 0.2119 0.2984 0.8715 0.8957 0.5402 0.5716 0.745
King 0.212 0.213 0.2366 0.289 0.7626 0.559 0.6368 0.7498
Hart 0.0694 0.2192 0.1765 0.0749 1.3768 0.3781 0.627 0.9206
CDW 0.1672 0.1226 0.6153 0.2981 1.0647 0.4849 0.6193 0.7303
Fields 0.1871 0.1401 0.497 0.3486 0.8058 0.5625 0.6505 0.6995
Shorrocks 0.0683 0.0982 0.1368 0.0344 0.5921 0.17 0.2715 0.4013
Indicator
PSEUDO-PANEL
 
          Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006, 2009 
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Appendix Table A9.6 Standard Error of Estimates of Income Mobility, 2003-2009 
(standard deviation across iterations) 
AM (A) AM (B) BGK DLLM1 (A) DLLM1 (B) DLLM2 (A) DLLM2  (B) DLLM2  (C)
Ave. Rank Jump 0.086 0.085 0.0786 0.0505 0.3344 0.2157 0.2695 0.3188
Fields-Ok 0.232 0.229 0.3121 0.5556 0.8119 0.4715 0.6141 0.7583
King 0.223 0.2143 0.2305 0.2588 0.6528 0.5806 0.6293 0.6621
Hart 0.0784 0.078 0.1695 0.0813 1.2445 0.4731 0.7185 0.9356
CDW 0.2004 0.201 0.5555 0.2296 0.7547 0.389 0.5784 0.5644
Fields 0.2442 0.243 0.5096 0.2926 0.631 0.4636 0.6451 0.6106
Shorrocks 0.0679 0.0723 0.1424 0.039 0.5633 0.2169 0.3089 0.4213
Indicator
PSEUDO-PANEL
 
     Source: Author’s computations using household expenditure per capita data from the longitudinal subsample of FIES 2003, 2006, 2009
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Chapter 10 Summary and Conclusion 
 
10.1   Introduction 
The primary objective of this study was to measure and examine income mobility in the 
Philippines using longitudinal data from the redesigned Family Income and Expenditure Survey and 
Labour Force Survey. The study highlights the importance of taking a longitudinal perspective when 
examining a country’s income distribution and going beyond cross-sectional indicators of mean 
income, poverty and inequality. One of the main advantages of examining income mobility using 
longitudinal data over the conventional cross-sectional perspective that is commonly adopted in many 
income distribution studies is that the former is able to differentiate between persistent and transient 
poor, and between those who experience stable income stream and those who have fluctuating income 
flows. Empirical evidence of these patterns provides more accurate insights for policy planning.  
 
10.2   Motivation and Research Goals  
Over the recent years, the Philippines has shown strong economic growth which even exceed 
economists’ initial growth forecasts. From 2009 to 2012, for instance, its GDP per capita grew at 
annual rate of 4.1% (WDI 2014).  Due to this apparent rosy economic performance, several major 
global international credit rating agencies awarded the country an investment grade.  As improved 
credit ratings usually translate to lower debt interest payments, experts forecast that the Philippines 
will attract more foreign investment and encourage stronger domestic consumption (ADB 2013c). 
These factors can potentially propel the country into a virtuous economic growth regime in the 
coming years, a welcome outcome for a country that has long been regarded as the “Sick Man of 
Asia” due to slow economic growth since the 1980s. However, such an outcome is not pre-ordained 
considering that average income, poverty and inequality are not improving. This could be indicative 
that the benefits of growth bypass those who are most disadvantaged. Using the longitudinal data that 
has recently become available through the country’s improved household survey system, this study 
describes income mobility patterns in the country and identifies the offsetting forces that contribute 
to trivial changes in the Philippines’s conventional income indicators despite its transition into faster 
economic growth regime over the past decade. 
The first three chapters of this study set the tone by reviewing the important analytical tools 
typically used for examining income mobility of Filipino households. The following six chapters are 
motivated by specific research questions, which have attracted a lot of interest among policymakers 
and yet have been given little attention in empirical research due to limited panel data needed to carry 
out such type of research.  
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10.3   Main Findings 
There is significant income mobility in the Philippines despite stagnant income poverty rates and 
inequality levels.  
One of the key findings of this study is that the distribution of household income in the 
Philippines is much more dynamic than what is commonly presumed due to slow poverty reduction 
and stubbornly high levels of income inequality. For instance, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, more 
than half of the household population moved into a different income quintile from 2003 to 2009. This 
implies that a simple examination of temporal trends in cross-sectional indicators of poverty and 
inequality in the Philippines will fall short in providing a comprehensive picture of how the country’s 
income distribution has evolved throughout the years.   
 
There are various offsetting forces that contribute to minimal changes in cross-sectional income 
poverty and inequality.    
The results from Chapter 4 provide evidence that for every household that experienced upward 
(absolute) income mobility of a certain magnitude, there is approximately one household that 
experienced downward income mobility of the same magnitude.  Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 
7 reveals that improvement in socio-economic capital levels seem to have been washed out by the 
deterioration of economic returns to those capitals.  
 
Filipino households have experienced widely varied income mobility trajectories, with the poor 
households experiencing slightly faster income growth rates than the rest.  
Results from Chapters 4 and 6 indicate that lower income households were more likely to 
experience faster income growth rates than the rest of the population. In particular, if Filipinos were 
classified according to their initial household incomes, Chapter 6 demonstrates that lower income 
households were more likely to experience consecutive episodes of upward income mobility while 
middle income households were more likely to register slower income movements. Higher income 
households experienced the most erratic income mobility trajectories. Although these mobility 
patterns portray convergence of income and relatively pro-poor growth, temporal income fluctuations 
partially drive this result. In particular, when households are classified according to longitudinally-
averaged income instead of their initial incomes, evidence of income convergence becomes weak.  
 
Majority of poor Filipinos are persistently disadvantaged but economic vulnerability also 
exacerbates the country’s problem on poverty.  
Although there is evidence that lower income households observed faster income growth, 
Chapter 5 shows that poverty in the Philippines is still mostly characterized by long episodes of 
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income shortfall below the poverty line. Furthermore, a significant fraction of the Filipinos who are 
not persistently poor are economically vulnerable and are at risk of falling into poverty from time to 
time.  For instance, about 10% to 15% of the non-poor households (based on the US$2/day poverty 
line) in a specific year transitioned into poverty in the succeeding survey period. Furthermore, the 
proportion of the poor who are in transient poverty increases as the poverty line decreases or as the 
poverty measure becomes more sensitive to the illfare of the poorest of the poor.  
 
The quality of employment plays key role in facilitating a positive income mobility regime.  
The statistical models used in this study identify employment to be one of the most important 
correlates of income mobility. Results from Chapters 5 to 8 highlight that holding good jobs 
minimizes the risk of falling into long episodes of poverty while transition into better jobs increases 
the odds of upward income mobility.  
 
Pseudo-panel estimation provides an alternative tool for examining welfare dynamics in the 
absence of panel data.  
Examining welfare dynamics in developing countries is often constrained by the lack of suitable 
panel data that track the living standards of people over time. The pseudo-panel estimation approach 
discussed in Chapter 9 which use repeated cross-sectional data to impute income trajectories can be 
considered as a welcome addition to the modern methods of mobility analysis.  
10.4   Broad Policy Implications 
The findings underscore the need for more effective policies that will facilitate more sustainable 
gains in poverty reduction and equitable distribution of socio-economic opportunities created by 
economic growth. There is no one-size-fits-all policy that can be implemented to meet this objective. 
In a country like the Philippines where the economic growth is not distributionally-neutral, the focus 
should be on finding ways to make growth more responsive to poverty reduction and equally 
distributed socio-economic opportunities.  
There are several channels through which growth can be more inclusive for the persistently 
poor and more sustainable for those who periodically move into and out of economic hardships. To 
achieve a pro-poor growth, changes in the socio-demographic structure of the Philippines need to be 
examined to ensure that economic returns to higher skills will not deteriorate. In other words, as the 
country invests in socio-economic capital development, such an initiative has to be buttressed by an 
effective management of the economic returns to these forms of capital. This study also finds that 
employment plays a key role in driving household income distribution outcomes. Worryingly, 
unemployment rate in the Philippines remains high at 7 percent. In addition to the need to generate 
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more jobs, the country also confronts the challenge of ensuring that these will be productive and 
good-quality jobs. In addition, since poverty is still very much an agricultural phenomenon, creating 
more jobs in the non-agriculture sector where labour productivity is much higher could have the 
enabling capacity of reducing poverty rates. However, this is easier said than done. I have mentioned 
in Chapter 8 that if the current labour market trends continue, economists from ILO forecast that 
employment-to-population ratio in the Philippines will decrease by 0.1 percentage point between 
2010 and 2015 while labour productivity is expected to drop by 1.1 percentage point over the same 
period. This is likely to lead to minimal changes in poverty rates in the coming years unless the 
bottlenecks toward the creation of more vibrant employment opportunities can be addressed so that 
poor people are able to use labour as a vehicle out of economic dearth.  
Since living conditions in developing countries are usually plagued by socio-economic risk, the 
role of income shocks in the evolution of the household income distribution should also be 
underscored. My findings that income shocks in the country have a poverty-increasing effect from 
2003 to 2009 may be a cause of concern. Given that access to adequate insurance and social protection 
coverage facilitates effective management of risks and their negative consequences for income 
distribution outcomes, it is important to ensure that social protection systems are working. However, 
studies suggest that while the Philippine government has a wide range of programs offering social 
safety nets especially to the poor and the vulnerable segments of the population, most of these 
programs are fragmented and thus, do not provide sustainable protection from socio-economic risks. 
If left unaddressed, income shocks may continue to have debilitating effects on the poor. This prompts 
the need to evaluate the effectiveness of existing social protection infrastructure in the country.  
10.5   Limitations and Future Directions 
This study has advanced the existing socio-economic development literature in the Philippines 
by providing a benchmark for examining income mobility. However, it has a number of limitations 
that are also worth pointing out. First, income mobility is not a perfect measure of equality of socio-
economic opportunities. For instance, this study showed that mobility can be inflated by transitory 
income fluctuations and thus, it will not be safe to assume that higher levels of mobility are always 
desirable. The existing literature has proposed a number of alternative measures of equality of 
opportunities, some of which are based on calculating the income growth rates with a declining 
weight on growth amongst the rich (Palmisano & Peragine 2014). Future research can explore how 
these alternative measures fare relative to the mobility measures discussed in this study. Second, well-
being is measured mainly in terms of household expenditure per capita. Since the 1970s, there has 
been a lot of contention on how well-being should be measured. One of the commonly used 
alternatives to expenditure is income (or earnings). Chapters 1 and 3 have discussed the advantages 
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and disadvantages of using one over the other and identified this study’s motivation for using 
consumption expenditure. Nevertheless, I have carried out robustness analysis using income rather 
than expenditure data. What I find from these robustness checks is that there are slightly higher levels 
of mobility when income is used instead of expenditure. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
temporal distribution of income is less stable than expenditure. All other results are qualitatively 
similar. What I have not done in this thesis, however, is to probe beyond the income dimension and 
look at non-monetary measures of well-being. Over the recent years, there has been increasing 
recognition that understanding living standards and well-being requires shifting the focus of inquiry 
from one-dimensional income-based poverty measures to multidimensional poverty measures that 
tap other important life domains. This approach emerged from the paradigm on social exclusion and 
deprivation proposed by Townsend (1979) and Sen’s notion of functioning and capabilities (Sen 
1985). However, much of the empirical application of this framework has focused on data from 
developed countries. Some of the results emerging from these studies suggest that there is a relatively 
low degree of overlap between income poverty and multidimensional poverty. If income poverty is 
not necessarily the same as multidimensional poverty, this difference should affect how poverty-
reduction programs are designed. Whether the same pattern holds true in the context of developing 
countries like the Philippines is a promising avenue for future studies. This can be done if we improve 
the existing data collection systems in developing countries to incorporate not only a longitudinal 
perspective but also shift from the conventional income-based measures to more holistic and more 
direct measures of living standards. In the case of the Philippines, combining the data from the Annual 
Poverty Indicators Survey which collects information about non-monetary measures of well-being 
with the FIES-LFS data could be explored, although much care should be taken to ensure the 
comparability of data between these surveys.  
Furthermore, to be able to advance research about poverty and disadvantage, it is important to 
collect more contextually relevant indicators. For instance, there are some studies from developed 
countries following a life-course perspective which find that the relationship between disadvantage 
and social status is becoming weaker while life course events are becoming more important 
determinants of socio-economic pathways. To be able to determine how life course events shape the 
poverty risks of people in the context of developing countries, we need to start collecting such data. 
The third potential limitation of this study is the limited number of time points used in the 
analyses. Nationwide panel data is scarcely available in the Philippines. Some longitudinal studies 
which have significantly longer observation periods cover only limited areas. Since I worked with 
limited time points, there has been a preference to use relatively simple approaches, particularly when 
estimating the mobility of permanent and transitory income. Nevertheless, in most of my analyses, I 
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examined the robustness of the results to chosen methodologies and measurement parameters up to 
the extent that could be afforded using the available data.  
The fourth potential limitation relates to how I addressed the issue of non-coverage bias when 
working with the panel subsample of FIES-LFS. As explained in Chapter 3, I reweighted the panel 
subsample to make it comparable with the cross-sectional sample. While the resulting average 
income, poverty and inequality rates are comparable to that of the full cross-sectional sample, the 
standard errors are also slightly inflated not only because of the smaller sample sizes but also due to 
the use of additional survey weight adjustments. Thus, when comparing groups with respect to some 
key characteristics of interest, larger differences are needed to be able to detect significant findings.  
The fifth limitation is that most of the mobility estimates are presented at the national and broad 
regional levels only. This approach is mainly dictated by the sample size limitations. There is a need 
for future studies to provide a more disaggregated set of mobility estimates especially on poverty 
dynamics as a number of previous studies have highlighted the significant spatial variations in the 
Philippines in terms of socio-economic development. Perhaps, a better approach is to present mobility 
estimates at the administrative level (e.g., village, municipal or provincial levels), which local 
government units could use as inputs for policy planning. However, this would require the use of 
other computationally-intensive statistical techniques such as small area estimation which is beyond 
the scope of this study.   
Sixth, there is only limited discussion in the thesis on how the mobility estimates for the 
Philippines can be viewed in an international comparative context. If the country is to be the next 
Asian Tiger, it is important to gauge where the Philippines stands in terms of the socio-economic 
mobility relative to other strong candidates within Developing Asia.  This analysis is reserved for 
future research.  
Finally, this study is neither a full account of the economic history of the Philippines over the 
past decade nor a comprehensive diagnostic or prescriptive examination of what went wrong and 
what has to be done for rapid economic growth to translate into significant poverty reduction and 
equitable distribution of opportunities. It is an initial study to investigate the usefulness of utilising 
longitudinal data and provide a benchmark for future. In addition, the attempt to showcase the 
usefulness of taking a longitudinal perspective when examining a broad range of topics about the 
income distribution may have led to a less detailed discussion of the policy implications of the results.   
In summary, the Philippines has made a substantial progress in accelerating economic growth 
over the past decade. However, it seems to be failing short in achieving some of the goals set forth in 
the MDGs, particularly in reducing poverty. For instance, in 1991, about 30% of the country’s 
population lived with less than $1.25 a day and the proportion dropped to 18% in 2009 which is still 
3 percentage points less than the 2015 MDG target of 15%. Although it is possible that the Philippines 
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will hit the target just in time based on the trends observed over the past ten years, many of its 
neighbouring countries with similar or even slower pace of economic growth have attained their 
respective poverty targets much earlier (UNDP 2013). This is indicative that there is ample room for 
improvement for the country’s poverty reduction efforts. As we start tackling how to address this 
“unfinished agenda” and reflect on how we should move forward after 2015, it is hoped that this study 
will bring to the attention of researchers, policymakers and other key stakeholders the need to invest 
in the collection and statistical analysis of appropriate indicators that would allow a more dynamic 
examination of people’s well-being over time. This is the first step in identifying intervention policies 
that could improve the living standards of those who remain extremely poor, minimize the 
vulnerability of the transiently poor and ensure that the benefits of economic growth are accessible 
for everyone.  
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